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ABSTRACT 
Currently, a great schism exists in the way that the law of financial provision treats cohabiting 
and married couples on relationship breakdown. Given that research consistently 
demonstrates that women are predominantly responsible for carrying out homemaking 
activities regardless of employment status, at the heart of this divide is the way that the law 
attributes value to this traditionally female role. In the married context, on divorce, 
breadwinning and homemaking contributions have equal value, yet in the cohabitation context 
only financial contributions are recognised, with homemaking having no value attributed to it. 
This polarised approach has received extensive criticism from the courts, the legal profession 
and the academic community, both for overvaluing domestic contributions in the married 
context and for ignoring or at best undervaluing them in the cohabitation context. Yet, despite 
the agreement over the inadequacies in this area, there is a lack of consensus over the 
direction that reform should take, and so far attempts have been slow and have often come to 
nothing, especially in the cohabitation context. Furthermore, feminist opinion is divided about 
whether financial recognition of domestic contributions in family law poses a threat to the 
financial autonomy of women, encouraging patriarchal financial dependence; or whether such 
developments redress a glaring inequality inherent in gendered roles freely chosen within the 
family.  
Consequently, this project uses the two very differing feminist positions of Ruth Deech and 
Martha Fineman who embody this divide as the lens through which to explore this 
dichotomous tension underlying the law in this area. To test out these two feminist stances, 
this project uses a range of doctrinal, feminist and empirical methodology, namely interviews 
with legal practitioners, to compare the approaches in New Zealand, Scotland and Queensland, 
Australia alongside England and Wales, where each jurisdiction differentially reflects a point on 
a spectrum between Deech and Fineman’s contrasting positions. This project also uses focus 
groups with members of the public in England and Wales to ascertain the affected 
communities’ views on these models of financial provision. Drawing on these results, this 
thesis shall consider how the law of financial provision in England and Wales should divide 
assets on relationship breakdown in the marriage, civil partnership and the same- and 
different-sex cohabiting context. Should it promote financial autonomy or should it offer 
greater protection to those who lead gendered lives in the private sphere?  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
…the English statute [the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973], in its fundamental provisions…is 
in…need of modernisation in the light of social and other changes as well as in the light of 
experience. 
There is a limitation on the resources of even the judges of the House of Lords to conduct 
wide-ranging comparative studies as a prelude to establishing a new principle, or perhaps 
to abandoning an existing principle in what is essentially a social policy field…  
 
Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 [121 – 122] (Postscript, per Sir Mark 
Potter) 
 
Financial provision on relationship breakdown in England and Wales is in need of reform. The 
calls for change come from a vast range of bodies including the courts,2 legal practitioners,3 
independent public bodies4 and academic communities.5 This criticism extends to both the 
married context (and where the same provisions have been extended to civil partners) as well 
as the unmarried cohabiting context. 
Currently, the law categorises contributions in relationships as financial and non-financial (or 
domestic), which gives rise to many issues on partnership breakdown: financial contributions 
are much more straightforward to quantify than the non-financial ones. Consequently, a 
central focus for criticisms in this area has been gender, given that this area raises questions 
concerning the public regulation of the private sphere, and research has consistently 
demonstrated that women are most typically responsible for contributions associated within 
this sphere. Even when both partners are in employment, the division of paid and unpaid work 
carried out within households remains gendered, with women rather than men making the 
most of the unpaid domestic contributions of caring for children, household chores and the 
organisation and running of the family home.6 Consequently, the fundamental question 
concerns how much financial recognition should be given to domestic contributions when 
                                                          
1 This thesis reviews the Law as it is up until the 16th April 2012. Any subsequent changes have not been included in the main text 
although, where relevant, important changes after this date have been mentioned in footnotes. 
2 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 
3 For example Resolution. See Resolution ‘Campaigns’ <http://www.resolution.org.uk/campaigns/> accessed 4 December 2011 
4 E.g. The Money and Property Committee (Family Justice Council) Annual Report 2006-2007 Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.4 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/E6732066-A7F2-485C-A5C3-738DA0588909/0/fjcreport200607.pdf> accessed  1 
December 2011 
5 See the below sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 to see the calls for reform from the academic communities in the married, 
cohabiting and same-sex context. 
6 R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, 
M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52; R Breen and L Cooke, 
‘The Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour’ (2005) 21(1) European Sociological Review 43 
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relationships break down. How far should the law value those contributions made within the 
private sphere? 
In England and Wales, domestic contributions are treated in fundamentally different ways in 
different relationship contexts. In the marriage context, White v White (2000)7 introduced a 
principle of fairness establishing a principle of non-discrimination so that breadwinner and 
homemaker contributions are valued equally when deciding how to divide assets on divorce. 
Yet, despite a sharp increase in the numbers of those cohabiting in England and Wales since 
the 1970s while the number of those marrying has declined,8 no such principle applies in the 
cohabitation context. Rather, Property Law applies and domestic contributions are ignored.9 
For Eekelaar,10 differential treatment between cohabitants and married couples seems to 
implicitly presuppose a difference in behaviour. The principle of fairness on divorce provides 
for and even encourages11 a gendered homemaker/breadwinner split in relationship roles. Yet, 
in the cohabitation context, the Law’s abstention which provides little or no support for 
cohabiting couples infers a social norm which assumes financial independence and thus 
implies that gender equality already prevails.12  
These different approaches have been criticised heavily. In the married context, some 
commentators such as Deech13 suggest that domestic contributions are overvalued in the 
divorce context, leaving marriage exposed to gold-diggers. The Law’s presumption that there 
will be a homemaker/breadwinner divide ignores the increase in the number of women in the 
labour force.14 Deech’s fundamental criticism of this approach is that it will encourage women 
to continue to adopt the homemaker role.15 Consequently, as Barlow suggests, this non-
discrimination principle may have been a reform more suitable for the 1970s.16 Similarly, Sir 
Mark Potter in his postscript in Charman v Charman17 questioned whether the huge 
settlements that are possible on divorce were ‘desirable’, and suggested that the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 is ‘in need of modernisation in the light of social and other changes.’ This 
                                                          
7 White  v White [2000] UKHL 54, [2001] 1 AC 596 [24] (Lord Nicholls) 
8 E Beaujouan and M Bhrolchain, ‘Cohabitation and Marriage in Britain Since the 1970s’ 145(3) Population Trends (ONS 2011) 19-
20; J Haskey, ‘Cohabitation in Great Britain: Past, Present and Future Trends and Attitudes’ (2001) 103 Population Trends 4, 11-12 
9 For example, see the discussion in A Lawson, ‘The Things We Do for Love: Detrimental Reliance in the Family Home’ (1996) 16 
Legal Studies 218; J Miles, ‘Property Law v. Family Law: Resolving the Problems of Property Law’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies 624 
10 J Eekelaar, ‘Uncovering Social Obligations: Family Law and the Responsible System’ in M MacLean (eds), Making Law for Families 
(Hart 2000) 16 
11 Some argue that in effect it makes it financially better for the woman to be the homemaker. See, for example, N Francis, ‘If it’s 
Broken – Fix It’ (2006) 36 Family Law 104, 107 
12 J Eekelaar, ‘Uncovering Social Obligations: Family Law and the Responsible System’ in M MacLean (eds), Making Law for Families 
(Hart 2000) 16 
13 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229 
14 See below at section 1.2 
15 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229 
16 A Barlow, ‘Configuration(s) of Unpaid Caregiving within Current Legal Discourse in and around the Family' (2007) 58(3) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 251, 260 
17 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 
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modernisation is especially necessary given that the predominant origins of assets in big 
money cases has shifted from inheritance to a ‘new financial era dominated by hedge-funds, 
private equity funds, derivative traders and sophisticated off-shore structures mean[ing] that 
very large fortunes were being made very quickly.’18 Thus, there is a call for a comprehensive 
review of the law and the Family Justice Council in 2007 requested the Law Commission to 
consider reform in this area.19 The Law Commission has also recently recognised the need to 
re-examine this area of Family Law and has expanded the scope of its current project from 
‘Marital Property Agreements’20 to ‘Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements’.21 Initially, 
the Law Commission (post Radmacher v Granatino22 which gave greater weight to pre-nuptial 
agreements) was considering a scheme for binding pre-nuptial agreements. However, the Law 
Commission recognised that the questions being raised in relation to these agreements could 
only be fully answered through a greater consideration of what ‘needs’ means in ancillary 
relief.23 Now, the project is also considering the definition of matrimonial and non-matrimonial 
property and how far ‘one party should be required to meet the other's needs after the 
relationship has ended.’24 Thus, the Law Commission’s focus is now centred on the heart of the 
approach in the divorce context.  
In complete contrast, the Law is also criticised for ignoring, or at best undervaluing, domestic 
contributions in the cohabitation context,25 given that research shows the division of paid and 
unpaid work undertaken for the household reflects that of married couples.26 Consequently, 
the fear is that in fact the current law discriminates against the traditionally female 
homemaker ignoring ‘home-making and parental contributions’.27 Yet progress is slow; 
attempts at reform from the Law Commission and also Lord Lester’s Cohabitation Bill 2009 
                                                          
18 Sir Mark Potter concluded was the result of the removal of exchange control restrictions in 1979. Charman v Charman (No. 4) 
[2007] 1 FLR 1246 [116] (Sir Mark Potter).  
19 The Money and Property Sub-Committee of the Family Justice Council agreed to approach the Law Commission with the request 
that the reform of s 25 be included in its future work programme. The Money and Property Committee (Family Justice Council) 
Annual Report 2006-2007 Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.4 <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/E6732066-A7F2-485C-A5C3-
738DA0588909/0/fjcreport200607.pdf> accessed 1 December 2011 
20 Law Commission, Matrimonial Property Agreement (Law Com CP No 198 2011) 
21 Law Commission, Press Release Clarifying the Law on Financial Provision for Couples when Relationships End 
(The Law Commission, 6 February 2012) <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/news/Press_notice_financial_provision.htm> 
accessed 5 May 2012 
22 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 
23 E Cooke, ‘Pre-nups and beyond: what is the Law Commission up to Now?’ (2012) 42(3) Family Law 323, 323 
24 Law Commission, Press Release Clarifying the Law on Financial Provision for Couples when Relationships End 
(The Law Commission, 6 February 2012) <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/news/Press_notice_financial_provision.htm 
accessed 5 May 2012> 
25 A Barlow, ‘Configuration(s) of Unpaid Caregiving within Current Legal Discourse in and around the Family' (2007) 58(3) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 251, 260 
26 A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, Cohabitation, Marriage and the Law: Social Change and Legal Reform in 21st Century 
Britain (Hart 2005) 91 - 93 
27 R Bailey-Harris, ‘Law and the Unmarried Couple – Oppression or Liberation?’ (1996) 8 Child and Family Law Quarterly 137, 139 
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have come to nothing and the government has made it clear that cohabitation reform is not on 
their current agenda.28 
Consequently, Family Law in the 21st Century and the area of financial provision on relationship 
breakdown can be seen to be in crisis. Therefore, there is a great need for reform in both the 
married and cohabiting contexts, with particular attention needed on how the law should 
value domestic contributions. As Glennon argues: 
…there is a clear need to combine the debates on married and unmarried couples as 
they raise mutual questions concerning obligations within domestic relationships of 
varying duration and circumstance and, as such, they should be considered as 
integrated policy issues.29  
 
Yet, there lacks a consensus over the shape that subsequent reform should take and feminist 
opinion is itself divided about whether the developments in the married context are a threat 
to the financial autonomy of women,30 encouraging patriarchal financial dependence; or 
whether such developments have redressed a glaring inequality inherent in gendered roles 
freely chosen within the family.31 Thus, at the heart of this debate is the public/private 
dichotomy which can be seen to reflect the delicate balance between autonomy and 
protection; should the law remain out of the private sphere, ignoring domestic contributions 
and thereby promoting the financial autonomy of women through the public sphere? Or 
should there be greater public regulation in the private sphere valuing domestic contributions 
within relationships and thereby affording greater protection for women who assume the 
homemaker role?32 
 
Given the context set out above, it seems that future reform requires consideration of the 
appropriateness of greater recognition of non-financial domestic contributions in the 
cohabitation context; a clearer understanding of how domestic contributions are being valued 
on divorce, and guidance on whether this should or should not extend to the same-sex 
context. The aim of this project is therefore to examine how the law might in future better 
address the valuation of domestic contributions, in order to consider these calls for reform and 
to provide further evidence for policy makers in this area when addressing reform.  
                                                          
28 Jonathan Djanogly, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice, Written Ministerial Statement, 6 September 
2011 
29 L Glennon, ‘Obligations between Adult Partners: Moving from Form to Function?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law Policy 
and the Family 22, 44 
30 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229 
31 A Diduck, ‘Fairness and Justice for All? The House of Lords in White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981’ (2001) 9(2) Feminist Legal Studies 
174, 180 - 182; R Bailey-Harris, ‘The Paradoxes of Principle and Pragmatism: Ancillary Relief in England and Wales’ (2005) 19 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 229, 231 
32 This debate is explored in more detail in Chapter 2 
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To consider how the law should develop in the modern context, this thesis takes a feminist 
approach as this is undoubtedly a women’s issue. While doing so, this thesis will use the 
public/private divide identified in feminist legal theory as a starting point to determine how far 
the law should regulate the private sphere. To see if a compromise can be reached between 
the approaches which divide feminists on this issue; this thesis uses (heuristically) the 
polarised feminist perspectives of Ruth Deech and Martha Fineman. These two commentators 
embody the dichotomy in this feminist debate and therefore they shall be used as lenses 
through which the subject matter of this thesis shall be analysed. For Deech, the law should 
promote autonomy, stay out of the private sphere and give no value to domestic 
contributions; to attach a value to the traditional ‘female role’ would retard the emancipation 
of women. Furthermore, in the cohabitation context, Deech argues that the law should 
recognise that cohabitants have chosen to avoid legal regulation by not marrying and 
therefore we should allow ‘a corner of freedom where couples may escape Family Law with all 
its difficulties.’33 In direct contrast with Deech, Fineman argues that the law should protect 
those within the private sphere and in particular, protect the Mother/Child care-dyad and 
other forms of care-giving relationships by protecting those who are economically dependent 
as a result of being a carer. For her, the care-giving relationship, and therefore domestic 
contributions, should be central to the legal framework and this should be irrespective of the 
relationship status.34 This thesis aims to examine these theoretical positions in practice to see 
whether a balance can be achieved between the two and to propose a suitable line for reform. 
To test out these stances, this project compares the approaches in New Zealand, Scotland and 
Australia alongside England and Wales, which differentially reflect the positions between 
Deech and Fineman’s positions. These jurisdictions each have legislation that requires the 
courts to take account of domestic contributions and each has different formulations of 
approach, resolving these issues in distinctive ways. New Zealand most closely resembles 
Deech’s approach, emphasising autonomy and clean break; Scotland also embraces Deech’s 
approach but to a lesser degree, recognising economic disadvantages; Australia’s welfare 
based system is much closer to Fineman’s position; and finally England and Wales, which is 
inherently needs-based in terms of its bottom line, embraces Fineman to the greatest 
degree.35 Consequently, this thesis shall use Deech and Fineman’s positions as heuristic 
devices to evaluate these different jurisdictional approaches and also to provide insight into 
                                                          
33 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 43 
34 M Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge 1995) 
35 See Chapter 2 for greater expansion. 
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reform considerations through the comparative doctrinal analysis, as called for by Sir Mark 
Potter in Charman v Charman above.36  
In addition, empirical methods are used to provide a holistic examination of these perspectives 
in practice. This project uses structured interviews with lawyers practising in the four 
jurisdictions to ascertain their perspectives on the effectiveness of their respective schemes. 
Additionally, the empirical stage of this project asks the essential question of how well each 
approach might serve families in England and Wales by carrying out focus groups with 
purposively selected members of the public in this jurisdiction to see how these different 
formulations of domestic contributions might be received by the affected community. 
Accordingly, this holistic examination provides a three-dimensional depiction of how the law in 
each jurisdiction works in practice, allowing the attitudes, thoughts and perceptions of the 
lawyers to build a thorough picture of how these different jurisdictions, embodying different 
feminist positions, operate in reality.37  Furthermore, the doctrinal and empirical methodology 
gives these feminist positions a practical framework of effect and will provide an opportunity 
to consider how the law of financial provision on relationship breakdown in England and Wales 
could and should be valuing domestic contributions in the 21st Century.  
The rest of this chapter outlines the demographic changes of the family in England and Wales 
and considers how well the current law of financial provision fits these changes for married 
and cohabiting couples. The next chapter shall set out the methodology used in this project 
and Chapters 3 to 6 shall in turn focus on the findings from each individual jurisdiction 
(Chapter 3, New Zealand; Chapter 4, Scotland; Chapter 5, Australia; and Chapter 6. England 
and Wales). Chapter 7 outlines the findings from the focus groups which test the general 
public’s reactions (in England and Wales) to these different approaches. Finally, Chapter 8 
presents the conclusions from this study.  
1.2 The Changing Family in England and Wales? 
As McRae suggests,38 while there has been considerable change in the structure of families, 
there is also a great level of continuity that still exists in British households. The change that 
McRae refers to is evident: in the last half of the twentieth century the normative family, its 
traditions and practices have undergone a dramatic transformation. Scott refers to this as 
                                                          
36 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 [121 – 122] (Postscript, per Sir Mark Potter) 
37 M Israel and I Hay, ‘Good Ethical Practice in Empirical Research on Law’ (UK Centre For Legal Education), Flinders University, 
Adelaide, Australia , <www.ukcle.ac.uk/resources/israel_and_hay.html. accessed 21 November 2009 
38 S McRae, Changing Britain: Families and Households in the 1990s (Oxford University Press 1999) 26 - 28 
29 
 
being a ‘second demographic revolution’.39 Once ‘family’ was defined by form, a marriage-
centric notion based on relationship status and characterised by the patriarchal structure of 
male breadwinner and the female homemaker.40 Thus, the roles adopted within the family 
were institutionalised through marriage and were gendered with women largely separated 
from the public sphere and confined to the private sphere.  
However, this institutional and form-based view of the family has shifted from relationship 
form to function (looking at what families do instead of what form they take41). Marriage is no 
longer the primary family arrangement; marriage rates have decreased in England and Wales 
and are at an all-time low42 while divorce rates have almost doubled since 1971.43 Meanwhile, 
there has been an increase in different types of non-traditional families such as lone 
parenthood, cohabitation and same-sex couples. The Office of National Statistics estimated in 
2007 that there were around 4.5 million cohabiting couples in the UK (73% of whom have 
never married before).44 They predicted that this would continue to rise particularly for adults 
over 30 years of age45 and Haskey (2001) predicted that one in four couples living together by 
2031 would be cohabiting.46 Furthermore, there are over three million one-parent families and 
1.8 million cohabiting couples with dependent children.47 While these new-style families have 
become permanent fixtures of the social fabric, evidence suggests that other relationship 
structures are emerging such as those ‘living apart together’.48 
Opinions towards family have also changed; attitudes on sex before marriage are less 
traditional49 and only 18% of respondents in 2006 viewed homosexuality to be wrong 
compared to 24% in 1996.50 Heterosexual cohabitation outside marriage is receiving increased 
social recognition51 not just at a national level, but in the western world more generally.52 
                                                          
39 J Scott, ‘Family and Gender Roles: How Attitudes are Changing’ International Conference on Family Relations (GeNet. Working 
Paper No.21 University of Valencia, Spain 2006) 3 
40 N Smelser, ‘The Victorian Family’ in P Laslett (ed) Families in Britain (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1982)  
41 J Eekelaar and M Maclean, ‘Marriage and the Moral Bases of Personal Relationships’ (2004) 31 (4) Journal of Law and Society 
510, 537 - 8 
42 E Beaujouan and M Bhrolchain, ‘Cohabitation and Marriage in Britain Since the 1970s’ 145(3) Population Trends (ONS 2011) 19 - 
20 
43 E McLaren, ‘Divorce in England and Wales, 2010’ Statistical Bulletin (ONS 08 December 2011) 1 
44 B Wilson, ‘Estimating the Cohabitation Population’ Population Trends (ONS 2009) 21, 21 
45 B Wilson, ‘Estimating the Cohabitation Population’ Population Trends (ONS 2009) 21, 136 
46 J Haskey, ‘Cohabitation in Great Britain: Past, Present and Future Trends and Attitudes’ (2001) 103 Population Trends 4, 11 - 12 
47 J Jeffries ,‘Families and Households 2001 – 2010’ (2011) Statistics Bulletin (ONS 2011) 1 
48 Duncan and Philips in 2006 found nine per cent of respondents to the nationally representative British Social Attitudes survey 
classified themselves in such intimate but non-co-residential relationships. S Duncan and M Phillips, ‘New Families? Tradition and 
Change in Modern Relationships’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: 
the 24th Report (Sage 2008) 14 - 16 
49 S Duncan and M Phillips, ‘New Families? Tradition and Change in Modern Relationships’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M 
Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage 2008) 4 
50 S Duncan and M Phillips ‘New Families? Tradition and Change in Modern Relationships’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M 
Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage 2008) 18 
51 A Barlow and G James, ‘Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain’ (2004) 67(2) Modern Law Review 143 
52 K Kiernan, ‘The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe’ 15 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 1 
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Furthermore, evidence is showing that people believe cohabitation and marriage to be socially 
similar.53 
This move away from the ‘imposed normative order’ of marriage54  seems to be attributable to 
a decrease in religious adherence and collectivism, and instead, a ‘new important place of the 
individual in society and by extension, in families’55 has developed. Individualism emphasises a 
growth in values such as independence or autonomy and, in the family context, a way of self-
defining intimate relations. Consequently, Giddens argues that people now enter ‘pure 
relationships’ for their own sake lasting for ‘as long as it is thought by both parties to deliver 
enough satisfactions for each individual to stay within it.’56 Furthermore, for Giddens, romantic 
love has been replaced with an ‘active and contingent love’57 which ‘develops only to the 
degree to which intimacy does.’58 For some, this expansion allows for greater autonomy and 
negotiation between family members moving away from the patriarchal subordinating 
structure that the traditional family imposed,59 as these new family forms are based on 
negotiation and fluidity.60 For others, however, this development away from the traditional 
family is viewed in a negative light as dysfunctional, unstable and therefore seen to be a rise in 
the ‘broken family’.61 Baroness Young described it as the ‘self-first disease which is debasing 
our society’.62 The fundamental question is whether or not new emerging family forms should 
be normalised by adopting a new form of regulation, or whether we should try and force a 
traditional model onto them.63 
Crucial to this question is the recognition that gender roles within society have changed 
radically in many ways. A greater number of women are in the labour market, with 65.4% of 
women employed either full-time or part-time64 and now 13.52 million women are in 
employment in comparison to 15.54 million men, the smallest gap in employment yet.65 
Perceptions have also changed, and Duncan and Phillips indicated that there has been a 
reduction in those who agree that a ‘man’s job is breadwinning, a woman’s job is 
                                                          
53 J Lewis, The End of Marriage?: Individualism and Intimate Relations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2001) Chapter 6, 123; S Duncan, 
and M Phillips, ‘New Families? Tradition and Change in Modern Relationships’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M Philips, M 
Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage 2008), 5 - 8 
54 C Smart and B Neale, Family Fragments (Blackwell 1999) 8 
55 A Diduck, Law’s Families (Lexis Nexis 2003) 2 
56 A Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love & Eroticision in Modern Societies (Polity Press 1995) 58 
57 A Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love & Eroticision in Modern Societies (Polity Press 1995) 5 
58 A Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love & Eroticision in Modern Societies (Polity Press 1995) 62 
59 J Lewis, The End of Marriage?: Individualism and Intimate Relations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2001) 21 – 22; V Elizabeth, 
‘Cohabitation, Marriage and the unruly consequence of Difference’ (2000) 14 (1) Gender Studies 87, 88 
60 A Diduck, Law’s Families (Lexis Nexis 2003) 25 - 26 
61 Rt Hon Ian Duncan Smith, Breakdown Britain 2008 (Conservatives in Social Justice Policy Group 2007) 1 
62 J Lewis, The End of Marriage? : Individualism and Intimate Relations (Edward Elgar 2001) 11 
63 C Smart, The Ties that Bind (Routledge 1984) 
64 R Clegg and N Palmer, ‘Labour Market Statistics, November 2011’ Statistical Bulletin (ONS November 2011) 4 
65 R Clegg and N Palmer, ‘Labour Market Statistics, November 2011’ Statistical Bulletin (ONS November 2011) 4 
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homemaking/care-giving’ from 29% in 1989 to 16% in 2006.66 Similarly, only 35% agreed that 
‘a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’ compared with 47.5% in 1989. 
For Giddens, women are the most extensive example of individualisation, and he argues that 
women have been successful in their claims for autonomy, equality and sexual emancipation,67 
and have also become more financially independent. 
Nevertheless, as McRae infers,68 there is still a great level of continuity in place. While the 
traditional family has lost its form, ‘families of choice’ (family arrangements alternative to the 
traditional family such as cohabitation and same-sex relationship) ‘seek values commonly 
associated with the traditional ideal of the family – a sense of involvement, security and 
continuity.’69 Further similarities can be seen in the ever present imbalance between the 
genders and their interaction within the public/private sphere. Women are predominantly 
earning much less, with a gender pay gap of 10.2% in 2010,70 and their median weekly earnings 
average is around 17% lower than men’s.71 Furthermore, women are more likely to be part-
time workers, and this has been attributed to child-care influencing the employment patterns 
of mothers.72 However, despite predictions that women’s increased participation in the 
workforce would be matched by an increase in the number of hours spent on domestic labour 
by men,73 this has not yet materialised. Consequently, women still make the majority of unpaid 
domestic contributions.74 In fact, it seems that although attitudes may be more 
accommodating for women who work, it is still perceived that it is women’s natural role to 
complete household tasks, and Scott contends that changes in attitudes to family behaviour 
and values are therefore not so revolutionary. 75 Moreover, where women are in control of 
financial expenditures, they are more likely than men to spend their income on family and 
                                                          
66 R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K 
Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52, 54 
67 A Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love & Eroticision in Modern Societies (Polity Press 1995) 6 
68 S McRae, Changing Britain: Families and Households in the 1990s (Oxford University Press 1999) 26 - 28 
69 S McRae, Changing Britain: Families and Households in the 1990s (Oxford University Press 1999) 25 
70 Annual Survey on Hours and Earnings (Based on SOC 2010)’ (2012) Statistical Bulletin (ONS 2012) 1 
71 Men were recorded as earning £538 on average per week compared with £440 for women. M Williams ‘2011 Annual Survey on 
Hours and Earnings (Based on SOC 2010)’ (2012) Statistical Bulletin (ONS 2012) 1 
72 5.84 million women are in part-time work compared to 1.96 million men. R Clegg and N Palmer, ‘Labour Market Statistics, 
November 2011’ Statistical Bulletin (ONS November 2011) 4  
73 J Gershuny, M Godwin, and S Jones, ‘The Domestic Labour Revolution: A process of Lagged Adaptation?’ in M Andersen, F 
Bechhofer and J Gershuny (eds), The Social And Political Economy Of The Household (Oxford University Press  1994) 151, 151 - 152 
74E.g. caring for children, household chores and the organisation and running of the family home. R Crompton and C Lyonette, 
‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E 
Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52, 75; R Breen and L Cooke, ‘The Persistence of the 
Gendered Division of Domestic Labour’ (2005) 21(1) European Sociological Review 43, 53; J Scott, ‘Family and Gender Roles: How 
Attitudes are Changing’ International Conference on Family Relations (GeNet. Working Paper No.21 University of Valencia, Spain 
2006) 
75 J Scott, ‘Family and Gender Roles: How Attitudes are Changing’ International Conference on Family Relations (GeNet. Working 
Paper No.21 University of Valencia, Spain 2006) 16 
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children,76 and financial practices may be gendered in both the married and cohabiting 
contexts.77 Research is also indicating that it may be the birth of children which triggers a more 
traditional division of labour in modern relationships.78 
Thus it seems that while women are gaining greater financial independence and employment 
opportunities, this is limited by their responsibilities in the domestic sphere, and often women 
are carrying out a dual burden of breadwinning and homemaking. This chapter shall now turn 
to the law surrounding married, cohabiting and same-sex couples to determine how the law of 
financial provision on relationship breakdown is responding to this (arguably smaller than first 
thought) social change in gender roles to establish whether the law is in fact fit for purpose. 
1.3 The Legal Family in England and Wales 
1.3.1 Marriage 
For many years, law only recognised the married family. Ancillary relief in England and Wales 
currently operates a system based on separate property following the Married Women’s 
Property Act 1882, the first legislation which enabled married women to own property in their 
own right during marriage.79 Before this, property had been subject to the doctrine of unity 
and upon marriage a wife’s property automatically belonged to her husband. After the 1882 
Act, however, upon divorce each party left the marriage with their separate property. This shift 
in approach reflected the then prevailing enlightenment foundation of autonomy, the 
economically rational man and formal equality.80 Thus, the onus was on property and so 
domestic contributions were ignored. Yet, due to the unequal economic status of men and 
women and a social shift from renting to buying family homes,81 the separate property 
approach led to some harsh decisions82 in which attempts to use the law of trusts to soften the 
impact of divorce ultimately failed. Only maintenance was payable, and assets could not be 
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reallocated. This subsequently brought about a series of structural changes within divorce 
law83 and ancillary relief.   
Thus, the Matrimonial Property and Proceeding Act 1970 (consolidated in Part II of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 [hereafter MCA]) provided the courts with power to redistribute 
assets on divorce and gave them greater discretion to consider a broad list of factors under 
s25(2).84 In 1984, the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act amendments made children the 
first consideration and also introduced the principle of ‘clean break’. These two factors could 
have been combined to give the primary carer of children a greater share of the capital assets 
on divorce at the expense of spousal maintenance. Instead, the courts developed the more 
certain one-third rule starting point85 which essentially became translated as the basis for 
needs-based awards for the homemaker on relationship breakdown. These later became the 
party’s reasonable requirements as calculated by the Duxbury formula86 where any capital 
surplus left after meeting these requirements was returned to the breadwinner. This placed a 
glass-ceiling87 on the awards that domestic contributors (typically women) could achieve on 
relationship breakdown and can be seen as a welfare-based approach. In its favour was the 
fact that awards on divorce were relatively certain. 
However, in White v White (2000),88 there was a fundamental shift in the court’s approach 
away from ‘welfare’ towards ‘entitlement’89 in a bid to end what in practice was essentially 
gender discrimination. White was a case that concerned a modern-day couple where both 
parties worked on a farm inherited by Mr White and also both carried out child-caring and 
domestic contributions. This decision radically overhauled the discretionary approach of the 
courts, introducing a principle of fairness measured by a yardstick of equality. This, the courts 
suggested, meant that equal division should be the starting point thus removing discrimination 
between the breadwinner and homemaker. Lambert v Lambert90 (which concerned a couple 
that had a more traditional homemaker/breadwinner divide of relationship roles) later 
emphasised breadwinning was not to be seen as intrinsically more valuable than homemaking. 
Consequently, White introduced what was seen by some as a quasi-deferred community-of-
property system, entitling each spouse to an equal share of assets on divorce unless a 
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departure from the yardstick of equality could be justified.91 The aim, it was said, was to 
achieve ‘fairness’ between parties. 
Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane (2006)92 later clarified that ‘fairness’ consisted of three 
strands: needs, compensation and sharing. Needs are to be generously interpreted to reflect 
the standard of living, and compensation is intended to redress any relationship-generated 
disadvantage irrespective of relationship duration.93  McFarlane, which was held to be a 
paradigm case for when compensation is to apply, concerned a 19-year-long marriage with 
three children and assets worth £3 million. Both spouses had been in equally lucrative careers, 
with Mrs McFarlane having given up her career to raise their children. On divorce, Mr 
McFarlane was earning £1 million a year and the courts recognised that if the assets were split 
equally, then his wealth would quickly exceed Mrs McFarlane’s since she had given up her 
career. Consequently, the courts granted Mrs McFarlane £250,000 per annum in order to 
compensate her for her sacrifice. Essentially, through ‘compensation’, the law is reinforcing a 
holistic approach to non-discrimination between breadwinner and homemaker, which looks to 
achieve substantive rather than formal equality. The law is not only recognising the extent of 
the homemaker’s contribution, but it is also recognising the full economic impact that care-
giving can have, particularly for women post-divorce.94 This holistic approach therefore 
removes the ‘glass-ceiling’ for women that had existed in the previous needs-based approach 
towards financial awards95 and can be seen to address a glaring inequality inherent in 
gendered roles freely chosen within the family by giving greater recognition to the domestic 
contributions in the marriage context.96 
However, particularly in large money cases, there have been huge criticisms of this approach, 
alleging that the courts are far too generous and the awards granted are overvaluing domestic 
contributions. In Miller (a case which involved a two-year marriage without children), Mrs 
Miller had worked in a public relations firm on a salary of £85,000 per annum. Upon marriage, 
she gave up her job and home to become the homemaker. Mr Miller was a multi-millionaire, 
who had worked as a chief investment officer for a company in which he also owned 
substantial shares. The court found that the needs and economic disadvantage arising from 
the marriage were very small but that Mrs Miller was used to a high standard of living and a 
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large amount of the wealth had been acquired during the marriage. She was accordingly 
awarded £5 million of her husband’s total £32 million assets although it is unclear how this 
sum was calculated. This included a combined share of the couple’s two homes and a 
proportion of the vast increase in value that Mr Miller’s property had accrued over the course 
of the marriage. While £5 million was not an equal share of Mr Miller’s assets, it certainly was 
far more than her needs or reasonable requirements, and it seems to be a vast sum for only 
two years of marriage.  This is not an isolated case either and these big awards have been 
demonstrated in cases like Mills v Mills-McCartney,97 where the wife received £16.5 million 
after a four-year marriage with one child as a result of generously interpreted needs. The post-
White approach evidently enables large awards to be made in the wife’s favour. 
Nevertheless, there is perhaps some ability for the courts to also evaluate contributions 
through ‘stellar’ or special contributions. In Charman v Charman98 (a 28 year marriage with 
two children) the courts, while strengthening the principle of equal sharing, suggested that 
special contributions could be either financial or non-financial, although the latter are 
extraordinarily difficult to value. Here the courts suggested that in these cases a percentage of 
33-45% should be awarded to the other spouse. Consequently, the courts granted Mrs 
Charman (homemaker) 36% of the £131 million assets built up over the course of the marriage 
on account of Mr Charman’s special contributions. However, the courts were unclear and 
lacked clarity over their reasoning.99  
Yet, some commentators contend that the courts in White and Miller/McFarlane, in order ‘to 
prevent discrimination coming in through the front door may have allowed it in through the 
back.’100 For some feminists, ‘protection [is] the polite way to refer to subordination’.101 By 
providing maintenance and valuing domestic and financial contributions equally, the law 
essentially encourages a patriarchal financial dependence. It demeans women, presenting 
them as weak and vulnerable and in need of protection.102 For Diduck, valuing domestic 
contributions as equal, rather than focusing on needs, has attributed too high a value to 
previously undervalued work.103 Thus, to many commentators, it seems that the law has 
swung too far in the opposite direction, through over-valuing domestic contributions, 
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reinforcing stereotypes and encouraging gold-digging.104 Although this ‘gold-digging’ fear is 
confined to a small number of big asset cases, it now potentially means that a wife is capable 
of attaining an equal share in the capital with the potential for periodical payments not 
confined to need, but to the estimated compensatory value for the career lost. As a result, this 
potentially may give over-sized awards to ‘undeserving’ wives.105 Furthermore, given the 
increased engagement women have with the labour market and the decline of  
homemaker/breadwinner relationship models as they are replaced by dual earner couples or 
part-time/fulltime models, perhaps as Barlow suggests, the provisions of White would have 
been better suited to the 70s.106 
This concern about over-generous evaluations of domestic contributions is particularly 
relevant given the inability of parties to protect their assets with any certainty through pre-
nuptial agreements. The courts traditionally have been reluctant to enforce pre-nuptial 
agreements on the grounds of public policy.107 However, since 1997 in S v S108 the courts began 
to see pre-nuptial agreements in much more favourable lights.109 Most recently in Radmacher 
v Granatino110 the Supreme Court held that respect should be given to the parties’ autonomy 
and if the contract was not unfair (measured by needs and compensation) it should carry great 
weight when the court is considering how to divide assets on relationship breakdown. Pre-
nuptial agreements, therefore, may have some weight, but they cannot with any certainty 
protect a party’s assets. The Law Commission111 is currently exploring the approach that 
should be taken for pre-nuptial agreements and a Bill is anticipated in 2012 which may change 
this approach. 
Furthermore, conceptual difficulties have been identified in the three strands of fairness. 
According to Glennon, these three strands divide into two inherently different theoretical 
approaches when valuing contributions and dividing the assets.112 Needs and compensation 
are value-based calculations or functional awards on the share that is apportioned and the 
equal sharing is status-based owing to the relationship itself. Alternatively according to Cooke, 
equal-sharing is partnership based whereas needs and compensation represent an award both 
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satisfy different perceptions of fairness.113 There is concern that these two conflicting 
theoretical bases of ancillary relief will produce equally conflicting and uncertain results. The 
incompatible theoretical approaches of these strands of fairness is certainly exemplified in the 
narrow application of compensation due to concern that it may lead to double counting when 
used alongside needs.114 
Thus fundamental concerns have been voiced about the way that the courts value domestic 
contributions in the married context. These include the criticisms that it prevents the 
emancipation of women from the private sphere; that it is uncertain and unclear; that there 
are not enough opportunities for spouses to protect their financial autonomy given that equal 
sharing can extend to all matrimonial assets; that special contributions are rarely applied; and 
that the impact of pre-nuptial agreements (while having greater impact post-Radmacher)115 on 
future asset division is uncertain. Consequently, there have been calls for reform from the 
courts, from the academic community and also from legislative bodies, although there has 
been little consensus over the shape that this should take.  
Due to the high levels of uncertainty in this jurisdiction, some commentators have critiqued 
the current approach under s25. Bailey-Harris has criticised the law as lacking ‘
 over the interpretation of s25 
factors and their piecemeal application116 and Bird went as far as suggesting guidelines for the 
courts when interpreting s25.117 Others have suggested that reform should move away entirely 
from such a discretionary approach, and instead we could consider a statutory-based reform 
similar to a community-of-property regime.118   
While some have argued for greater certainty surrounding the role of needs, others have 
suggested that reform should move away from a needs-focused approach altogether. The 
Centre for Social Justice has called for a strict equal division of assets in both big and small-
asset cases rather than the needs-based approach that currently governs smaller asset 
cases.119 In contrast, Bailey-Harris has called for greater recognition of marriage as a 
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partnership of equals, and a discussion of what is meant by equality of outcome;120 and Miles 
has argued that greater certainty would be achieved by abandoning need in favour of using 
equality and compensation121 as the core principles which may help to simplify the 
complicated nature of exercising compensation, sharing and need, and avoid the trap of 
double counting domestic contributions.122 Moreover, there has been considerable debate 
surrounding the appropriateness of maintenance, and Deech argues strongly the case against 
maintenance believing that it perpetuates dependency and prevents women’s emancipation 
from the private sphere.123  
However despite the contention that there needs to be a more restrictive approach to the 
care-giver, many argue that this is not possible until greater social equality has been achieved. 
Commentators such as O’Donovan,124 Diduck and Orton argue125 that only once women have 
equality in the public sphere – and as Glennon would add, a better valuation of domestic work 
in society in general – can maintenance and women’s dependence on men be significantly 
reduced.126 
Thus ancillary relief in England and Wales is criticised for its level of complexity, its lack of 
certainty and its overgenerous valuation of domestic contributions. Yet, commentators are 
divided over how this should be reformed and it is evident that future guidance is necessary on 
the approach that should be taken. Accordingly, this thesis draws on the differing approaches 
in New Zealand, Queensland, Australia and Scotland in the married context127 and considers 
from Deech’s and Fineman’s perspectives how domestic contributions are currently and 
should be approached in the future. 
1.3.2 Different-Sex Cohabitation 
As section 1.2 above discussed, since the 1970s there has been a dramatic growth in the 
number of cohabiting couples. In comparison, there has been relatively little legal change 
although the law has gradually recognised a ‘cohabitation rule’ in an ad hoc, haphazard 
fashion128 which treats cohabitants as husband and wife to limit their benefit entitlements. 
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Furthermore, there has been some recognition of cohabiting couples as a family such as in 
Rent Act succession cases like Dysons Holdings v Fox129 and the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 was effectively the first active legislative step the law took 
to protect cohabiting couples.130  
Yet, on relationship breakdown, apart from Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 (which 
provides financial provision for the benefit of the children regardless of marital status),131 
there is no specific Family Law remedy for financial provision on relationship breakdown and 
therefore domestic contributions are treated completely differently to the married context. 
Perhaps most indicative of this difference in the law’s attitude is the absence of any 
consideration of these; cohabitants, both same and opposite-sex, are not recognised as a 
family in their own right and consequently have no access to a Family Law remedy. Instead 
they must rely on Property and Trust Law to establish any legal entitlement to any asset 
including (usually the most contentious object) the family home. This in turn means that while 
domestic and financial contributions of married couples are given equal weighting, here 
domestic contributions are often overlooked and ignored.132 
Trust Law predominantly looks towards direct financial contributions as a means of 
determining an interest through a constructive trust or a resulting trust. Since Stack v 
Dowden,133 the constructive trust has been identified as the most appropriate mechanism in 
cohabitation cases. This requires a common intent between the parties for the property to be 
beneficially shared and that the cohabitant searching for a share has detrimentally relied on 
this common intent. Both common intent and detrimental reliance can be either express or 
implied. Express common intent requires that an actual conversation takes place134 and 
express detrimental reliance is where money is spent on the property with the belief that they 
shared an interest in that property.135 Implied common intent on the other hand can arise 
from the parties’ behaviour if they have made a direct financial contribution such as paying the 
mortgage136 and detrimental reliance can be inferred where the party has embarked on 
exceptional behaviour such as improvements to the family home137 which the court does not 
think would have occurred unless the claimant believed that they had an interest in the 
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property. Nevertheless, the courts have not recognised indirect financial contributions or 
domestic contributions. 
Stack v Dowden138 did offer some relief to this approach and indicated that the courts are now 
able to impute intentions; to look at ‘what the parties must, in the light of their conduct, be 
taken to have intended’139 that is to say, the courts can read into what the couple would have 
intended, yet the Law Lords were keen to emphasise that ‘fairness is not the appropriate 
yardstick’.140 Jones v Kernott141 confirmed the use of imputation in joint names cases although 
this, the court stated, was only in reference to the quantification of shares. While Lady Hale 
and Lord Walker did not specifically refer to fairness, they stated at [47]: 
‘…if [the court] cannot deduce exactly what shares were intended, it may have no 
alternative but to ask what their intentions as reasonable and just people would have 
been had they thought about it at the time.’142 
Reading the intentions as reasonable and just offers the opportunity for fairness to creep into 
trust cases, although this is limited in its application and fairness is completely different from 
the fairness that operates in the matrimonial context. Furthermore, it appears limited only to 
the quantification of shares. Thus domestic contributions in the cohabitation context remain 
unrecognised143 in an area that is complex and confusing144 with a ‘witches’ brew’ of remedies 
which are unpredictable for the economically weaker cohabitant.145 However, the position of 
sole owners has not been changed by these recent developments and unless a trust has been 
expressly declared or written,146 remains focused on financial contributions for the 
establishment of a constructive trust. 
It is evident that there is a stark division in the value placed on domestic contributions for 
married and cohabiting couples on relationship breakdown. Yet, the division of paid and 
unpaid work undertaken by cohabiting couples for the household recurrently reflects that of 
married couples.147 These similarities with married couples also appear to extend to the type 
of responsibilities and moral obligations that cohabitants feel towards the wider family.148 
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Moreover, there has been a large growth of research recently which indicates that differences 
in the organisation of relationship responsibilities may not stem from relationship status, but 
from more subtle socio-economic factors. Research into the financial arrangements of couples 
has shown that when age and relationship length are taken into account, married and 
cohabiting couples organise their financial affairs similarly.149 Furthermore, research into the 
division of housework, such as by Crompton and Lyonette,150 also demonstrates that influential 
factors such as age, employment status,151 working hours152 and the presence of children153 
appear to affect the division of paid and unpaid labour rather than relationship status.154 
However, there is a split over whether this area should be reformed. For commentators such 
as Deech and Bottomley,155 disregarding domestic contributions promotes financial 
independence and autonomy. It refrains from interfering with the private sphere and gives the 
parties the freedom to determine how to order their own property, allowing them to try 
alternative forms of relationships rather than ‘to have one form imposed on them especially 
one that treats women as perpetual dependents.’156 Instead, as traditionally gendered roles 
are not attached with any value, cohabitation is a way that gendered practices can be avoided 
and a greater position for negotiation is available, providing a space ‘to define gender and 
personal identity in more liberating and non-traditional ways.’157 This places women in a better 
bargaining position.158 Consequently, the approach towards cohabitation avoids patriarchal 
dependence as it presumes and therefore encourages financial equality between the parties. 
Furthermore, women are encouraged to engage with the labour market because there is no 
recognition of domestic contributions and therefore there is no room to entice women into 
the domestic sphere.  Therefore, for Montgomery159 and Eekelaar,160 the principles applied 
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‘are those which the parties have accepted themselves’161 and there is a strong emphasis 
placed on the choice of cohabitants not only to order their own affairs (Deech contends that 
cohabitants ‘are well aware of the situation they have placed themselves in’),162 but also to 
choose not to enter marriage where these sorts of contributions would have far more sway.  
 
However, there are strong arguments that the Trust Law approach fails to protect the 
vulnerable, and the case of Burns v Burns163 is frequently cited to demonstrate the gross 
unfairness that exists in the cohabitation context. This case concerned a 19-year-long 
cohabitation relationship where Mrs Burns assumed the homemaker role raising their three 
children who at the time of the trial were adults and had all left home. She had even changed 
her surname to match her partner’s, redecorated the house, bought various chattels and paid 
for a substantial amount of the bills with a part-time job that she had in the later years of the 
relationship. Yet, at the end of the relationship Mrs Burns had no real earning potential as the 
result of her homemaking role. In the absence of any direct financial payments which Lord 
Justice Fox emphasised should be referable back to the purchase price or the mortgage on the 
property, Mrs Burns was left without a share in the home and without a remedy elsewhere so 
she was in effect left with nothing. Essentially, child-bearing and its effect on Mrs Burns’ socio-
economic status is of no value to the courts when establishing a beneficial interest.  
Consequently a major concern is that this amounts to discrimination against the homemaker 
or ‘primary carer’164 as the current approach in Trust Law omits ‘home-making and parental 
contributions’,165 a role predominantly held by the female partner.166 As Baird argues ‘it is 
women, usually, who are left high and dry after cohabitation.’167 Further commentators such 
as Barlow, Lind and Wong also identify this approach as being discriminatory against women 
due to the habitual gendered nature of domestic contributions in relationships;168 and for 
Fineman a lack of recognition of care-giving relationships ignores the gendered lives that 
women lead and how their lives are really characterised by dependency.169 Trust Law fails to 
protect the vulnerable by ignoring the voices of those within the private family sphere. While 
ignoring domestic contributions may encourage financial independence, it in fact does not 
recognise those women who have freely chosen (with their partner’s agreement or 
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encouragement) a gendered homemaker role in the domestic sphere and therefore this 
consistently undermines the homemaker.170  
 
Furthermore, it seems that cohabiting couples are not necessarily characterised by equal 
financial autonomy. While some have argued that the Burns scenario is no longer a reality,171 
Douglas et al.’s172 work indicated that in fact the Burns scenario still exists and again it is the 
female partner who tends to be disadvantaged by the lack of recognition of domestic 
contributions in Trust Law. Additionally, there are concerns that the ability to be autonomous 
and to achieve financial dependence may not be possible for all cohabitants and research 
indicates, that while cohabitants tend to have a more egalitarian division of roles than married 
couples, this may be attributable as aforementioned to other factors, other than relationship 
status, that affect the division of paid and unpaid labour.173 In addition, although some believe 
that respect should be given to the cohabitant’s autonomous choice not to marry and 
therefore there should be no Family Law intervention aside from the enforcement of 
cohabitation contracts,174 yet Probert,175 while examining the French PaCS,176 which employs a 
contract to constitute the relationship and define rights, found that these were not often used 
and the contractual element could lead to unequal bargaining positions.  
However, while there is consensus that reform is needed, there is a lack of clarity firstly over 
what principles should govern any reform and secondly whether a cohabitation regime should 
be different or similar to marriage. For some commentators such as Barlow et al, family 
regulation should be based on function rather than form.177 Some of those who have 
embraced this function over form approach have argued that the law should redistribute 
property in the same way that it does in marriage by extending Part II MCA,178 although others 
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think that this should be subject to a two-year qualification period.179 Similarly, some 
commentators think that a cohabitation regime should have the same approach to marriage, 
as the marital approach is essentially remedial180 and in 2010 Lord Lester put forward a 
cohabitation Bill (which subsequently was unsuccessful) which proposed very similar 
provisions to the married context although with some differences.181 An approach like this 
would be based on entitlement however Probert worries that a similar scheme to Part II MCA 
may move too far away from a financial focus in the cohabitation context.182 Furthermore, 
there are concerns that an approach identical to marriage will undermine the institution 
itself183 although Kiernan, Barlow and Merlo184 analysed marriage rates in Europe and Australia 
and suggested that there is little relationship between these rates and the introduction of 
legislation which treats cohabitants as spouses. 
For those who think that cohabitants should be treated differently, there is also a lack of 
coherence over the approach that should be taken.185  For some, like Deech, the approach is 
simple; cohabitants should have no Family Law remedy at all.186 Yet, many commentators 
argue that there should be some provisions made available to cohabiting relationships. 
Eekelaar187 has suggested that the law should focus on the reasonable expectations of the 
parties, what the parties would deem that they ought to have, and Douglas et al.188 suggested 
that the approach should be based on unjust enrichment, ‘the idea that one party ‘gets 
something for nothing”189 or enjoys a windfall at the expense of another.’190 The Law 
Commission has also suggested a scheme which attempts to redress imbalances and 
compensate losses through a statutory scheme of economic advantages and disadvantages.191 
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However, at present the Government clearly has no intention to reform the current system192 
and thus continues to promote autonomy. The law is overwhelmingly considered 
inappropriate in this area but while options for law reform are extensive, there is no unity over 
how, instead, cohabiting relationships should be treated on relationship breakdown. This 
project considers the approaches in New Zealand, Scotland and Australia who have all 
approached cohabiting couples in different ways to determine how domestic contributions 
should be recognised in cohabiting couples and whether any difference should lie between 
cohabitation and marriage.  
1.3.3 Same-Sex Relationships 
Same-sex and different-sex cohabiting couples are treated indistinguishably and while same-
sex couples cannot marry (although this itself is currently under review),193 they are able to 
enter into a civil partnership under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA). The CPA introduced 
almost identical legal consequences of marriage to same-sex couples who entered into a 
registered partnership, and Schedule 5 of the CPA sets out a framework for financial provision 
on the dissolution of civil partnerships which is to correspond to those provisions in the MCA. 
Thus, s21(2) of the schedule mirrors s25 of the MCA, setting out the factors which must be 
considered when making a financial order on dissolution. Initially, there was some uncertainty 
over whether the homemaker/breadwinner approach,194 taken in the marriage context, would 
be duplicated for civil partnerships. However, the court recently confirmed in Lawrence v 
Gallagher (2012)195 that the approach in the Civil Partnership context was to be no different 
from that in the marriage context. 
The debates surrounding the introduction of the CPA stemmed from the manifest inequalities 
and injustices that same-sex couples faced without the option of entering a registered 
partnership equivalent to marriage. While the CPA has rectified this inequality,196 no real 
consideration has been given to the financial and domestic realities of these relationships. 
Therefore, there lacks an understanding of whether, empirically, there could or should be 
differential treatment between marriage and civil partnerships on relationship breakdown. 
This is a particular concern since the presumptions that exist in the marriage context in 
ancillary relief seem to have been extended into the civil partnership context. How appropriate 
is this extension given that the assumptions in the married context appear to be based on 
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gendered beliefs about how different-sex couples organise their domestic affairs? Should the 
same presumptions which are based on a homemaker/breadwinner relationship model be 
applied in the same-sex context? 
Little empirical research on the way that same-sex couples organise their financial and 
domestic affairs exists in the UK and therefore this thesis also draws from a small body of work 
undertaken abroad. Research demonstrates both here and abroad that lesbian and gay 
couples are generally more likely to have liberal egalitarian attitudes compared to 
heterosexual couples.197 Dunne demonstrated that the ‘absence of gender polarized norms 
informing approaches to parenting and divisions of labour allows lesbian partners greater 
flexibility in negotiating their arrangements’198 and thus they are more likely to foster 
conceptions of equality. This questions whether financial provision based on gender relations 
in the family sphere will reflect the greater space for negotiation which exists within same-sex 
couples. 
Furthermore, with a considerable proportion of studies tending to find that most same-sex 
relationships are in fact dual-earner families,199 it seems, superficially, that the traditional 
homemaker/breadwinner divide has been rejected by same-sex couples and thus they each 
will have some level of economic independence. When it comes to housework, it seems that 
same-sex couples are likely to divide the tasks fairly equitably. Kurdek’s studies in both 1993 
and 2006200 compared the division of housework in cohabiting same-sex couples and 
heterosexual married couples without children and found that lesbian and gay couples tended 
to distribute household labour equally while married couples without children were least 
equal, with wives doing most of the housework. In his 2005 review, he determined that 
‘although members of gay and lesbian couples do not divide household labour in a perfectly 
equal manner, they are more likely than members of heterosexual couples to negotiate a 
balance between achieving a fair distribution of household labour and accommodating the 
different interests, skills, and work schedules of particular partners.’201 Other research has 
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reflected this more equitable division of labour particularly in lesbian couples.202 Chan203 
compared lesbian parents and heterosexual parents and discovered that although household 
tasks and family decision-making were relatively similar, generally lesbian biological and non-
biological mothers shared child-care tasks more equally than heterosexual parents. In the UK, 
Dunne204 also found, in her study of 29 lesbian couples with children, that domestic 
responsibilities were fairly evenly shared, and that there was a mutual recognition of a 
woman’s right to financial independence. 
Although some studies have found that equal sharing may not be universal in same-sex 
relationships,205  the majority of studies in this area seem to produce evidence that a greater 
level of equality exists in the division of roles. Seemingly, sexual orientation is a key factor in 
affecting the equality of a couple’s division of housework as it lacks the traditional gendered 
hierarchy.206 Thus, an interpretation of s21(2) factors based on the presumption of a 
homemaker/breadwinner divide would have little consideration for the impact that sexuality 
may have on the division of labour. In fact, this extends to financial organisation with Burns, 
Burgoyne et al. (2008) indicating that same-sex couples demonstrate a more individualistic and 
different approach than heterosexual couples in the way that they treated financial resources, 
and that there was a greater level of importance placed on financial autonomy and a lower 
level of financial interdependence compared to different-sex couples.207 Arguably a different 
approach is needed in models of financial provision in order to account for this greater level of 
financial independence and more egalitarian relationship dynamics.  
Consequently, following the marital model of financial provision may not in its current 
application provide same-sex couples with rights and responsibilities that accurately reflect the 
roles that they play in each other’s’ lives. In fact, the absence of gender power imbalances and 
gender-based influences on the division of household roles makes it possible to predict that 
the courts will make a greater use of the yardstick of equality to achieve fair division of 
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property. Yet splitting the assets equally may not, as Burgoyne208  voices her concern over the 
Civil Partnership Act’s provisions, take into any account that maybe there seems to be a 
greater level of financial independence in these couples. Consequently, this project considers 
the suitability of other approaches in New Zealand, Scotland and Australia in the context of 
same-sex relationships. 
1.4 Conclusion 
It is evident from this chapter that the way in which domestic contributions are valued on 
relationship breakdown in England and Wales is in serious need of reform and both in the 
married/civil partner and unmarried context. However, the debate surrounding reform is 
contentious and there is little agreement on the shape that change should take and how much 
recognition the law should give to domestic contributions: should it encourage women to be 
financially autonomous by attributing no value to domestic contributions or should it recognise 
gendered roles freely chosen by women (and encouraged by their partners) and therein 
provide greater protection by attributing higher value to these contributions? Consequently, 
this thesis aims to provide essential insight into this debate by considering Deech and 
Fineman’s polarised views which embody these two conflicting positions. To do this, this thesis 
explores how these divergent feminist positions would work in practice and whether a 
compromise between the two can be reached. The next chapter now sets out the empirical 
and feminist methodology that this thesis uses to do so. 
  
                                                          
208 M Burns, C Burgoyne, and V Clarke, ‘Financial affairs? Money Management in Same Sex Relationships’ (2008) 37 (2) Journal of 
Socio-Economics 481, 509 
49 
 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research Aims 
 
The last chapter identified the need for reform to the law of financial provision in England and 
Wales in both the married and cohabitation regimes. In particular, it is evident that detailed 
consideration of how the law should value domestic contributions is required. Therefore, the 
aim of this thesis is to examine how the law might in future better address the valuation of 
domestic contributions (particularly regarding cohabitants), to answer the calls for reform 
identified in chapter 1. To gain insight into these issues, this project explores the law of 
financial provision on relationship breakdown in England and Wales, New Zealand, Australia 
and Scotland where different approaches have emerged in different years.  Thus the following 
research questions are posed: 
Research Question 1: How successful is each jurisdiction in valuing domestic contributions? 
This will be considered by asking:  
(a) How domestic contributions are valued for: 
(i) Married Couples 
(ii) Cohabiting Couples 
(iii) Same-Sex Couples 
(b) How satisfactory is this valuation when viewed from (divergent) feminist 
perspectives? 
(c) How satisfactory is this valuation considered to be within its own individual 
jurisdiction? 
Research Question 2: What lessons can be learned in England and Wales from these other 
approaches: 
(a) Do they rectify current criticisms? 
(b) Would they be well received in England and Wales? 
 
This is a socio-legal project, which moves beyond the sole use of traditional legal methodology 
and its focus on black-letter law. However, research question 1(a) involves a doctrinal analysis 
of the legal systems under examination, exploring legal sources like cases, statutes, legislative 
information, court rules, and the law of other countries.209 Banakar argues that this black-
letter approach conveys the ideal state of the legal system, providing a degree of certainty, 
giving definite answers to practical questions.210 That is to say, it searches for the laws of law, 
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trying to present law as it is. Yet is this enough for Family Law or is more socio-legal context 
required? 
For some, it is impossible to merge other disciplines with law in this attempt to provide 
context. As Foucault argues, a discipline’s knowledge is created by its own self-validation, two 
separate fields cannot be combined; they will not add to each other’s knowledge, only 
transforming the way that knowledge is sought.211 Thus, their conflicting paradigms and 
classifications cannot be merged easily, and in fact any integration of the differing types of 
data produced will not be compatible. Luhmann212 and Teubner213 define the law as an 
autopoietic system. It is an intellectually closed system that has its own concepts and 
rationality and can only use its own elements to reproduce itself and therefore it remains 
closed to other systems of knowledge. This other knowledge is in fact impossible to measure 
or compare. This then has been interpreted to mean that sociological insights cannot be 
turned into legal concepts and legal definitions cannot be formed into sociological 
categories.214 Consequently, it has been argued that it is unworkable to draw on concepts from 
other disciplines to use in one’s own.  
However, a narrow focus on legal sources carries limitations. Detaching the law from any form 
of context or regard of itself as a social phenomenon tends to over-simplify problems and lose 
sight of how law functions in reality.215 Furthermore, ignoring context consequently presents a 
two-dimensional picture of the law in action, devoid of society’s perspectives, attitudes and 
any consideration of the law’s effect on people. Thus, ascertaining suitable reform options in 
Family Law or even identifying whether reform is needed is problematical. To ensure effective 
law reform ‘[one] need[s] to know how law or legal decision-making or legal enforcement 
really works outside the statute or text book.’216 Selznick217 and Nonet218 argue that positive 
law is only a small part of the bigger picture; one cannot escape context nor separate positive 
law and moralities; it is important for us to understand it as a system of values. Therefore, it is 
necessary to draw on other tools and sources in other disciplines such as feminist theory or 
empirical research to provide a picture of law in action. This more holistic approach allows the 
researcher to effectively judge Family Law from inside the legal system as they are able to 
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position Family Law219 in its social context, which provides a deeper level of understanding of 
how this area of law works in practice. This is especially important for Family Law which really 
needs to be socially located in the context of the culture that it operates in. Moreover, 
Cotterrell argues that the only way to really make sense of legal concepts is by sociological 
interpretation;220 ‘a question, which cannot be legitimately answered by reference to a statute 
or judgment, lies outside the doctrinal gaze.’221 Therefore a solely doctrinal analysis (while 
pivotal in establishing differences between legal systems) would avoid answering the question 
of how effectively domestic contributions are and should be valued. Instead, a socio-legal 
approach is necessary to get to the heart of this question.  
The use of feminist and empirical methods alongside the doctrinal approach therefore will 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the four jurisdictions. To provide an assessment of how 
the law can better value domestic contributions from a feminist perspective, this thesis uses 
the positions of two divergent feminist commentators as a heuristic device to critique how the 
different legislative frameworks in England and Wales, Scotland, New Zealand and Australia 
affect women. Then, the empirical phase will provide a three-dimensional depiction of how 
the law in each jurisdiction ‘functions in reality’ from the perspective of legal practitioners.222 
This will give each jurisdiction’s background and context; an ‘empirical understanding of the 
law in action helps us to understand society better.’223 The combining of feminist methodology 
alongside empirical methodology is, as Hunter identifies, valuable for ‘address[ing] complexity 
rather than producing simplified and bounded responses to often oversimplified or 
ideologically driven policy questions.’224 
 
This chapter shall now explore the three methods that this thesis uses to analyse the four 
jurisdictions’ theoretical and practical issues. First a comparative doctrinal analysis addresses 
how contributions are valued. Second, a feminist critique considers how satisfactory these 
different methods of valuing contributions are. The third phase is an analysis of structured 
interviews with practitioners to consider how satisfactorily the scheme works in practice. This 
will be followed by focus groups with members of the public in England and Wales to consider 
how well received these differing approaches would be. 
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2.2: Methodology 
 
2.2.1 Doctrinal Analysis 
A comparative doctrinal approach has been selected as it allows the comparison of differences 
and similarities between legal institutions and systems225 and presents a potential tool in 
domestic law reform by ‘borrowing’ ideas (here concerning how to approach domestic 
contributions) from other jurisdictions.226 Örücü argues that ‘borrowing’ and imitating is 
central to legal reform as the law has limited innovation to be found within itself.227  
These four jurisdictions have each been selected because each has different formulations of 
how courts should take account of domestic contributions with different formulations of 
approach and each is different to England and Wales’ wholly discretionary approach. New 
Zealand’s deferred community-of-property system has an ‘entitlement’ system dividing assets 
equally,228 Scotland has a quasi–community-of-property system which also rebalances 
economic advantages/disadvantages and shares economic burdens;229 and Australia actively 
quantifies contributions made throughout the relationship.230 Furthermore, each jurisdiction 
treats cohabitants in different ways. Australia and New Zealand have both extended financial 
provision remedies available on divorce to all same/different-sex cohabitants, and Scotland 
has a similar but different approach from married couples, rebalancing economic advantages 
and disadvantages. In the process of the doctrinal comparison, consideration has been given to 
any influences such as religious laws, international laws and normative orders to gain as 
complete a picture as possible. 
However, commentators have raised concerns231 about the danger of merely comparing 
jurisdictions and how they differ. Twining232 observes the difficulty in ranking or statistically 
comparing jurisdictions but consequently declares that some form of evaluation must take 
place. Specifically, a review is needed rather than a mere expansion of knowledge233 which 
should also consider factors such as cultural elements to provide an understanding of the 
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dynamics of imposition and resistance.234 For Örücü235 and Probert236 the danger lies in the 
presumption that legal systems can be copied or ‘transplanted’ into other jurisdictions, 
especially where the solutions have grown out of dissimilar legal systems. This danger is 
because fundamental differences may lie in structure, substance and culture of the 
jurisdictions which may prevent the scheme that is successful in one context from being 
equally successful in another. Örücü calls for a ‘transposition’ of legal ideas where the legal 
concepts are in effect ‘tuned’ into these respective jurisdictions.237 
Additionally, Cotterrell felt that to determine the success of ‘legal transplantation’ and to aid 
transposition, consideration must be given to the four communities of law238 including the 
‘affective community’. This community relates to family life which Cotterrell feels is ‘especially 
relevant in considering organisational problems…for example in marriage and divorce, 
inheritance in families, and sexual and fiduciary relations.’239 Consequently, although all four 
jurisdictions share common law history, due attention must be given to subtle differences 
which lie in the different countries. Therefore, each chapter explores the comparative 
similarities and differences which arise in each jurisdiction examined within this thesis. 
Furthermore, the focus groups offer fundamentally important insight into how individuals will 
respond to these bigger societal changes affecting how law in this area should react in England 
and Wales. 
2.2.2 Feminist Critique 
As discussed, within feminism there are contrasting positions on how domestic contributions 
should be valued in law and these are used as lenses to analyse the subject matter within this 
thesis. This section therefore sets out the heuristic devices that shall be used to critique the 
jurisdictions in this study.  To do so, this part shall first explain why feminist methodology is 
being used by justifying why this is a women’s issue and what the feminist method of ‘asking 
the woman question’ entails. This section then explores the current gulf in feminist theory 
relating to the public/private divide, before explaining how the positions of Fineman and 
Deech embody this debate and subsequently how they are to be used as lenses throughout 
this thesis.  
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2.2.2.1 Justifying Feminism: Is this a Woman’s Issue? 
The gulf between unmarried and married couples/civil partnerships and the financial awards 
made on relationship breakdown can, for the most part, be attributed to the way in which the 
law values domestic contributions. In the cohabitation context where Property Law applies, no 
recognition to the non-financial role is given,240 and conversely, in the married and civil partner 
context, White241 established that financial and domestic contributions are to be given equal 
weighting. Thus, while financial contributions are a pivotal point in determining financial 
provision for both relationship types on breakdown, it seems that the law is in fact sending out 
very different messages about how domestic contributions should be recognised, if at all. As 
Eekelaar contends,242 the law is therefore making different assumptions about the way that 
roles are divided according to relationship status, with marriage having a social bargain of a 
gendered homemaker/ breadwinner divide whereas in the cohabitation context there is the 
presumption that the relationship is more equal and less gendered.  
 
Yet, women are responsible for the bulk of domestic tasks in both the marriage and 
cohabitation context243 and research has demonstrated that women complete 19 hours of 
housework a week compared to the men’s average of 5.5 hours.244 Furthermore, while women 
are dominant in the execution of household tasks, they are less dominant in the labour 
market. This is despite the number of women in employment being just shy of men;245 for men 
still earn an average 10.2% more than the average woman246 and women are far more 
prevalent in lower-wage jobs and the part-time sector.247  Additionally, women are most likely 
to be out of employment because of their commitments within the family home.248  
 
Additionally, the increase in women’s participation in the labour force, and therefore in the 
number of hours women take up in employment, has not been met by a diminution in the 
number of hours women spend on domestic labour. Instead, women are carrying out dual 
roles of breadwinning and homemaking, whereas men still predominantly remain in the 
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breadwinner role.249 Moreover, child-care responsibilities often result in women selecting jobs 
that fit most conveniently around these duties. Consequently, women take up a higher amount 
of part-time roles250 than men as their ability to enter employment is heavily affected by their 
ability to arrange private childcare. This occurs regardless of relationship status.251 
Furthermore, childcare is consistently an area where the distinction between sex and gender is 
often blurred. Women’s physical ability to bear children and the consequent legal  structure 
that surrounds having children which is strongly linked to sex (such as maternity leave) in fact 
perpetuates the gendered social norms that identify women as care-givers. This all denotes 
that the approach taken towards recognising domestic contributions is a women’s issue. 
Women, therefore, are construed as homemakers, and are typically more economically 
disadvantaged as a result of caregiving work and consistently end up poorer on relationship 
breakdown than their male counterparts.252  
This contrasts with the Scandinavian welfare model,253 often described as ‘women friendly’254 
which has strong provision for childcare and therefore reduces the need for women to fit work 
around their home lives.255 As a result of these ‘women friendly’ policies, women take on more 
fulltime employment256 and thus Scandinavian domestic partnerships can realistically be more 
egalitarian.257 The Scandinavian system demonstrates that there is a correlation between 
women’s economic activity and how the state regulates domestic activities and childcare. This 
strengthens the argument that the question of how to value domestic contributions is a 
women’s issue; it is fundamentally women’s lifestyles that will be most greatly affected.258 
Accordingly, it seems that by valuing domestic contributions schizophrenically, where the 
married homemaker is eagerly compensated for her commitment to the family sphere 
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compared to the unmarried homemaker whose contributions are ignored, the Law is in fact 
dividing women into hierarchical groups, with married women placed largely at the top of the 
ladder. This consequently is generating concerns that, rather than recognising the actual worth 
of these contributions, the law is basing its financial provision on unfounded assumptions. 
These are arguably reinforcing gender stereotypes in both contexts. In the cohabitation 
context, as the law ignores domestic contributions and instead gives weight to financial 
contributions, the presumption is that cohabiting couples are more egalitarian, acting with 
financial rationality. This disadvantages cohabiting women as it fails to recognise the 
precarious economic position that often accompanies the gendered homemaking role. In 
comparison, in the married context, the law presumes that there is a more traditional division 
of relationship roles and therefore the law encourages a family structure based on the 
homemaker/breadwinner model. This places women in a vulnerable position by encouraging a 
financial dependency on their male partners, consequently discouraging women from the 
public sphere.259 The different ways of valuing domestic contributions send out confusing 
signals that do not appear to reflect empirical evidence. Yet, should the law promote financial 
autonomy and value domestic contributions less to try and encourage women to take a more 
active role in the public sphere and thus become more financially independent? Essentially 
should the law be working against socially constructed ideas of gender roles or should it be 
recognising this gendered disadvantage and accordingly protecting those who act within the 
private sphere?  Furthermore, should the Law intervene at all in the cohabitation context and 
if so, should it be treated analogously with marriage? 
This is an especially urgent question given that current family policy in England and Wales 
seems to be heading towards a more autonomous, self-regulating approach (often termed as a 
third-way egalitarian approach) of enabling self-provision.260 The courts have recently given 
pre-nuptial agreements much greater weight in ancillary relief proceedings261 and both the 
Conservatives’ Every Family Matters262 and Labour’s Supporting Families263 policy documents 
indicate definitive moves towards less state intervention and a greater element of expectation 
on the individual’s responsibility to act as an independent economic actor. Therefore, it is vital 
at this juncture to determine whether this is in fact in the best interests of women. On the one 
hand, it is important to be mindful of concerns that feminist methods can tend to be ethno-
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centric and over-generalising by not taking into account the various differences that exist 
amongst women according to socio-economic backgrounds, or cultural and racial 
differences.264 Nevertheless, feminism is still a useful mechanism that provides a theoretical 
basis for research which specifically questions the relationship between Law and gender and 
thus exposes potential bias. In doing so, a feminist methodology provides new understandings 
of the Law’s limits and potential reform opportunities to attain greater gender equality.265 
Feminism, therefore, in the context of my research design, provides a tool to consider how the 
different schemes in England and Wales, Scotland, New Zealand and Queensland, Australia 
affect the interests of women.  
2.2.2.2 Asking the Woman Question 
Feminism is, as Dalton explains, ‘dedicated first, to describing women’s subordination…; 
second to asking both how…and why…women continue to occupy this position; and dedicated 
third to change.’266  Bartlett contends that feminist inquiries use three main methods:267 
feminist practical reasoning, consciousness-raising and asking the woman question. Of these 
three major methodologies, asking the woman question seems to be most suitable for this 
thesis’ research question. While both consciousness-raising and feminist practical reasoning 
could contribute to this area, they tend to draw on more empirical questions which aim to 
expand knowledge on women’s lived experiences and the way that they reason differently 
from men.  
Asking the woman question essentially considers the gender implications of a social practice or 
rule, exposes bias by confronting the assumption of neutrality and addresses exclusion.268 
Largely concerning the social position of women, this feminist method therefore moves 
beyond the external question of ‘what’ the Law consists of and instead delves deeper into an 
analysis of implicit cultural norms and gendered constructs that are embedded within the legal 
doctrine. Accordingly, this critique asks whether women’s values and experiences are 
overlooked or neglected by the law, thus disadvantaging and/or subordinating women.269 
Asking the woman question can therefore reveal whether the law of financial provision on 
relationship breakdown in each jurisdiction best serves the interests of women or whether it in 
fact overlooks or discriminates against women. This is essentially a textual analysis which 
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includes identifying the gendered nature of the language of law as well as considering the aims 
and the role of the law, and its theoretical implications for the interests of women. Therefore 
this approach allows for a direct comparison of the black letter law and its gendered 
implications in each country under examination in this thesis. Yet, what shape should the 
inquiry into the legal systems take and how do feminist opinions divide over the route to 
reform? 
2.2.2.3 The Public/Private Divide 
Pateman describes the public/private debate as being ‘ultimately what the feminist movement 
is about.’270 This feminist inquiry examines the ideological divide between the public sphere 
(the market, the state and the political arena) and the private sphere (the family and the 
home). While both spheres are inhabited by both sexes on a daily basis (which blurs the 
boundaries between the two),271 the divide is inherently gendered, with women being most 
inclined to remain within the domestic sphere. Subsequently, and as the aforementioned 
statistics demonstrate,272 women are less engaged with the labour force and consequently are 
often in an economically disadvantaged position in comparison with their male counterparts. 
This inquiry therefore examines and challenges the boundaries between these two spheres in 
a bid to reduce these apparent inequalities. Yet, within this area, distinct schools of feminist 
thought have opposing views on the stance that law reform should take. In particular, opinions 
differ on how far matters regarding the private home-life should remain outside of the law’s 
control. Essentially, this can be equated to the polarities of autonomy and protection, 
independence and dependence: those who value the importance of a woman’s ability to 
remain autonomous in her home (and economic) life, and thus her ability to privately order 
her affairs as she chooses, versus the extent to which this must, or should be sacrificed to 
ensure that woman’s voice is adequately represented within the public sphere.273 The 
public/private debate is the ‘struggle of recognising motherhood versus avoiding the 
institutionalised violence of patriarchal motherhood.’274  
There are three core feminist schools of thought which conflict within this debate:275 liberal 
feminists, radical feminists and cultural feminists. For liberal feminists such as Deech and 
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Pateman,276 the key to solving gender inequalities is by recognising autonomy and choice. 
Women are rational individuals, as rational as men, and therefore have the ability to decide 
how to order their relationships and whether they assume a role within the private or public 
sphere. Therefore, the law should treat men and women the same, encouraging women to 
engage more in the public sphere; there should be some basic level of essential sameness 
contained within the law.277 To ‘offer state protection’ that interferes in the private realm 
presents women as weak and disadvantaged and consequently would contradict public 
freedom and equality.278 For liberal feminists, ‘protection [is] the polite way to refer to 
subordination’279 and it reinforces patriarchal values of the ‘woman’ as the protective remedy 
is only available to those women who conform to their ‘traditional’ function within the 
domestic sphere. Williams contends that male and female stereotypes within the law must be 
challenged and instead their similarities must be stressed; the female should not be simply 
reduced to the mother.280 Here, differential treatment such as valuing domestic contributions 
perpetuates socially constructed gendered roles. It would enforce patriarchal ideals by 
accentuating dissimilarities between the sexes and thus legitimising women’s disadvantage 
from remaining in the private, domestic sphere.281 Therefore, valuing domestic and financial 
contributions equally is to re-embody and perpetuate gender stereotypes which prevent 
women from extending beyond the private sphere; it encourages gendered dependency rather 
than empowering women. 
At the other end of this debate, ‘radical’ and ‘cultural feminists both argue that the law needs 
to intervene to achieve gender equality, and to do so it needs to lessen or at least change the 
boundaries of the public/private divide. For radical feminists, the divide is about power 
relations, where male work in the public sphere is valued and female work in the private 
sphere is ignored. MacKinnon argues that the public/private divide is a way of dominating 
women, stating that ‘an equality question is a question of the distribution of power’.282 She 
takes the view that patriarchy and public oppression has its roots in the family, stemming from 
social concepts of reproduction and sexuality.283 For some radical feminists, the extension of 
state control into the private sphere will then merely be an extension of patriarchal power. 
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Similarly, there is a concern that treating men and women according to similar idealised 
standards (that in the same way as men, women must become equal economic actors within 
the public sphere) by getting women to match male characteristics is another way of exerting 
control as women are pushed into these male determined boundaries and thus controlled 
within the public sphere.284 Therefore, women must conform to more masculine 
characteristics in their everyday working lives to succeed. For Imray and Middleton,285 it is 
necessary for the law to intervene to redefine structures and limit female subordination. There 
must, and can be a neutral ‘equal’ ground between men and women that is different from our 
current starting point of sex and gender, which recognises some differences, and some 
similarities.  
For difference feminists, great weight is placed on that which is essentially feminine; they 
argue that there are qualities or characteristics that are inherently female and which differ 
from that inherently male characteristics. Often drawing on the work of psychologist Carol 
Gilligan’s In a Different Voice,286 this body of feminists argue that there are fundamental 
differences between women and men. In this study, Gilligan demonstrates that men and 
women speak different moral languages; women’s voice embodied ‘the truth of an ethic of 
care, the ties between relationship and responsibility, and the origins of aggression in the 
failure of connection.’287 Yet, men instead placed a higher value on rights and an ethic of 
justice. This ethic of justice which ‘proceeds from the ethic of equality’ differs from the ethic of 
care which rests on the premise of non-violence – that no one should be hurt – and is based on 
connections and relationships rather than separation and abstraction.288 It is this ethic of care 
that should be included within our own system of justice. Accordingly, the goal of difference 
feminists ‘is to give equal recognition to women's moral voice of caring and communal 
values.’289 Fineman adopts the approach and argues that care-giving relationships, rather than 
sexual relationships, should be at the centre of Family Law.290 West in fact argues for a 
connection thesis, one that recognises that ‘women are actually or potentially materially 
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connected to other human life.’291 Thus, there is a consensus that a difference lies between 
men and women.  
Consequently, for difference feminists such as Baker, the public/private divide legitimises a 
double role for women292 as it does not recognise that women do have gendered lifestyles. 
Lacey furthers this argument stating that the public/private divide allows the government to 
effectively clean its hands of responsibility293 and consolidates the status quo, as the term 
‘private’ essentially implies that the private sphere is outside the influence of both the state 
and market relations.294 A lack of recognition of the ‘private’ sphere means that women are 
marginalised as they are no longer at the forefront of the debate.295 Therefore, little 
recognition of the value of domestic contributions (the traditional female role) in a 
relationship means that women’s rights within the home are restricted compared to that of 
males. Therefore, to redress the imbalance and ensure women have a say in their everyday 
lives, the law must regulate the ‘private’ and recognise (along with the rest of society) the 
weight and impact of such domestic contributions.  
These three schools of feminist thought clearly have different perceptions on how gendered 
inequalities brought about through women’s economic disadvantage in the private sphere 
should be approached. For liberal feminists the public/private barriers should remain: the 
private sphere should stay private where people can order their family life as they choose. 
Instead the focus should be on discouraging women from choosing a role that is based in the 
private sphere; women need to start engaging more within the public sphere. For radical 
feminists it is about completely redefining structures and the public/private divide based on 
new social values. Finally, difference feminists argue that there should be greater state 
intervention in the private sphere in order to protect women by taking account of gendered 
differences that give rise to the economic disadvantages. Consequently, there is no clear 
consensus that can be drawn from this debate on the approach that financial provision on 
relationship breakdown should take and whether contributions made in the private sphere 
should be recognised to protect those in financially weaker positions. 
This thesis therefore sets out to determine the most appropriate way for Family Law to value 
domestic contributions at the end of a relationship. In order to provide greater insight on this 
matter, this project uses the divergent stances of Ruth Deech (who represents liberal 
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feminists) and Martha Fineman (who represents cultural feminists), who embody the polarised 
positions within this debate, to formulate a heuristic device that shall be used to analyse the 
jurisdictions in the following chapters. (The radical feminist position is not used as a lens here 
given that it calls for a fundamental restructuring of the public/private divide and is beyond 
the remit of this thesis.) These jurisdictions have been selected as they give Fineman and 
Deech’s feminist positions a practical framework of effect. They each value domestic 
contributions differently and consequently align in varying degrees with these divergent 
feminist stances (discussed below).296 Therefore, this feminist critique (using Fineman and 
Deech as the lenses) will gauge the practical gender implications and expose any bias or 
exclusion within the schemes and ask whether one feminist approach is more appropriate than 
the other in practice or whether a compromise can be achieved between the two. 
2.2.2.4 The ‘Fineman’ and ‘Deech’ Lenses  
As addressed above, the public/private debate essentially concerns a division between 
autonomy and protection and this section draws predominantly on the clash between liberal 
and difference feminist aims exemplified through the contrasting viewpoints of Ruth Deech 
and Martha Fineman. Deech and Fineman are directly concerned with the regulation of the 
family in law and the level of state intervention that is required to remove gender inequalities 
from within the private sphere. Deech’s focus is on Family Law within England and Wales and 
her argument presented here is taken from a series of journal articles and lectures where she 
critiques the current system. Her primary argument represents the liberal notions that the 
private sphere should remain private, autonomy should be protected and women are capable 
of engaging within the public sphere and should not be discouraged from doing so. In contrast, 
Fineman’s work critiques American political dialogue and legal regulation and proposes reform 
options for the family in American society. For the purpose of this thesis, two of her works are 
being used to set out her argument: The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other 
Twentieth Century Tragedies297 and The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency.298 The 
central elements of her thesis argue that the recognition of the family in law should be centred 
on care-giving relationships and not relationship status, as dependency arises from the care-
dyad, and that the public sphere, the state and the market has a collective responsibility for 
this dependency. A detailed examination of both commentators will provide a comprehensive 
comparison of the fundamental differences between these two feminist schools of thought. 
Furthermore, by presenting their arguments in a deliberately reductive form designed to 
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encapsulate the key differences in their standpoints of greatest significance to legal 
developments in this sphere, this thesis will create a heuristic device which will be used to 
analyse the jurisdictions explored within this thesis. This provides an original lens through 
which to judge the operation of the four jurisdictions and provides a platform for discussing 
reform. 
2.2.2.4.1 Deech’s Position 
Deech’s stance (as aforementioned) reflects the liberal feminist position which holds that 
autonomy and financial independence (and therefore self-sufficiency) is the key to gender 
equality. Deech argues that women are as capable as men of acting with legal rationality and 
independent thought and she vehemently opposes the image of the vulnerable, weak woman 
who is compelled to remain in the domestic sphere against her own wishes. It is the shift in 
women’s position299 through education, political status and participation in the workforce 
which, in Deech’s eyes, means that women can and should be treated equally to men without 
any concession to their choice to take on a childcare/homemaker role. To have a system which 
‘recognises’ contributions traditionally made by women in the private sphere would remove 
the idea that women are capable of choosing their own lifestyles.300  
Consequently, Deech promotes the liberal values of ‘voluntarism’ or ‘choice’. Therefore, she 
argues that as women are equal to men and should be treated so, they should be accountable 
for the choices that they have made in accordance with their own free will. Deech accordingly 
argues that women who do not engage in the economic sphere have failed (rather than being 
prevented from doing so) and that ‘failures in those fields do not mean that the divorcing 
husband is responsible for them.’301 To have a state imposed solution removes some of the 
power and freedom that women have in the private realm, to organise their own affairs and 
choose how to carry out their day-to-day roles and how to have their assets and childcare 
divided on relationship breakdown. This, in turn, perpetuates the concept that women are 
unable to be rational in comparison to men. Their choice to give up economic employment is 
‘a free choice to opt for the home rather than the office’302 and therefore women should take 
the financial consequences of having made this decision. Accordingly, to have greater state 
regulation within the private sphere would compromise gender equality by perpetuating 
gendered stereotypes; ‘female dependency tends to deny freedom of choice’.303 However, 
                                                          
299 Or ‘background conditions’ as Fineman refers to below in section 2.2.2.4.2 
300 R Deech, ‘The Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation’ (1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 480, 
486 
301 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1142 
302 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1142 
303 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229, 230 
64 
 
Deech’s position freely ignores the ‘irrational’ desire to care for the family at the expense of 
woman’s own career. Furthermore, it fails to consider the couples’ joint benefits relating to 
the child welfare or from avoiding the practical difficulties of finding quality childcare.  
Maintenance provisions at the end of a relationship (in stark contrast to Fineman’s perspective 
where they may provide some way of equalising resources between unequal family 
members304) therefore pose serious difficulties for Deech. Her primary concern is that 
recognising and quantifying domestic contributions or the homemaking position will legitimise 
the perception of the homemaker’s role as being inherently feminine.305 To do so would, from 
Deech’s position, be counterproductive to gender equality in two ways: deterring women from 
engaging with the public sphere and limiting gender equality in the public sphere.  
Firstly, using her rationale, maintenance will persuade women out of the working environment 
to choose a legitimised lifestyle characterised by financial dependence: 
It is actually considered degrading to women…and perpetuates the common law 
proprietary relationship of the husband and wife even after divorce…306 
Deech describes extensive maintenance provisions as essentially punishing husbands while at 
the same time rewarding women for assuming the stereotypical gendered role by carrying out 
domestic contributions and caretaking. This fundamentally encourages the development of a 
‘meal-ticket’ attitude, making it more beneficial for women to remarry than to find work.307 
Deech also fears that the valuing of domestic contributions will create an easier route for 
women and encourage ‘gold-digging’ as it would essentially make the homemaker ‘exempt 
from financial responsibility for the family.’308 This in turn serves to reinforce stereotypes of 
male superiority and increases hostility between former husbands and wives.309 Deech argues 
that the theory of compensation behind this (that there is a need to compensate non-
monetary contributions and handicaps in the labour market) is erroneous given that for: 
…most women work, [caretaking] is a matter of choice; childcare does not take up the 
whole of a long marriage…310 
The dependency that Fineman discusses below is therefore from Deech’s perspective 
temporary and fleeting. Furthermore, carrying out domestic work is to some extent self-
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interested as housework, whether single or cohabiting, must be done.311 Deech therefore 
argues that instead the law ought to be promoting the principle that women should and can 
strive for economic independence to limit the subordination of their sex through a 
dependency on male finance.  
Her second argument is that state interference in the private sphere may actually defeat the 
progress made for gender equality in the public sphere. She argues that economic 
disadvantages suffered by wives should not be shouldered solely by the husband and actually 
large awards to rich women serve to further disadvantage the low paid married working 
woman. These sorts of awards legitimise employers’ attitudes that discriminate against 
women ‘as they are aware of the meal-ticket-for-life mentality.’312 Consequently, Deech wants 
the private sphere to stay just that: private. 
Deech therefore wants to see an end to discretion-based financial provision at the end of 
relationships and instead a greater recognition of autonomy by enforcing the use of pre- and 
post- nuptial contracts between couples. Where there is no contract, Deech favours the 
continental community-of-property approach of formally dividing narrowly defined 
matrimonial property313 between the couple. Short term marriages of three years or less 
should be returned to the position that they were in before they married. Those with children, 
or small assets should be allowed to remain in the home until the children are 18. 
Maintenance from Deech’s position should be eliminated except where children are present or 
the spouse is unable to work and should aim solely to be rehabilitative to enable financial 
autonomy post-divorce.314 Therefore, she prioritises formal equality and certainty in a bid to 
‘reduc[e] costs and promot[e] negotiation in a better spirit.’315 This is in stark contrast to 
Fineman’s perception that equality of resources should be the focus of any post-separation 
financial provision.  
Deech’s choice and autonomy arguments also extend to her views on cohabiting couples. 
While Fineman maintains that all care-givers should be treated the same,316 for Deech, treating 
cohabitants synonymously with married couples is dangerous. Firstly, they are different 
entities; cohabitants have chosen not to marry and cohabitants have no outward signs of 
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commitment317 and so are unstable.318 Therefore, to protect them using the same legal 
measures as married couples would be unfounded as both the spouse and the cohabitant have 
different expectations; cohabitants, she assumes, have freely chosen not to marry and thus 
should forego any benefits on relationship breakdown, whether it be to retain benefits from 
not being married or to avoid the legal consequences of marriage. Cohabitants’ choice not to 
marry (and correspondingly their responsibility for the consequences of this) should be 
respected and ‘there should be a corner of freedom where couples may escape Family Law 
with all its difficulties.’319 Deech therefore argues that to have specific cohabitation law 
interferes with the rights of the individual: ‘autonomy, privacy, a sphere of thought and action 
that should be free from public and legal interference, namely the right to live together 
without having a legal structure imposed on one without consent or contract to that effect.’320 
Secondly, Deech fears that extending remedies on divorce to the cohabiting context 
(particularly in their current state) would ‘retard the emancipation of women’ as it would 
enforce regulation based on entrenched gendered stereotypes. Furthermore, it would 
encourage women to take an easier path, to become ‘gold-diggers’: 
What message would such a Bill give to young girls contemplating further education, 
when it opens the way to huge hand-outs to women who have been fortunate enough 
to live with a rich man for a while, while others, equally deserving, will get nothing at 
the end of a relationship because there are no assets available to be shared?321 
Consequently, Deech argues that cohabiting contracts should be recognised and enforced to 
‘build on [cohabitants’] autonomy rather than take it away.’322 Deech does not want to 
reinforce gender stereotypes and consequently wants to avoid the homemaker/breadwinner 
presumption that she feels is present in the marital context. Yet, she argues that, if necessary, 
the extension of Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 may be appropriate323 to ensure that 
cohabitants are responsible for their children while at the same time respecting their 
autonomy.324 Currently, having a system which does not protect financial autonomy may 
dissuade couples (particularly those with big assets) from marrying. However, Deech argues 
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that as the most stable place for children is within a marriage, it is important to not have a 
legal structure in place that will deter people from marriage.325  
2.2.2.4.2 Fineman’s Position  
Fineman has a fundamentally different perspective on what the relationship between the state 
and the family should be. Like Deech, she is dissatisfied with the dual message that women 
have to care-take or to perform in the economic field,326 but her answer to this problem lies in 
the reordering of the family, to move it from its focus around sexual relationships to care 
relationships.  
In The Neutered Mother, Fineman critiques how sexual relationships are at the centre of legal 
regulation; the current husband-wife structure, she argues, serves to disadvantage the mother 
and care-giving relationships. By focusing on a sexual bond rather than ‘motherhood’, Fineman 
contends that the core concepts of patriarchy are reinforced; namely sexuality and intimacy; 
and thus patriarchy continues to be the dominant discourse in family arrangements.327 
Consequently, Fineman critiques the general trend towards formal equality between husband 
and wife as advocated by liberal feminists such as Deech. She maintains that this move, which 
has fundamentally involved degendering or neutralising relationship roles and a shift towards 
sameness in treatment between sexual partners, in fact ignores differences between genders 
rather than eradicates them: 
Ignoring differences in favour of assimilation has not made the differences in gender 
expectations and behaviour disappear. These differences operate to women’s 
disadvantage as the material implications of motherhood, for example, have negative 
consequences in the context of career development and opportunity.328 
Fineman argues that this ‘sameness’ argument is overly simplistic and therefore an obstacle to 
finding an adequate solution for the societal and economic problems that women face.329 She 
contends that it is necessary to ‘…recognise the reality of existing systemic and persistent 
inequalit[ies] and move beyond the simplistic equality paradigm, establishing an affirmative 
feminist theory of difference.’330 While Deech asserted that women are as rational and capable 
as men, Fineman stresses that women are different and these ‘differences’ extend far beyond 
the biological to include cultural disparities with the latter being harder to change than the 
former: ‘to state that something is socially constructed, in [Fineman’s] opinion, is to concede 
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that it is powerful and resistant to change.’331 Consequently, she develops the concept of 
‘gendered lives’ to demonstrate that: 
…as a socially and legally defined group, women share the potential for experiencing a 
variety of situations, statuses, and ideological and political impositions in which their 
gender is culturally relevant…332 
Fineman is careful to point out that she is not claiming that all women will react identically or 
that all women’s experiences will be wholly dissimilar from men’s experiences. Rather, she 
states, that there are some experiences, such as aging, that women typically experience in a 
unique way.333 Consequently, despite the infinite differences that exist between women, all 
women must care about the social and legal construction of gender as inevitably all women 
will be treated by and measured by this interpretation. Fineman uses motherhood to explain 
this: 
…Although we may make individual choices not to become mothers, social construction 
and its legal ramifications operate independent of individual choice. As is 
demonstrated in everyday existence, women will be treated as mothers (or potential 
mothers) because ‘Woman’ as a cultural and legal category inevitably encompasses 
and incorporates socially constructed notions of motherhood in its definition.334 
By creating a space for women’s perspectives335 to be seen as distinct from men’s and making 
gender central, Fineman argues that it is possible to consider and challenge these differences 
to ‘remedy socially and culturally imposed harms to women.’336  
Accordingly, Fineman is critical of the ‘gender-neutral fetish of liberal legalism’337 and argues 
that the equality rhetoric has a negative impact on the mother. The move towards equality 
between the husband-wife dyad has neutered ‘mother’ to ‘parent’ and at the same time 
reclassified ‘mother’ as ‘wife’ to suggest an equal or full partnership between husbands and 
wives.338 Wives are therefore expected to act as economic actors as Deech’s stance 
demonstrates. Yet, Fineman argues that this position held by liberal feminists is extremely 
detrimental to children.339 To contend that women should participate as equals in the public 
sphere ignores differences and the fact that women (as a gendered category) bear the burden 
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of intimacy;340 women bear children and therefore dependency. Those who assume the 
primary care for children (most typically women) become dependent on others so that the 
care can be conducted341 and yet, the institutions in place in society342 do not facilitate the 
care of children. Consequently women are disadvantaged by this dependency in terms of their 
ability (and their expectation) to engage as equals in the public sphere.343 ‘It is only legal 
discourse, not society that is now formally Mother purged. The very gendered and mothered 
lives most women live continue.’344 
Yet, despite the impact that dependency has on the caretaker’s ability to engage in the public 
sphere, dependency is hidden within the private family sphere. The move towards a concept of 
partnership in the husband-wife dyad has meant that dependency is no longer the justification 
for reallocating marital wealth to women345 and as a result Fineman argues that dependency is 
an underdeveloped discourse within the family.346 While dependency, she argues, is natural 
and inevitable,347 society’s traditional assignment of caretaking to women, wives, mothers, 
daughters, daughters-in-law and sisters348 and the historic division of labour in the family make 
the continued importance placed on the nuclear family harmful and a repository of 
dependency: ‘dependency is naturally assigned to this private family by the state. Within the 
family, this dependency is further directed by continued gendered role division.’349 The 
gender-neutral equality rhetoric therefore disadvantages care-givers and fails to adequately 
value the importance of this nurturing role in society. Fineman also focuses on those who do 
not conform to the traditional family, such as single mothers, who in direct contrast to the 
nuclear family, lack privacy and seem to warrant what Fineman deems as ‘punitive’ state 
intervention.350 Consequently, while Deech argues that the private sphere should remain 
private, Fineman contends that the private family is not a sufficient space to deal with single 
motherhood or the lack of equality in the family.  
Fineman’s solution to these fundamental problems within Family Law is to propose a radical 
restructuring of Family Law. To ‘provide a protected space for nurturing and caretaking’,351 she 
suggests a shift in the focus of Family Law from the husband/wife dyad to the mother/child 
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dyad where ‘mother’ also means those who take care of dependants, and child refers to all 
those who are dependent. This, Fineman argues, will protect the weaker nurturing units352 and 
it will consequently place responsibility on the state to protect and regulate the family rather 
than relying just on the private family. The Law would be asserting an imposed solution on 
how to recognise domestic contributions and thus give greater weight to those in the home-
caring role. Therefore, the state protects the care-relationships by preventing the law from 
overlooking them purely because they happen within the private sphere. Therefore, it would 
mean ending marriage as a category with any legal significance and reforming the law around 
the functional family.353 
In The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency, Fineman critiques American political dialogue 
for overusing the term ‘autonomy’ and develops the idea of dependency that she raised in The 
Neutered Mother, presenting it as a natural and inevitable societal condition. Consequently, 
The Autonomy Myth advances her position to argue that society owes a social debt to 
caretaking and therefore there should be a ‘collective responsibility for dependency.’354 Her 
thesis moves beyond the focus of the family and the traditional private sphere to re-examine 
and challenge the public/private divide itself. Therefore Fineman also examines the role of the 
workplace and the state and in turn argues that the public/private boundaries need 
remodelling so that dependency is no longer hidden within the private family sphere. Thus, 
Fineman argues that the care-dyad should be supported and subsidised by these public 
institutions rather than left to the private realm of the family which inevitably serves to 
damage care relationships and perpetuates gendered inequalities.  
Fineman identifies ‘autonomy’ and ‘equality’ as ideological terms frequently used in the 
political and legal arena of American society. Autonomy is ‘characterised by self-sufficiency 
and independence…only if we are economically self-reliant can we be considered 
independent’355 and so dependency and subsidy are therefore highly stigmatised antonyms.356 
Autonomy, for Fineman, can be understood as the mandate for equality of opportunity.357 
However, ‘terms such as autonomy and equality…can be understood in conflicting and 
incompatible ways.’358 For example ‘equality of opportunity’ could mean allowing individuals 
to succeed or fail based on their own merits or it could justify affirmative action to equalise 
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possibilities for potentially excluded groups.359 In family terms, Fineman emphasises the 
approach taken severely affects the division of matrimonial assets and ongoing financial 
responsibilities post-divorce.360 Should there be a formal division of assets between husband 
and wife that will recognise equality at the expense of the caretaker’s autonomy as Deech 
contends or should the care-dyad be able to achieve autonomy at the expense of equality and 
the other party’s autonomy to choose the extent of their contributions?361 
For Fineman, the answer to this dilemma is to recast autonomy. In its current form, autonomy 
is not possible while ‘only some individuals bear the burdens of family and reproduction in 
society’;362 autonomy only works where inequalities are not present.363 However, dependency 
currently is hidden within the private family which hinders gender equality as it is impossible 
to break the gendered division of labour.364 Therefore Fineman argues that for autonomy to 
exist there needs to be an equality of resources and a collective responsibility for the care-
dyad. Consequently she proposes a new definition of autonomy; ‘autonomy supported by 
societal commitment for the provision of basic social needs.’365 This definition will shift 
dependency from the hidden realms of the family to give it greater social recognition.  
There are different ways in which this shift can occur. Fineman places a higher value on 
childcare, but the question that this demands is how this is to be translated into the private 
sphere. Should there be greater state provisions for childcare such as the extensive ones seen 
in Scandinavia, or should there be a higher valuation of these contributions on relationship 
breakdown through Family Law? For Fineman, to attain family equality, the workplace must be 
retheorised and the whole public/private divide rethought:366 the care-dyad must be at the 
heart of the family, rather than hidden in the family. In fact Fineman once again indicates that 
sexual relationships should not give rise to legal structures. Therefore a structural change in 
other societal institutions outside of the family is necessary367 to take account of the double 
burden to meet the conflicting demands of workers and care-giving.368 To ignore care-giving 
not only perpetuates this autonomy myth but it also serves to continue the economic 
disadvantages suffered by caretakers.369 Thus, Fineman wants the state and the family to no 
longer be cast as distinct public/private spheres, but rather to anchor the caretaking family 
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firmly within the state and she uses the metaphor of social contract to develop this idea. 
Fineman argues that the responsibility for care-giving should be spread to social institutions 
other than the family370 to make dependency more visible rather than just absorbed by the 
family.371 She therefore argues that there should be collective responsibility for dependency 
with a more tenable workplace and state. In the workplace, Fineman argues that there should 
be a greater sharing of the fruits of the labour for employees and employers which take into 
account the organisation and functioning of the family.372 For the relationship between the 
individual and the state, Fineman argues that there should be a more substantive concept of 
equality which addresses equality of resources through a ‘lifelong provision of fundamental 
social goods, which are necessary for individual survival and flourishing, and specific additional 
subsidies that support the caretaker and caretaking.’373  
Yet, this utopia for Fineman has some practical limitations. To restructure the social fabric in 
such a way demands enormous societal change to this social contract and the boundaries of 
the public/private divide. Consequently, Fineman’s design seems beyond current financial 
possibilities. Furthermore, it would require a dramatic shift in attitudes by both reformers and 
the general public and it does not seem possible for this change to be a rapid one. Therefore, 
for the foreseeable future Fineman’s reconception of the family is not fully realisable. Instead, 
it is necessary to consider more realistic ways in which Fineman’s care-dyad family can replace 
the current patriarchal family. In the absence of larger structural reforms to the way in which 
society views the family, it is possible to use Family Law and particularly financial provision on 
divorce as a means through which ‘care’ and therefore dependency can be placed at the heart 
of the family. In The Autonomy Myth, Fineman believes dependency should have greater social 
recognition because it should not be cast as a societal ‘problem’;374 it is inevitable through 
undertaking care and therefore ‘independence from subsidy and support is not attainable, nor 
is it desirable; we want and need the webs of economic and social relationships that sustain 
us.’375 Therefore, it should not be viewed as (as Deech sees it) an autonomous ‘choice’ to 
assume the care-giving role or at least not a choice to consent to the ‘societal conditions 
accompanying that role and the many ways in which that status will negatively affect her and 
her children’s economic prospects.’376 Instead, Fineman argues that there is a social debt owed 
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to care-givers given that ‘caring for dependents is a society-preserving task.’377 Yet this vital 
societal function carries with it a double burden: firstly the economic disadvantage of care-
giving and secondly that at the same time families that require subsidy are considered to be 
failing. It therefore is a matter that Fineman believes should be an issue of social concern 
rather than hidden away in the family sphere.378 Consequently, for Family Law this requires a 
more holistic consideration of the inevitable dependency that arises from the economic impact 
of care-giving. 
By contending that care-giving should be a societal concern rather than remaining a private 
family matter, Fineman inevitably questions the public/private divide. Here Fineman reiterates 
her argument voiced in The Neutered Mother that the family should not be centred on the 
husband-wife dyad: ‘…marriage allows us to ignore dependency in our policy and politics 
because we can always safely refer that nasty subject to the waiting societal receptor.’379 
However, while the private sphere has traditionally been seen by feminists like Deech as 
dangerous and detrimental to women,380 Fineman argues that this is because the private 
sphere’s boundaries are drawn around the husband-wife relationship. As a consequence, 
dependency has been privatised, absorbed by the family and is therefore invisible; inevitably 
the economically stronger spouse will carry the power in a relationship and thus the traditional 
gendered division of roles will continue.381  
…it is the role of mother, not her sex that is disadvantageous to a woman in a 
workplace that has been designed for a ‘breadwinner’ who is supported by someone at 
home doing dependency work…382 
Consequently, assuming the role of care-giver within the private sphere is not, as Deech would 
argue, an autonomous choice. Fineman argues that autonomy for the care-dyad is not 
possible: ‘motherhood is mired in dependency’ for both the child and the carer383 and yet the 
workplace is not designed for the caretaker or the family and therefore the family is 
disadvantaged.384 Equality is only feasible if someone else is carrying out the caretaking.385 
Therefore, it is the arbitrary division of the public/private spheres that disadvantages women 
in the private domestic sphere and yet at the same time this perpetuates the autonomy myth 
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that autonomy (or self-sufficiency/independence) is attainable for everyone in society.386 
While, for Fineman, the answer to this dilemma is in a radical restructuring of societal 
institutions, it is possible that Family Law could be used to achieve entitlement to equality of 
resources. By reallocating family property at the end of the relationship in a manner based on 
entitlement but that is designed to meet needs and provide ongoing support for the care-
dyad, it is possible to allow parties to achieve substantive rather than formal equality.   
2.2.2.4.3 The Lenses 
Deech and Fineman clearly have different conceptual stances on how the law should regulate 
the family sphere as exemplified in table 2.1 below. It is evident that the core differences 
between the liberal and difference feminist schools of thought can result in diametrically 
opposed reform options. However, how would these reform options work in practice? Would 
systems which embrace the core principles of either commentator solve the gender 
inequalities and dissatisfaction that currently exist within the provisions in England and Wales? 
Or given that Deech seems to focus more on couples without children while Fineman really 
only focuses on families with care-dyads present could a balance be achieved between these 
two viewpoints? To explore the answer to this question the jurisdictions selected have systems 
that embody these positions to varying degrees on the spectrum between Deech and 
Fineman.387 New Zealand is most Deech-like, embodying the values of certainty, autonomy, 
formal equality and clean break and separating long and short duration marriages. Scotland is 
also Deech-like with greater elements of Fineman: while it embodies similar values to New 
Zealand, it also introduces concepts of an economic burden of care and a greater focus on 
compensatory provisions designed to protect the homemaker. Queensland, Australia seems to 
have Fineman as a starting point with elements of Deech: it is discretionary, specifically valuing 
domestic contributions although they are not equated equally to financial contributions and 
maintenance provisions are rarely awarded. Finally, England and Wales has the most pro-
Fineman approach which is discretionary and focuses on future needs at the most basic level 
of financial provision, but it also makes room for compensation and equal sharing and it also 
regularly awards maintenance where property division will not meet needs. Thus, Fineman and 
Deech’s polarised positions (that embody core difference and liberal feminist values) are given 
a framework of effect.  
Furthermore, by using the lenses of both commentators as a means to evaluate these 
jurisdictions, this critique will be able to consider the effect that such approaches have on 
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women, whether there is any resulting gendered bias or exclusion and whether one approach 
or a balance of the two would be a favourable approach to law reform in England and Wales. 
The next section shall now address the empirical methods that shall be used hand in hand with 
the feminist methods to test whether these theoretical feminist ideals work in practice. This 
will provide a three-dimensional approach to looking at whether these jurisdictions satisfy 
feminist demands and practical demands. 
 
Table 2.1 A Comparison of Deech and Fineman's positions 
Ruth Deech’s Position Martha Fineman’s Position 
Women and men should be treated equally; 
women are as rational as men 
Women are different from men; this 
difference lies in gendered lives 
Autonomy: Imposing a solution will 
subordinate, and undermine women’s 
autonomy 
Autonomy myth! Dependency is inherent, 
thus the Mother/child care-dyad needs 
protecting by state 
Responsibility for choice to assume caretaking 
role 
Assume caretaking role is not a product of 
free will 
The Law should promote autonomy and 
economic independence 
The Law should protect the care-dyad; 
collective responsibility for dependency 
The Law should remain outside of the private 
sphere 
The Law should protect and recognise the 
private sphere, make sure the carer’s voice is 
‘heard’ in the public sphere 
Formal equality  Entitlement to equality of resources 
Domestic contributions should have no value; 
financial contributions and property 
ownership is central. To value them is to 
retard the emancipation of women  
Care, and therefore domestic contributions 
should be central and highly valued by 
state/law 
 
Cohabitants should have no remedy; their 
free choice not to marry should be recognised  
The family should be based on function rather 
than form. Therefore around the care-dyad 
regardless of relationship status. It shouldn’t 
be based around the husband/wife dyad  
Ideally financial agreements; maintenance 
should only apply in extreme circumstances 
and be rehabilitative. 
Maintenance and discretion to support the 
care-dyad in addition to entitlement to 
equality of resources 
End of discretion – certainty is key Needs discretion: dependent on it to work out 
how to protect care dyad 
 
2.2.3 Empirical Investigation 
The empirical phases of this thesis will provide important insight into the ways that law reform 
could value domestic contributions. The University of Exeter's ethics committee gave research 
ethics approval, having scrutinised the empirical methods employed.388 Further ethical 
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considerations are discussed below.389 This part of the project will answer research question 
1(c) and research questions 2(a) and (b) outlined above in section 2.1. 
As aforementioned, empirical methodology has been chosen as it was felt that analysing the 
law at solely a theoretical level would in fact only present a superficial examination into the 
effects of the differing legal systems. Empirical methods will allow deeper investigation into 
‘the impact that law, legal institutions, legal personnel and associated phenomena have on 
people, communities and societies, as well as the influence that various social, economic and 
political factors have on law, legal phenomena and institutions.’390 Research question 1(c) is 
addressed through interviews with lawyers which explore the practical impact of the schemes, 
and research question 2(a) is explored by analysing these interviews to consider what lessons 
England and Wales can learn from these different jurisdictional approaches. This will help 
avoid the simplistic transplanting of other jurisdictions’ legal schemes into our own system.  
Given the calls for change in both the married and cohabiting context,391 research question 
2(b) is vital to address the opinions of those who would be directly affected by altering the law 
of financial provision on relationship breakdown. As the Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal 
research stated: 
As [the] Government increasingly regulates economic, social and family relationships in 
rapidly changing contexts, there is a need for empirical evidence about the impact of 
law and regulation; how mechanisms of regulatory control could be improved and 
adapted; how individuals and organisation[s] respond and adapt to the legal 
environment and how law can contribute to the overall well-being of society.392 
Furthermore considering Article 8 of the ECHR conveys a right to respect for one’s private and 
family life and one’s home, reform that has implications on legal responsibilities between 
family members requires some consideration of the views of those who are most likely to be 
affected. This next section will outline the research methods involved in answering firstly 
research question 1c (structured interviews) and then research question 2b (focus groups).  
2.2.3.1 Qualitative versus Quantitative Stratagems 
This thesis adopts a mixture of quantitative (structured interviews) and qualitative techniques 
(focus groups) to answer RQ1c and RQ2b respectively for what Bryman terms as 
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‘completeness’ where ‘the researcher can bring together a more comprehensive account of 
the area of inquiry.’393 
These two types of methodology represent different epistemological stances. Quantitative 
strategies are predominantly connected with positivism which advocates the objective 
collection of numerical and statistical data and a ‘predilection for a natural science 
approach.’394 This ‘fact-finding’ nature, manifest in questionnaires, seeks trends and patterns 
within data, searching to explain events. Alternatively, qualitative stratagems are intrinsically 
linked to interpretivism which advocates subjectively ‘focus[ing] on words rather than 
numbers, capturing data through open-ended questions using techniques such as historical 
analysis, focus groups…and interviews.’395 Its emphasis on ‘the properties, the state and the 
character’396 (the participants’ rather than the researcher’s viewpoint397) enables the research 
to develop an understanding of why particular events occur. Consequently, a combination of 
these two approaches has traditionally been met with controversy, with some arguing that 
qualitative and quantitative stances cannot be combined due to conflicting theoretical 
commitments.398  
Yet, the use of both together is something that is becoming more popular within social science 
and socio-legal research projects as it is felt that each stratagem will compensate for the 
other’s shortfalls.399 Quantitative methods are accused of losing some context or element of 
understanding by overlooking the respondent within the process, consequently presenting a 
static view of social reality and an artificial sense of precision.400 In comparison qualitative 
methods have been called too subjective, vague, and imprecise,401 therefore qualitative 
research is difficult to replicate due to its unstructured nature, and there is a risk of over-
generalising because its sample size is so small. These methods often lack transparency402 and 
so raise data validity issues.403 Furthermore, the two different approaches will possess and 
search for different concepts of true or acceptable knowledge: ‘focus[ing] on the different 
dimensions of the same phenomenon.’404 RQ1(c) seeks to generate knowledge and measure 
the regimes’ effectiveness and thus the use of structured interviews will enable a direct 
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comparison of the pros and cons of the differing jurisdictions. RQ2(b), on the other hand seeks 
to understand and test the parameters of the general public’s opinions on the direction of 
reform, therefore focus groups will facilitate some insight into this approach. Consequently 
using these quantitative and qualitative approaches together will present a thorough 
examination as each element will complement and strengthen the deficiencies of the other 
approach. 
This project uses a combination of structured interviews (which also included some open-
ended questions) and focus groups, both signifying different relationships between theory and 
research. Whereas structured interviews are deductive, testing theories where the researchers 
must already be aware of the range of possible answers405 (which shall be deduced from some 
of the feminist conceptions of fairness perhaps), focus groups are more inductive providing 
flexibility to accommodate and encourage the exploration and revelation of non-prescribed 
issues. Consequently, the structured interviews will test whether the trends and patterns406 of 
the differing positive and negative effects in the jurisdictions differ and how. This presents a 
more general overview of the system and allows a comparison of how the schemes function in 
reality. This method will further allow for measurement of opinions and patterns enabling 
‘more precise estimates of the degree of relationship between the concepts.’407 In contrast, 
focus groups provide a social context that permits the exploration of a participant’s 
experiences and beliefs to generate a detailed understanding of the particular social 
phenomena in question and thus will determine how well the schemes would be received, and 
what the public actually want. 
2.2.3.2 Interview Stage 
Structured interviews can take place face-to-face or over the phone. Instead of encouraging 
dialogue, the participant has a far less significant role to play (a hierarchy between researcher 
and participant is visible); the questions are predominantly closed and (through the use of an 
interview schedule) read out in an exact order so as to produce exactly the same stimuli or 
context in each interview to reduce the amount of interviewer variation and potential bias 
infiltrating results. This technique reveals patterns and trends which are broader and more 
generalising by standardising the methodology408 and provides enough closed questions to 
make a better direct comparison between the jurisdictions. Furthermore it was felt that a 
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more structured schedule of questions would facilitate a better way of comparing the 
jurisdictions, as the codes are already set prior to the interview taking place. 
Nevertheless, it was felt that a structured interview would in fact be more appropriate than a 
self-completion questionnaire. While self-completion questionnaires would remove the issue 
of transcribing altogether, it was felt that it limited the possibility of probing, and insuring that 
questions were fully understood and fully answered. A structured interview also allows for any 
issues that have not previously been thought of beforehand to be followed up. This is not to 
standardise, but to facilitate comparisons and it is possible to ask some open questions, 
whereas with the questionnaires, respondents are less likely to write longer answers. Self-
completion questionnaires often have lower response rates and a greater risk of having 
unanswered questions; using structured interviews instead will ensure that all questions are 
answered. This allows prompting and probing ensuring answers are complete. It also keeps 
interviewer control, whereas the questionnaires would lose it to some degree. 
Each structured interview was carried out by telephone, due to geographical factors. Thus to 
keep the context the same, the legal professionals in England and Wales were approached by 
telephone, even though it would here be feasible to contact them in person. Although some 
research suggests there are lower response rates to interviews by telephone,409 it was a 
practical necessity in this project. 
2.2.3.2.1 Sample 
The sample for this thesis is not intended to be statistically representative, and thus does not 
need to be nationally representative within the jurisdictions or representative of the 
composition of the legal professions. It was felt that this would be an unachievable aim given 
the time-span and cost-limitations. Accordingly, this section aims to collect a small cross-
section of the legal professions in each country to compare their interpretation of their 
jurisdiction. Therefore, from each of the four jurisdictions, between 13 and 16 lawyers were 
selected as these respondents encounter the schemes’ practical effects as they are involved in 
its day-to-day running. Given that the Australian cohabitation regime which applies to all 
states bar Southern and Western Australia had only been enacted since 1st March 2009,410 this 
thesis selected respondents from Queensland, Australia which had (prior to 2009) similar State 
provisions for cohabiting couples.411 It was therefore hoped that respondents from 
Queensland would have greater insight into how the new Federal regime would operate in 
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practice. Of those participants involved, there was an equal number of men and women from 
each jurisdiction except New Zealand (perhaps due to the fact that gaining participants from 
this jurisdiction most heavily relied on snowballing in comparison to the others), in case 
concepts of fairness and bias towards clients differ between genders, and each jurisdiction had 
a range of those who had practised from three to over 40 years, thus the respondents had a 
detailed knowledge of this legal area, and experience with a large number of cases. The 
characteristics of the samples are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Contact was made in a number of ways and the predominant method in each jurisdiction was 
approaching practitioners through e-mail. Websites which listed the membership of specialist 
Family Lawyers were identified and then an e-mail was either sent to individual members or an 
e-mail was sent to the organisation and asked to be distributed to its registered members such 
as the Family Law sections of the Queensland Law Society and the New Zealand Law Society, 
also Scotland’s Faculty of Advocates and Family Law Association and Resolution and the Family 
Law section of the Law Society of England and Wales. Furthermore, key firms were also 
identified and targeted and adverts were placed in popular legal resources. Snowballing was 
also used, and respondents tended to forward the e-mail to other colleagues who might be 
interested in taking part. 
The aim was to get a range of lawyers from a variety of locations within each jurisdiction to 
give a broad overview of the practical operation of the scheme. However, in England and 
Wales, most of the respondents who came forward in response to advertising the project were 
located in the South of England and in Queensland, Australia the majority were from Brisbane 
itself. Scotland and New Zealand had a much wider geographical range of lawyers. 
2.2.3.2.2 Interview schedule 
A pilot was carried out on three interviewees to test out the schedule and this fed back into 
the design. The final interview schedule was split into three parts (the initial socio-
demographic characteristics were collected through e-mail exchange prior to the interview). 
Section A looked at general attitudes towards statements relating to the perception of same-
sex/different sex cohabiting and civil partners/married couples (this altered according to 
relationship statuses terminology in each jurisdiction). These were ranked on a likert scale of 
strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.  Section B was 
concerned with the practical elements of each jurisdiction. A variety of questions were posed 
which looked at firstly the overall principles which guided their jurisdiction and the lawyers’ 
satisfaction with these. Secondly, the questions addressed how their jurisdiction value 
contributions and the interview schedule also assessed the lawyers’ opinion on these issues. 
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These looked at a number of relationship models (homemaker/breadwinner, dual earner, 
fulltime/part-time) as well as comparing relationship styles and also addressed the impact that 
the presence of children made. These questions were answered on a likert scale of 0 (agree) – 
10 (disagree) and were also followed up by a qualitative question which asked respondents to 
expand their answers. Each of these questions were asked in the context of married, civil 
partner (where relevant), different-sex cohabitant and same-sex cohabitants.  Section C finally 
used two scenarios of couples breaking up: the first based on Burns v Burns412  and the second 
based on Miller v Miller413 with a number of variables to establish how their jurisdiction would 
settle financial provision and how satisfied they were with this approach. A copy of the 
interview schedule is provided in appendix A. 
As a large proportion of the interview questions were closed questions, each interviewee’s 
response was recorded down by hand and to reduce interviewer effects, the questions were 
adhered to as closely as possible and question order did not vary, and awareness is given to 
the preceding questions. The interviews were also recorded to capture the open questions and 
this was done by the use of telephone recording equipment. 
2.2.3.2.3 Data Analysis: 
The interviews were recorded and the closed questions were coded before the interviews and 
then the results entered into SPSS for analysis. For the open questions, the responses were 
transcribed, entered into NVivo for analysis, manually coded using thematic analysis according 
to the six step process suggested by Braun and Clarke.414 This involved the researcher 
familiarising herself with the content, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing, 
defining and naming themes before setting out the findings. Specifically, theoretical thematic 
analysis415 was used as themes were generated against the backdrop of the opposing stances 
of Deech and Fineman. Therefore, the themes generated were based around Deech’s position 
of financial autonomy, clean break and formal equality and Fineman’s position that places 
importance on care-giving, discretion and substantive equality. The chapters which explore 
New Zealand, Scotland and Queensland, Australia present the jurisdictional findings which 
largely reflect on the qualitative results that came out of the open ended questions on the 
structured interview. The final jurisdictional chapter which examines England and Wales has a 
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larger comparative section which makes use of the quantitative data in order to draw broader 
comparisons between all four jurisdictions. 
2.2.3.3 Focus Groups: 
For this section of the thesis, focus groups in England and Wales were used to establish the 
opinions of those most affected by the schemes. Focus groups are group interviews focusing 
on a particular theme, in this instance the division of assets on relationship breakdown, and 
the valuation of domestic contributions. These sessions provide a more natural setting for 
participants to voice their opinions in a setting where the presence of other group members 
encourages the sharing of experiences and anecdotes and comments on one another’s 
contributions,416 allowing members to probe each other’s opinions causing others to qualify 
their view.417 It gives the participants more control over the direction of the argument, 
allowing them to raise issues that they feel are important in this area. Accordingly, focus 
groups are a qualitative technique which is inductive. It generates theory from data, and thus 
can develop the issues that are pertinent to the group and express their wishes for law reform. 
The lack of hierarchy between interviewee and participant also facilitates a greater freedom of 
speech. Moreover, it is possible to have a number of interviews at one time, and observable 
comparisons between conflicting opinions and socio-demographic features may reveal 
themselves in the course of the dialogue, rather than comparing structured interviews, one-
by-one. Each applicant was also asked to fill out a brief questionnaire presenting their socio-
demographic characteristics (discussed below). 
2.2.3.3.1 Sample 
The sample was not intended to be statistically and therefore nationally representative. 
Instead, the aim was to represent opinions from a range of different socio-demographic 
groups on how domestic contributions should be valued. It was decided that the groups would 
be divided according to relationship status and gender to test whether this affected attitudes 
to the different schemes. Other characteristics were desired to test whether these had an 
impact. Consequently, this project sought a sample to include a range of those with or without 
children, employment status, gender, income grouping and relationship duration to get a 
complete spectrum of the population and only one partner from each couple was used. 
Altogether five groups took place ranging between four and six participants. This is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 7 along with group numbers and the demographics of those groups. 
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The sample was drawn from the East Devon area to make it feasible to organise the groups. To 
gather participants, a number of strategies were deployed. Advertisements were placed 
around the University and in the local newspaper. Local nurseries were contacted and asked to 
place adverts on their notice boards. Additionally, a group was set up on the Facebook 
networking site advertised to people within the Exeter University website. E-mails were sent 
out to organisations asking for distribution, and snowballing was used with not only 
participants, but also from people who had been approached but did not fit within the 
research criteria. 
2.2.3.3.2 Focus Group Schedule 
A pilot focus group was carried out which fed into the design of the focus groups. The focus 
group schedule418 focused on general discussions of types of contributions, how domestic 
contributions should be valued beside financial contributions and what scope relationship 
property should take. In these questions, the groups were also asked whether this altered 
according to relationship status or differed between same-sex and different-sex relationships. 
The participants were then given a hand-out419 which presented five models based on each of 
the jurisdictions’ approaches. The groups were asked to outline their opinions on the 
approaches, which ones they preferred or disliked and whether different approaches were 
more or less suitable according to different relationship statuses. Then, finally, the groups 
were presented with two scenarios (again based on Burns420 and Miller421) which had a number 
of potential outcomes based on the differing approaches of the jurisdictions and were asked to 
select which outcome they preferred. Throughout the session, the moderator’s involvement 
was kept to a medium level; the group remained directed which ‘emphasises the research 
team’s focus [and is] better for consistent comparison.’422 To have less structure would 
potentially surrender control of the group which would have made it difficult to compare the 
groups.423 Each session took place at the University of Exeter and was recorded using an MP3 
recorder and notes were made if any significant body language signified agreement also.   
Additionally, at the start of the session, the groups were given a self-completion 
questionnaire424 to outline their socio-demographic characteristics. 
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2.2.3.3.3 Data Analysis 
The recordings were transcribed and thematic analysis was used to analyse the data from the 
focus groups using the six step process suggested by Braun and Clarke425 outlined in section 
2.2.4.2.3. Deech and Fineman’s contrasting positions were used to generate the themes. 
2.2.3.4 Ethical Considerations 
This project adheres to the School of Law's Statement on ethical practice which acknowledges 
the British Sociological Association and the Socio-Legal Studies Association’s statement of 
ethical practice. Furthermore, the project corresponds to the ethical guidelines in the 
jurisdictions studied, including the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research and the Australian code for the responsible conduct of research.426 For New Zealand, 
this project abided by the Association of Social Science Researchers’ Code of Ethics.427 
Participation was completely voluntary and the participants had to complete a consent form 
which they had to sign and return.428 Each respondent was supplied with an information sheet 
to ensure that the participants were fully informed of the research procedures and the nature 
of the research itself.429 They were informed that the sessions were being recorded. 
Throughout, the participants were aware that they could withdraw from the process at any 
time. All participants retained anonymity with any identifying information being removed by 
redacting any names or data that might make the participant identifiable. Additionally, the 
other focus group members came to an agreement on their own rules of confidentiality. To 
further ensure confidentiality, no one had permission to access any un-anonymised data for 
any purposes without the prior consent of the participants. The data was stored securely in 
secure filing cabinets and on password-locked computers. The data will be kept in an 
anonymised format for a period extending beyond the thesis deadline to ensure that it is no 
longer needed. 
2.2.3.5 Researcher Considerations 
Objectivity in empirical work is always a challenge for any researcher embarking on such a 
project. While all efforts were made to ensure that as much impartiality was kept as possible, 
inevitably it is not feasible for a researcher to be wholly objectively neutral. Bias inevitably 
arises in two forms: firstly the direct influence that the researcher may have over the 
                                                          
425 See note 423 above. V Braun and V Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology 
77, 87. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, section 7.2 
426 The Code is also a reference for people outside the research community who require information on the standards expected in 
responsible conduct of research within Australia. See <http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/r39syn_summary.htm> 
accessed 1 February 2009 
427 The Association can be found at:  <http://assr.rsnz.org/ethics.html> accessed 1 February 2009 
428 This was either physically or electronically given that some of the interview participants were based abroad. See Appendices E 
and F 
429 See Appendices G and H 
85 
 
participant’s behaviour and secondly the researcher’s own beliefs.430 The first form was limited 
as far as possible by keeping rigorously to the structured questionnaire for the interview stage 
of the project and by limiting moderator involvement to a medium level of interaction in the 
focus group stage. The second form of bias affects the way in which the data was analysed 
which hinges on the researcher’s approach due to its subjectivity.431 Again, although the 
researcher tried to stay as objective as possible, it is possible that the fact that the researcher 
is based in England and Wales may affect the analysis. 
2.3: Conclusion 
 
These three phases will present three dimensions to assessing the direction of reform. By using 
these different methods, a complete picture shall be given of the effectiveness of each 
different approach to valuing domestic contributions. However, there are some limitations, 
the samples are not nationally representative and are relatively small, thus the aim is to 
identify some major positives or negatives that these schemes may offer for consideration of 
reform in England and Wales. The next four Chapters use these combined methods in the 
context of New Zealand, Scotland, Queensland Australia and England and Wales. 
 
  
                                                          
430 J Iacono, A Brown and C Holtman, ‘Research Methods – a Case Example of Participant Observation’ (2009) 7 The Electronic 
Journal of Business Research Methods 1, 39 available online at <www.ejbrm.com> accessed 1 February 2009 
431 J Iacono, A Brown and C Holtman, ‘Research Methods – a Case Example of Participant Observation’ (2009) 7 The Electronic 
Journal of Business Research Methods 1, 39 available online at <www.ejbrm.com> accessed 1 February 2009 
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CHAPTER 3: DEECH’S POSITION IN PRACTICE – NEW 
ZEALAND 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2,432 New Zealand’s approach to financial provision on relationship 
breakdown, at first glance, most closely resembles Deech’s position. 
Although a common law jurisdiction, New Zealand now espouses a deferred community-of-
property system under which all relationship property (narrowly defined)433 is divided equally 
between the parties except for three situations:  
- Marriages of short duration (under three years) 
- Extraordinary Circumstances 
- Economic Disparity 
These exceptions provide the courts with greater discretion to consider how property awards 
should be made. However, certainty as a result of formal equality is at the heart of New 
Zealand’s framework. Accordingly, settlements are very predictable and it is extremely unusual 
for awards (especially the homemaker’s) to achieve anything other than 50% of relationship 
property.  Furthermore, New Zealand also has a strong concept of financial autonomy. Not 
only are pre-nuptial agreements recognised, but the system firmly adheres to the principle of 
clean break. Therefore maintenance is rarely awarded and where it is granted, it is solely 
rehabilitative, for example to retrain those who receive it. This jurisdiction therefore has a 
system which strongly protects property rather than the needs of the parties. 
Consequently, New Zealand’s regime embodies autonomy, formal equality and clean break 
and therefore it appears to be as close as possible to Deech’s position. Yet, at the same time, 
some elements of Fineman’s stance seem to have permeated the system through the 
exceptions to equal sharing. In particular, since the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 
2001, the courts are able to consider any economic disparity which exists between parties at 
the end of the relationship. This provision was designed to produce a fairer outcome for 
traditional homemaking wives by allowing the courts to have greater recognition of the 
economic impact that a care-giving role can have. Some purists have criticised these statutory 
                                                          
432 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.4.3 
433 This definition is discussed below. 
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provisions for weakening community-of-property within New Zealand.434 Nevertheless, despite 
these discretionary provisions, it seems that this overarching focus on formal equality rather 
than on the care-dyad (and its subsequent needs) means that New Zealand’s approach is far 
from satisfying Fineman’s position. Thus, New Zealand presents an opportunity to explore a 
system that embraces more of Deech’s core principles in practice while acknowledging some 
of Fineman’s concerns about the care-dyad. 
Therefore, this chapter examines a scheme that gives Deech’s position a practical framework 
of effect. Using Deech’s and Fineman’s positions as heuristic devices, this chapter considers 
the doctrinal implications that New Zealand’s scheme has for homemakers and care-givers. 
Furthermore, the empirical phase shall build a picture of how this approach operates from the 
user’s perspective. By combining these methods, this chapter will evaluate whether a balance 
has been achieved between these two feminist positions and in turn, how far New Zealand’s 
approach feeds into and develops broader considerations of how England and Wales should 
value domestic contributions. 
Additionally, New Zealand is particularly interesting because of its unique way of dealing with 
cohabiting couples. Since 2001 and the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act which 
amended the 1976 Matrimonial Property Act, New Zealand has treated married and cohabiting 
(also known as de facto couples) of over three years duration in exactly the same manner.  
This, since 2004, now includes same-sex cohabiting couples. Under the Civil Union Act 2004, 
both same-sex and different-sex couples can enter a civil union which has the same legal 
remedies as married couples have on divorce. One difference between cohabiting and married 
couples is that cohabiting couples on relationship breakdown simply have to stop living 
together whereas married couples must file for divorce. Thus, on the whole, these 
relationships are treated exactly the same when it comes to financial provision on relationship 
breakdown. This therefore provides an opportunity to consider the extension of a scheme 
closer to Deech’s position with regard to cohabiting couples. 
Before it is possible to begin the analysis, it is important to first consider the cultural 
similarities and differences between New Zealand, and England and Wales to avoid the 
dangers of transplanting legal provisions from one jurisdiction to the next.435 New Zealand is a 
common law jurisdiction and has strong historical connections (legally, politically and 
culturally) with England and Wales; New Zealand is part of the commonwealth and the Queen 
                                                          
434 Nicola Peart, ‘The Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001: A Conceptual Change’ (2008) 39 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 813, 827 - 828 
435 E Örücü, ‘Law as Transposition’ (2002) 51(2) International and Comparative Review 205 
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is its Head of State, represented by the Governor-General. New Zealand also has an 
uncodified, unwritten constitution much like England and Wales and it also closely follows a 
Westminster style Government clearly separating the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. However, New Zealand only has one house of Parliament (the House of 
Representatives) following the abolition of the upper house (the equivalent to the House of 
Lords) in 1951. Since the Statute of Westminster (1947),436 the New Zealand Parliament has 
unrestricted power to legislate, although it still has some UK statutes embedded in its system 
and there is still the possibility that the UK could extend laws to New Zealand with the 
Wellington Parliament’s consent. 
Thus, both systems have similar legal foundations with similar sources of law and are governed 
by the same legal principles of the rule of law, equity, procedural fairness, judicial precedent, 
prospective legislation and the separation of powers. In fact, as McLintock identifies, in New 
Zealand the courts’ policy has been to preserve uniformity with the common law in England.437 
Consequently, the courts often refer to decisions from the Supreme Court in England and 
Wales, and correspondingly, some English decisions refer to decisions made by the courts in 
New Zealand as can be seen in Lord Nicholls’ judgment in White.438 Nevertheless, one 
important difference is that New Zealand, is influenced by the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi which 
guides relations between the government and the Maori people. Although this does not 
directly influence Family Law approaches, it is an important difference between the nations 
and there are attempts in Family Law to make provisions for Maori customary law.  For 
example, the Property (Relationships) Act 2001 makes provision for the Maori in two ways. 
Firstly, s6 excludes Maori Land from the definition of relationship property and s2 excludes 
‘Taonga’ (treasured goods in Maori culture) from the definition of relationship chattels.439 
However, the inclusion of provisions relating to the Maori in Family Law has generally been ad 
hoc in nature and has been heavily criticised.440  
Culturally, in the family context, there are also similarities between New Zealand and England 
and Wales. New Zealand also shares growing rates of cohabitation441 and a decline in marriage 
from just under 40,000 in December 1961 to just over 13,800 in December 2008442 with people 
                                                          
436 Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947 (Public Act no. 28 of 1947) 
437A McLintock, ‘Legal System: Sources of Law’ (An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, 1966) 
<http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/1966/legal-system/1> accessed January 2010 
438 White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981 
439 J Ruru, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Family Law: Issues in Aoteatoa/New Zealand’ (2005) 19(3) International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family 327, 335 
440 See the discussion in J Ruru, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Family Law: Issues in Aoteatoa/New Zealand’ (2005) 19(3) International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 327, 335 
441 2 in 5 couples living together were unmarried in 2006 (an increase from 1 in 4 in 1996) Statistics New Zealand (2010) 
Demographic Trends (Statistics New Zealand 2009) 10 
442 Figure 3.01 Statistics New Zealand (2010) Demographic Trends (Statistics New Zealand 2009) 9 
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now marrying far later than ever before.443 Furthermore, the differences in both the public and 
private sphere between men and women in England and Wales seem also to be reflected in 
New Zealand. Women on average earn $438 compared to men’s $681 per week444 and are 
continually recorded as carrying out more housework: the 2006 census established 61% of 
those caring for someone who was either ill, a child or elderly were women445 and men are 
also recorded as spending far fewer hours on unpaid housework than women.446 
These similarities, alongside its distinct legal framework, make New Zealand an interesting and 
appropriate comparison for this study.  
3.2 Financial Provision on Divorce/Dissolution 
The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (henceforth P(R)A) as amended by the Property 
(Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 (henceforth P(R)AA) governs financial provision on 
divorce or dissolution. Since the Civil Union Act 2004, the P(R)A 1976 has been amended to 
include civil unions which are available to both same-sex couples and different-sex couples. 
Thus, while there are few reported cases on this type of relationship, it is presumed that 
exactly the same provisions will apply to Civil Unions as to Married couples.  
At the heart of this system is ‘the principle that questions arising under this Act about 
relationship property should be resolved as inexpensively, simply, and speedily as is consistent 
with justice.’447 This reflects the ideal principle that Deech thinks a system of financial provision 
should embody and New Zealand also focuses on reducing in-court litigation. The courts can 
make a series of orders under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (P(R)A) s33(4) ranging 
from lump sums to periodical instalments. However, the goal of financial provision in New 
Zealand is to facilitate a clean break where possible. 
The framework further echoes Deech’s standpoint in relation to pre-nuptial agreements. Part 6 
of the P(R)A, s21, allows for the parties to opt-out of the statutory regime through pre-nuptial 
(to contract out), nuptial or post-nuptial agreements448 to settle relationship property 
entitlements. For Deech, the presence of marital agreements allows for the ‘recognition of 
autonomy...with the aim of reducing costs and promoting negotiation in better spirit’449 as it 
allows the couples to regulate their affairs. Yet, in New Zealand there are some safeguards in 
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place and these agreements must meet the minimum requirements set out in s21F: the 
agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties,450 be witnessed by a lawyer451 and 
both parties must have had independent legal advice452 which explains the effect and 
implication of the agreement.453 S21J states that the courts can set these agreements aside if 
they are seriously unjust either from the outset or over time; the court cannot give partial 
effect to these agreements.  Serious injustice is not defined in the Act although there is a list of 
matters to which the court must have regard, including ‘whether the agreement has become 
unfair or unreasonable in the light of any changes in circumstances since it was made (whether 
or not those changes were foreseen by the parties).’ This gives recognition to the potential for 
an inequality in bargaining power in these early negotiations. However, Richardson (2002) 
fears that there may be limited public awareness about the possibility of using these 
agreements to contract out of the Act454 so it is questionable how far these are applied in 
practice.  
 
3.2.1 Property Settlement and Equal Sharing: Defining Relationship 
Property 
 
Equality is the overriding principle on property separation and all spouses/partners are entitled 
to equal division of relationship property. Yet, relationship property is narrowly defined; 
including only the family home,455 family chattels456 and any other relationship property listed 
under s8(a) – (l).457 Thus separate property which is not subject to equal division (defined by 
s9) includes: all property not owned for family purposes; gifts; inheritances and business assets 
(and therefore business gains made throughout the relationship). This suggests a narrow 
conception of partnership limited to a direct nexus between property and the relationship. 
Consequently it upholds Deech’s principles of financial autonomy by discouraging ‘gold-
digging’ and prolonged financial dependence on their partners. Deech specifically argues that 
‘subject to the existence of an agreement...the post-marital matrimonial assets could be 
divided equally.’458 Yet formal equality presumes a position of equality between spouses. For 
Fineman, this equality rhetoric works to disadvantage mothers and those whose lives are 
                                                          
450 S21F(2) P(R)A 1976 
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454 N Richardson, ‘The New Zealand Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001’[2002] International Family Law Journal 86 
455 S11(1)(a) P(R)A 1976 
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characterised by dependency in a care-dyad as it ignores differences and inequalities that arise 
through gendered lives. Fineman instead argues that striving for equality of resources between 
spouses would provide a fairer outcome.459 However, Deech argues that ‘some certainty about 
the way to split assets may be more important than total fairness, especially when 
considering...difficult negotiations.’460 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible under s9A461 for separate property to become relationship property 
if a nexus can be established between the separate property and the other (non-owning) 
spouse. If a relationship is found, the non-owning spouse’s share is limited to the increase in 
value of the property which reflects their contributions rather than the whole property being 
subject to formal equality. For example, in Rose v Rose,462 the husband had owned a farm in 
partnership with his brother and father before their 25-year-long marriage. During this 
marriage he established a successful wine-making business on the farm and at the time of 
separation, Mr Rose’s separate property amounted to $2.8 million. While s9 P(R)A states that 
this would be separate property and thus not subject to equal sharing, Mrs Rose argued that 
her child-care and household contributions and the income she earned ‘off-farm’ (which 
amounted to a significant proportion of the household income) had indirectly contributed to 
the increase in value of the separate property under s9A as it enabled Mr Rose to work on his 
farm and business. The courts agreed and awarded her 40% of the increased farm value and 
50% of the increased business value which amounted to 20% of the $2.8 million assets. This 
award, Atkin believes, reflects the fact that the increase in the separate asset pool was derived 
not solely from the owning spouse.463 Furthermore, considering that the property was the core 
asset at the end of the relationship,464 fairness dictated that the indirect contributions should 
be reflected in the award to achieve fairness. Section 9A allows for fairness to infiltrate 
awards. As a result, s9A has been heavily criticised by a number of commentators such as 
Briggs and Peart who have both argued that the section dilutes formal equality and is 
conceptually incompatible with the aims of the P(R)A and therefore requires amendment.465 
 
While s9A clearly offers the courts a chance to give greater recognition to care-giving activities 
undertaken within the domestic sphere and to integrate fairness to some degree when 
                                                          
459 M Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge 1995) 22 
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granting awards, this in practice seems to be a limited opportunity. The award granted to Mrs 
Rose (despite being a revolutionary case) seems particularly small given that her dual role of 
both care-giving and earning an income outside of the farm meant that she made a significant 
contribution to the family for over a quarter of a century. It is possible to argue that a 20% 
share is therefore not reflective of the extent of her contribution. Furthermore, Rose is 
generally considered to be a ground-breaking case with regards to relationship property and 
therefore such s9A variations are uncommon; the narrow approach to separate property 
contained within s9 is typically applied.  While from Deech’s position this generally restrictive 
approach to separate property promotes financial autonomy and prevents any ‘gold-
digging’,466 it clearly hinders, or caps the awards that the homemaker or primary care-giver can 
achieve. The emphasis placed on nexus makes it difficult for Fineman’s care-dyad to access 
separate property unless the spouse can demonstrate a link to an increase in its value. 
Consequently, in the majority of cases it is unlikely that care-giving activities will be able to 
establish such a connection between the contribution and the separate property. This may be 
particularly detrimental to longer relationships with children where greater resources may be 
required to meet needs.  
 
3.2.2 Exceptions to Equal Sharing 
Yet, the courts have discretion to depart from the principle of equal sharing in three 
circumstances: marriages of short duration; extraordinary circumstances; and economic 
disparity which are designed to create fairer outcomes and limit discrimination against the 
homemaker. In these situations, the courts have the ability to analyse any contributions made 
in a relationship which are listed in s18(1)(a) – (h).467 While this list can seem limiting as it is 
exhaustive and thus anything outside of these factors cannot be considered,468 it encompasses 
only three specific monetary contributions and s18(1)(h) seems to include emotional 
support.469 Therefore, the Act evidently recognises non-financial contributions and s18(2) of 
the Act specifies that there is no presumption that monetary contributions are to be 
considered more valuable than non-monetary contributions. 
As a result of s18(2), the courts tend to adopt a global approach to valuing contributions;470 
they look at the overall contributions to the partnership rather than individual contributions to 
                                                          
466 For example, in Vowles v Vowles unreported, Family Court, Palmerston North FAM-2005-054-000401, 8 December 2006 NZ 
which concerned inherited farm land, the wife had made contributions to the land as a farmer’s wife, and so was awarded 20%. 
467 S18(1)(a) – (h)Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2F (as amended by the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2005, s 3) 
See Appendix J 
468 Reid v Reid  [1979] 1 NZLR 572 (CA), [1980] 2 NZLR 270 (CA) at 609 and Gerbic v Gerbic [1992] NZFLR 481 
469 Lebajo v Lebajo (1994) NZFLR 665 – where the claimant got her husband permanent residency. 
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specific property (different to Australia’s nexus approach);471 and consider the quality and 
significance of the contribution, rather than its size or weight.472 
Ultimately, the assessment of the respective contributions to the marriage or de facto 
relationship will be one of impression by the Court and is not something capable of 
precise measurement.473  
This offers an opportunity for the courts to give serious weight to domestic contributions 
preventing a rigid equal division of relationship assets which would leave the homemaking 
spouse or the financially weaker spouse in a particularly vulnerable position. Yet, it is 
questionable how effective this recognition of contributions can be, especially in light of a 
limited definition of relationship property and at the same time Deech argues that domestic 
contributions should receive no value at all.474 So how have the courts applied this section? 
3.2.2.1 Section 14 and Marriages of Short Duration 
The courts approach marriages classified as short duration (under three years including any 
pre-marital cohabitation)475 differently when dividing assets. Instead of equally dividing 
relationship property, the property is divided according to the s18 contributions made by each 
party.476 This approach under s18 accords with Deech’s belief that there should be a difference 
between the treatment of long and short marriages which she too defined as three years or 
less.477 Here, the family home and chattels are not subject to equal sharing478 if the asset is 
owned substantially by one party at the date of the marriage, the source is from gifts,479 
inheritance or trust,480 or where ‘the contribution of one spouse to the marriage has clearly 
been disproportionately greater than the contribution of the other spouse.’481 However, other 
relationship property will be divided equally unless there is evidence to suggest that one party 
had made a greater contribution than the other.482 Therefore, the majority of claims that come 
to court argue that interests in property should be altered on account of contributions 
(similarly to the evaluative approach evident in Australia).483 This is perhaps more generous 
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than Deech would like as she indicated that in short marriages: ‘there should be no division at 
all, but the parties should go back to the position they were in before they were married.’484 
Yet, while s18(2) of the P(R)A suggests equal valuation of different types of contributions, 
Judge MacCormick in Walker v Walker485 stated that although there was no presumption that 
monetary contributions carried more weight: 
 ...nevertheless greater weight is given to [them] during the length of a marriage that 
has been relatively short, such that there has not really been time for the non-
monetary contributions to have built up in value.  
 
This sentiment has been reiterated in a number of subsequent cases.486 In VN v SH,487 the wife 
had intermittently worked fulltime during the three year relationship and where she did not, 
she had cared for their daughter. She had brought in funds that were dissipated and earned an 
income where the husband did not. Here the tenancy was in the husband’s name and he 
received $50,000 from his mother to buy the property. The judge stated: 
There is little challenge to the two jobs which the wife undertook. Nor is there any 
challenge to the wife’s care and the home after their daughter was born. In other 
words, there was nothing which would suggest this was anything other than a typical 
marriage where the wife worked prior to her pregnancy and, after giving birth, cared 
for their daughter.488  
 
So it seems that domestic contributions must build up value over time, yet by the time that 
they will have accrued any value, the equal sharing provision will apply. Consequently, 
domestic contributions are lost in formal equality and completely invisible from the court’s 
scrutiny. It seems that this valuation is attributable to a general perception that there is 
nothing particularly great about domestic contributions compared with financial contributions. 
This echoes Deech’s belief that ‘housework has to be done whether single or cohabiting’489 and 
in practice it goes some way to putting the parties back in the position that they would have 
been in had they not married. This offers much protection for financial autonomy within the 
private sphere and yet it seems particularly unjust that even the presence of children does not 
qualify the relationship to receive equal division.  
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However, there are some rare circumstances where non-financial contributions will be 
considered substantial. In IS v CB490 the couple had been separated for five years; the husband 
was a seaman whose whereabouts were unknown. The wife had started her own business 
during this time and cared for their child. He was on the deeds of the house to help him gain 
entry to New Zealand, but had contributed nothing to the mortgage or business, was an 
alcoholic and there were indications of domestic violence. The court found that the wife’s 
contributions were disproportionate. Similarly, in Treloar v Treloar,491 a marriage under three 
years with one child, it was found that monetary and domestic contributions were equal. Mrs 
Treloar contributed $40,311.62 to a house and he contributed $17,443.68. Mr Treloar’s 
income was $15,000 greater than hers and he helped her catering business with unpaid 
manual work. She ran this part-time and cared for their child. They held that because she was 
ill, a 60/40 split of the assets was fair. The courts recognise extreme hardship on the 
homemaker; where the breadwinner’s financial contributions are equally beneficial to both 
parties, the homemaker must have suffered. By doing so a clear message is given out; 
homemaking is nothing special and Fineman’s care-dyad therefore has no position in the 
court’s consideration; the court overlooks the gendered nature of Motherhood and 
consequently the extent to which a relationship of even three years can give rise to financial 
dependency or vulnerability.  
 
3.2.2.2 Section 13 and Extraordinary Circumstances 
Another exception to equal sharing where the courts will consider s18 contributions is defined 
in s13 P(R)A where extraordinary circumstances exist that would make sharing ‘repugnant to 
justice’ which Judge Quillan described as something ‘so out of the ordinary that an equal 
division is something the Court feels it simply cannot countenance.’492 This allows the courts to 
look at the impact of equal sharing where it might cause great hardship to one party by either 
suspending it completely or by postponing it until a later date.493 
Yet, it seems from subsequent case law that extraordinary circumstances will rarely be granted 
for domestic contributions as, once again, the courts are looking for something extraordinary 
rather than the average day-to-day undertaking of household duties. In SAB v JJB494 (a 20–year 
marriage) the wife assumed the homemaker role, also assisting on her husband’s farm and 
caring for their son. This, she argued, was without any emotional support as the husband 
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suffered from depression; she claimed she was the only one ‘functioning’ in the marriage and 
attempted to use s13 to justify a departure from equal sharing. The husband countered the 
wife’s s13 argument given that he had tried his best and that most of the financial 
contributions came from his inheritance in the last two years of their relationship. The wife’s 
s13 claim failed and the inheritance was excluded from equal sharing and Judge Somerville 
stated: 
It is disappointing that their life together had more than its fair share of life’s 
vicissitudes, but they were not extraordinary, either singly or in combination.495 
 
Instead, the courts seem to be looking for factors such as dishonesty, mental health conditions 
or addictions which impact family fortunes496 and accordingly (as with marriages of short 
duration) they are looking for a negative contribution or hardship rather than a positive 
contribution, or that of a ‘superwoman’. As Judge Woodhouse stated in Martin v Martin: 
The phrase ‘extraordinary circumstances’ refers, I think, to circumstances that must 
not only be remarkable in degree but also be unusual in kind. It is vigorous and 
powerful language to find in any statute and I am satisfied that it has been chosen 
quite deliberately to limit the exception to those abnormal situations that will 
demonstrably seem truly exceptional and which by their nature are bound to be rare.497 
This case held that there was nothing extraordinary about the husband providing home and 
money even if the relationship was unhappy. Park v Park (1980)498 and D v D (1997)499 both 
held that someone who shoulders both financial and domestic contributions while the other 
does nothing will be taken to be a gross disparity and thus an extraordinary circumstance. In 
fact, unless domestic contributions are accompanied by some hardship or some major financial 
contribution, they will not be enough to establish extraordinary contributions; again there is 
the emphasis on domestic contributions being ‘normal’ or expected.  Consequently, Fineman’s 
care-dyad and the homemaker have little room to vary equal sharing. 
On the other hand, financial contributions that demonstrate a skill can be enough to satisfy the 
definition of ‘extraordinary circumstances’. Reid v Reid500 concerned a marriage where the wife 
was the homemaker and the husband had built up a highly successful business and was 
awarded 60% of the business assets stating that he made a ‘clearly greater contribution’. 
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Furthermore, in Byrne v Byrne,501 a 12.5 year marriage, the wife contributed $124,000 (largely 
inheritance money) and the husband $20,000 to buying and building their family home. The 
home was therefore relationship property and subject to equal sharing and the couple 
occupied the home six months before separation. However, Mrs Byrne was awarded 65% of 
the assets on account of her extraordinary financial contribution to the purchase and 
construction of their home. Financial contributions can sway the courts, and it seems this 
preoccupation with money or extreme hardship reflects the doctrine either of ‘special 
contribution’ in Australia or ‘stellar contribution’ in England and Wales which grants the courts 
the ability to give a larger sum on account of these (usually financial) contributions which in 
turn ignores the ‘super mother’. 
This approach clearly matches with Deech’s contentions of promoting financial autonomy and 
not ascribing a value to domestic contributions. Yet, it seems that section 13 provides a trifling 
amount of recognition for homemaking and care-giving contributions. It requires the 
homemaker to suffer a substantial disadvantage through physical hardship in comparison to 
the breadwinner’s substantial financial advantage. Consequently, this offers little protection to 
Fineman’s care-dyad and may reflect a growing expectation of women to engage with the 
labour market as a mandatory requirement which in itself ‘has operated to harm the most 
disadvantaged and defenceless mothers.’502 
3.2.2.3 Section 15 and Economic Disparity 
Given the limited scope for the homemaker to make a claim against equal sharing, s15 P(R)A 
was introduced under the P(R)AA with the aim to ameliorate the position of those in 
homemaking or care-giving roles and overcome standard of living and income inequalities 
caused by a breadwinner/homemaker role division.503 S15 allows the courts to grant orders to 
redress economic disparities where the division of relationship responsibilities has resulted in 
one party being significantly better off than the other.504 The key point here under s15(1) is 
that the financial disparity between the parties is a result of the division of relationship 
functions. To identify this, the courts can have regard to each partner’s earning capacity, 
responsibilities to children and other relevant circumstances505 and can use a lump sum or 
property transfer from the stronger party to adjust accordingly. Consequently, it presents an 
opportunity to ‘compensate’ the primary care-giver who has sacrificed her career for the sake 
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of raising children or taking on the homemaker role and as a result her husband’s career has 
flourished. 
The introduction of s15 was not without controversy and some feared that this would 
undermine a community-of-property regime as it shifted a pure formal equality focus to one of 
substantive equality.506 In fact Peart argues that it defies one of the Act’s core principles and 
has ‘no place in a code of rules that is expected to provide an inexpensive, speedy and simple 
resolution to relationship property questions.’507 Yet it offers a chance to effectively recognise 
and value care relationships that the previous sections have failed to do although its 
effectiveness is limited due to its retrospective rather than prospective focus. However, for 
Deech, compensation is an unrealistic basis for awards as she feels that career sacrifices in 
relationships are an advantage rather than a disadvantage for the homemaker: ‘either it is a 
career which one would give up with a sigh of relief with the prospect of being kept, or it is a 
free choice to opt for the home rather than the office.’508  
The courts have so far narrowly interpreted s15 and the burden of proof lies with the claimant 
(most usually female)509 to establish a causal link between the economic disparity and the 
division of roles,510 without which a claim will fail. This evidence is specifically looking at what 
career or position the claimant would have been in had it not been for the role division. Yet, as 
LL v JL demonstrated,511 without evidence of what career the wife would have pursued, a s15 
award will not be made even if there is a great economic disparity.512 The difficulty in proving 
this therefore places a high hurdle before the claimant in achieving a claim based on s15 and 
as a result limits the scope of the award. Furthermore, it relies on what the claimant was liable 
to earn – yet what if she had only been stacking shelves before she gave up her career? 
However, s15 can go some way to redressing disparities. In M v B513 a 25-year marriage with 
two children, the wife gave up a successful senior position in market research to raise their 
two children while undertaking part-time work. The husband became an equity partner in a 
law firm. At the time of separation her income was 5% of his. It was determined that his 
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success was not a result of the division of functions, but her sacrifice was and the court 
awarded her $75,000 on top of half of the $900,000 relationship property.514 Yet despite 
recognition being given, the award is still arguably small where sacrificing a career was only 
worth $75,000.515 How far does this reflect the long-term lasting financial impact of someone 
who has been out of work for 25 years? Similarly, in V v V a sum of $67,000 was awarded to 
compensate a wife’s calculated shortfall in earnings for an eight-year period from the 
separation. It seems that the courts are awarding modest sums where this section is being 
used, and for Miles, it seems that there is fear in the courts that the use of this section could 
lead to a double accounting of contributions from the homemaker.516 
In X v X517 (a marriage of 21 years), the courts stated that this was a case for which s15 had 
been designed. Both parties had attained an accountancy degree, the wife had excelled at her 
studies and had a job at a major accounting firm, so they started off their careers at equal 
levels. She subsequently gave up her job to raise their children and at the time of separation 
Mr X was earning $1.5 million annually and could earn $180,000 a year. In comparison, Mrs X 
was only expected to achieve up to $65,000. She was awarded $240,000 out of a total $7.5 
million relationship property pool. The court supported Miles’ 2003518 observation that there 
are two types of economic disparity: ‘but for’, where the party has suffered from the division 
of functions for taking the role, and ‘economic enhancement’, where a party’s position has 
been enhanced as a result of the division of functions. This echoes Scotland’s economic 
advantage and disadvantage provision in its framework for financial provision on divorce.519 
Furthermore, the court identified that: 
…to ensure that the reality of decision-making in relationships is reflected, it should be 
presumed that functions within a marriage are agreed to by both parties unless that 
presumption is meaningfully impugned. [105] (Robertson J)  
 
Consequently, the courts recognised that a decision to divide the roles is attributable to both 
parties, not just one’s choice to stay at home. Yet, while the court recognised that this was a 
joint decision and that this case was a classic s15 case, the actual departure from equal sharing 
was considerably small in size. Mrs X achieved just a 53.5% share and therefore only an 
additional 3.5% (five years calculated wage post-divorce) was granted to compensate her for 
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the career sacrifices she made during a 21–year-long relationship. Additionally, this small 
percentage is only half of the actual calculated loss. So, if the applicant requires 10% to 
rebalance any economic disparity, the actual adjustment will only be 5% so that the applicant 
would receive 55%. This is because this adjustment will result in a 10% difference (55:45) 
between the applicant’s and the respondent’s award. This limits the extent through which the 
settlement will be able to recognise the full economic impact of the care-giving role.  
 
Thus, the aim of s15 is not to achieve substantive equality and therefore not to achieve 
Fineman’s equality of resources. Rather, s15 awards are only made where an imbalance exists 
that prevents the courts from achieving formal equality between the parties. This 
consequently confirms Miles’ belief that this section actually imposes an ‘equality ceiling’ as it 
should do no more than bring the parties to substantially identical incomes and living 
standards.’520 This approach is focused on relationship functions and formal equality rather 
than separate property and the actual long-term financial positions of the party.521  
 
Nevertheless, discussion before the 2001 Act indicated that it was to apply to ‘the exceptional 
case, not the norm’522 and in Speller v Chang523 the court stressed that s15 was not to give the 
courts discretion to redress all economic disparities, nor to achieve generalised social justice or 
gender equality objectives and therefore this narrow approach is perhaps to be expected. 
Consequently, s15 does not seem to falsely inflate claims of potential careers (as some feared) 
as it is so strictly applied, and additionally it does not ignore the fact that it is a free choice to 
assume the homemaker role. However, it creates a great deal of uncertainty and does not 
seem to reflect a partnership choice in the division of relationship functions. It protects those 
who have sacrificed a career in a limited capacity and only where there is sufficient evidence. 
Furthermore, s15 is only used to redress an imbalance, and therefore it seems to fail to 
recognise the care-dyad and at the same time conflicts with Deech’s position. This 
dissatisfaction is heavily discussed in the empirical section below. 
 
3.2.3 Maintenance 
It is possible to get maintenance – a needs-based remedy – on separation under s64 (subject 
to s64A) of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 which may alleviate the restrictive nature of 
                                                          
520 J Miles, ‘Dealing with Economic Disparity: An Analysis of Section 15 Property (Relationships) Act 1976’ [2003] New Zealand Law 
Review 535, 295 
521 J Miles, ‘Dealing with Economic Disparity: An Analysis of Section 15 Property (Relationships) Act 1976’ [2003] New Zealand Law 
Review 535, 296 
522 Associate Minister Of Justice  In The Whole Committee Hearing Of The Bill (1998) 591 NZPD 8625 
523 Speller v Chang [2003] NZFLR 385 
102 
 
property settlement in New Zealand. This is a separate consideration to property settlement 
(although it can be heard at the same time)524 and is rarely used.525 S64(2) provides a list of 
factors that can be taken into consideration526 and awards made can either be periodical 
payments or lump sums, again reflecting the clean break principle within New Zealand’s 
jurisdiction. 
Where it is used, s64A reflects Deech’s rationale that maintenance should have a rehabilitative 
function and imposes the limitation on s64 that the party must resume responsibility for their 
own needs in a reasonable time at which time they will no longer be able to get maintenance. 
However, ‘reasonable time’ is not defined by the Act, and it seems that maintenance will only 
be ongoing in extreme situations, such as the ongoing care of an autistic child527 and even then 
the focus will still be on retraining and rehabilitation. When awarding maintenance, the courts 
consider two elements: whether it is unreasonable for party A to do without maintenance 
from party B;528 and whether it is reasonable to require party B to provide maintenance to 
party A.529 To determine this, the courts will consider a range of factors including the ages of 
each party, the effect of the division of functions and duration, ability to self-support and other 
relevant circumstances.530  
While this may even go too far for Deech who contends that maintenance should solely be 
used for those incapable of finding employment rather than a mechanism for retraining, the 
actual awarding of maintenance is incredibly uncommon531 as it conflicts with clean break 
principles even though it can be awarded as a lump sum. Consequently, the courts have a strict 
interpretation of both the applicant’s ‘reasonable needs’ and ‘actual income’ to determine if 
this is necessary and also the respondent’s ability to pay.  
Yet, this restrictive approach to maintenance means that the courts limit extensive financial 
dependency post-separation and instead encourage the principles that Deech advocates: 
rehabilitation, self-sufficiency and joint economic responsibility for any children of the 
relationship.  However, from Fineman’s position, this approach is potentially over simplistic. 
Fineman argues that financial autonomy through self-sufficiency is unattainable without 
equality of resources. Yet, the narrow application of maintenance provisions in New Zealand 
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limits the extent and the frequency with which this form of equality can be achieved. 
Consequently, this approach fails to enable Fineman’s care-dyad to achieve economic 
autonomy in the majority of cases.  
 
3.3 Cohabitation  
Since 2001, cohabiting couples have had almost the same property rights on relationship 
breakdown as married couples. A cohabiting relationship is defined under section 2D of 
the P(R)A as two people living as a couple532 and the courts determine this by taking into 
consideration all the circumstances of the relationship.533 Despite these guidelines, the 
courts generally struggle with defining cohabitation relationships534 and some cases have 
established that living together fulltime is not necessarily a prerequisite to coming under 
the definition of the Act.535 For all intents and purposes, cohabiting couples are treated 
almost synonymously with married couples and civil unions, thus the principle of equal 
sharing on relationship property536 and the exceptions of s13 extraordinary circumstances 
and s15 economic disparities apply without any difference. This, for Deech, imposes the 
law on two people who have chosen not to marry. On the one hand it legitimises claims 
made by undeserving mistresses and on the other it undermines financial autonomy and 
‘retards the emancipation of women, degrades the relationship, takes away choice.’537  
Part 6 of the Act also allows cohabiting couples to enter an agreement subject to the same 
requirements as aforementioned in the married/civil union context. This provision 
compensates to some level Deech’s concern of imposing a system on people’s private lives 
as it allows those who consciously avoid marriage or civil unions to opt out of the regime 
and protect their assets as well as organise their own affairs. However, there are concerns 
raised above that people are firstly not aware that they can contract out, and secondly 
that couples in cohabiting relationships do not actually know that the law applies to them, 
and thus will not make an agreement.538 Therefore, while these agreements enable 
couples to prevent the law from interfering in their private sphere, there is still the danger 
                                                          
532 s2D(1) Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
533 See Appendix K 
534 See for example N Peart ‘De Facto Relationships (or Maybe Not) in New Zealand) [2008] International Family Law 130 
535 See RRB v GF [2008] NZFC and see Scragg v Scott [2006] NZFLR 1076, Horsfield v Giltrap (2001) 20 FRNZ 404 (CA) 
536 S11 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
537 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 40 
538 N Richardson, ‘The New Zealand Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001’[2002] International Family Law Journal 86 
104 
 
that in some circumstances the default scheme will be an unwelcomed interference in the 
private ordering of a couple’s family life. 
Furthermore, the 2001 amendments also removed sexuality discrimination and, again while 
few same-sex cases exist, the presumption is that same-sex cohabiting couples will be treated 
the same as different-sex cohabiting couples.  Consequently, the same critique of the P(R)A 
applies to civil unions and cohabiting relationships. While this is a positive step from Fineman’s 
position, it is perhaps important to note that, rather than placing Fineman’s care-dyad at the 
heart of Family Law, instead this extension further legitimises sexual bonds as a central focus 
of Family Law from which Fineman argues Family Law should move away. Nevertheless, by 
extending the legal entitlements once available at the end of marriage to now include same-
sex and unmarried couples, New Zealand’s system has in effect increased the number of care-
dyads that can access financial relief post-separation.  This provides greater protection for a 
wider number of Fineman’s care-dyads.  
3.3.1 Cohabiting Relationships of Short Duration 
 
One key difference between cohabiting and married relationships lies in relationships under 
three years’ duration. Whereas married relationships will be subject to a consideration of the 
contributions made by the spouses, in the cohabitation context, this is not automatic. Section 
14A establishes that a short cohabiting relationship be treated in the same way as short 
duration marriages only where there is a child of the relationship,539 or one party has made a 
substantial contribution that means no property order would result in a serious injustice.540 If 
these two situations can be established, then the share will be determined by the cohabitants’ 
relative contributions541 and the aforementioned s18. If not, then claims will fall outside of the 
scope of the P(R)A and have to rely on trust and Property Law. This consequently may reduce 
the fears that Deech has of abuse by ‘undeserving mistresses’ as there is a three-year 
qualification period before the scheme applies. However, Deech herself preferred a much 
longer period of ten years.542 
There has been a lack of continuity over the definition of substantial contribution. Schmidt v 
Jawad543 defined ‘substantial’ as a ‘considerable amount’, ‘real importance or value’ that has 
gone ‘far beyond the norm’. LS v ZJ emphasised that substantial meant real importance but 
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said that it did not need to go that far, just beyond the norm.544 Lawson v Perkins also followed 
this latter definition.545 Here, Ms Perkins was responsible for all the household tasks, used her 
income towards the relationship and helped Mr Lawson in his business (cleaning and painting). 
This was held to not have gone beyond the norm and once again, unsurprisingly the courts 
have an extremely restrictive view of domestic contributions and it is unlikely that 
homemaking or care giving would be defined as a substantial contribution. Fineman’s 
unmarried care-giver is without any protection for the first three years of a relationship. 
On top of requiring a substantial contribution, this contribution must have caused a ‘serious 
injustice’. There has also been a range of definitions of this term and Justice Chisholm in S v 
W546 described it as a ‘relatively high threshold’ and cases seem to link this to financial 
disparities and financial hardship.547 In fact, TF v AH,548 described it as requiring the claimant to 
be ‘on all fours’ financially indicating the level of extreme dependency required whereas 
married couples in short relationships do not have to establish a serious injustice. While this 
high bar aligns with Deech’s position it seems that in actuality the P(R)A offers protection in a 
limited way for cohabitants without children. 
3.3.2 Maintenance 
 
Maintenance under the Family Proceedings Act 1980 can also be awarded to cohabiting 
couples. But s70B states that to grant a maintenance award under s70, the cohabitants (much 
like a marriage of short duration) must either have (a) a child of the relationship or have 
carried out a substantial contribution and (b) that a failure to make an order would result in 
serious injustice. This higher threshold indicates that there seems to still be a hierarchy 
between relationship forms and future provisions, with this protection being much harder to 
achieve, particularly when serious injustice is interpreted so stringently. This seems 
unsatisfactory from both feminist perspectives: for Deech, the mere concept of maintenance 
for cohabitants is abhorrent549 particularly when she believes cohabitation is a union that 
Family Law should refrain from interfering with. For Fineman, the extent of maintenance as 
previously discussed is too narrow and does nothing to protect the financially vulnerable care-
dyad. 
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3.4 Doctrinal and Feminist Analysis Conclusion 
 
New Zealand’s system of financial provision on relationship breakdown most closely embodies 
Deech’s perspective of the form that the law should take. Little regard is given to domestic 
contributions which, for Deech, would serve to promote the emancipation of women from the 
private sphere. This, combined with New Zealand’s equal sharing of (narrow) relationship 
property that is strictly adhered to, and its restrictive approach to maintenance, strongly 
protects individual rights and property and prevents a patriarchal dominance exerting itself in 
the private sphere. It respects people’s rational ability to choose how they order their lives 
with limited interference from the courts, and its strengths also seem to lie in the rigid 
application of certainty, meaning that awards are predictable and the legal principles are clear 
to understand. 
 
Yet, it seems that by doing so domestic contributions are completely invisible to the courts. 
The equal sharing provision which represents Deech’s position by advocating formal equality 
between spouses has, as Fineman argues, degendered and neutralised relationship roles, 
ignoring differences that arise from ‘gendered lives’.550 Consequently, given the limited 
application of maintenance, it means that in actual fact where there is a financial disparity, 
there is little remedy available for the economically dependent spouse. Even where the courts 
can address contributions, greater weight is given to financial contributions and instead 
domestic contributions must be accompanied by a severe hardship. Too little recognition is 
given to domestic contributions. Consequently, it seems that s15 has failed in its objectives 
due to the courts’ preoccupation with ownership rights and equality causing an overly narrow 
application of their own discretion. Therefore, the homemaker seems overly disadvantaged by 
New Zealand’s framework as equal sharing only applies to narrowly-construed relationship 
property and at the same time there is little relief available from s15 or the maintenance 
provisions. 
 
It is strongly debatable whether, as Deech claims, this serves to emancipate women from the 
private sphere and encourage them to be financially autonomous. The mere fact that s15 was 
introduced into the community-of-property regime in fact suggests that a pure Deech-like 
regime is too extreme and supports contentions made by O’Donovan551 and also Ingleby552 
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that wider changes must first come from society rather than the law. It seems to presume 
financial equality between spouses and fails to recognise any inequality or long lasting financial 
disadvantage that may be caused through ‘gendered lives’ particularly caused by the presence 
of children. Consequently, New Zealand’s approach may be unsuitable for long-term 
relationships with dependents.  
 
While the treatment of cohabitants in a similar manner opens up more possibilities to protect 
the care-dyad, an extension of the legal framework in New Zealand is unsatisfactory as it does 
not focus on this aspect of family life at all. Even for Deech, treating cohabitants in the same 
way poses a dilemma, as it enforces a legal framework on the unsuspecting cohabitant when 
their rational choice has meant that they have not chosen this for themselves. It would be 
unsatisfactory for such a scheme to be imposed in England and Wales. 
 
3.5 Empirical Analysis of New Zealand Lawyers 
 
Yet how does a scheme which most closely resembles Deech’s position work in practice? What 
did the thematic analysis reveal about the lawyers’ thoughts on how New Zealand’s system 
operates in reality? After setting out the socio-demographics of the respondents, this section 
shall explore the major themes that emerged from the analysis in the married, cohabiting and 
same-sex context. 
 Altogether, 16 practitioners were interviewed from various locations around New Zealand. 
Out of these, 11 were male and five were female, meaning that answers may be skewed to 
some degree towards the male responses. There was a wide range of ages within the group as 
shown in Table 3.1. The most frequent category was over 60, meaning that the respondents in 
this jurisdiction were older than the other jurisdictions. Most of the practitioners had been 
practising in the categories of 21-30 and 31–40 years and one had practised between 41–50 
years. Three fell in the 11–20 years category and two had practised for under 10 years, thus on 
average the lawyers had longer experience in this field than in the other jurisdictions. This also 
means their perspectives encompassed the system before and after the 2001 P(R)AA changes.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
552 R Ingleby, ‘Lambert and Lampposts: The End of Equality in Anglo-Australian Matrimonial Property Law’ (2005) 19 International 
Journal of Law Policy and the Family 137 
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3.5.1 Socio-Demographics of the Interviewees 
Table 3.1: Ages of the respondents 
 
3.5.2 Responses in the Marriage Context 
Table 3.2: Qualitative themes in New Zealand in the married context 
Overarching Themes Themes Sub-Themes 
Deech-centric 
Equality equates procedural 
certainty 
Predictability 
Simplicity 
Out of court settlement 
One-size-fits-most 
Equality avoids evaluation 
Practical 
Partnership 
Insufficient substantive 
fairness 
Too rigid  
Exceptions (ss13–15) 
Infrequently awarded 
Ignores dual burden 
Ignores future impact 
Negligible awards 
Gendered disadvantage  
Limited maintenance 
Deech-centric 
Clean break 
Rehabilitative maintenance 
Too limited 
Low awards 
Asset Size 
Short marriages - - 
1 
1 
5 
2 
6 
Base = 15 
Under 30
30 - 39
40 - 49
50 - 59
Over 59
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As demonstrated in Table 3.2, out of the thematic analysis in New Zealand, the ‘Deech-centric’ 
stance emerged as an overarching theme in the marriage context and it was evident that the 
lawyers embraced the core aim of the P(R)A. However, the lawyers were also conscious of the 
fact that property settlement often involved a fine balance between certainty and fairness and 
arguably, therefore, a balance between Deech’s and Fineman’s positions:  
This is a law that is one size is supposed to fit all as much as possible. Then it becomes 
a matter of balancing; should we change it so that we can provide a fair solution in a 
larger number of cases at the expense of certainty? (NZLaw11) 
The qualitative data also revealed the parallel overarching theme of ‘insufficient substantive 
fairness’. It seems that the lawyers’ overwhelming preference for procedural certainty was 
often at the expense of more substantive fairness. 
3.5.2.1 Deech-Centric Views 
 A number of clear positive themes emerged with regards to the operation and process of New 
Zealand’s legal system. At the heart of this was the theme that ‘equality equates procedural 
certainty’ and therefore predictability. The lawyers identified that the fundamental benefit 
attached to a starting point of equality was ‘simplicity’: the system is easier for legal 
practitioners to apply and also for the general public to understand. Consequently some of the 
participants emphasised that, on breakup, individuals were aware of their financial 
entitlements:  
 So when people enter relationships, they know what the outcome’s going to be if they 
separate. And people very quickly adapt to it. (NZLaw9) 
The certain fifty-fifty split of matrimonial property creates a clearer and simpler path to 
remedying property disputes at the end of a relationship. The direct consequence of a simpler 
system is the higher frequency of out-of-court settlements for financial provision on 
relationship breakdown. The qualitative analysis within New Zealand indicated that the 
deferred community-of-property approach resulted in a lower level of litigation. The lawyers 
were content with this outcome as less litigation also means lower costs and rapid family 
dispute settlements: 
I think it’s working extremely well. It’s avoiding huge amounts of litigation...and vast 
cost…it’s a good thing... (NZLaw9) 
This rule-based approach obviously reflects Deech’s position that a system of property 
settlement should be clear, predictable and certain and the majority of the interviewees stated 
that the one size fits all approach generally produced fair outcomes: 
The regime that we have on the face of it can be very fair…I think it works very well for 
the majority of people… (NZLaw4) 
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These procedural benefits were also connected to the theme that ‘equality avoids evaluation’; 
dividing assets equally prevents the courts from having to value the contributions that either 
parties have made. The lawyers generally wanted to avoid evaluating contributions because 
they felt that it would disadvantage the homemaker as (typically) she would have to establish 
the nexus between her contributions and the property: 
Well I think [equal sharing] means that the homemaker doesn’t start on a, with a 
disadvantage and having to prove that her, usually her, contributions are of equal 
value to the breadwinner. And, um, I think that’s good. (NZLaw11) 
Equal sharing was therefore seen to prevent the courts from effectively ‘judging’ the 
homemaker’s contribution.  
Additionally, the lawyers thought that there were strong pragmatic reasons for avoiding 
evaluation. Three quarters of the respondents emphasised the inherent difficulty in valuing 
domestic contributions beside financial contributions stating that it was like comparing ‘apples 
and oranges’. Therefore there were concerns that it would be impossible to ever place a 
tangible value on these types of homemaking activities. Furthermore, the lawyers felt that 
there would be fundamental problems with evidence not only relating to the documentation 
of such activities but also that clients may over-exaggerate their contributions altogether: 
 ...it’s one of those notorious areas where it is the tendency for the client to overstate 
their contribution and understate that of the other. (NZLaw6) 
Therefore the practical result of quantifying non-financial contributions would potentially 
increase litigation by making it too hard to settle and subsequently this would cause 
uncertainty within the system. The lawyers felt that New Zealand currently avoided these 
problems as a result of equal sharing: 
 Well I don’t think there are difficulties because of the way in which our legislation 
works which is as I say contributions are irrelevant except in a few cases. (NZLaw9) 
Another theme that explains the lawyers’ belief that there should be equal division of family 
assets was that marriage was a ‘partnership’ and thus property settlement should reflect this: 
 …because it’s a partnership; whatever you contribute in your relationship should count 
equally. (NZLaw1)  
 
This strong discourse surrounding partnership meant that a large proportion of the 
respondents believed that assets should be divided equally whether or not there were 
children:  
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…the provision to care for the children is just one of the examples of a contribution to a 
relationship partnership. You can still have a relationship with no children where one 
person or both people are contributing equally to each other. (NZLaw7) 
This focus on certainty and the benefits of a rule-based system is not to say that the lawyers 
felt that New Zealand’s approach was without discretion. Nearly half of the respondents felt 
that New Zealand has a good level of discretion which takes account of relationships where 
one size does not fit all. This discretion refers to the courts’ ability to depart from equality 
using ss13-15 P(R)A. Yet, as the ‘too rigid’ theme below shall discuss, the practical application 
of this discretion has been heavily criticised. Nevertheless, despite these concerns, 12 out of 
the 16 lawyers indicated overall satisfaction with their system in practice and there was a stark 
sense of realism here; the participants recognised that, yes there was room for improvement, 
but overall the system worked as well as it could in practice: 
…it works as best it can and I guess the reality is that…there’s no perfect solution 
financially in trying to divide a whole into a half… (NZLaw7) 
3.5.2.2 Insufficient Substantive Fairness 
While the lawyers were generally happy with the Deech-centric nature of the New Zealand 
system, there were concerns that the system was far ‘too rigid’ in places and the practitioners 
clearly wanted greater flexibility. This meant that often the lawyers thought that there was 
‘insufficient substantive fairness’:  
…generally, it’s fair, but…because it’s one-size-fits-all it can create an enormous 
unfairness. (NWLaw2)  
Most notably, the respondents heavily criticised s13 (extraordinary circumstances) and s15 
(economic disparity) for failing to alleviate the harshness of equality. The perceived failure of 
these sections fell into two categories: failure to recognise any ‘dual burden’, and a failure to 
recognise the future impact of the homemaking role. The first of these related to s13 which 
was most criticised in relation to the dual earner relationship model where one party was 
predominantly responsible for the care-giving activities. The second category related to the 
compensatory section of the P(R)A, s15. Furthermore a few lawyers were concerned that s15 
was not wide enough as it only compensates someone for a career loss, thus is limited to those 
who had the clear potential of a high flying career. In practice, the lawyers indicated that 
equality was difficult to depart from as the hurdles that needed to be overcome before a 
claimant could use either ss 13 or 15 were set too high: 
 You could be a drunken sod and there are no exceptions to the law, there are no 
exceptions really unless there are extraordinary circumstances [s13] but they are that 
hard to prove that no-one ever bothers really. (NZLaw9). 
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We have got s15 which does give some compensation, but the test is harder to satisfy, 
and therefore…those efforts or the disadvantage, sorry, isn’t really going to be 
adequately compensated. (NZLaw4) 
Consequently, claims under ss13 and 15 were ‘infrequently awarded’. Thus, in reality, the 
homemaker is hard-pressed to achieve an award other than equality and therefore 50% is the 
maximum award possible. Most practitioners felt that the limited application of ss13 and 15 
therefore failed to protect the homemaker.  
...some of the cases talk about a career break…that’s fine if you’re talking about a 
homemaker who has a university degree and was a professional whatever. But, you 
know, that’s only 3% of the population… (NZLaw13) 
Where ss13 and 15 are successfully used, half of the practitioners thought the awards were 
too modest. NZLaw16 described the awards as ‘relatively modest and usually it’s not worth the 
effort’ and NZLaw13 describes them as ‘negligible’. Subsequently, it is perceived that the cost 
of litigating is unlikely to be outweighed by any award achieved under section 13 or section 15. 
It seems that the inevitable cost of bringing a claim under these sections acts as a deterrent as 
NZLaw16 puts it, ‘you’d be silly going to court, it’s too expensive’. As a result there is the 
danger that the economically weaker spouse will settle for equal sharing out of his/her 
financial inability to access the court system: 
…the court does make provision under s15…but to actually initiate litigation in New 
Zealand under the P(R)A it is very expensive, so the asset pool, it has to be a very big 
asset pool to justify initiating the application, and that is a big barrier in itself. 
(NZLaw16)  
 
Most worryingly, the lawyers stated that the disadvantage suffered from the limited use of 
discretion was in fact a gendered disadvantage. It seems that a limit of 50% therefore places a 
glass-ceiling for those (usually women) in economically weaker positions: 
I suppose there are enough settled cases where there are lawyers just negotiating into 
a settlement. You’d be silly going to court, it’s just too expensive. And…I think there are 
these barriers for…women going to court. (NZLaw16)  
You’ve got to prove...the economic disparity at the end of the marriage and 99% of the 
time it’s a woman, and she’s got to prove that. (NZLaw12) 
 
However, it seems the lawyers’ dissatisfaction with these provisions was not because of the 
actual statutory framework in New Zealand. Rather, it was due to the judges’ strict 
interpretation of the statute and the courts’ obsession with equal division: 
The issue in NZ is that the…court really doesn’t have a lot of discretion; it’s equal 
sharing. It’s almost like it’s the Holy Grail... (NZLaw13) 
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Yet, a large proportion of the lawyers also indicated that there were practical difficulties with 
s15 and the compensatory provision that meant that the judges avoided the discussion of s15: 
…it’s really hard to prove a career break because it’s really hard to get any evidence 
about what the career would have been. And, um, in practice the economic disparity 
provisions haven’t worked out as I believe, um, the people who came up with them 
(laughs) first envisaged… (NZLaw13) 
Consequently, the courts had stayed away from any discussion of this provision. Thus, while 
the lawyers are generally satisfied with the Deech-centric approach in New Zealand, there is 
huge dissatisfaction with the way in which the care-dyad and the homemaker are treated on 
divorce.  
3.5.2.3 Limited Maintenance 
The views espoused in relation to maintenance were also inherently Deech-centric. The 
general consensus was that clean break was preferable to ongoing financial dependency. 
Maintenance was thought to prevent couples from moving on. Yet most respondents 
recognised that there were certain situations where maintenance should be awarded. These 
situations related to the parties’ earning potential, the length of the relationship, the age of 
the parties (namely older parties nearer retirement age) and the presence of any children: 
…there are two major groups of generally women, the much older age group within 5-
10 years of retirement, and the much younger age group stuck at home with kids. Both 
two groups in particular need help and just don’t have the capability to be financially 
independent. (NZLaw7) 
 
Half the respondents suggested that the concept of partnership meant that it is the parties’ 
obligation to provide support to one another: 
...financial dependence is either explicitly or implicitly part of the bargain while they’re 
together. (NZLaw13) 
Yet, where the participants thought that maintenance should be awarded, most argued that 
maintenance should only be rehabilitative rather than ongoing:  
 I guess, to a certain extent, things like spousal maintenance can go some way to 
redress inequity if you look at what the earning potential, uh, one of the partners could 
have been had they continued in their role as opposed to, uh, what they did by doing 
domestic work in the house. (NZLaw3) 
 
Generally, the respondents were content with the rehabilitative approach in New Zealand. 
However, some felt that in certain situations, maintenance awards were very small and 
insufficient particularly where there were children: 
…well there is spousal maintenance, you can apply for it, but it’s pretty…low and it lasts 
for a couple years if you’re lucky. (NZLaw2) 
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This supports Fineman’s argument that children, or a care-dyad should make a difference in 
the way that awards are allocated post-separation. Furthermore, the theme of ‘maintenance’ 
emphasised the inadequacy of clean break in cases with small assets, and consequently some 
lawyers thought the size of assets affected whether maintenance should be applicable: 
I do think that the New Zealand system works fine to protect the non-earning spouse 
where there are high incomes. Where there are not it doesn’t, but that’s probably 
because it’s the dissolution isn’t dividable for practical reasons. (NZLaw8) 
 
3.5.2.4 Short Marriages 
‘Short marriages’ was another theme that the lawyers referred to and it seemed that often 
these cases tended to settle which one respondent attributed to be due to costs: 
I suppose there are enough settled cases where there are lawyers just negotiating into 
a settlement, you’d be silly going to court it’s just too expensive (NZLaw16). 
 
There was also some division over how appropriate the three year bar was. For some, three 
years was too long and for others it was too short. Consequently, it seems that the three year 
rule is applied too rigidly, and therefore greater flexibility is desired by the lawyers: 
Because of the rigidity there are often unfair results, especially where there is a 
relationship of three years…where the law says everything is 50:50. So that rigid result 
can be unfair sometimes, particularly in shortish relationships.(NZLaw14)  
Overall, in the married context, the lawyers were satisfied with the principles that prioritised 
procedural fairness over substantive fairness. However, it was clear that often this approach 
went too far towards formal rather than substantive equality. While the respondents were 
content that equality avoided pragmatic difficulties with valuing domestic contributions, ss13 
and 15 exceptions to equality were rarely used and too narrowly applied and, combined with 
the limited application of maintenance, inevitably disadvantaged Fineman’s care-dyad. 
Evidently greater recognition of the domestic role is required. 
 
3.5.3 Responses in the Cohabitation Context 
 
Table 3.3 Qualitative themes in New Zealand in the cohabitation context 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Similar 
Function 
In practice 
Exception: short duration relationships 
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The qualitative themes outlined in Table 3.3 demonstrate the lawyers’ belief that cohabiting 
couples and married couples are, and should be, treated similarly. Throughout the interviews 
all of the lawyers either discussed the similarities of these relationships or simply gave the 
same answers as they did in the married context. Despite similarities in treatment, there was 
some indication that the courts might be a little more restrictive with cohabiting couples. One 
lawyer emphasised that: 
...anecdotally I would say if you’re a de facto wife trying to prove s15, then you’ve got 
even less chance than if you were married. (NZLaw12) 
Nevertheless, nearly all respondents felt that the same principles on relationship breakdown 
should apply uniformly between married couples, cohabiting couples and same-sex couples. 
This theme of ‘similarity’ is also evident in Table 3.4, where the lawyers indicated that 
cohabiting and married relationships were alike, especially where there were children. Thus 
the lawyers fundamentally reflected Fineman’s position that relationships which are 
functionally similar should be treated in the same way.  
Table 3.4: Attitudes towards cohabitation and marriage 
 
 
However, despite the overwhelming consensus that these relationship styles were similar, the 
lawyers were worried about the three-year qualifying period for cohabitants. Firstly, NZLaw13 
raised this concern as currently the regime for short duration cohabiting relationships does not 
go back to Property or Trust Law: ‘the act doesn’t say “in the event of it being applied you go 
back to general principles”, the act still applies, you just don’t have a remedy’. Consequently it 
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seems that where the relationship is shorter than three years there is no real remedy 
available. Therefore, cohabiting relationships under three years may actually be in a worse 
position than they were before the 2001 amendments.  
The second concern was that the cohabitation provisions could apply to casual relationships or 
to those couples who had made a conscious decision not to marry/enter a civil union: 
...with de facto couples you don’t know...if you are in one when you started…people fly 
into them...and then are really shocked to lose the family home because the court says 
that you were in a de facto relationship even though you didn’t, sort of give it a 
thought. Even though you weren’t living in the same house or having [a] sexual 
relationship. That’s sort of quite bizarre. (NZLaw11) 
 
Therefore, it was felt that sometimes the limitation period could be too short. Perhaps if a 
scheme is to give such entitlement rights then a longer limitation period is required, although 
this needs to be followed with provision for those who do not fall within the limitation period.   
3.5.4 Responses in the Civil Union/Same-Sex De Facto Context 
Table 3.5 Qualitative themes in New Zealand in the same-sex context 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Uncertainty 
Lack of experience 
Presumed similarity 
Children 
 
The predominant theme here was ‘uncertainty’ as Table 3.5 demonstrates and was generally 
due to the lawyers’ lack of experience with same-sex relationships. Despite this uncertainty, 
the majority presumed that same-sex and different-sex relationships would be treated 
identically. Furthermore, the participants strongly believed that ‘it should make no real 
difference in the wide world whether they’re same-sex couples or de facto couples.’ However, 
some lawyers stated that as the courts were more likely to award a clean break where there 
were no children and at the same time same-sex couples were less likely to have children than 
different-sex couples, that in reality there would be some difference between same-sex and 
different-sex relationships: 
You usually find that with same-sex couples there is less of a presence of children, 
although not necessarily so. (NZLaw6) 
 
The lawyers indicated that same-sex couples without children had a greater room for choice 
which suggests that same-sex couples are perceived as having a greater ability to negotiate 
roles within the relationship: 
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 ...logically there shouldn’t be any difference, but, um, if there are children then I think 
there has to be a distinction...In a same-sex case there could be one who...could have 
voluntarily taken over that role and made sacrifices so that the other could be the 
breadwinner. (NZLaw5) 
Overall, however, the respondents generally believed that same-sex couples and different-sex 
couples should be treated similarly, except where there were children. There was a tendency 
to think that same-sex couples were more egalitarian, or at least more able to negotiate within 
the private sphere. 
3.5.5 The Vignettes 
As set out in Chapter 2, two scenarios were posed to the lawyers outlining a set of 
circumstances surrounding a couple splitting up. For each scenario, the lawyers were given the 
outcome in England and Wales. The lawyers were asked their opinions on this approach and 
also how this would differ from the way in which their own jurisdiction would approach the 
scenario. Both scenarios also had four variables of case facts and the participants were asked 
how each variable would affect their jurisdiction’s approach.553 This provides an opportunity to 
consider the implications that this scheme would have for cases that have provoked critique of 
the current system in England and Wales. Would it rectify these criticisms? 
 
3.5.5.1 Scenario A 
Scenario A was based on Burns554 and the outcome given in England and Wales was that the 
female cohabitant was left with no share in the property, no right to remain in the home and 
no remedy elsewhere on relationship breakdown. The majority as displayed in Table 3.6 below 
thought it was too protective to the financial earner and there was a clear shock from the 
lawyers in the way cohabitants are treated in England and Wales: 
If that is a true statement I am horrified. Um, I am horrified (NZLaw6) 
All the lawyers agreed that New Zealand’s approach would be much more generous, and those 
who expanded on how indicated that Miss Jones would be entitled to half the house and 
family chattels. Three also thought that there was a possibility of short term maintenance555 
and two thought that Ms Jones potentially had a s15 claim.556 Thirteen of the lawyers felt that 
New Zealand’s approach was about right. However, three felt that they would like the award 
to be a little more generous by way of compensation. 
                                                          
553 Appendix A 
554 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch. 317. See Appendix A for details of the scenario 
555 NZLaw3,9,12 
556 NZLaw1,7 
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Table 3.6: Attitudes to England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario A 
 
 
 
3.5.5.1.1 Scenario A – The Variables 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law would alter its response for four different 
variables listed in Table 3.7. As Table 3.8 below shows, on the whole, the respondents believed 
that the approach would stay the same. As we can see on the table, there were two slight 
variations: employment and children. 
The five of the lawyers who thought the outcome would be a little less generous if she had 
carried on in employment, attributed this to Miss Jones’ reduced ability to apply for a s15 
claim557 or any maintenance.558 Two lawyers559 thought if Miss Jones had had no children the 
settlement would be a little less generous as it would reduce the ability to claim economic 
disparity under s15.  Yet the majority stated that this should not affect the award: 
Even though they didn’t have children and she still didn’t work, that must be what they 
decided their lives together should be like, so she still shouldn’t be disadvantaged by it. 
(NZLaw11) 
All of the respondents, when asked how satisfied they were with the outcome, selected ‘5’ on 
a scale of 0 – 10 which indicated that they believed the outcome was ‘about right’. Similarly 
                                                          
557 NZLaw4,7,11 
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when the lawyers were asked if they would alter the approach in any way,560 all selected that 
they would keep the outcome the same. 
Thus it seems that overall, in cohabitation cases similar to Burns, the New Zealand lawyers 
considered the outcome in England and Wales as wholly inappropriate and they are 
completely satisfied with their own approach in this context. 
Table 3.7 Scenario A variables 
 
Table 3.8: How would the outcome vary for the variables? 
 
3.5.5.2 Scenario B 
Scenario B was based on Miller561  involving a married couple of less than three years without 
children with a vast pool of money assets.562 Unlike Scenario A, the responses were less 
consistent and while the mode deemed England and Wales’ outcome to be too generous to 
Mrs Higgins, a third felt that this was the right outcome demonstrated in Table 3.9:  
I think it’s good, it’s about right and I wish we could do that. (NZLaw11) 
 
                                                          
560 The participants indicated on a likert scale of ‘much less generous, a little less generous, the same, a little more generous and 
much more generous’. 
561 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
562 Appendix A 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Variable 1 - No
Children
Variable 2 -
Marriage
Variable 3 -
Continued
employment
Variable 4 -
Same-sex
relationship
Much less generous
A little less generous
The same
A little more generous
Much more generous
Variable Number The Variable 
1 Miss Jones had not had any children. 
2 Mr Smith and Miss Jones were in fact married 
3 Miss Jones had worked throughout the relationship 
4 If this was a same-sex relationship with adoptive children 
Base = 16 
120 
 
Table 3.9: Lawyers’ attitudes to England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario B 
 
 
Table 3.10: How would New Zealand’s jurisdiction alter in comparison? 
 
 
When the respondents were asked how New Zealand’s approach would alter in comparison to 
England and Wales (as Table 3.10 displays), nine agreed that it would be much less generous.  
The irony of the situation is we get the answer that you gave in the first scenario. 
(NZLaw6) 
Three lawyers indicated that these types of relationships were rare and so were unfamiliar 
with these types of cases. However, it was clear that as this was a relationship of short 
duration, it would largely depend on the parties’ contributions and the lawyers generally felt 
that they needed more information before they could make an adequate prediction of the 
outcome. Most felt that the likelihood was that in New Zealand Mrs Higgins would receive 
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nothing, particularly no capital share of any property. Some indicated that she may be entitled 
instead to some limited spousal maintenance. 
 
Table 3.11: Lawyers’ attitudes on New Zealand’s approach 
 
The majority felt that New Zealand’s approach was about right (‘5’) (see Table 3.11), although 
five felt that it was a little too protective of the financial contributor. There is clearly a greater 
level of dissatisfaction in this context than in Scenario A. Yet, the mode (nine lawyers) 
indicated that they wouldn’t alter this outcome (Table 3.12).  
 
Table 3.12: How would the lawyer alter their jurisdiction’s approach? 
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3.5.5.2.1 Scenario B – The Variables 
Table 3.13: Scenario B variables 
 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law would alter its response for four different 
variables listed in Table 3.13. Table 3.14 clearly shows that if this had been a same-sex 
relationship, the outcome would not alter. For the other variables there was some difference. 
For Variable 1, nine believed the outcome would be more generous indicating that it would 
alter Mrs Higgins’ ability to claim maintenance.563 If the relationship had been a long marriage 
all the respondents agreed that the outcome would be much more generous as the 
relationship property would be divided equally. Three felt that on top of equal sharing, Mrs 
Higgins would be able to claim for an economic disparity.564 For Variable 3 (if she had remained 
in employment), seven lawyers believed the award would be less generous, reducing the 
possibility of maintenance claims,565 and some thought it would diminish her contribution to 
the property.566 However, nine believed that it would remain the same as Mrs Higgins is still 
making a contribution.567 
 
Generally, the lawyers felt that the approach towards each variable was about right as Table 
3.15 shows. Yet, six selected a number under ‘5’ indicating that they thought that the current 
approach was a little too protective to the financial contributor where there were children and 
conversely too generous to the non-financial contributor in the longer relationship. This was 
reflected in the responses given when the practitioners were asked how they would vary this 
approach (see table 3.16). Thus it seems that in short marriages New Zealand does not protect 
the care-dyad enough and one lawyer thought there should be provision specifically for the 
child.568 NZLaw11 felt that Mrs Higgins should have more entitlement for the future because of 
the child. Furthermore, it seems in big money cases over a long duration that equal division is 
too generous, and does not protect property rights enough for the main breadwinner. At the 
                                                          
563 5 felt it would be a little more generous, 4 felt it would be much more generous 
564 NZLaw4,10,11 
565 6 felt it would be a little less generous and 1believed that it would be much more generous 
566 NZLaw6 
567 NZLaw8 
568 NZLaw2 
Variable Number The Variable 
1 If the couple had had children 
2 If the relationship had lasted 20 years 
3 If Mrs Higgins had not given up her well paid job. 
4 If this was a same-sex relationship (Civil Union) 
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same time, where there are children, equal division is not enough to meet the homemaker’s 
needs. 
Table 3.14: How New Zealand’s original outcome would change for each variable? 
 
 
Table 3.15: Attitudes to variables’ outcome in Scenario B 
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Table 3.16: How would they alter their jurisdiction’s approach? 
 
3.6 New Zealand’s System of Financial Provision: A 
Conclusion 
 
The doctrinal, feminist and empirical analysis provides invaluable insight into New Zealand’s 
framework of financial provision on relationship breakdown. Moreover, this jurisdiction has 
given Deech’s position a practical framework of effect and therefore it has been possible to 
explore the advantages and disadvantages of an approach that aligns with Deech’s end of the 
feminist spectrum. It was evident from the empirical analysis that New Zealand successfully 
embodies Deech’s core principles of formal equality, autonomy and certainty. The lawyers’ 
views were generally Deech-centric and thus they were extremely satisfied with the 
procedural benefits that accompanied this rule-based approach. The most notable benefit was 
that certainty enables frequent out-of-court settlements and therefore reduces the amount of 
litigation. The result is that a formulaic system offers a more cost-effective system with less 
financial pressure on the courts. Out of court settlement also reduces individual costs and 
therefore access to justice is not hindered by the cost of litigation; the parties are aware that 
they are entitled to 50% of the relationship property without having to argue for this share. 
This also limits any inequality of bargaining power between parties. Furthermore, for the 
respondents, an additional strength of equal sharing is that the law does not quantify domestic 
contributions. Rather it considers the parties to be in an equal partnership and thus values 
their respective roles equally. The lawyers believed that this avoided the pragmatic difficulties 
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of quantification and also prevented homemaking contributions from being undervalued or 
effectively judged by the courts.  Consequently, it seems that New Zealand’s approach has 
successfully given effect to Deech’s proposition that the law should be kept out of the private 
sphere and couples should be allowed to organise their own affairs in any manner they 
choose.  
 
However, the direct consequence of not evaluating contributions is that homemaking activities 
are essentially unseen by the courts and therefore the concept of partnership, rather than 
Fineman’s care-dyad, underpins New Zealand’s system. The difficulty with this is that 
partnership presumes equality, and yet the care-dyad, as Fineman argues, is characterised by 
dependency. Unsurprisingly, the lawyers identified that the one-size-fits-all approach is 
unsuitable in certain scenarios, especially where children are present.  
 
While New Zealand’s exceptions to equality under ss13, 14 and 15 were designed to alleviate 
the rigidity of formal equality, in practice these appear to have been applied too narrowly and 
are rarely used. Consequently, New Zealand failed to effectively consider the future economic 
implications that the care-giving role can have on a party’s ability to be financially 
autonomous. Unsurprisingly, the lawyers extensively criticised these sections for not 
effectively protecting the economically weaker party at the end of the relationship (identified 
as a gendered disadvantage); this emphasis on procedural fairness has, to some extent, 
sacrificed substantive fairness.  
 
 From Deech’s position such an approach aids the emancipation of women from the private 
sphere. Evidently, from the lawyers’ perspectives, rather than promote financial 
independence, this scheme in reality leaves women at a disadvantage. The narrow 
interpretation of matrimonial property combined with the extreme difficulty of varying an 
award under ss13-15 means that in reality a cap is placed on the awards that can be achieved. 
Therefore, while this model may be well suited for parties who are on an equal financial 
footing, it seems that, the one-size-fits-all approach does not fit relationships where there is a 
role imbalance. In particular, the vignettes demonstrated that in contexts such as long-term 
relationships with large asset pools, couples with children and also short duration relationships 
there is a need for greater recognition of long-term financial sacrifices made in these 
circumstances. There were also suggestions that the rehabilitative maintenance provisions also 
supported by Deech (while generally championed as an appropriate approach by the lawyers) 
were in fact too modest and narrowly applied particularly in small-asset cases and cases 
concerning children.  Therefore, it seems that as O’Donovan has argued in the context of 
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maintenance569 and also Ingleby570 has argued, a greater level of social equality is needed 
before such formal equality can be applied. Until then, as Lady Hale has stated in the English 
case of Miller, equality works to the disadvantage of the primary carer: 
Too strict an adherence to equal sharing and the clean break can lead to a rapid 
decrease in the primary carer’s standard of living and a rapid increase in the 
breadwinner’s.571 
As both Weitzman and O’Donovan572 have argued, as long as social inequalities exist and 
women are more likely to sacrifice their careers, ‘we cannot treat men and women as equals in 
the divorce settlement.’573 Consequently, until there is a higher degree of social equality 
between the genders, a greater level of discretion and a more needs-based approach is 
required to redress the criticisms that New Zealand received from Fineman’s lens.  
 
Yet, these criticisms were targeted at the judges rather than the statutory provisions. The 
judges were too restrictive in their approach and it seems that the simplicity of formal equality 
may cause the judges to avoid complex discretionary issues. It may also be the practical 
difficulties of measuring relationship generated disadvantage under s15 which are causing 
restrictive interpretations of this section. Equality allows the judges to avoid these difficult 
discretionary questions. This suggests that in a rule-based system, it is necessary to provide 
adequate guidelines for the judiciary on the application of that discretion. Otherwise, it is 
possible that the discretion will only be used in an overly limited way. 
 
However, New Zealand provided a fantastic opportunity to consider the impact of treating 
cohabiting couples and same-sex couples identically to married couples. It was evident that 
the lawyers believed that functionally similar relationships should be treated similarly 
regardless of relationship styles or sexuality. Yet, one concern existed over the rigidity of the 
qualifying time period. It was clear from the empirical results, that in light of the often casual 
start to cohabiting relationships, the automatic entitlement to equal division of family property 
after three years made some of the lawyers uncomfortable as it was too short a time period. 
Instead, it seems that as there was such a huge shift in rights at the end of that time period, 
the lawyers would prefer it to apply to relationships that were longer than three years.  At the 
same time, the lawyers felt that the provisions were inadequate for those relationships that 
were shorter than three years and especially where there were children. Consequently, the 
                                                          
569 K O’Donovan, ‘The Principles of Maintenance: An Alternative View’ (1978) 8 Family Law 180 
570 R Ingleby, ‘Lambert and Lampposts: The End of Equality in Anglo-Australian Matrimonial Property Law’ (2005) 19 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 137 
571 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 [142] (Lady Hale) 
572 In the context of maintenance, K O’Donovan, ‘The Principles of Maintenance: An Alternative View’ (1978) 8 Family Law 180 
573 L Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (The Free Press 1985) 218 
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lawyers appeared to want a more flexible, discretionary qualifying trigger that was not so 
focused on the length of the relationship, but one that also could include couples who had 
children. Furthermore, where there were no children, greater protection was needed for the 
cohabiting couples. 
 
Thus, this need for greater discretion characterises the analysis conducted in this chapter. 
While New Zealand provides a case for having greater certainty because of the lower costs that 
follow, it seems that the application of formal equality has perhaps gone to an extreme. 
Therefore, a system this close to Deech’s end of the spectrum is too restrictive for Fineman’s 
care-dyad; a balance has not effectively been reached.  Instead, more flexibility and perhaps a 
greater consideration of needs is required. The next chapter now considers a scheme that is 
closer to Fineman’s end of the spectrum. Scotland, while still embracing Deech’s position at its 
heart, has a greater level of discretion within its statutory framework. Consequently, it remains 
to be seen whether Scotland’s approach offers a greater balance between Deech’s and 
Fineman’s positions. 
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CHAPTER 4: DEECH WITH ELEMENTS OF FINEMAN – 
SCOTLAND 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
While New Zealand almost fulfils Deech’s approach towards financial provision on relationship 
breakdown, Scotland’s system encapsulates greater elements of Fineman’s position. Scotland 
has a similar starting point to New Zealand equally dividing matrimonial property, advocating 
certainty, clarity and autonomy. However, this is the first of five principles under the Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 1985 (henceforth the FL(S)A),574 whereas in New Zealand equal sharing is 
the core principle. Scotland therefore contains much greater discretion for the courts to move 
away from equal division where there is an economic imbalance between parties. This, 
(alongside a wider definition of relationship property) provides Fineman’s care-dyad with 
potentially larger settlements and therefore greater protection in comparison with New 
Zealand’s approach. Nevertheless, Scotland still espouses the principle of clean break, and just 
like New Zealand, maintenance settlements are limited and designed to be rehabilitative. 
Consequently, where New Zealand seemingly failed to achieve a balance between these two 
feminist positions due to the overly rigid application of formal equality, Scotland offers a 
system with greater flexibility. The question now posed in this chapter is how far this 
framework rectifies the criticisms that arose in New Zealand, and does it therefore achieve a 
balance between Deech’s and Fineman’s stances? By also considering how far lawyers 
perceive their system to be effective, this chapter shall explore how the day-to-day application 
of this approach treats the care-giving role. 
Scotland has a different approach towards different relationship statuses. Under the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, same-sex couples can enter a registered relationship that carries with it 
almost exactly the same entitlements as marriage;575 yet, this does not extend to cohabiting 
couples. Instead, under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 cohabiting couples (same and 
different-sex) have a similar but different approach in financial provision on relationship 
breakdown in comparison with marriage/civil partnership. This centres on rebalancing 
economic imbalances (more narrowly construed than in the marriage/civil partnership 
context) to ensure that no-one is dramatically better or worse off financially than the other as 
                                                          
574 These 5 principles are listed in appendix L 
575 The Scottish Government intends to legalise same-sex marriage and it is thought that a draft bill will be produced for 
consultation later in 2012. See ‘Same Sex Marriage to be Legalised’ (The Scottish Government, 28 July 2012) 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2012/07/same-sex25072012> accessed 1 August 2012 
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a result of the contributions made in the relationship. Moreover, this scheme was specifically 
designed to find a balance between financial vulnerability and respecting the privacy of the 
cohabitants.576 This balancing act therefore appears to be between Fineman’s and Deech’s 
positions respectively. Deech argues that the law should not regulate cohabiting couples, 
respecting their choice not to marry,577 and in contrast Fineman argues that the law should 
centre on protecting care-giving relationships regardless of relationship status.578 Given that 
Scotland’s framework has attempted to find a middle-ground between these positions, does 
this mean that it has achieved a satisfactory balance between these two commentators? 
Once again, before this chapter begins its analysis, it is important to consider the similarities 
and differences between Scotland and England and Wales. Scotland is geographically much 
closer to England and Wales than Australia and New Zealand, yet there are some fundamental 
differences in its legal system. To understand the possibility of using this jurisdiction to help 
develop options for legal reform in England and Wales, it is necessary to outline the cultural, 
legal and political similarities and differences between the two. 
Scotland’s legal system is pluralistic deriving from a number of legal sources like Roman law, 
Civil Law and also some Common Law. While the Acts of Union 1707 meant it shared the 
legislature with the rest of the UK, it maintained its fundamentally different and separate legal 
system, and in 1998 The Scotland Act devolved power to Scotland allowing it to set up its own 
Executive and Parliament, which adopted a model similar to the Westminster model.579 This 
meant Scotland could now make laws on those areas which were not reserved for 
Westminster580 including family policy and thus family reform is in the hands of the Scottish 
Executive. Consequently, Scotland has a very different legal background in comparison to the 
other jurisdictions. However, due to its close history, England and Wales’ case law can be very 
persuasive on Scots Law. The Supreme Court is both the highest appellate court in Scotland 
and England and Wales and often members of both the Scottish and English judiciary will 
preside over cases from both jurisdictions. Consequently calls for reform and comparisons 
between the two jurisdictions can occur in overlapping cases. For example, Lord Hope of 
                                                          
576 Scottish Executive Family Matters: Improving Family Law in Scotland (Justice Department CPl 2004) 30. See also K Norrie, The 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006: Text and Commentary (Dundee University Press 2006) 57 
577 R Deech, ‘The Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation’ (1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 480; 
R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 43 
578 M Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge 1995) 
579 The core characteristic of the Westminster model has been described as ‘the dependence of the executive on the legislature 
and the leadership of the legislature by the executive’ by K Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century (Phoenix 
House 1962) 165 
580 See Schedule 4 and 5 to The Scotland Act 1998 
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Craighead sat on the bench in Miller; McFarlane581 where he called for the Scottish system to 
be more like England and Wales.  
 
Culturally, there are also similarities between these jurisdictions and a lot of the empirical 
surveys in the UK family context include respondents from both England and Wales, and 
Scotland. The Office of National Statistics (ONS) recorded a dramatic growth in the numbers of 
people cohabiting in both England and Wales and Scotland since the 1960s.582 Similarly, there 
has been a decline in marriage rates583 and again, there appears to be a gendered split in terms 
of employment patterns (women occupy more lower-wage jobs and are more inclined to be 
the homemaker). Furthermore, the British Social Attitudes survey (which again recorded 
attitudes in both Scotland and England) demonstrated a change in attitudes that have become 
more accommodating to once unconventional living arrangements.584 Thus large similarities 
exist between Scotland and England’s demographics. 
 
4.2 Financial Provision on Divorce/Dissolution:  
Marriage and Civil Partners 
 
As aforementioned, the FL(S)A as amended by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 and  Part 3 
of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 are the primary legislation concerning property settlement on 
divorce. Now Schedule 28 Part 2 of the FL(S)A sets out civil partnership provisions which mirror 
that of married couples. However, while the presumption is that the application of provisions 
will be identical, only 46 partnerships have been dissolved585 since 2004 and none have yet 
reached the law reports. It remains to be seen whether the provisions will be applied in the 
same way. 
In the married context, the process when determining financial provision on 
divorce/dissolution was set out in Sweeney v Sweeney:586 
(1) Identification and valuation of the matrimonial property. 
                                                          
581 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
582 J Beaumont, ‘Households and Families’ 41 Social Trends (ONS 2009) 10 – 11% unmarried men and 13% unmarried women 
cohabiting in 1986 compared with 24% and 25% respectively in 2006; K MacLachlan ‘Marriages in Scotland 1855 to 2010’ (General 
Register Office of Scotland 2010) <http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/statistics/theme/vital-events/marriages-and-civil-
partnerships/time-series.html> accessed 6 August 2011 - married couples from 51% to 43% between 1991 and 2001, and 
cohabiting couples from 4% to 7% 
583 From 40,103 in 1960 to 1989 28,480 in 2010. See K MacLachlan ‘Marriages in Scotland 1855 to 2010’ (General Register Office of 
Scotland 2010) <http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/statistics/theme/vital-events/marriages-and-civil-partnerships/time-
series.html> accessed 6 August 2011 
584 A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage 2008) 
585 The Scottish Government Statistical Bulletin: Crime and Justice Series, Table 1: Divorces and Dissolutions Granted, 2000-01 - 
2009-10 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/12/17151409/4> accessed May 2011 
586 Sweeney v Sweeney (No 1) [2004] SC 372 
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(2) Division of that property between the parties (whether in equal shares or 
otherwise) 
(3) Consideration of the parties' resources to test whether the 'fair' division arrived 
at stage 2 is 'reasonable'. 
Here, equal sharing is the corner stone of property settlement yet, unlike New Zealand, the 
Scottish Law Commission587 determined that formal equality’s one size would not fit all and 
thus ensured there would also be enough discretion for the courts to move away from equality 
when necessary.588 Consequently, s9 FL(S)A sets out five principles that the courts are to apply 
when determining awards.589 For Scott, the court still retains a large amount of discretion 
through step 3590 and furthermore, the courts are able to choose the most suitable order 
having regard to the s9 principles and to the resources of the party.591 These awards can 
include capital sums, property transfer, periodical allowance and pension sharing orders.592 
However, the strong emphasis on clean break under s13(2) provides that periodical allowances 
can only be granted if the other orders are considered inappropriate or unsuitable given the s9 
principles or the parties’ resources. The essence of Scotland’s scheme reflects Deech’s 
viewpoint that a clean break is preferable to promote greater financial autonomy. 
4.2.1 Section 9(1)(a): Fairly Sharing Matrimonial Assets  
 
Fair sharing has been defined as equal sharing under the FL(S)A593 to reflect that marriage is an 
equal partnership,594 thus the ‘fruits’ of that union are to be shared equally between the 
parties. The definition of matrimonial property is far wider in comparison with New Zealand.595 
While it similarly includes the family home and family chattels596 it also includes any property 
acquired during the marriage, but before the date of separation597 (although this excludes gifts 
or inheritance from third parties unless it is used to buy the matrimonial home).598 This means 
that (unlike New Zealand) business assets and property not owned for family purposes gained 
during the marriage will be subject for equal division.599 This provides a broader conception of 
                                                          
587 Scottish Law Commission, Aliment and Financial Provision (Scot Law Com No 67, 1981) 
588 Scottish Law Commission, Aliment and Financial Provision (Scot Law Com No 67, 1981) para 3.62 
589 See Appendix M 
590 McCaskill v McCaskill [2004] FamLR 123 see J Scott, ‘Principle or Pragmatism? The current state of Financial Provision on 
Divorce’ A paper originally delivered on 12 November 2007 at a seminar by BDO Stoy Hayward in Scotland, 2 
591 S8(2)(a) and (b) Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
592 S8(1) Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
593 S10(2) FL(S)A 
594 Scottish Law Commission, Aliment and Financial Provision (Scot Law Com No 67, 1981) para 3.67 
595 See in comparison Chapter 3, section 3.4.1 New Zealand P(R)A 1976 
596 S10(4) (a) 
597 S10(4) (b) and S10(3) Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 -  the relevant date is either the date they ceased to cohabit or the date of 
the service of the summons in action of divorce. 
598 Davidson v Davidson [1994] SLT 506 (Lord Maclean) ‘...any property acquired by the parties during the marriage but before 
separation is matrimonial property even if it is purchased with funds which one of the parties has acquired by way of gift or 
succession’ 
599McConnell v MCConnell [1993] GWD 34 - 2185 
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‘partnership’ as it allows for the recognition of the homemaker’s role in enabling their partner 
to achieve great business success. Furthermore, the wider definition of matrimonial property 
offers a greater protection for the financially vulnerable partner as there are more resources 
that can be moved in Fineman’s mother/child care-dyad’s direction. From Deech’s position, as 
expected, this potentially impinges on one’s own financial autonomy.  
However, recognising that formal equality is not always equity, Scotland has a number of 
‘special circumstances’ under s10(6)(a) – (e)600 where equality can be departed from601 (not 
including the four other s9 principles) although these are to be used minimally.602 For the 
purposes of this thesis, the next section shall focus on s10(6)(a),(b) and (d): financial 
agreements, source of funds and the use of matrimonial property. Yet, the very wording of 
these exceptions is financial in nature which suggests that they may be designed to benefit the 
breadwinner rather than the homemaker. 
While pre- and post- nuptial agreements have not been fully tested by the Scottish Courts, it is 
generally held that they and their civil partner equivalents are enforceable.603 Section 16 FL(S)A 
allows the court to set these aside where the agreement was ‘not fair and reasonable at the 
time it was entered into.’604 Nevertheless, there is little specification as to the prerequisites for 
entering an agreement compared to the extensive requirements within New Zealand. 
Consequently, the quality of legal advice may not render the agreement unfair, as Sheriff AG 
McCulloch demonstrated: 
The pursuer may well have received poor quality or inadequate legal advice at the 
time, and her interests may not have been fully protected by her solicitor, but that does 
not, in my view, mean that the agreement becomes unfair and/or unreasonable.605 
Generally, despite the lack of precise definition and clarity on the enforceability of such 
contracts, the courts have never regarded them as contrary to public policy (unlike England 
and Wales until recently) and are reluctant to overturn them.606 It is evident how this position 
would find favour with Deech as it gives weight to the individual’s autonomy and holds them 
responsible for entering such agreements. This raises serious concerns about the extent to 
which this assumes autonomy, particularly when Fineman argues that liberal conceptions of 
                                                          
600 See Appendix M 
601 Examples of the court having had to give consideration to the question of whether or not special circumstances pointed to fair 
sharing being unequal sharing can be found in cases such as Little v Little [1990] SLT 785, McLean v McLean [2001] Fam LR 118, R v 
R [2000] Fam LR 43, Sweeney v Sweeney (No2) [2006] SC 82 (resources – business) and McConnell v McConnell (No2) [1997] Fam 
LR 108. 
602 Scottish Law Commission, Aliment and Financial Provision (Scot Law Com No 67, 1981)  para 3.83 
603 S10(6)(a) also see Milne v Milne [1987] SLT 45 [47] (Lord Kincraig) 
604 This was based on recommendations made by the Scottish Law Commission, Aliment and Financial Provision (Scot Law Com No 
67, 1981) para 3.190  
605 Turner v Turner [2009] F486/05 [18] (Sheriff AG McCulloch) 
606 See for example Inglis v Inglis [1999] SLT (Sh Ct) 59 
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equality are idealistic and do not recognise any existing inequality of circumstances.607 It could 
mean that the weaker financial party is unable to, or does not consider the possibility of, 
accessing legal advice at the outset of these agreements and consequently is pressurised into 
agreeing to terms that they do not fully understand. Consequently, this seems to act to the 
detriment of the financially weaker party. Not only is there a high bar in place to establish 
unfairness, but fairness is taken from the time that the contract was entered into. Therefore, 
an unforeseen change in circumstances in the relationship, such as having children, which 
materially alters the level of financial independence or equality between spouses, may not 
render the contract unfair. This concern is especially pertinent when the onus is on the 
claimant to establish that the terms are unfair. Thompson608 believes that this burden lies with 
the claimant because the alternative (that the respondent must prove that the contract is fair) 
would discourage self-regulation. While this provision supports Deech’s position, it seems that 
there is little protection for Fineman’s care-dyad and therefore the real danger exists that pre-
nuptial contracts could pose a severe financial disadvantage for those whose lives are 
characterised by dependency. 
Another way the courts can grant an exception to equal sharing is through a source of funds 
argument under s10(6)(b). This means that if an asset has been purchased, for example, with 
property owned by one party prior to the marriage or through an inheritance or gift, then it 
can be excluded from the pool of matrimonial assets.609 It acts as a limitation to excessive gain 
of assets (which would be defined as separate property within New Zealand) by the non-
owning spouse, such as the expansion of businesses or purchasing shares through pre-marital 
business assets. Again, this seems to be weighted in favour of the breadwinner and while this 
can serve to protect the financial autonomy of both the husband and wife, it can also 
negatively impact the care-dyad. In Jesner v Jesner610 the matrimonial home (in joint names) 
had been purchased through the breadwinner’s (the husband’s) assets which had been held on 
trust for him and was therefore held to be an exception to equal sharing. This was even though 
Mrs Jesner, as a result of being the homemaker, was in a far weaker financial position and 
would be left in a far more precarious situation without a limited share in the matrimonial 
home. Consequently, there is a very real possibility that it may disadvantage the care-giving or 
homemaking spouse.  
S10(6)(d) provides that the courts can look at the use of the matrimonial property and so can 
consider the impact that dividing it will have on the parties. For example, if a home is being 
                                                          
607 See for example Inglis v Inglis [1999] SLT (Sh Ct) 59, 70 
608 J Thompson, Family Law in Scotland (4th edn, Butterworths Lexis Nexis 2002) 16 
609 However, this does not include it being bought by one party’s income or efforts during the marriage. 
610 Jesner v Jesner [1992] SLT 999 
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used by the breadwinner as a business and to share it equally would have huge repercussions 
on the viability of the business, the courts may depart from strict equal sharing and instead 
grant another award such as a capital sum allowance through a second mortgage. In contrast, 
the courts may also depart on the grounds that the children need a home especially where 
couples have limited assets. For example, in Peacock v Peacock611 the wife received the family 
home to provide a house for her children, but the courts rebalanced this by relinquishing her 
interest in a small life insurance policy; the overall financial aspect of equality is still achieved, 
but not necessarily through the matrimonial property. Thus, the courts recognise the 
importance of not compromising the financial autonomy of one party in one context, and at 
the same time appreciate Fineman’s care-dyad, providing housing where necessary to 
recognise the needs of the children where the claimants’ resources are unable to meet  
needs.612 This arguably does not compromise Deech’s position either, as she recognises that in 
situations (only) where there are young children the care-giver may require further (short-
lived) support.613 
Generally, these ‘special circumstances’ which alter the composition of matrimonial property 
are weighted in favour of the breadwinning or property-owning partner. While these 
provisions can alter the form of the property that is being divided to provide relief from both 
Fineman and Deech’s positions, they cannot be used to increase the value of the property pool 
subject to equal division for the financially weaker spouse. Yet, at the same time these 
provisions can significantly reduce the amount of matrimonial property available and 
consequently s10 exceptions to equal sharing embody Deech’s values of encouraging and 
protecting financial autonomy and property. However, the most concerning element of these 
provisions is the enforceability of pre-nuptial agreements as, particularly given their lack of 
formal requirements, they could overlook the fact that many financially vulnerable partners 
are in a weaker bargaining position. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these exceptions are intended for minimal use614 and 
in fact just because these special circumstances may arise does not necessarily mean that the 
courts will automatically depart from equality;615 they must first establish if it is justifiable to 
depart from equality.616 Furthermore, anything considered non-matrimonial and not subject to 
equal division is not completely removed from the court’s consideration; this property still 
                                                          
611 Peacock v Peacock [1994] SLT 40 
612 See for example in Adams v Adams (No 1) [1997] SLT 144 where Lord Ordinary Gill would not transfer the large house to the 
wife who would be the primary care-giver on account of the fact that she could not afford to run it as it was too big. Thus, there is 
a limit on how far the courts are willing to go financially speaking for the homemaker. 
613 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1145 
614 Scottish Law Commission, Aliment and Financial Provision (Scot Law Com No 67, 1981) para 3.83 
615 Jaques v Jaques (1997) SC (HL) [20] (Lord Clyde) 
616 Sweeney v Sweeney (No2) [2006] SC 82 [18] (Lord Hamilton) 
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counts as a resource of the party617 that the courts can use when adjusting shares under the 
other s9 principles. Thus it seems that in actuality a balance has been achieved here between 
autonomy and protection. While this tries to ensure that financial assets are not subject to 
‘gold-digging’, at the same time it does not then serve to place a cap on the financially weaker 
party. Yet, it still means that the court follows financial rather than domestic contributions at 
the outset; the care-dyad is not central, but is more protected than within New Zealand. 
4.2.2 Section 9(1)(b): Economic Advantage and Economic Disadvantage 
This section is intended to add an additional share to 50% and is frequently described as the 
most important of the provisions618 (particularly for the homemaker where there is little 
matrimonial property) as it involves a fair account of any economic advantages or 
disadvantages619 that stem from the parties’ contributions (which can be financial and non-
financial). This can only be awarded through capital sums or property transfers. Section 11(2) 
expands on the factors to be considered:620  
a. Whether ‘the economic advantages or disadvantages sustained by either party have 
been balanced by [those]…sustained by the other party’ and 
b.  Whether ‘any resulting imbalance has been or will be corrected by a sharing of the 
value of the matrimonial property or otherwise.’  
Section 9(1)(b) is essentially a compensatory provision similar to New Zealand’s ‘economic 
disparity’ provision, although Scotland’s approach is arguably broader as it does not require 
the nexus between the division of relationship roles and the economic disparity.621 Instead, the 
thrust of s9(1)(b) is to weigh up one party’s economic advantages and disadvantages against 
the other’s and where there is an imbalance an award can be made. Therefore, there is a 
direct comparison between the financial positions of the parties at the end of the relationship. 
Any  disadvantage must have been suffered in the interests of either the family or the other 
party and it must not have been redressed through the previous s9(1)(a) equality provision. 
Compared with New Zealand, this broader approach makes the provision more accessible, 
easier to prove (although the onus is on the applicant)622 and recognises to a greater degree 
the effect of care-giving. 
                                                          
617 S8(2) FL(S)A 1985 
618 See for example J Thompson, ‘Financial Provision on Divorce – the Current State of Play’ (1990) Scots Law Times  17 – 20 and 33 
- 38 
619 Perhaps this is the justification behind the use of economic advantage/disadvantage in Scotland’s provision for cohabitation. 
See discussion at 4.5 below. 
620 S11(2) 
621 See New Zealand’s S15(1) P(R)A 1976 inserted by s17 P(R)AA 2001. See Chapter 3 at section 3.4.2.4which provides ‘where the 
division of relationship responsibilities has resulted in one party being significantly better off than the other’. 
622 E.g. Welsh v Welsh [1994] SLT 828 
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Yet, in terms of application, there are some difficulties quantifying the parties’ economic 
advantages and disadvantages, particularly regarding career sacrifices. In Welsh v Welsh623 the 
wife, who had given up employment to raise their family and support her husband, had been 
seeking a division above equality using principle 9(1)(b). Lord Osborne held that  
…while it is plain that the pursuer herself suffered an economic disadvantage in the 
interests of the defender and her children, insofar as she gave up quite well paid 
employment to look after her family, it appears to me to be equally plain that she 
enjoyed certain associated economic advantages in the same situation, in respect that 
she was subsequently maintained exclusively from the earnings of the defender during 
the period in which she had no employment.624  
He continued,  
it appears to me also that, in consequence of the pursuer giving up her paid 
employment, the defender himself sustained an economic disadvantage, in respect 
that he was thus rendered the sole breadwinner for the family, assuming the 
responsibility for maintaining, not only his children, but also the pursuer herself.625  
 
Consequently, this case was altered in the husband’s favour on the grounds that the wife had 
an economic advantage by living in the house rent free. Furthermore, in Coyle v Coyle626 
another case which tried to frame the homemaker’s career sacrifices as an economic 
disadvantage that the breadwinner economically benefited from, Lady Smith emphasised: 
…it is important to recognise that Parliament did not in the 1985 Act provide that 
whenever a party divorce after marriage where one has been the breadwinner and the 
other been the homemaker, the latter must receive extra financial provision on 
divorce.627 
Frequently, the courts offset the economic disadvantage that the care-giving spouse has from 
their career sacrifice with the economic advantage they receive from being provided for by the 
financially stronger spouse. This echoes Deech’s contention628 that compensation is artificial, 
as the only way that a woman could give up her career was if her partner’s income provided 
enough for her to be able to do so and therefore the woman does so ‘with a sigh of relief’.629 
However, this tendency of the court to count the advantage of living in the home has, for 
Thompson,630 resulted in this provision failing at its initial aim to recognise the economic 
contributions made by the homemaker. Furthermore, it arguably overlooks the future 
                                                          
623 Welsh v Welsh [1994] SLT 828 
624  Welsh v Welsh [1994] SLT 828 [83] (Lord Osborne) 
625  Welsh v Welsh [1994] SLT 828 [84] (Lord Osborne) 
626 Coyle v Coyle [2004] SFLR  
627 Coyle v Coyle [2004] SFLR [37] (Lady Smith) 
628 See Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.3’s discussion of s15 P(R)A 1975 in New Zealand 
629 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229, 231 
630 J Thompson, Family Law in Scotland (5th edn, Butterworths Lexis Nexis 2007) 173. See Ali v Ali (No 3) [2003] SLT 641 where the 
wife had also given up work to support the running of the family and to assist her husband on the farm argued economic 
disadvantage on this ground, but the court held this argument to be unsuccessful due to her advantage of living on the farm. Also 
see Coyle v Coyle [2004] SFLR [4] 
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difficulties631 that occur from being out of employment and instead views this disadvantage as 
having been offset by benefitting from their partner’s ability to provide. This ignores the fact 
that the economic disadvantage, particularly where there are children is accepted in the 
interests of the family and as part of that relationship.  
Yet, this provision has also been used to recognise career sacrifices where the economic 
disadvantage has not been outweighed by the economic advantage. For example in McCormick 
v McCormick,632 the courts held that the wife was at a disadvantage in that it would be difficult 
for her to gain employment at her age in her former profession.  Furthermore, the courts 
appear to have adopted a wide definition of ‘career sacrifice’ taking it to mean not just the 
specific loss of earnings associated with giving up a set career path, but also to include the less 
specific general impact that not working has on the likelihood of employability. For example, in 
Loudon v Loudon633 equal sharing was altered as the homemaker was untrained and there was 
a great disparity in assets: 
The defender is now well launched on a business career where he can command a high 
salary…The pursuer, on the other hand, requires to retrain in order to get back, as she 
put it, on the employment ladder…The difference between her earning potential now 
and what she would probably have been earning but for her marriage to the defender 
cannot be calculated with any accuracy but I think it reasonable to conclude that the 
pursuer has suffered a material economic disadvantage in this connection.634 
If the economic disadvantage is seen as extensive enough, the courts may even award the 
homemaker the whole property such as in Cunniff v Cunniff635 where the wife had not worked 
for over 20 years, had nowhere near the earning power of her husband and would not have 
been able to afford alternative accommodation. Thus, there is some attention given to the loss 
of financial autonomy which seems to meet both Fineman’s and Deech’s positions; it 
recognises vulnerability and dependency that Fineman identifies as the result of care-giving 
that are often accompanied by an inability to enter employment, and Deech even recognises 
that limited provision may be needed for those who are incapable of gaining employment due 
to age or illness.636  
While this seems to provide more effective compensation for the homemaker than any of the 
provisions in New Zealand, it seems that s9(1)(b) is biased in the application of this provision 
and the asset pool size. It is much more likely in big asset cases for the economic advantages 
                                                          
631 Dougan v Dougan [1998] SLT (Sh Ct) 
632 McCormack v McCormack (1987) GWD 9-287 [10] 
633 Loudon v Loudon [1994] SLT p 385C 
634 Loudon v Loudon [1994] SLT p 385C (Lord Milligan) 
635 Cunniff v Cunniff [1999] SLT 992 
636 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229, 231 
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and disadvantages to be balanced than it is in smaller asset cases. Furthermore, Lord Hope in 
Miller637 indicated that periodical payments cannot be awarded under this section and yet the 
courts are reluctant to award capital sums where there are small assets (although it can be 
made by instalments from the husband’s future income). Fundamentally, this means that this 
provision may not adequately compensate the homemaker in small asset cases even though 
these are the relationships for which this provision was designed. Therefore, it is questionable 
how far s9(1)(b) goes to realising the compensatory function that this was meant to have for 
homemakers.638 Instead, the courts appear to have circumvented this limitation, as Thompson 
explains,639 by using s9(1)(e) to grant long term maintenance. Yet, that is contrary to the 
purpose of that maintenance section. Therefore, it seems that greater scope is needed for the 
orders to improve this situation and also it indicates that periodical payments are necessary 
for the effective application of a compensatory provision. 
While this provision goes some steps further than New Zealand in addressing the position of 
the financially vulnerable, the danger of counting the economic advantage of having lived in 
the house as outweighing or significantly reducing the economic disadvantage suffered leaves 
the vulnerable homemaker in a precarious position.  Section 9(1)(b) considers it an advantage 
even when it is a necessity to carry out the caring role, and arguably the economic focus of this 
section overtakes the original compensatory and partnership focus that it was meant to have 
as the current interpretation does not recognise that career sacrifice decisions are often joint 
and also benefit the other party (as it is made in the interests of the family). This seems 
particularly disadvantageous for homemakers in relationships with smaller asset pools. 
Yet, this could be compensated under the section 9(1)(d) and (e) principles that deal with 
maintenance provision although given that this is considered to be the most important 
principle, it is questionable how far s9(1)(c)-(e) can improve this. 
4.2.3 Section 9(1)(c): Economic Burden of Caring 
This principle is specifically designed to ensure the economic burden of caring is fairly 
distributed between the couple through financial support in addition to principles 9(1)(a) and 
(b) by means of capital awards, property transfers or, as long as these awards are 
inappropriate, under s13(2) periodical allowances (until the child’s 16th birthday). Such 
allowances can be made in respect of a child of the marriage, which includes children accepted 
as children of the marriage.640 This principle will only be used where s9(1)(a) and (b) are not 
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638 E Clive, ‘Financial provision in Divorce’ (2006) 10 Edinburgh Law Review  413 
639 J Thompson, Family Law in Scotland (5th edn, Butterworths Lexis Nexis 2007) 173  
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enough to cover the economic burden of caring, and consequently not many cases will require 
an extra adjustment. This heightens the problem (particularly in small asset cases) that 
adjustments under s9(1)(b) cannot be awarded through periodical payments. Yet where 
s9(1)(c) is used it can extensively alter the award to protect the care-dyad. For example, in Orr 
v Orr641 the wife had given up her work as a senior staff nurse to raise their two children under 
12. On divorce it was held that a claim under principle 9(1)(c) would stand because she could 
not afford to purchase the house nor return to work fully due to school hours. She was 
awarded 60% of the matrimonial property and a periodical allowance of £600 for 12 months. 
Sheriff Stephen stated that given the circumstances, to not consider this principle would make 
‘nonsense of the aim of the legislation’.642 This, for McGovern, represents a greater shift from 
the courts to award compensation to homemakers and depart quite dramatically from equal 
sharing.643 
No provision like this exists in New Zealand, and arguably this gives greater recognition to the 
care-dyad as it recognises the direct financial consequences of the party who has to raise the 
children. Thus, while maintenance for the care of the children (rather than for the care-giver) 
must be a consideration for the proceedings, this section can take account of the fact that the 
care-giver may suffer economic disadvantages such as not being able to work fulltime or 
having to hire a nanny. Yet, the rarity with which s9(1)(c) is applied indicates that its effects are 
limited. Furthermore, the award is for the cost of raising the children rather than the effects of 
raising children and so reflects Deech’s notion which requires single mothers to engage in the 
labour market.  
4.2.4 Maintenance: Section 9(1)(d): Not More than Three Years and 
Section 9(1)(e) To Relieve Hardship Over a Reasonable Period 
 
The provision of maintenance in Scotland is, like New Zealand, designed to be rehabilitative in 
accordance with Deech’s beliefs about awarding maintenance. Yet, as has been discussed in 
Chapter 3,644 it once again represents the assumption that women should be engaged within 
the labour market, which ignores the gendered lives that are lived in the private sphere. This 
section is designed to be in addition to the above principles, and therefore will only be 
                                                          
641 Orr v Orr [2006] (Edinburgh Sheriff Court) 31 July 2006  
642 Orr v Orr [2006] (Edinburgh Sheriff Court) 31 July 2006 taken from A McGovern (2006) ‘Provision and prejudice: Consideration 
of a case which may indicate a greater willingness by the Scottish courts to compensate for future financial prejudice following 
divorce’ (The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 13 November 6)  
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awarded if it is felt that the other principles do not cover this requirement already. However, 
the courts under s9(1)(d), unlike the previous sections, can award periodical payments 
although this is capped at a maximum period of three years. Section 11(4) sets out the factors 
that the court must have regard to when considering this principle.645 As Thompson points 
out,646 this provision is based on fairness and equity rather than entitlement; therefore 
behaviour will be taken into account when deciding whether it would be inequitable or not to 
make an award under this section.647 Furthermore, the award will hinge on whether the 
claiming party has found fulltime or even part-time employment.648 Therefore, the courts try 
to limit this section’s interference with the principle of clean break by ensuring that the award 
is not a perpetual financial burden, that it will help to retrain the claimant and that it is only 
awarded where necessary. This three year cap consequently means that the scope for 
maintenance is much more limited than in New Zealand. While there is an option for a longer 
period of maintenance under s9(1)(e), the requirements are much stricter and thus the 
Scottish courts are unable to grant maintenance where necessary for a period of longer than 
three years. This, from Fineman’s position, fails to disrupt forms of inequality and 
consequently protection is extremely limited and focused on ensuring women engage with the 
labour force to the detriment of care relationships. 
Section 9(1)(e) allows for ongoing maintenance for a reasonable period. Under this principle 
the courts must have regard to factors649 and again, behaviour will be a consideration. This 
provision is specifically to grant ongoing support designed to deal with age or illness650 and 
therefore incapacity to work. Thompson651 notes that use of this provision is extremely rare, 
although the courts have sometimes granted it to middle-aged women where they had not 
received a s9(1)(b) award and as a result, the courts were concerned with their ability to 
survive.652 Moreover, s9(1)(e) requires severe hardship which is strictly interpreted.653 This 
strict interpretation and application of maintenance is exactly how Deech believes it should be 
awarded. Yet, as discussed above, from Fineman’s perspective, it indicates a severe limitation 
on protecting and recognising the operation of dependents within the private sphere and the 
impact that this may have long-term on those who are characterised by dependency. 
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647 FL(S)A 1985, s11(7)(b) 
648 Sheret v Sheret [1990] SCLR 799 
649 S11(5) listed in Appendix N 
650 Johnstone  v Johnstone (1990) SCLR 358 
651 J Thompson, Family Law in Scotland (4th edn, Butterworths Lexis Nexis 2002), 965 
652 E.g. McConnell v McConnell [1995] GWD 3-145 and Stott v Stott (1987) GWD 17-645 
653Barclay v Barclay [1991] SCLR 205 
142 
 
Thus it seems that in fact financial provision for married couples is weighted towards Deech’s 
position and does not go far enough to protect Fineman’s care-dyad. So how is this 
approached in the cohabitation context? 
 
 4.3 Cohabitation 
The Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 brought in a regime regulating their rights and 
responsibilities654 for cohabiting couples and which was intended to be different from married 
couples: 
The Scottish Ministers do not intend to create a new legal status for cohabitants. It is 
not the intention that marriage-equivalent legal rights should accrue to cohabiting 
couples, nor is it the intention to undermine the freedom of those who have 
deliberately opted out of marriage or of civil partnership. The Scottish Ministers 
consider it vital to balance the rights of adults to live unfettered by financial obligations 
towards partners against the need to protect the vulnerable.655 
While having this in mind, s28 has sought to protect the financially vulnerable656 yet it also 
followed the earlier Scottish Law Commission’s 1992 recommendations which wanted neither 
equal sharing (designed to respect people’s choice not to marry)657 nor a needs-based 
approach (due to the fact that these relationships did not have a formal commitment).658 
Instead the cohabitation scheme seeks to offset any economic advantages or disadvantages as 
well as sharing the economic burden of childcare: similar provisions to s9(1)(b) and (c) of the 
FL(S)A. 
This desire to balance a right to privacy versus protection essentially deals with balancing 
Deech’s and Fineman’s positions. As addressed in Chapter 3, Deech is strongly opposed to a 
scheme that is unwittingly placed on cohabiting couples who she believes have not made that 
choice to marry and therefore have decided to not have legal obligations imposed on their 
private lives.659  Yet Fineman’s position seeks to protect the mother/child care-dyad regardless 
of sexual relationships or relationship status. How far has Scotland achieved this given that this 
scheme for cohabiting couples is intended to be narrower and less protective than in the 
marriage context? 
                                                          
654 The Scottish Executive (2005b) The Family Law (Scotland) Bill Explanatory notes(and other accompanying documents), 
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4.3.1 Defining the Scottish Cohabitant 
Section 25 defines a cohabiting couple as a couple who are/were living together as a married 
couple or civil partners660 and in fact this legislation was designed to remove any 
discrimination between the same and different-sex cohabiting couples.661  To determine 
whether a couple are cohabiting for the purpose of the Act, the courts are to consider the 
relationship’s length,662 nature,663 and any financial arrangements.664 This is a much shorter list 
than New Zealand’s factors for consideration and most notably does not contain the three-
year limitation period for a remedy that New Zealand has, as the Scottish Law Commission felt 
that the extent of economic advantages/disadvantages would be limited by their own nature 
in a short relationship.665 This potentially brings a greater range of claimants who can be 
protected under the Act as it does not necessarily exclude those who have been severely 
disadvantaged in a short space of time. Yet, a greater range of respondents potentially means 
that the scheme, from Deech’s position, may unjustly bring people under the Act from day one 
of a relationship, as there is no opt-out provision.  
4.3.2 The Cohabitation Scheme 
Under s28, the courts are able to make capital sum payments and orders relating to the 
economic burden of caring if they can establish 
(a) whether (and, if so, to what extent) the defender has derived economic advantage 
from contributions made by the applicant; and  
(b) whether (and, if so, to what extent) the applicant has suffered economic disadvantage 
in the interests of 
i) the defender; or 
ii) any relevant child.666 
 
Here contributions include financial and non-financial ones. This is strikingly similar to s9(1)(b) 
and (c) of the FL(S)A, however, as Norrie667 points out, s28 has a far narrower interpretation 
and s28(9) specifically limits economic advantages and disadvantages to gains/losses in capital 
and income and earning capacity. Subsequently, these provisions do not consider or provide 
for future losses668 despite this being, as Guthrie and Hiram identify, one of the main 
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contributors of financial vulnerability.669 Consequently, s28 does not fully recognise the 
economic impact that caring or homemaking can have on the position of primary care-givers 
and thus at the outset this scheme appears insufficient for protecting Fineman’s care-dyad. 
However, CM v STS670 indicates that the courts can look at the effect that an economic 
disadvantage will have on an individual’s participation in the labour market. Nevertheless s28 
presents a narrower consideration for cohabiting homemakers compared to married 
homemakers. For Miles et al. this provision is in fact unnecessarily cumbersome in contrast to 
section 9(1)(b) of the 1985 Act, particularly when the starting point in the marriage context of 
section 9(1)(a) will have gone some way to redress an imbalance.671 
While s28 seems to be very similarly worded to s9(1)(b), it does not permit the comparison 
between both parties’ economic advantages and disadvantages that is possible in the 
matrimonial context. Instead, the applicant must demonstrate that their economic 
disadvantage has not been outweighed by their own economic advantage which, as discussed 
below, can include being supported by the defendant. McCarthy describes this as follows:  
…the defender’s benefit must be set off against his disadvantage. The applicant’s 
disadvantage must be set off against her benefit. The legislation does not, however, 
direct the defender’s benefit to be offset against the applicant’s benefit.672 
Yet, there is a great deal of confusion (owing to the newness of this legislation) over how this 
provision should then be interpreted in the cohabitation context; how should it differ in 
practice from the matrimonial context? McCarthy argues that the absence of an explicitly 
stated underlying redistributive rationale in the legislation (other than the general aim of 
protecting the economically vulnerable and to achieve clarity and certainty) is the reason for 
this lack of direction.673 Consequently, he argues that the courts are using three rationales to 
redistribute assets in cohabitation cases: the partnership approach (that the relationship is a 
socio-economic partnership similar to the Australian context),674 the compensation approach 
(to repair damage that the relationship has caused and to return the parties to the position 
that they were in before the relationship),675 and the restitutionary approach (or unjust 
enrichment approach where one party essentially earns a share in the other’s property as a 
result of their contributions to the acquisition of that asset676).677 This confusion over how to 
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apply s28, McCarthy states, has led to a number of inconsistent and ‘bewildering’ outcomes678 
although, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Gow v Grant (2012), the courts appear to have 
established a clearer rationale pertaining to section 28.679 
In CM v STS,680 an early case (although it is important to note that few cases have been 
brought to court as yet) concerning an eight year cohabitation with two children the courts 
followed a similar interpretation to s9(1)(b). This, McCarthy believes, displays the partnership 
rationale to property division.681 However, subsequent case law has indicated that the courts 
are reluctant to use the same interpretation of this provision as in the marriage context682  
and, most recently, the Supreme Court in Gow v Grant emphasised that: 
…it would not be right to adopt the same approach to the application of [section 28] as 
would be appropriate if the exercise was being conducted under section 9 of the 1985 
Act. The starting points are different.683.  
Despite emphasising a distinction between s28 and s9(1)(b), the Supreme Court’s decision 
marked a much broader approach to section 28 than had been developing within the lower 
courts. In the prior hearing of Gow v Grant (2011)684 the Second Division had adopted a 
narrower formulation of section 28. Here, the Second Division emphasised that s9(1)(b) and 
s28 were different, requiring an alternative approach where the economic disadvantage had to 
be ‘in the interests’ of the other party: had Mrs Gow suffered a disadvantage in the interests of 
Mr Grant, that is to say, ‘in a manner intended to benefit the defender’? Here the respondent 
encouraged the applicant to sell her house (her only capital asset) and the proceeds were used 
to pay off debts, loan her son money and to contribute to the couple’s extravagant lifestyles. 
The lower court held that the money was used primarily for Mrs Gow’s own purposes rather 
than in the interests of the defender and the money that she had contributed towards joint 
living expenses were not enough for Mrs Gow to establish an economic disadvantage as Mr 
Grant had contributed more to the general finances. The court viewed this payment ‘to be 
more in the nature of compensation’.685 The court therefore adopted a ‘compensatory’ 
approach, interpreting the aim of the Act to be to restore any imbalance between the parties 
that resulted from the cohabitation. Furthermore, the Second Division emphasised that, rather 
than balancing economic advantages and disadvantages between parties as in the marriage 
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context, the courts are to assess them individually. This decision was subsequently overturned 
by the Supreme Court. 
While the Supreme Court also confirmed that s28 and s9(1)(b) were different, Lord Hope also 
recognised that ‘the underlying principle [of section 28] is fairness’686 and while this did not 
mean that the court was able ‘to correct any clear and quantifiable economic imbalance’,687 he 
stated that s28 was designed to achieve the same effect as s9(1)(b); fair compensation.688 
Therefore, he concluded, it may be useful to refer to s9(1)(b) cases when the courts are 
considering s28 factors.689 Furthermore, the Supreme Court critiqued the Second Division’s 
interpretation of the phrase ‘in the interests of the defender’. While Lord Hope agreed that ‘in 
the interests of the defender’ could mean ‘in a manner intended to benefit the defender’, he 
argued that this was not the only interpretation. Rather the phrase was to be given its natural 
meaning which ‘is directed to the effect of the transaction rather than the intention with 
which it was entered into.’690 Consequently, the Supreme Court argued that the Second 
Division had not given effect to the true meaning of s28. Applying this wider interpretation of 
the section, the Supreme Court found that Mrs Gow had suffered an economic disadvantage 
and accordingly awarded her £39,500. In doing so, the court’s rationale appears to have now 
settled somewhere in between McCarthy’s classifications of ‘partnership’ and ‘compensation’. 
On the one hand, the court’s rationale recognises that cohabitation is a committed 
relationship and accordingly cohabitation property disputes require a fair remedy. On the 
other hand, the court also recognises that cohabiting relationships are ‘a less formal, less 
structured and more flexible form of relationship than either marriage or civil partnership’ and 
therefore cohabitating couples are not entitled to marital-like rights.691 Is it possible that this 
represents a middle ground between Deech’s and Fineman’s positions where fairness and 
difference are both incorporated into a rationale? Or, by enabling s9(1)(b) cases to be used in 
relation to s28, has the Supreme Court irreversibly blurred the boundaries between the 
cohabitation and marital regimes? 
The final model for property redistribution that McCarthy identifies is the restitutionary model. 
Prior to Gow v Grant (2012),692 this model had seemingly become the most favoured one (out 
of the small body of cases that existed) and had also been used in cases such as Selkirk v 
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Chisholm,693 F v D694 and Jamieson v Rodhouse.695 In Lindsay v Murphy,696 (six year cohabitation 
with three children) the parties had bought a plot of land from the defender’s brother on 
which to build a house. To fund this venture the applicant contributed £84,500 from the sale of 
her former residence (in which they had both cohabited) and gifts from her mother. The 
defender contributed £5,000. Both parties made non-financial contributions to the project. 
The applicant was essentially responsible for project management and the defender used his 
contacts to get cheap labour and materials. The applicant was also the primary carer for their 
children. Here, the court affirmed that the economic advantage/disadvantage provisions in the 
cohabitation context were to apply differently in comparison to the married context; the 
approach to property settlement under the 1985 Act ’is one of entitlement, whereas the basis 
of the 2006 Act is discretion.’697 While the court found the Second Division’s decision in Gow v 
Grant (2011)698 useful for the discussion over how to approach s28, the court rejected the idea 
that awards under this section should be compensatory in their nature.699 Rather, the court 
preferred a more restitutionary approach700 which grants an award where there is an 
economic disadvantage that arises as a result of the parties’ contributions. This is a far 
narrower application of s28 than the compensatory model and essentially entails a much 
closer look at the contributions that the parties have made. Unlike the compensatory model, 
there is absolutely no room to compare the financial positions of the parties at the end of the 
relationship nor is there any room to consider things such as the loss of earnings that may 
arise from sacrificing a career to raise any children of the relationship.701 Yet, this rationale sits 
more closely with Deech’s position as it prevents extensive ‘gold-digging’ claims that the 
compensatory or partnership model may enable. As discussed below, this focus on 
contributions may severely disadvantage the homemaker as the courts appear to place far 
greater weight on financial contributions.  
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Gow v Grant (2012),702 the rationale for s28 was not 
yet established and thus these three models (partnership, compensation and restitution) 
represented the potential approaches that the courts could use, all of which could produce 
vastly different outcomes.703 Not only did this mean that there was a lack of clarity concerning 
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how this section would be interpreted, but Miles et al.’s (2010) study found that practitioners 
viewed this uncertainty to be a fundamental problem as it potentially stopped cases 
progressing.704 However, it was felt that these concerns would dissipate over time as case law 
developed705 and indeed it seems that Gow v Grant (2012) has settled this ambiguity in a 
manner that appears most preferential from Fineman’s perspective and at the same time can 
be seen to be a disappointing development from Deech’s standpoint. Through Deech’s lens, 
the restitutionary rationale would have been the most satisfactory interpretation of s28. 
Nevertheless, it remains clear from this growing body of decisions, that the application of the 
economic advantage and disadvantage provision in the cohabitation context (while the 
underlying rationale is not yet clear) is intended to be narrower than in the matrimonial 
context. For cohabiting couples, there is a need to establish a direct link between the 
economic disadvantage suffered and the interest of the defender whereas the married 
applicant needs only to show that they have suffered a disadvantage in the interests of the 
family.  Subsequently, this limits the cohabiting applicant’s ability to redress general financial 
imbalances that exist at the end of the relationship as the primary care-giver must prove that 
their contributions in the private sphere have directly caused their partner’s success in the 
public sphere (although it is questionable how different this will be in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gow v Grant). This requirement to establish a link between domestic 
contributions and success in the public sphere is (as demonstrated in the feminist critique of 
New Zealand706) a difficult task for the claimant to carry out successfully. From Deech’s 
perspective, this bar protects the financial autonomy of the breadwinner and prevents ‘gold-
digging’ claims made through tenuous connections to one party’s financial success. Given that 
it seems that only much, much smaller awards are possible, this seemingly fails to protect the 
dependency intrinsic to the mother/child care-dyad, and instead promotes the expectation to 
be self-sufficient which Fineman has criticised for neutering the mother as it disregards 
gendered dependency within the private sphere. 
Section 28(9) states that indirect or non-financial contributions for looking after the house or 
child classify as contributions that the courts can consider in a bid to protect the financially 
vulnerable who usually find themselves in this role. Yet, the courts in practice seem to have a 
narrow application of this section and (thus far) these contributions alone have not led to 
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successful claims. It seems that the courts are adopting a ‘water under the bridge’ approach707 
when considering homemaking contributions; offsetting these against the advantage of 
receiving the defendant’s economic support. For example in Jamieson v Rodhouse708 (30-year 
cohabitation and a ‘relevant’ child of the family) both parties worked fulltime, the house was 
in his name and he paid the bills and mortgage, she paid for her child, household items and did 
all the housework. It was determined that the position was economically neutral, that 
advantages and disadvantages offset each other so no award was met. Similarly, in Selkirk v 
Chisholm709 (nine-year cohabitation with no children) the house was in his name and he paid 
for all the bills. Both worked fulltime, and he, later, as self-employed. Both paid for furnishings 
and redecoration and shared domestic chores. He did outdoor jobs, she cleaned and washed 
clothes and paid for food and telephone calls. It was held she had no advantage or 
disadvantage; she would have paid those bills anyway.710 
 
The courts are therefore in practice not awarding for indirect contributions or domestic 
contributions as they are outweighed by the benefit of economic support. In fact, in the Selkirk 
case above, the judge himself emphasised ‘it is significant that in none of these cases was any 
award made solely on the basis of contributions towards household bills.’711 This potentially 
means that the homemaker is entirely vulnerable as these contributions are not enough on 
their own to substantiate a claim. The homemaker’s vulnerability is intensified under this 
scheme, given that there is also no real potential to consider future losses and that economic 
advantages and disadvantages are based on an individual rather than a relationship 
assessment. In fact, where awards have been granted, the contributions are combined with a 
financial one such as in F v D712 above, Gow v Grant713 or in Lindsay v Murphy714 where her 
contributions of helping to design a house (where both parties were unemployed) were held 
to be an economic disadvantage. Consequently, it seems that these provisions have not 
achieved their original design to delicately balance financial vulnerability and financial 
autonomy. Instead they fail to protect the financially vulnerable and arguably require some 
greater recognition of needs that arise from the care-giving dyad.  
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The courts under s28(2)(b) can also make awards based on the economic burden of caring, and 
this is used more frequently than economic advantage/disadvantage for those with children: in 
CM v STS715 they altered the settlement based on income and residency, in F v D716  they 
halved the economic burden of caring, and in Lindsay v Murphy717 she received just over 
£8,000. Generally, these awards have been considered modest and to have not considered the 
full extent of the primary care-giver’s limited financial resources.718 Furthermore, the awards 
that the courts can offer here are limited to lump sums, although these can be awarded in 
instalments,719 which espouse the principle of clean break. However, it also means that 
ongoing support is removed from the primary care-giver which ignores dependency. Miles et 
al.720 found this concern was echoed by the practitioners who felt that the range of orders 
available is too limited. For Deech’s standpoint, this narrow approach for s28(b) encourages 
women to be self-sufficient and assume equal financial responsibility for their children. Yet 
from Fineman’s position, this is in complete conflict with the way that women lead their lives 
characterised by the care-dyad and thus their dependency.  
4.3.3 Cohabitation Agreements 
While all these provisions are unsatisfactory to Deech, as they interfere with the private 
sphere (despite their clear emphasis on autonomy), cohabitation agreements are the way in 
which she believes cohabitants should be able to sort out their legal status. Yet, this is an 
uncertain area as the Act itself does not contain a provision prohibiting such agreements, but 
nor does it state that they are enforceable. Miles et al. believe that, given the strong 
background of autonomy in Scots Law, these agreements would probably be enforceable as 
the law already recognises agreements that regulate the parties’ property in the married 
context from which spouses are free to opt out.721 It would be illogical to think that 
cohabitants could not use such agreements as well, however this remains to be seen in future 
cases. This lack of certainty may be a concern for those espousing Deech’s view, but the 
general feeling appears to be that there is no reason why cohabitation agreements would be 
automatically considered void. 
4.4 Doctrinal and Feminist Analysis: Conclusion  
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While the provisions in Scotland go some way towards balancing Deech’s and Fineman’s 
positions particularly in comparison with New Zealand, Scotland’s approach also seems to be 
too weighted towards autonomy; the impact of care-giving is not recognised and there 
perhaps needs to be a greater general consideration of the impact of care-giving ability. 
Furthermore, s9(1)(b) seems to be limited in its application given that it is not possible to grant 
periodical payments for this section. Consequently, Scotland’s approach in the married context 
is too restrictive and ignores the holistic effect that homemaking can have on a party’s 
financial ability. In the cohabiting context this seems to be even more limited because of the 
scheme’s focus on financial contributions and the apparent lack of recognition of domestic 
contributions. While Gow v Grant (2012)722 offers a wider interpretation of section 28, overall 
the cohabitation scheme still offers too little protection from Fineman’s perspective, and 
unwarrantedly interferes with a couple’s autonomy from Deech’s position. This next section 
looks at the practical implications of the schemes from the position of those lawyers who 
operate within Scotland’s system. 
4.5 Empirical Analysis 
 
After having addressed the doctrinal and feminist analysis of Scotland’s framework, this 
chapter shall now look at the empirical findings from the interviews with practitioners in 
Scotland. This section shall first of all address the socio-demographics of those who took part 
and then go on to outline the responses in the married, cohabiting and same-sex context to 
determine how an approach which is similar to New Zealand’s but closer to Fineman’s position 
serves the interests of women from the practitioners’ perspective. 
4.5.1 Socio-Demographics of the Interviewees 
A total of 16 practitioners from Scotland took part in this research project, of which an equal 
number were male and female. The largest number of respondents (see Table 4.1) were in the 
50 – 59 age bracket, a slightly younger demographic than New Zealand, although on the whole 
there was a similar age spread in both jurisdictions. Only three were aged 39 and younger. 
Most practitioners had practised in the area for a length of 11–20 years and 21–30 years. Four 
had practised between 31-40 years, thus the lawyers on average had been practicing for a 
lesser amount of time than the New Zealand practitioners.  
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Table 4.1: Ages of the respondents in Scotland 
 
4.5.2 Responses in the Marriage Context 
Table 4.2 Scotland’s themes in the marriage context 
 
The themes that emerged from the qualitative analysis conducted in Scotland essentially 
divided into two core categories as shown in Table 4.2. Firstly, the lawyers’ responses were 
very Deech-centric. That is to say, the practitioners embraced the core features of Deech’s 
arguments and, consequently, a number of themes emerged from the Scottish data that were 
similar to those in New Zealand although the themes in Scotland were arguably voiced with 
less fervour. Nevertheless, the extent of this similarity was surprising given that Scotland’s 
system had a higher level of discretion in comparison with New Zealand. The second 
overarching theme reflected the lawyers’ strong concerns over the support that was offered in 
Scotland to those who were economically vulnerable on relationship breakdown.  
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4.5.2.1 Deech-Centric Views 
Out of the list of principles723 that the lawyers were asked to rank in order of importance 
within Scotland, the majority listed fairness as most important followed by ‘equal sharing’ and 
clean break. This reflected the diluted application of equality that Scotland has in comparison 
to New Zealand.  
Table 4.3 How rigid/discretionary the lawyers believe Scotland to be. 
 
 
As Table 4.3 above demonstrates,  on a scale of one to 10724 half of the lawyers strongly felt 
that their system has complete discretion and the majority selected a number above five 
indicating that discretion was more prevalent than the application of strict rules. 
Consequently, Scotland has a higher amount of discretion within its system which arguably 
conflicts with the principles that Deech epitomises. 
However, despite the higher level of discretion, the analysis revealed that Deech’s core values 
were maintained rather than weakened. Therefore, the qualitative analysis reflected New 
Zealand’s analysis to a greater degree than expected; the lawyers emphasised that having a 
rule-based system which has equality as its starting point meant that certainty and clarity were 
at the heart of the system. The most celebrated benefit of this was the low level of litigation 
that it produced, and which therefore reduces both personal and court costs. 
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…the Scots have sacrificed some equity in favour of certainty and the benefit to parties 
is they don’t spend so much on legal expenses.  (ScotLaw3) 
One lawyer specifically indicated that there had been a drop in cases since the 1985 Act was 
introduced: 
I think what I would say now is that 20 years plus on from the 1985 Act, I find myself as 
a specialist Family Law solicitor specialising in financial provision as opposed to 
children, I would find myself in court very rarely. (Scotlaw14) 
 
Thus it seems that having equality as a starting point (even with a greater level of discretion) 
protects Deech’s core values. The participants were generally satisfied with the mixture of 
rules and discretion within their system. In Table 4.4 below, six respondents felt that the 
mixture of rules and discretion was about right, although seven respondents felt that it was 
too uncertain. 
Table 4.4 Lawyers’ opinions on how rigid/discretionary Scotland is. 
 
 
Similarly, the qualitative analysis demonstrated that most lawyers felt that the right balance 
between rules and discretion had been achieved. There is an ‘exercise of discretion within a 
clear structure’725 where equality under s9(1)(a) provides certainty, clarity and consistency and 
the following s9(1)(b)-(e) provisions provide the courts with greater discretion to alter the 
award. Yet how is it possible that Deech’s principles have not been undermined by this level of 
discretion? It seems that the answer lies in the lawyers’ perceptions that cases involving a 
consideration of s9(1)(b)–(e) are uncommon: 
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…there are so few cases that hinge on economic disadvantage it’s difficult to form an 
overall impression. (ScotLaw3) 
The theme ‘infrequent vulnerability’ accompanied this perception (this shall be developed 
further below at section 4.5.2.2), that is to say that the need to use these sections was 
infrequent and therefore equality dominates. Consequently, despite the greater space for 
discretion, in reality it is infrequently used which perhaps explains why those themes of clarity, 
certainty and consistency have not been extinguished by the ‘side effects’ of discretion. 
Unsurprisingly, the lawyers were wary of a system that embraced too much discretion and 
there was specific criticism over the amount present in England’s jurisdiction: 
The analogy I would normally draw is that if you can imagine the Forth Bridge, a 
beautiful strong standing structure, that’s Scots Family Law. English law is the swirling 
murky water that lies beneath. (ScotLaw9) 
The participants, therefore, championed the starting point of equality. Part of the lawyers’ 
satisfaction was closely linked to the theme of partnership as equality ‘doesn’t give preference 
to husbands or to wives.’726 Rather, equal division of matrimonial property recognises that the 
marriage has been a joint partnership. This theme was most evident when the participants 
were asked to consider dual earner relationships where one party had made an ‘additional 
contribution’, or where one party has a ‘dual burden.’727  Instead of attributing an additional 
value to those additional contributions, the participants wanted to ‘avoid evaluation’ and thus 
equality was still the preferred choice of property division. ‘Autonomy’ and ‘choice’ were 
strong themes that appeared to justify this response: 
…it’s how people live their lives and who does the washing and ironing is really up to 
them to sort out amongst themselves. (ScotLaw6) 
Interestingly, there was a presumption that any additional burden would balance out the 
partnership. A few of the lawyers presumed that (as in Australia) the person carrying out the 
additional burden would not be in an equal financial position to their partner. Consequently, 
the respondents in Scotland thought that recognising an additional contribution would both 
ignore the economic advantage that the primary care-giver has received from their high 
earning partner and also it would ignore the amount of effort or strain in the breadwinner’s 
job. Consequently the lawyers presumed that this additional role is offset by the breadwinner’s 
role728 (a fear that Miles had recognised):729 
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You may well find that one party could be in a high pressured job earning a lot more 
money, whereas the other party might be working fulltime in a less stressful job and 
have more time available. So say for example an accountant and a teacher. (ScotLaw2) 
Two other themes of ‘practicality’ and ‘financial autonomy’ also emerged as justifications for 
not recognising an additional contribution. Nearly all the lawyers indicated that it was 
impractical to value domestic contributions and so it should be avoided where possible: 
I think that…one of the main difficulties in quantifying domestic contributions is that 
there are so many different ways of doing it and you know on the one hand you might 
have someone saying if you had to employ a housekeeper, nanny, cleaner and so on, 
this is what it would have cost you over the course of the marriage…that’s one way of 
doing it (ScotLaw16) 
If you’re going to ask who made what sort of contribution you’re going to have endless 
proof, you have to bear in mind that Scots law in process is very focused on oral 
evidence and one of the reasons we have the system we do in principle is it means you 
are spared days and days and days in court of people trawling through ’well I made the 
teas, I did the ironing (laughs)’ that would be…that would be just awful for everybody. 
Judges just wouldn’t want to do it. ScotLaw3) 
For those who referred to financial autonomy, it was because there was a lack of need to 
recognise the additional contribution. Both parties had some degree of financial autonomy, 
and therefore this should be recognised by the courts: 
...because if you have both fulltime earners they can both go off and earn; they’re both 
economically able and independent. (ScotLaw3) 
 
This Deech-centric theme of ‘avoiding evaluation’ also tied into the lawyers’ general 
preference for allowing the couple to financially move on as soon as possible post-separation. 
For a large proportion of the lawyers, clean break was the most appropriate approach at the 
end of the relationship. There was a strong perception that having ongoing financial 
relationships hinders the parties’ ability to move on,730 particularly for the party who has to 
continue paying maintenance. Some also believed that there should be an emphasis on self-
sufficiency, a principle that Deech espouses and (as in New Zealand) there was a strong 
consensus that any maintenance should be rehabilitative: 
 ...the law should provide for some balancing of either assets or maintenance to help 
them get back on their feet or become independent. (ScotLaw4) 
4.5.2.2 The Marginalised Vulnerable 
Overall, the respondents were satisfied with having equal sharing as the dominant approach in 
Scotland. There was a general consensus from the majority of the participants that (just as in 
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New Zealand) the one-size-fits-all approach worked in most circumstances and that while it 
might not produce the best outcome for individual clients, it works best for society: 
I’m satisfied because if you look at the population as a whole, it probably works 
reasonably well and at least people know what’s going to happen with their lives. 
(ScotLaw3) 
 
Subsequently this led to the theme of ‘infrequent dependency’ which means that either 
dependency itself is infrequent at the end of a relationship, or at least dependency that is not 
satisfied by the equal sharing principle is infrequent. Only in rare situations would the 
discretionary principles be used. Yet, the participants recognised elements of Fineman’s 
autonomy myth in limited circumstances and identified scenarios that would require a broader 
consideration of s9(1)(b)–(e). Most notably, the lawyers indicated that having children would 
increase the claimant’s needs. This was attributed to the cost of having children through a 
career sacrifice which inevitably had an economic impact on the primary child-carer. Similarly 
some felt children reduced the ability of the spouses to make independent choices: 
 ...you simply can’t compare a situation where somebody’s got childcare obligations 
and has dedicated a life to doing that as opposed to…you know perhaps enjoying a 
slightly more luxurious lifestyle (laughs) so it’s a slightly different take on things. 
(Scotlaw16) 
Correspondingly, the presumption was that those without children had a much greater 
capacity to be autonomous: 
…where there are no children, people should be independent, but that’s subject to the 
length of the marriage and the possibilities of being independent.731 
However, there were other situations that the lawyers recognised would lead to greater 
financial vulnerability such as where a career had been sacrificed (although this was usually 
associated with childcare); the age of the spouses; the length of the marriage and the ability of 
the spouse to return to work. Nevertheless, the presumption by the lawyers was that 
dependency was infrequent. 
Yet, where there was a need to move beyond the equal sharing principle, the themes raised 
were generally negative, and the lawyers criticised the Scottish approach for providing 
‘insufficient support’ where it was necessary. There were three areas of dissatisfaction: 
equality, compensation and maintenance. Equality was felt to be insufficient because it 
ignored homemaking contributions and therefore it was only fair in certain situations, for 
example, only where there is enough property classified as matrimonial property or if the 
homemaker was in employment already: 
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…if they’re in some sort of employment and continued employment, then yes it’s fair 
that everything accumulated in the marriage is split between them. But that might 
leave the homemaker in a vulnerable position in the sense that they may have no job, 
no sort of ongoing pension or income... (ScotLaw13) 
Consequently, the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach falls short where the partners are not in equal 
financial positions at the end of the relationship. 
Compensation, or principle s9(1)(b) received the largest amount of criticism from the lawyers, 
particularly relating to the full-time/part-time relationship model. Only one lawyer732 felt that 
this principle adequately rebalanced economic advantages and disadvantages. Half the 
respondents felt that it failed to compensate the economic impact that the homemaking role 
had and consequently that the homemaking partner was financially vulnerable post-
separation. All the participants agreed that the disadvantage is a gendered one: 
 .. .because it’s predominantly women who are the homemaker, with no earning 
capacity to speak of and sometimes a capital settlement isn’t enough and she’s left in a 
very financially vulnerable position, or a very much poorer position than her 
husband...because he’s still got a career and income and she doesn’t... (ScotLaw4) 
For one lawyer, the extent of the disadvantage was contingent on the relationship’s length: 
It really depends on the length of the relationship but it doesn’t usually take proper 
account of economic disadvantages resulting from being out of the labour market. So I 
think in a three-year relationship it may not have done that much damage but in a 20-
year relationship... (ScotLaw16) 
Yet, the reasons asserted for s9(1)(b)’s inadequacy were only in part related to the statutory 
scheme. Fundamentally, some lawyers felt that the statutory regime was too restrictive on two 
accounts: firstly, by excluding periodical payments from s9(1)(b): 
...a part-time spouse is not going to get maintenance from her husband she’s still got 
the costs of child care etc. (ScotLaw10) 
Secondly that the definition of matrimonial property is too restrictive: 
 I mean there are difficulties…where the breadwinner’s money or property is kept out of 
the pool of matrimonial property. (ScotLaw2) 
 ...if there’s no matrimonial property either because it’s been inherited or for some 
other reason…then it’s very difficult to value the homemaker contributions. Uh 
homemaker’s tend to do badly. (ScotLaw3) 
The most notable reason for s9(1)(b)’s failure was connected to the judicial application of this 
section. The lawyers felt that the statute provided ample protection for homemakers, but the 
judges’ interpretation was too narrow: 
                                                          
732 ScotLaw5 
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…in my view they are protected, it’s just that the case law hasn’t applied the 
protections in the statute law. (ScotLaw1) 
 
 ...I don’t think the judiciary has used the flexibility that’s available to them and now we 
have precedents that are just backing up the legislation. (ScotLaw12) 
 
This problem was also present in New Zealand. Perhaps the danger of having equal division as 
a starting point is that equality is so easy to award. Consequently, the simplicity of equally 
dividing assets means that the courts either are less acquainted with or wish to avoid the 
complex discretionary issues associated with s9(1)(b)-(e); the danger of certainty is that it is 
more appealing for the judges: 
...it’s because we’re so focused on our first principle [equal division of matrimonial 
assets], that we find the second one so difficult. (ScotLaw3) 
The general consensus was that greater recognition is needed of the economic impact and the 
extra effort that is required by the primary care-giver: 
…I think the courts undervalue economic disadvantage that’s caused by having to be at 
home to or be available to look after and rear children. (Scotlaw6) 
The final sub-theme under ‘inadequate support’ is ‘maintenance’. The results clearly 
demonstrated that maintenance provision under principles 9(1)(c)–(e) was rarely awarded and 
thus the majority of awards embraced clean break. For a large proportion of the lawyers, this 
was the most appropriate approach at the end of the relationship. However, there was 
consensus from almost all the participants that while it worked generally well, there were 
situations where it was inappropriate, namely where there was a greater level of financial 
enmeshing and dependency: those who were out of employment; those with children and also 
the age/length of the relationship. Six lawyers felt that the current provisions were too 
restrictive (again due to the courts’ interpretation). This disadvantage was felt to be gendered 
and particularly for women who had been out of the workforce: 
I suspect that the…way the legislation has been interpreted over the years is in a lot of 
cases probably too harsh for one party that has…given up the employment and it may 
well be a need to review that in terms of financial support for a greater period on 
divorce. (ScotLaw2) 
In practice the focus on equality and the presumption that one-size-will-fit-all marginalises 
those who are financially vulnerable at the end of the relationship. Not only is their 
vulnerability ‘invisible’ within the application of equality, where the courts attempt to use 
discretion to provide support, the approach is often too narrow and inadequate. While the 
majority of lawyers felt that these circumstances were rare, it seems that this ‘inadequate 
support’ would appear to fail to meet Fineman’s position in practice. 
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4.5.3 Responses in the Cohabitation Context733 
Table 4.5 Scotland’s themes in the cohabitation context 
Themes Sub-Themes 
The Same as marriage Function 
Different from marriage 
Choice 
Different institutions 
Expectation 
Abstract difference 
Practical difference 
Cohabitation scheme 
Uncertainty 
Court’s application 
Too restrictive 
Poor drafting 
 
As demonstrated in Table 4.5, the majority of the themes in this part of the analysis focused 
more on comparing cohabitants with married couples rather than on the substantive 
cohabitation regime.  
Very few lawyers felt that cohabitation should be treated the same as marriage because they 
were functionally similar relationships. However, the majority of respondents strongly felt that 
cohabiting couples should be treated differently from married couples. One sub-theme that 
emerged as the lawyers justified this viewpoint was ‘choice’: cohabitation was viewed as a 
choice not to marry:  
 
It’s unfair but you make a conscious decision to marry or not to marry. There has to be 
a distinction between marriage and cohabitation. (ScotLaw10) 
 
Secondly, the overwhelming majority of respondents believed that there was a great 
difference between cohabiting and married couples; cohabitation is a different institution, a 
completely different relationship. Therefore, the lawyers thought that the relationships should 
be treated differently: 
I think there should be a huge difference there, because one is not a diluted version of 
the other, it’s a different institution and the criteria should be different because you’re 
not dividing assets which accrued over that period. I think that would give injustice. 
(ScotLaw9) 
                                                          
733 Note that the empirical work was prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gow Grant [2012] UKSC 29. Consequently, the 
system had far more uncertainties and appeared to be favouring the restitutionary model as defined by McCarthy. See F 
McCarthy, ‘Cohabitation: Lessons from North of the Border?’ (2011) 23(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 277 and the discussion 
at Section 4.3.2 
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As Table 4.6 demonstrates, 13 respondents believed that marriage is more financially 
intertwined than cohabitation, although only five agreed that marital unions organised their 
affairs more traditionally than cohabiting couples. Scotland, out of all the jurisdictions, had the 
highest number of respondents who agreed that cohabiting couples were different from 
married couples. Furthermore, whereas all the jurisdictions indicated there might be a greater 
level of similarity where there are children, Scotland most strongly indicated that, even with 
children, only five thought they were similar and 10 agreed that without children they were 
different.  
Table 4.6: Attitudes towards cohabitation and marriage in Scotland 
 
For others, the difference that lay in the expectation of rights which was linked to this was the 
perception that those who were married demonstrated a higher level of commitment than 
those who cohabited. Three participants felt that this was because cohabiting couples tended 
to drift into relationships: 
I think that the commitment of marriage means they have an interdependence and 
reliance on one another which goes beyond cohabitation. (ScotLaw3) 
 
 Yet, the emphasis on difference between relationship styles tended to be ‘abstract 
differences’ rather than ‘practical differences’. Although most lawyers believed that 
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cohabitants should be treated differently to married couples, there was little discussion 
(especially where respondents were unhappy with the current Scottish regime) over what that 
difference should be in practice. Generally it was felt that the approach should be more 
restrictive; if cohabiting couples want more rights, then they should marry. Yet, only a couple 
of respondents felt like Deech that there should be no scheme whatsoever. Clearly the real 
issue at the forefront of the participants’ minds was maintaining the distinction between 
married and cohabiting couples as it seems that little thought has been given as to just how 
this should be approached. 
However, maintenance was one ‘practical difference’ that the respondents referred to where 
they argued that maintenance should be more restrictive for cohabiting couples. The majority 
felt that cohabiting couples should not have any access to maintenance on the grounds that 
they had different expectations to married couples: 
...in Scotland we’ve adopted a clean break for cohabitation so all you can really get is a 
capital sum payment. I actually think, looking at it, that that’s right. There can be no 
ongoing maintenance. (ScotLaw10) 
The only exception raised to this was where there were children involved. In fact, most lawyers 
felt that children should make a difference to the way that cohabiting couples were treated. 
Some indicated that the care-dyad had greater needs because of the financial burden 
associated with primary care-giving. Others felt that having children required more effort from 
the care-giver and that couples without children were more indulgent: 
 ...we do try to take account of a situation where there are children more favourably 
financially because obviously there’s…recognition of the input that’s required with 
children. (ScotLaw7) 
On the whole it was clear that Scottish lawyers felt that children should make a difference for 
cohabiting couples. However, it was not clear whether the lawyers felt that the cohabitants 
with children should be treated in the same manner as married couples with children. 
Nevertheless, what was apparent was that where the lawyers indicated that maintenance 
should be available in situations where there were children, the maintenance should only be 
for the child, rather than for the primary care-giver.  
4.5.3.1 The Scheme 
The respondents were evidently uncertain about the actual operation of the cohabitation 
scheme. This was unsurprising given how recently the legislation was introduced. Yet, this 
uncertainty was also linked to the dominant theme of ‘dissatisfaction’ which related to the 
163 
 
drafting of the legislation. Just as Miles et al.734 found, the lawyers were highly critical of the 
statutory provisions contained within the 2006 Act.  Half the lawyers argued that the 
legislation was poorly drafted which made it hard to advise clients. Nearly all the participants 
agreed that the legislation needed to be completely redrafted rather than just making 
amendments to the current scheme: 
 ...the legislation we’ve got about cohabiting couples...needs to be repealed; the single 
thing you could do to improve it would be to repeal it. (ScotLaw6) 
…it’s really badly written. And we’re all struggling to advise our clients and to advise 
the courts on the way to go. (ScotLaw1) 
More substantively, the respondents indicated that the definitions of economic advantages 
and economic disadvantages were unclear and there was a lack of certainty over how much 
discretion the Act contained. For some the difficulty was down to the level of discretion within 
the scheme and for others the scheme was too rigid. Again the courts were criticised for 
interpreting the Act too narrowly, and therefore the respondents called for a greater level of 
guidance on how discretion was meant to operate: 
I think that the court’s interpretation of the statute has been unduly harsh... 
(ScotLaw15) 
 
 I don’t think there’s enough guidance given on…discretion and [how] it ought to be 
exercised and the circumstances it ought to be exercised in. (ScotLaw6) 
Out of those who felt the scheme was too restrictive, some felt that there was not enough 
discretion to construe the economic disadvantage. ScotLaw9 emphasised the problem of 
offsetting raised by Miles et al.:735 
 It’s very hard to prove the necessary advantage/disadvantage balance. It will be an 
unusual relationship in which there’s not something to set off. Very unusual indeed. But 
it is quite difficult to prove that disadvantage. (ScotLaw9) 
Furthermore, there was some indication that the regime was too narrow because there was no 
concept of cohabitation property: 
‘Because there’s no concept of cohabitation property as there is in matrimonial 
property. So if it’s a very long cohabitation the breadwinner only is going to get some 
compensatory payment rather than a fair share... (ScotLaw11) 
                                                          
734 J Miles, E Mordaunt, and F Wasoff, Legal Practitioners’ Perspectives on the Cohabitation Provisions of the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006 (Nuffield Foundation 2010) 
735 J Miles, E Mordaunt, and F Wasoff, Legal Practitioners’ Perspectives on the Cohabitation Provisions of the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006 (Nuffield Foundation 2010) 
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Aside from being too restrictive, ScotLaw12 felt that the time limitations in place actually 
encouraged a greater level of litigation and there were indications that the range of options 
available was too limited: 
...the difficulty with the legislation is as I say it’s badly drafted, there’s very limited time 
periods to make a claim which means we’re needing to be more litigious than would 
otherwise be the case and the range of options to the court are limited. (ScotLaw12) 
So it seems that overall the lawyers are unhappy with the framework in place in Scotland for 
cohabiting couples and the poor drafting has contributed to a large amount of uncertainty 
over how the scheme will operate in practice. Yet despite this dissatisfaction, the lawyers were 
unable to offer an alternative framework even though the overwhelming majority of those 
interviewed believed that cohabitants should be treated separately. The fundamental concern 
was maintaining the difference between relationship styles. 
4.5.4 Same-Sex Relationships 
Table 4.7 demonstrates how uncertain the respondents felt in the same-sex context, reflected 
in the fact that a high proportion of respondents selected ‘neither agree nor disagree’. 
Table 4.7: Attitudes towards same-sex relationships in Scotland 
 
 
 
7 8 6 
8 
3 
4 
1 
4 5 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Same-sex
Relationships Divide
their relationship
Responsibilities in a
similar manner to
different sex
cohabiting
relationships
Regardless of who
made the
contributions,
financial and
domestic
contributions are of
equal value within
Civil Partnerships
Regardless of who
made the
contributions,
financial and
domestic
contributions are of
equal value within
same-sex
cohabitation
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Base = 16 
165 
 
Table 4.8 Themes in the cohabitation context in Scotland 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Uncertainty 
Lack of experience 
Presumed similarity 
Children 
 
The interviews also reflected this uncertainty in the thematic analysis (as Table 4.8 shows) as 
the lawyers lacked experience with same-sex couples in both the civil partner and cohabiting 
context.736 However, each lawyer who expressed this uncertainty presumed that the 
relationships would be treated the same as different-sex relationships: 
That’s an interesting one because in fact we don’t have any case law in relation to 
same-sex couples...but I presume that they would. (ScotLaw1) 
 
Generally, the lawyers felt that there was, and should be no difference when valuing domestic 
contributions between married couples/civil partners and different-sex/same-sex cohabitants. 
Consequently, throughout the interviews, the respondents gave the same answers in both the 
same-sex and different-sex contexts. 
 
The only difference that was voiced was attributed to the fact that same-sex relationships 
were less likely to have children737 and one lawyer indicated that there may be a difference in 
relationship duration: 
 
This is based on anecdotal evidence alone, but I gather that same-sex cohabitation has 
a rather shorter shelf-life than hetero-cohabitation. I know of no reason why this 
should be true. (ScotLaw9) 
 
However, the rest of the participants indicated that there should be no difference between 
same- and different-sex relationships: 
It’s just the same. Marriage and civil partnerships are interchangeable and 
cohabitation, gay or straight is interchangeable. And that is how it should be. 
(ScotLaw9)  
4.5.5 The Vignettes 
As outlined in Chapter 2, there were two scenarios posed to the lawyers. Scenarios A and B 
outlined a set of circumstances based on Burns738 and Miller739 which also had a number of 
alternative variables.740  
                                                          
736 ScotLaw1,2,3,7,9,12,13,16 
737 ScotLaw3 
738 Burns  v Burns  (1986) Ch 317 
739 Miller v Miller [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
740 Appendix A 
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4.5.5.1 Scenario A741 
Table 4.9: Attitudes to England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario A 
 
Table 4.10: Attitudes to Scotland’s approach to Scenario A 
 
When asked their opinions on the outcome of Scenario A in England and Wales, the Scottish 
lawyers’ responses were not as fervent as the New Zealand lawyers’. While most felt that it 
was too protective of the breadwinner, the mode was ‘3’ and four lawyers felt that it was 
about right (Table 4.9). When asked how Scotland would alter the award in comparison, 12 
                                                          
741Appendix A (based on Burns v Burns (1984) Ch 317  
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indicated it would be a little more generous by way of a capital lump sum based on her 
economic disadvantage on giving up her career. Yet, as Table 4.10 demonstrates this was only 
a little closer to ‘5’ (about right) than the approach in England and Wales. Therefore six wanted 
Scotland’s approach to be more generous.  
4.5.5.1.1 Scenario A – The Variables 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law in Scotland would alter its response for each 
of the four different variables.742 As displayed in Table 4.11 all the lawyers felt that the award 
would be exactly the same if this was a same-sex relationship and 14 agreed that if Miss Jones 
had been married, the outcome would have been much more generous. Where Miss Jones 
remained in employment or where she had had no children, nine thought that both variables 
would result in an award that was a little less generous and five felt that the award would be 
the same. 
On the whole, as Table 4.12 shows, the respondents thought that Scotland’s approach for each 
variable was about right and nearly all the lawyers indicated they would not alter Scotland’s 
approach to these variables. However, three lawyers felt that it was slightly too protective of 
the breadwinner for variable 1 where there were no children.  
Table 4.11: How Scenario A’s outcome in Scotland would vary for each variable 
 
                                                          
742 See Appendix A or table in New Zealand chapter 
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4.5.5.2 Scenario B 
 
Table 4.13: Attitudes towards England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario B 
 
When asked their opinions on the outcome in England and Wales in Scenario B,743 the mode (7, 
as in New Zealand) selected ‘8’, that it is too generous towards the homemaker (as 
demonstrated in Table 4.13 and as Table 4.14 shows, nine felt that the approach in Scotland 
                                                          
743 See the interview schedule in Appendix A Scenario B was based on Miller v Miller [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
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would be much less generous. Answers varied on the size of the lump sum from 0.4 million,744 
0.8 million,745 1.4 – 2 million746 and 3 million pounds747 and maybe some limited support.748 
Most lawyers felt that the award would be much less generous in Scotland in comparison with 
England and Wales because of the ‘source of funds’ argument749 and a number indicated that 
Mrs Higgins would not be entitled to maintenance.750 12 lawyers felt that this approach was 
about right. 
Table 4.14: How the lawyers would alter Scotland’s approach to Scenario B 
 
4.5.5.2.1 Scenario B – The Variables 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law would alter its response for four different 
variables.751 Consistently in Table 4.15, 11 thought having children would make it a little more 
generous, length would make it a lot more generous (11) and if this had been a civil 
partnership, 10 thought that it would be exactly the same. However, if Mrs Higgins had 
remained in employment six indicated she would have received a little less, although the 
majority thought that it would also stay the same. All lawyers thought that this was about right 
for the variables. Yet, when they were asked whether they would alter the approach the 
lawyers indicated in Table 4.16 that in a 20–year-long marriage, eight would make it a little less 
generous. Thus, the respondents appeared to be least satisfied with the treatment of long-
term big money cases and, just as in the New Zealand scenario, it seems that the equal division 
of matrimonial property is considered to be too generous. 
                                                          
744 ScotLaw13 
745 ScotLaw6 
746 ScotLaw12 
747 ScotLaw2 
748 ScotLaw2 
749 ScotLaw1,2,3,6,9,15 
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Table 4.15: How Scenario B’s outcome in Scotland would vary for each variable 
 
 
Table 4.16: How the lawyers would alter Scotland’s approach to Scenario B 
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employs a greater level of discretion within its system. Where New Zealand clearly fell short of 
Fineman’s position, Scotland offers a greater attempt to protect the care-dyad, as it has more 
discretion to alter awards where equality is not appropriate. This therefore moves Scotland (in 
comparison with New Zealand) closer towards Fineman’s end of the spectrum. Consequently, 
it was anticipated that Scotland would offer a less restrictive approach and potentially achieve 
a greater balance between the two feminist positions.  
Overall, the lawyers appeared to be satisfied with Scotland’s approach and, although a little 
uncertain, they were generally happy that same-sex couples were treated exactly the same as 
different-sex couples. In the married/civil partnership context, the strengths from a formulaic 
system were evident, also supporting the findings from Chapter Three. The respondents 
embraced Deech-centric views and therefore saw equal sharing and clean break as the best 
possible approach because it offered certainty, clarity, simplicity and a more cost-effective 
system. While this satisfies Deech’s position, the wider definition of matrimonial property 
allows for greater settlements to be made in the care-giver’s interest in comparison with New 
Zealand.  Moreover, Scotland appears to address both the breadwinner’s and homemaker’s 
interests. Section 9(1)(a)’s exceptions under s10(6) are designed to protect the breadwinner’s 
proprietary interests and there is extraordinary weight placed on matrimonial agreements 
although this seems to have no regard for any inequalities that may exist between the parties.  
On the other hand, Scotland does not necessarily exclude these assets from division under the 
other s9(1) principles of economic advantage/disadvantage, economic burden of care and the 
maintenance provisions. Thus the additional provisions were designed to rebalance any 
economic inequality that was suffered by either party and consequently presented an 
opportunity for the courts to adopt a more holistic consideration of the economic impact that 
care-giving can have on one party’s financial position. 
Generally the respondents believed that one-size-fits-most and therefore cases which required 
the use of the courts’ discretion under s9(1)(b)–(e) were in fact rare. Yet, where the discretion 
was used, the criticism was strong. It was evident that, as in New Zealand, the lawyers were 
concerned that the judges were too focused on formal equality and accordingly not using the 
discretion available under s9(1)(b)–(e). It seems that the firm principle of equality may have 
clouded the courts’ attempts at implementing discretion due to the simplicity of equally 
dividing matrimonial assets. It seems that where there are firm principles of equality, equally 
detailed guidelines for discretion may be needed to ensure that the courts avoid being 
tempted by equality’s simplicity. 
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Moreover, the economic focus of s9(1)(b)–(e) (rebalancing economic advantages and 
disadvantages, and sharing the economic burden of caring) demonstrates that care-giving 
relationships are not the focal point of this approach.  Seemingly, this places the financially 
weaker party in a precarious position post-divorce and therefore those who are vulnerable at 
the end of a relationship appear to be marginalised. This vulnerability is accentuated by the 
fact that s9(1)(b) is measured in economic terms. Consequently, the primary care-giver’s 
disadvantage from giving up a career is frequently offset by the perceived advantage from 
essentially ‘being kept’ by the other spouse. This is despite the fact that staying at home is 
often for the benefit of the family’s welfare. The result is that compensation is modestly 
awarded and particularly given the court’s inability to award periodical payments for this 
principle, s9(1)(b) therefore fails to rebalance relationship generated disadvantage. 
Furthermore, s9(1)(c) is not concerned with the long-term economic impact of caring, but 
instead it is concerned with the immediate cost of raising a child. Therefore, as the lawyers 
also identified, Scotland's approach tends to disadvantage couples with small asset pools and 
those who are enmeshed financially as a result of children or unemployment. Arguably this 
framework of financial provision is more suitable for those homemakers with big asset pools 
and children who are still at home, rather than those who have medium to small pools of 
assets and whose children have left home. The practitioners agreed that a greater level of 
support was therefore necessary where there are children or where the spouse has given up 
employment. 
Thus, in the married context at least, Scotland’s approach does go some way forward to 
balancing the feminist positions in comparison with New Zealand, but it seems that the focus 
of this jurisdiction is still too weighted towards autonomy. There perhaps needs to be a greater 
ability for periodical payments to be awarded under s9(1)(b) and greater recognition from the 
courts of the full economic impact of care-giving. 
In contrast, in the cohabiting context the balance between Deech and Fineman appears even 
less satisfactory. For Deech, any Family Law-based remedy is an unwarranted intervention by 
the state and for Fineman, the Scottish cohabitation regime (despite Gow v Grant [2012]) 
offers little protection for the care-dyad as the provisions fail to accommodate domestic or 
indirect contributions. This dissatisfaction is reflected in the empirical analysis, where the 
lawyers thought that the statutory provisions were too limited and badly drafted and 
therefore too protective of the financial contributor. However, despite this extensive 
dissatisfaction, the lawyers did not suggest a way of improving the legislation. Rather, the 
predominant focus of the discussion was that a difference between cohabitation and married 
couples should remain. The respondents were clear that cohabitants and married couples 
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should be treated separately to respect the choice not to marry and to reflect the fact that 
these different relationships are completely different institutions. Therefore, cohabitants 
should have a more restrictive approach with limited maintenance for where there were 
children. More research is perhaps needed on how the lawyers would prefer their system to 
approach cohabiting couples. 
 
Overall, it seems that on paper Scotland’s approach would achieve a balance between Deech 
and Fineman. However, in reality, Scotland is too focused on financial autonomy. While 
Deech’s position has huge benefits procedurally, enabling couples to settle outside the courts, 
this has the danger of disadvantaging care-givers/homemakers, as equal sharing and clean 
break only seem suitable for those couples where both spouses are in economically equal 
positions. Much greater recognition is therefore needed of the economic impact that care-
giving has on Fineman’s care-dyad. Thus, it seems that this system could benefit from a lesser 
obsession with equal sharing and instead a greater focus on the needs of care-givers 
particularly in small asset cases. Perhaps having Fineman’s position rather than Deech’s 
position (and therefore discretion rather than rules) as the heart of the legal framework would 
prevent the courts’ tendency to apply discretion too narrowly. The next chapter looks at 
Australia which does just this. Australia’s framework for financial provision at the end of a 
relationship embraces Fineman’s principles as a starting point: namely discretion, protection, 
need and substantive equality. Yet it also embraces elements of Deech such as clean break and 
an emphasis on financial contributions. How much closer is Australia to balancing Deech’s and 
Fineman’s positions and has it eliminated the concerns that have arisen in Scotland? 
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CHAPTER 5: FINEMAN WITH ELEMENTS OF DEECH – 
AUSTRALIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters have outlined the practical implications of schemes that have a Deech-
like starting point, namely New Zealand’s and Scotland’s equal division of matrimonial assets. 
It was clear that while they both successfully achieved clarity, simplicity and certainty, this was 
often to the disadvantage of Fineman’s care-dyad where awards were frequently too 
restrictive. In complete contrast with these jurisdictions, financial provision on divorce in 
Australia rather than embracing principles of equality and partnership has a discretionary, 
welfare-based approach which aims to implement ‘just and equitable’ orders. Thus, the 
approach embraces substantive equality which purports to protect the economically 
vulnerable752 and there is a paternalistic approach to property division. It seeks to protect 
parties from adverse dealings in real property753 and to prevent potential hardships that arise 
as a result of marriage. This arguably protects the vulnerable homemaker from the reality of 
the financial consequences on divorce/relationship breakdown.754 Consequently, where 
provision for Fineman’s care-dyad was inadequate in the previous two jurisdictions, Australia 
has firmly embedded the principles that are core to Fineman’s position: discretion, protection, 
need and substantive equality, which place the care-dyad at the centre of financial awards. 
The question here is whether this completely different starting point offers a better way of 
balancing Deech’s and Fineman’s polarised positions.755 At first glance, this system conflicts 
with Deech’s position as it contradicts financial autonomy and certainty. Yet the strong 
influence of separate property during marriage756 means that the courts give greater weight to 
financial contributions. In fact there is no presumption of equal sharing757 between domestic 
and financial contributions, and so the courts evaluate contributions. Furthermore, the courts 
must have due regard to the clean break principle758 and thus strive to achieve settlements 
that avoid any ongoing financial obligations between the parties post-divorce. However, as 
seen in Scotland and New Zealand, the notions of clean break and financial autonomy 
                                                          
752 Law Reform Commission, Matrimonial Property (1987) (ALRC No 39 1987) 15 
753 Response of the Family Court of Australia to the Discussion Paper ‘Property and Family law: Options for Change’ (Response of 
Discussion Paper AGPS 1999) Para 66, page 18 
754 This, as shall be demonstrated in following chapters, differs completely from New Zealand and also Scotland. 
755 Appendix I and Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.4 
756 It operates a separate property regime for financial provision, where the property that either spouse acquires remains their 
own separate property during marriage 
757 Mallett v Mallett (1984) 156 CLR 605 
758 S81 Family Law Act (Cth) 
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potentially conflict with Fineman’s position as they often limit the settlement that the care-
giver can receive, especially in small asset cases, to the homemaker’s disadvantage. Yet, the 
extensive discretion and particularly the focus on welfare, rather than entitlement, suggests 
that the courts have space to protect and to potentially consider future needs. Australia, 
therefore, provides an opportunity to explore the success of enmeshing these different 
feminist stances using a Fineman-like position as a starting point and may answer the question 
as to whether a greater balance can be achieved between the two. 
Furthermore, examining the Australian jurisdiction will provide insight into how feasible it is to 
treat different relationship statuses in this manner. Recently, financial provision for married 
couples on relationship breakdown has been extended to different- and same-sex cohabiting 
couples759 (known as de facto couples in Australia). Thus, just as in New Zealand, cohabiting 
couples are treated synonymously with married couples although Australia uses a completely 
different framework in order to do so. Yet, this is the only jurisdiction where same-sex couples 
cannot enter some form of registered partnership under Australian federal law, although 
certain states have domestic partnerships registries760 and civil partnerships761 available. 
This chapter shall therefore measure how successfully Australia values domestic contributions 
by using Deech’s and Fineman’s stances to critique Australia’s law of financial provision on 
relationship breakdown and by examining the legal practitioners’ opinions of how the system 
treats homemaking contributions. Before this analysis, this chapter will firstly consider any 
differences that Australia has with England and Wales which require consideration when using 
it to guide reform in England and Wales. 
Chapter Two emphasised some of the difficulties that arise when selecting other jurisdictions 
to compare. Therefore, it is important to begin this analysis with a comprehensive 
understanding of the cultural, legal and political similarities and differences between England 
and Wales, and Australia. 
Australia is a federal democracy consisting of six states and ten territories. These States have 
powers to legislate over certain issues at state level, but any matters that relate to Australia’s 
constitution or Commonwealth matters are dealt with by the Federal Government.762 Under 
s51(xxi) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) marriage and divorce 
                                                          
759 1st March 2009 and the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 
760 New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria 
761 Australian Capital Territory 
762 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK), sets out the way in which power is to be distributed. Section 51 
provides a list of what comes under federal powers, with anything outside of it to be at the individual State’s discretion. Legislation 
relating to the s51 list is known as commonwealth legislation and commonwealth acts will be preceded by ‘Commonwealth ‘or 
Cth. 
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are stated as being one item on the list which is to be dealt with by commonwealth legislation 
(principally the Family Law Act (Cth) 1975, henceforth FLA), and since 1 March 2009 (when the 
Family Law Amendment (De facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 came into 
force), different and same-sex cohabiting couple matters have also been transferred to the 
Federal Government. Consequently, any cases relating to these matters must go to the Family 
Court of Australia and the Federal Magistrates Court rather than the States’ civil courts. 
However, cohabiting relationships that ended before 1 March 2009 must still rely on State law. 
Therefore, in this chapter, it is important to bear in mind that, in effect, two bodies of law 
(State level and Federal level) must be considered in the jurisdiction. Another important point 
to note is that Western Australia has different Family Law provisions compared to the rest of 
Australia and is not under examination here. It did not enter into an agreement on the Family 
Law Act Cth 1975 or the cohabiting couples 2009 amendments. Furthermore, while this Act 
extends to South Australia, the new cohabitation law also does not.  
While there are key differences between England and Wales and Australia, there are also a 
number of similarities making Australia suitable for comparison. Australia’s place in Britain’s 
colonial history means that it shares common political and legal traditions with a Westminster 
style of government763 and a common law jurisdiction. Therefore, both systems are founded 
on concepts of the rule of law, justice and equality before the law, procedural fairness, judicial 
precedent, prospective legislation and the separation of powers. 
Culturally, in the family context specifically, there are also similarities and Australia shares 
growing rates of cohabitation764 and declining rates of marriage.765 Similarly, men and women 
hold similar positions in society: women are generally on lower wages766 and are more inclined 
than men to be in part-time work767 or the homemaker, irrespective of working status.768 
                                                          
763 Australia’s parliament consists of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives.  
764 Australian Bureau of Statistics 1301.0 (Year Book of Australia2004) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/62F9022555D5DE7ACA256DEA00053A15?opendocument> accessed November 
2010. The 2001 census had recorded that the numbers of cohabitants rose by 28% from 744,100 to 951,500. 14.8% in 2006 of 
couple families were recorded as de facto Australian Social Trends Cat 4102.0 ‘Family and Community’ (December 2011) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/4102.0?opendocument#from-banner=LN> accessed 16/12/2011  
765 Australian Bureau of Statistics 1301.0 (Year Book of Australia2004) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/62F9022555D5DE7ACA256DEA00053A15?opendocument> accessed November 
2010. The 2001 census indicated that the marriage rate was the lowest rate on record 
766 Australian Bureau of Statistics 1301.0 (Year Book of Australia 2008) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/7d12b0f6763c78caca257061001cc588/0796FAC7CDEEA671CA2573D20010F2DD?ope
ndocument> accessed 1 November 2010. Women’s weekly earnings were on average almost $200 less than men ($967.90 to 
$1158.40)  
767 45.7% of women employed and  16.3% men Australian Social Trends ‘Work’ (December 2011) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/4102.0?opendocument#from-banner=LN> accessed 16 December 2011 
768 72.5% of men are employed compared to 59% of women Australian Social Trends ‘Work’ 16 December 
2011<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/4102.0?opendocument#from-banner=LN> accessed 16/12/2011 and 
Australian Social Trends 4102.0 (Year Book of Australia 
2009) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/7B7AF4BF75F4270CCA257583002A6139?OpenDocument
> accessed November 2010’. In 2006, ‘women did two-thirds of all household work while men did two-thirds of paid work’.  
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Additionally, Australia has similar sources of law to England and Wales769 and the Family Law 
courts in both jurisdictions often refer to one another in cases with similar statutory regimes. 
In the English case White770 Lord Cooke referred to the Australian law for his preferred 
approach to the case.771 Similarly, in Australian case law such as Figgins v Figgins772  the courts 
have discussed Lord Nicholls’ approach in White in their judgments. If we are referring to the 
Australian jurisdiction in our judgments, then surely some analysis needs to take place on the 
appropriateness of their approach to domestic contributions. 
5.2 Financial Provision on Divorce: Married Couples 
 
Property settlement is the fundamental way in which assets are distributed on relationship 
breakdown with property adjustment orders coming under s80 FLA which applies to all 
property owned by either spouse. Sections 79 and s79(2) provide a wide discretion for the 
courts in altering property interests, and s79(4)(a)–(g) and s75(2)773 provide a list of factors 
that must be taken into consideration. This is subject to the discretionary requirement for a 
just and equitable order and is in complete contrast to Scotland’s and New Zealand’s approach 
which are governed by much stricter rules on how to divide a much narrower definition  of 
property. 
Hickey v Hickey774 held that there is a four-step procedure for the analysis of interests in 
property settlement: 
1) Identify the ‘value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties 
at the date of the hearing.’  
2) Assess the parties’ contributions to the property and to the welfare of the family 
(which considers s79(4)(a)–(c) factors) 
3) Consider s79(4)(d)–(g) factors including (as s79(4)(e) stipulates) s75(2) factors  
4) Consider s79(2)’s requirement for a ‘just and equitable’ order. 
 
It is also possible under part VIIIA of the FLA ss90A–90L for couples to enter a binding financial 
agreement to regulate property and maintenance775 before,776 during777 and after778 the 
marriage. These, like New Zealand rather than Scotland, have formal requirements that need 
                                                          
769 Such as case law, statute, custom, subordinate legislation and international law 
770 White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981 
771 Lord Cooke favoured the approach taken by the Australian courts in Norbis v Norbis (1984) FLC 91-543.  
772 Figgins v Figgins (2002) Fam CA 688 
773 S75(2) factors have been incorporated by s79(4)(e) FLA(Cth) 1975 see appendix O and P 
774 Hickey v Hickey and the A-G for the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) [2003] FLC 93-143 
775 And also maintenance agreements see s86 and 87 of the Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
776 S90B Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
777 S90C Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
778 S90D Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
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to be met: namely a separation declaration before the provisions can take effect779 and, where 
there are children, the agreements must state who will receive payments and how much they 
will receive.780 They must also meet set criteria: they must be signed by both parties, both 
parties must obtain independent legal advice on their rights and the advantages and 
disadvantages of entering into an agreement, there must be a signed statement of that advice 
by the lawyer and each party must retain a copy. In Black v Black781 the courts adopted a strict 
interpretive approach that, if any of these requirements were not adhered to, the agreement 
could be set aside. In response, and in a bid to protect the binding nature of these agreements 
s90G(1A) was inserted782 which provides that if one of these requirements is not complied 
with, the courts will not set aside the agreement if it would be unjust and inequitable to do so. 
This reflects New Zealand’s approach in the face of incomplete formal requirements and 
reinforces the financial autonomy and the parties’ ability to self-regulate. The popularity of 
these agreements is growing in Australia with 14% of couples entering into them before 
marriage.783 
Yet, while in New Zealand these orders can only be set aside if they are seriously unjust from 
the outset or over time as the result of changes, Australia has a slightly wider list of occasions: 
if they are obtained by fraud; are impracticable; if some change in circumstance has occurred 
(relating to the care, welfare and development of the child) thus a party will suffer a 
hardship;784 or if they are void, voidable or unenforceable. While the provisions can exclude 
maintenance provisions, the courts can still make maintenance orders where the party (at the 
time of the agreement) could not support themselves without any state provision.785  
From Deech’s stance, this promotes financial autonomy and responsibility although to a lesser 
degree than New Zealand and even more so than Scotland. It protects those with an imbalance 
in resources (namely the financially stronger party) and recognises that women are as equally 
rational as men and fully capable of understanding the implications of entering such 
agreements. Furthermore, if the full extent of both parties’ financial positions has not been 
revealed (limiting how much ‘independent advice’ will protect women), such an agreement 
                                                          
779 S90DA Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
780 S90E Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
781 Black v Black [2008] Fam CAFC 7, (2008) FLC 93-357 
782 Federal Justice System Amendment (Efficiency Measures) Bill (No 1) 2008 schedule 5 
783 A McClintock, ‘Prudent Pre-Nups have More Strings Attached’ (The Sunday Morning Herald, 10 January 2010). This reported 
that theknot.com.au found that 14 per cent of engaged couples signed pre-nuptial agreements, which are considered binding 
financial agreements under Australian law. Read more: <http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/celebrity/prudent-prenups-have-more-
strings-attached-20100109-lzvc.html#ixzz1bGJMNsWr> accessed 1 November 2010 
784 S90K(1)(d) Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
785 S90F(1A) Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
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could contribute to relationship-generated disadvantage.786 In fact, the Women’s Legal Service 
argued before the recognition of such agreements in 2000, that pre-nuptial agreements serve 
to reward the main breadwinner and consequently these agreements conflict with s79’s 
objectives (which aim to make provision for women’s non-financial contributions)787 by 
privileging men and reducing the financial status of women.  
Yet, given that the courts may still enforce these agreements if the criteria are not met, it 
could mean that inequality of bargaining power is ignored if full independent legal advice has 
not been considered: it reduces the safeguards available. However, the wider set of 
circumstances that can set these agreements aside combined with the courts’ ability to still 
award maintenance perhaps balances Fineman’s care-dyad and Deech’s autonomy to a greater 
degree than the other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, for those without agreements or where the 
agreement has been set aside, they must rely on the property settlement within FLA 1975. 
5.2.1 Defining Relationship Property 
Property is broadly interpreted by the Australian courts as ‘indicative and descriptive of every 
possible interest which the party can have’788 and is valued at the date of the hearing. 
Accordingly, there is a much wider interpretation of property than in New Zealand and 
Scotland: everything can be divided in any way instead of an equal division of defined 
matrimonial assets. This broad interpretation of property means that there is an unrestricted 
amount of resources (depending on the case) that the courts can use to remunerate the 
homemaker; they are not restricted to a predefined ‘marital’ property and thus there is no 
statutory cap in place on potential awards. Consequently, there is little protection for the 
breadwinner’s assets and for Deech this may potentially encourage ‘gold-digging’ and ‘meal 
ticket for life’ attitudes that discourage women from being financially autonomous. The danger 
of this is reduced as generally future income and ‘career’ assets and consequently sacrifices 
made by one spouse to further the career of another are not compensated for by the courts. 
This absence of career assets seems to conflict with the other jurisdictions’ approaches which 
encompass an element of compensation within their systems. Therefore, it potentially ignores 
the extent of the relationship-generated disadvantage that may arise from the sacrifices made 
by one party to support the career of another. For Fineman, this wide definition of relationship 
                                                          
786 For example, see National Network of Women’s Legal Services Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee: Family Law Amendment Bill 1999  (1 November 1999) <http://www.nwjc.org.au/wlsn/flamendbill.html> accessed 12 
December 2010 
787 For example, see National Network of Women’s Legal Services Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee: Family Law Amendment Bill 1999  (1 November 1999) <http://www.nwjc.org.au/wlsn/flamendbill.html> accessed 12 
December 2010 
788 Duff v Duff [1977] FLC 90 – 217 
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property is a much better starting point in comparison to the previous jurisdictions, although 
the lack of compensation is somewhat limiting.  
 
5.2.2 Property Settlement: Step 2 - Valuing Contributions 
Whereas New Zealand and Scotland have the principle of equality at their heart and have clear 
principles for dividing property, one differentiating feature is that in Australia no core guiding 
principle exists and no presumption of equality between the parties exists either.789 
Consequently, none of the s79 factors supersede one another; it is for the court to judge the 
relevant factors to achieve a just and equitable outcome. Yet again, there is no clear statutory 
or other guidance as to what a ‘just and equitable’ outcome should entail; just that it should 
enshrine the clean break principle and therefore maintenance is rarely used. Consequently, 
the court’s primary concern on financial provision is to reward the parties for their past 
contributions; needs and compensation are merely secondary considerations which 
completely contrast with England and Wales’ focus.  
Instead, Step 2 (which considers financial790 and non-financial791 contributions to the property 
as well as contributions to the welfare of the family)792 is pivotal in determining how the courts 
should divide property on relationship breakdown by stating a percentage based on the value 
or weight given to their contributions. Step 3 considers any additional factors which include 
future needs and requirements of the parties, yet for the majority of financial awards, Step 2 
makes the decisive proportion of property division. Therefore, the emphasis of the courts lies 
on ascertaining a retrospective value of financial and non-financial contributions which 
completely differs from Scotland and New Zealand, who both avoid placing any value on 
contributions. 
Nevertheless, this lack of an overarching principle has caused a mixture of approaches to 
develop within the courts. Fehlberg defines them as the evaluative approach (where the courts 
evaluate asset-by-asset) and the partnership approach (where the courts will use global 
accounting).793 These two approaches, as this chapter shall explore, have conflicting rationales. 
The former is an individualistic ideal, aligning more with Deech’s contentions, which calculates 
the entitlement of a party by directly comparing their respective financial and non-financial 
                                                          
789 Mallett v Mallett [1984] 156 CLR 605 
790 S79(4)(a) 
791 S79(4)(b) 
792 S79(4)(c) 
793 B Fehlberg, ‘“With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow?”: The Partnership Theme in Australian Matrimonial Property 
Law’(2005) 19 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 176, 180 - 181 
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contributions. The latter approach, on the other hand, adopts a vision of marriage as a socio-
economic partnership between equals794 which will look at the overall contributions made 
within marriage, and view breadwinning and homemaking as reciprocal arrangements.795 The 
courts look at the collective contributions and assume that both parties have contributed more 
or less equally, thus justice and equity demands an equal division of the assets. Yet how does a 
system work with two different approaches that conflict in their philosophical position when 
either can be used in part or in whole depending on the case facts?796  
5.2.2.1 The Evaluation Theme 
There are two core features to this theme. Firstly, it recognises special contributions (similar to 
stellar contributions in the English context and extraordinary contributions in New Zealand’s 
context) and secondly it adopts an asset-by-asset approach, where the courts essentially 
evaluate the contributions that the parties have made to each asset although this is not a 
mathematical exercise. This approach tends to be applied in (although not limited to) shorter 
marriages without children: 
In a marriage of four years, with no dependent children being involved on either side, it 
ought to have been apparent to the parties’ legal advisers that each party’s actual financial 
contribution to the marriage was the primary issue.797 
This seems to fit with Deech’s belief that short marriages without children should be treated 
differently to longer ones. Here the courts have two steps: (i) to evaluate the contributions and 
(ii) to establish a nexus, or a strong link between the contributions and the property.798 
(i) Special Contributions 
When evaluating the contributions made within marriage, the courts will pay attention to any 
extraordinary contribution or special skill ‘outside the normal range’ of contributions that has 
been made by either party. This approach is not limited to short marriages. The courts have 
easily defined ‘special skill’ in terms of financial contributions to a relationship. For example 
they have consistently established that ‘special skill’ can refer to business acumen and 
entrepreneurial skills.799 Thus, where such aptitudes have produced great assets of over $10 
million (or even medium assets over $1 million) these sorts of contributions will warrant a 
property settlement made in favour of the breadwinner. Yet, difficulties arise where domestic 
contributions are concerned.  
                                                          
794 Ferraro v Ferraro [1992] 16 Fam LR 1, 40 
795 B Fehlberg and J Behrens,  Australian Family Law: The Contemporary Context (Oxford University Press 2008) 453 
796 Norbis v Norbis [1986] p. 534-5 (Wilson & Dawson JJ )  
797 Busby v Bushby [1988] FLC 91-919 
798 B Fehlberg, ‘“With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow?”: The Partnership Theme in Australian Matrimonial Property 
Law’(2005) 19 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 176, 180 - 181 
799 Ferraro v Ferraro [1993] FLC 92 -335; McLay v McLay [1996] FLC 92- 67 JEL v DDF [2000] 28 Fam LR 1, 12 
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In Ferraro v Ferraro,800 the court supposed that the doctrine could apply to both homemaking 
and breadwinning contributions. The Court argued:  
...in relation to the homemaker role the evidence may demonstrate the carrying out of 
responsibilities well beyond the norm as, for example, where the homemaker has the 
responsibility for the home and children entirely or almost entirely without assistance 
from the other party for long periods or cases such as the care of a handicapped or 
special needs child. On the other hand, in the breadwinner role the facts may 
demonstrate an outstanding application of time and energy to producing income and 
the application of what some of the cases have referred to as `special skills’.801 
This also demonstrates that the courts seem to have set the bar incredibly high to establish 
domestic contributions as a ‘special skill’, essentially requiring a hardship to accompany the 
homemaker’s role. In Ferraro, a 27-year marriage with a $12 million asset pool, the husband 
was the breadwinner whose time consuming career meant that Mrs Ferraro raised their three 
children almost entirely on her own. Even though the courts described her contributions as 
outstanding, it still was not enough to be identified by the court as a special skill. Once again, 
the difficulties that measuring contributions pose in the homemaker context are apparent as 
they were in New Zealand802 and Scotland:803 that the homemaker’s contribution must be 
‘beyond the norm’; but what else does outstanding mean if not an exceptional contribution? 
Instead, the courts (as in New Zealand and Scotland) are looking for the homemaker to have 
endured hardship and in a sense suffered while the breadwinner must show that they have 
flourished. Consequently, there is only one reported federal case where the homemaker’s 
contributions have been considered to be a special contribution and this was where the 
husband’s imprisonment meant that he had literally not been able to make any contributions 
at all.804 It seems that for domestic contributions to be deemed as a ‘special skill’ the courts are 
holding out for a ‘superwoman’.805 Even the Australian courts in Figgins v Figgins806 suggested 
that it is ‘invidious for a judge in effect to give marks to a husband or wife’ and did not want to 
engage in a qualitative analysis; the courts seem to want to evaluate financial contributions, 
but not domestic ones. 
This lesser value of domestic contributions is reflected in the case of dual earners; 
homemaking carried out by breadwinners is seen as a greater contribution than breadwinning 
carried out by homemakers. For example in JEL v DDF807 (a 19year-long marriage), the wife’s 
                                                          
800 Ferraro v Ferraro [1993] FLC 92 -335 
801 Ferraro v Ferraro [1993] FLC 92 -335, held at FLC 79, 572 
802 See Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.1 
803 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.2 
804 Johnson v Cooper [2004] FMCAFam 363 
805 A Ross ,‘Figgins – A New Direction Or Just Rhetoric’ (2003) 16(3) Australian Family Lawyer 34, 45 
806 Figgins v Figgins (2002) Fam CA 688 [57] (Nicholson CJ and Buckley J) 
807 JEL v DD (2000) 28 Fam LR 1, 12 
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illness hindered her ability to care for their four children. The husband had earned assets of 
$36.5 million and carried out domestic contributions equal to his wife due to her illness. He 
received 72.5% on account of his special contribution. In contrast in Phillips v Phillips808 (a 31-
year marriage) the wife had raised their children while working which enabled Mr Phillips to 
move to self-employment and earn a $26 million asset pool. Mrs Phillips’ role was valued at 
32.5% even though the courts acknowledged that he could not have made his substantial 
financial contribution without Mrs Phillips’ steady income. Consequently, this approach does 
not seem to consider the actual physical exertion of balancing care-giving responsibilities 
alongside employment. Rather, there is an inconsistent approach to valuing domestic 
contributions where the focus remains on the ‘quality’ or the fiscal value of the financial 
contributions. While this reflects the principle that equality is not the starting point, as 
established in Mallet v Mallet,809 Lewers et al. believe that evaluation seemingly reinforces the 
conception that domestic contributions are less taxing and less valuable beside those made by 
the breadwinner.810 This approach therefore places financial contributions rather than the 
care-dyad at the heart of this step and accordingly, from Fineman’s position, fails to recognise 
the importance of care-giving work.  
For Deech, this approach is preferable as it underplays domestic contributions and thus will  
reduce patriarchal financial dependence at the end of a relationship and encourage women to 
become financially autonomous. Furthermore, only recognising ‘special skill’ for financial 
contributions goes some way to protecting the individual’s rights and talents from an 
unwarranted gain by the other partner. This is particularly evident in shorter marriages with 
big money pools such as GBT and BJT811 a six year marriage without children, with assets of 
$1.4 million to which the wife only contributed $100,000; she was given 6.5%. Therefore, this 
doctrine protects the breadwinner against ‘gold-diggers’ and potentially ‘lazy wives’ by 
upholding a level of financial independence and thus encouraging financial responsibility. 
However, given that the majority of these cases involve assets of over $10 million,812 small 
percentages still involve large sums of money which could promote ‘gold-digging’ and a meal 
ticket for life attitude; it still may encourage, as Deech fears, young women to abandon their 
financial responsibility.  
                                                          
808 (1998) FamCA 1551 
809 Mallett v Mallett [1984] 156 CLR 605 
810 N Lewers, H Rhoades  and S Swain ‘Judicial And Couple Approaches To Contributions And Property: The Dominance And 
Difficulties Of A Reciprocity Model’ (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Law 123 
811 GBT v JBT [2005] FamCA 683 
812See for example JEL v DDF (2000) 28 Fam LR 1 where the wife received $12 million and Ferraro v Ferraro [1993] FLC 92 -335 
where Mrs Ferraro achieved over $5 million 
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Yet, for Fineman, particularly in longer marriages (as the evaluative approach is not solely used 
in shorter marriages), the doctrine of special contributions essentially places a cap on the value 
of domestic contributions beside financial contributions which results in a gendered 
disadvantage given that women habitually are responsible for the homemaking contributions 
in both the homemaker/breadwinner and the dual earner relationship models. Instead, by  
directly evaluating domestic contributions to be less significant than financial contributions, 
this step suggests that women are not workers and that non-financial contributions are less 
demanding and worthless beside those of financial ones. Consequently, this undermines the 
societal importance of the care-giving role and, furthermore, fails to appreciate the support 
that often the principal homemaker gives which leads to the financial success of the principal 
breadwinner. 
(ii) Nexus 
Not only are the contributions evaluated, but there must be a strong nexus between these and 
the asset; no nexus, no award. This nexus is not an entitlement but must be established and 
therefore is a more complicated task for the homemaker in comparison to the breadwinner. 
However, where there is a large financial contribution, the courts may use the erosion 
principle to establish that the other party’s non-financial contributions have offset this initial 
sum. This potentially means that the homemaker’s role is not completely overlooked by the 
courts.  
Yet, there is uncertainty with how this principle should apply. Cases such as Lee Steere v Lee 
Steere813 (an eight-year marriage with three children where the homemaker received 20 per 
cent of the farm, and a further five per cent on account of the s75(2) factors) suggested that 
the longer the marriage, the more the importance of the initial financial contribution (for 
example land) would diminish. This, the court held, was not due to time, but rather due to the 
‘offsetting of the other spouse’s contributions’; essentially, echoing New Zealand’s 
perceptions814 that the non-financial contributions would gain more weight over time. The 
rationale appeared to be that one day of housework was without value, but a lifetime of 
domestic contributions could be considered of equal worth to the initial financial one. 
However, cases such as Pierce v Pierce815 and Bremner v Bremner816 suggest that the erosion 
principle:  
                                                          
813 Lee Steere v Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626 
814 See Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.2  
815 Pierce v Pierce [1999] FLC 92-84 
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...simply reflects the circumstance that the respective contributions of the parties over 
a long period of marriage may ‘offset’ the significance which might otherwise be 
attached to a greater initial contribution by one party.817 
Consequently, rather than the domestic contributions gaining weight over time, the initial 
financial contribution loses its importance throughout the relationship’s duration. This 
interpretation of the erosion principle suggests that the longer the relationship is the more 
likely the courts will view the relationship as a socio-economic partnership.  
The erosion principle for Fineman seems unsatisfactory as neither approach recognises care-
giving for its own value. The burden instead is placed on the primary care-giver or homemaker 
to establish that the breadwinner’s contribution has been eroded. Yet, the ‘quantity’ or 
‘duration’ approach allows for greater recognition of the homemaker’s contributions. For 
example, in Bremner818 (a 22-year marriage) the husband contributed land at the start of the 
relationship which made 61% of the total assets. Mrs Bremner raised the children while in 
employment and contributed to the land’s upkeep by paying for its water bills. At the end of 
the relationship the land had been unimproved but its value had increased from $125,000 to 
$220,000 and it was divided 50:50. Many commentators noted819 that such an award would 
not have been made under the Lee Steere820 approach and consequently, this subtle nuance in 
justification of the erosion principle hinging on length rather than the amount of domestic 
contributions may greatly affect the outcome in the homemaker’s favour especially in shorter 
marriages. Furthermore, it also enables greater awards to be made in longer marriages as 
demonstrated in Bremner.821  
Yet the ‘duration’ approach to the erosion principle is harder to use where the substantial 
financial contribution has been gained later in the relationship as ‘the other party cannot be 
regarded as contributing significantly to an inheritance received very late in the relationship 
and certainly not after it has terminated, except in very unusual circumstances.’822 
Consequently, the perception that the relationship is a partnership is therefore limited to 
individual assets. Thus, a fundamental disparity exists between the evaluation of financial and 
domestic contributions that arguably leaves the homemaker in a financially disadvantaged 
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position. It suggests that financial contributions are ‘inherently more difficult and valuable 
than unwaged work in the home.’823 Clearly, financial autonomy is placed at the centre of this 
approach and, therefore it ‘places [the homemaker’s] withdrawal from the workforce rather 
than her homemaking contributions [as] the issue.’824 
In contrast, the erosion principle (particularly relating to duration) from Deech’s perspective 
may undermine financial autonomy of the parties as it enables the homemaking spouse to 
essentially establish a claim in the other party’s asset. Therefore, the absence of any 
‘valuation’ of the contributions that the parties make may lead to larger more unjustifiable 
awards. While this may impinge on the breadwinner’s financial autonomy, it also may 
discourage women from engaging with the public sphere if they believe that they will be 
entitled to the other party’s financial assets. Furthermore, this additional element adds a 
dimension of uncertainty and lack of clarity over which method of valuation will be used which 
conflicts with Deech’s position that a financial provision should embody certainty, and financial 
autonomy. 
In conclusion, it seems that this approach and the evaluation theme more generally may still 
be too generous and uncertain from Deech’s position and is definitely far too limiting and 
unobservant of the care relationship for Fineman’s. However, while this stringent approach to 
the homemaker’s contribution has been dominant in Australian courts, what is apparent is 
that over recent years, another theme for dividing property has developed within Australian 
case law, known by commentators as the partnership theme. 
5.2.2.2 The Partnership Theme 
This theme has become much more common within the courts and  
...instead of asking what are the parties' contributions to the property and financial 
circumstances of each...the Court now tends to ask about the parties' contributions to 
the marriage without this inquiry being tied into the question of responsibility for the 
property and the financial circumstances of the parties.825 
It consists of two approaches: (i) the ‘global’ approach where the courts look at the overall 
contributions made by the parties when coming to their decision and (ii) the ‘balancing’ 
approach where the courts balance the contributions against one another rather than 
requiring a nexus between them and the assets. Thus, the source of the assets and 
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contributions are considerations rather than overriding reasons for the reallocation of 
property. 
The partnership theme is most frequently applied in longer marriages and it allows the courts 
to consider all the circumstances of the individual case including s75(2) factors826 although this 
does not give the courts complete discretion.827 The development of this approach indicates 
the growing recognition within the courts that marriage is a partnership and cases like 
Ferraro828 and Waters v Jurek829 both use this concept of partnership as the justification behind 
their awards.830 This theme therefore ‘approaches the issue of property alteration in terms of a 
commitment to equality and to sharing implicit in the notion of marriage as a joining of 
lives.’831 Accordingly, as Fehlberg notes,832 it largely concerns the justification of bestowing a 
more favourable financial award on the homemaker and recognises a collective approach of 
the couple: that although they may make different contributions, they are equally valuable.  
Consequently, this means that unlike the evaluation approach it does not matter when the 
contributions are made in the relationship. In Aleksovski v Aleksovski,833 Kay J gave the analogy 
that if a party enters a marriage with a gold bar and for 20 years they strive for mutual 
support, at the end of the 20 years they have the gold bar.  Moreover, it should matter little 
when this gold bar enters the relationship and so if a party inherits the gold bar on the last day 
of their relationship they still will be seen to have the gold bar. This therefore means that the 
court uses a far more holistic approach to Step 2 which recognises that the parties’ efforts are 
joint and consequently that ‘the economic fruits of the marriage…should be divided between 
them.834 Therefore, the development of this approach represents a move away from a method 
which evaluates individual efforts towards the recognition that marriage is a joint partnership. 
Using this partnership theme instead of the evaluative theme could accordingly make an 
advantageous difference to the size of awards for the homemaker especially in large asset 
cases. The court in Lane v Wharton835 demonstrated this where it observed that the wife in this 
five-year relationship including two years of marriage (with $1.7 million assets) would receive 
80% by using the global approach compared to 76.6% under the evaluation approach.836 
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Consequently, as both parties’ efforts are being viewed as joint in a partnership under this 
theme, the homemaking and care-giving role is given greater value as it is being treated as 
reciprocal to breadwinning. Therefore, this theme recognises to a greater extent the 
importance of care-giving and arguably introduces the idea that homemaking is equally 
valuable to breadwinning. For Deech, greater intervention is a greater interference in the 
private sphere by the state and the concept of a partnership in marriage (in her analysis of the 
England and Wales context) ‘rests on the picture of the male earner and the wife as 
housekeeper and child-rearer.’837  
However partnership in Australia does not correspond with equality838 and the courts have 
clearly indicated equality is not to be the starting point.839 Consequently, there seems to be an 
increasing number of situations where the ‘nexus’ approach creeps into the partnership 
approach and limits the award on account of how the property is acquired. For example, in 
Farmer v Bramley840 a marriage of 12 years, the wife had been the primary carer for their 
children as well as nursing her husband through a heroin addiction. There was no property and 
18 months after separation the husband won $5 million in a lottery. Although the majority said 
that a nexus was not needed, she only received 15% on account of the way the property was 
acquired. Yet, no conceptual basis exists as to why she only was granted this amount and this 
appears contrary to Aleksovski’s gold bar analogy841 where Kay J indicated that it should not 
matter when the gold bar is acquired. Furthermore, in Figgins842 (a short marriage of three 
years, with seven years previous cohabitation with one child), the wife was the homemaker 
and two weeks after the marriage, the husband inherited $22.5 million. Rather than viewing 
this to be a special contribution, the courts considered the inheritance to be a windfall and 
granted her $2.5 million (10%) on account of the duration of the marriage and the way in 
which the property was acquired. This indicated a nexus requirement to this property even 
though the Court acknowledged that she deserved more.  
The absence of equality as a starting point under the partnership theme means that the 
doctrine of ‘special skill’ also obscures outcomes. In Ferraro,843 even though the court declared 
that marriage was a partnership, the court granted  a 37.5/62.5 split in favour of the husband 
on account of the husband’s special skill. Therefore, in reality the partnership theme does not 
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result in any form of entitlement to equal sharing as it does in New Zealand and Scotland as in 
the large majority of circumstances equality is not achieved. In essence it means that the 
contributions are still being assessed and consequently it could be argued that the majority of 
awards are only reflecting financial contributions and therefore financial success!844 
Accordingly financial contributions are at the centre of this step and consequently there is little 
acknowledgement of the contributions and sacrifices that are made within the private sphere. 
While the partnership theme is a positive step towards protecting Fineman’s care-dyad, the 
absence of a starting point of equality has caused the evaluation theme to take dominance.  
Parkinson argues that this approach demonstrates a lack of any ‘coherent principles about 
how to value the homemaker contribution845’ and frequently the courts do not articulate how 
they have quantified the award under this theme except for stating that they have used the 
partnership approach.846 Consequently, there is further uncertainty over how and when this 
theme applies to longer marriages; the reason for the decision does not have to be articulated. 
This uncertainty is something Deech disapproves of as it increases the chance of litigation and 
limits self-regulation.847 Yet, valuing financial contributions  more highly than non-financial 
ones may also protect the assets and contributions made by the owning spouse.  
5.2.2.3 Step 2: Conclusion 
Overall, it seems that these two approaches to dividing assets are philosophically opposed and 
thus it is confusing that they exist alongside each other and it is unclear how they are 
approached and when they will arise. At Step 2, both approaches make no attempt to protect 
those who are vulnerable or lead lives characterised by dependency. Where the partnership 
theme goes some way further to offering greater financial support to Fineman’s care-dyad it 
seems in reality to fall short as the private sphere is overlooked. In fact, Golder et al.848 identify 
that the law rarely puts those who have been economically dependent throughout the 
marriage in a position of economic independence. Yet how far does Step 3 remedy the position 
of the economically weaker spouse? 
5.2.3 Property Settlement: Step 3 – Other Factors 
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Step 3 of property settlement in Australia allows adjustments based on s79(4)(d)–(g) factors849 
including s75(2) factors,850 which essentially enables the courts to consider the future needs of 
the parties if it is just and equitable to do so. The factors considered are mostly financial issues 
such as the age and health of the parties, the length of the marriage (and its impact on the 
earning capacity of parties), employment prospects, financial resources and post-separation 
child-care responsibilities. These considerations are in no specific order, rather it is for the 
courts to decide how much weight (if any) should be attributed to each factor and therefore 
what resultant adjustments are required at this step. Essentially the court is concerned with 
two issues: firstly, who has primary responsibility for any children of the relationship post-
separation and secondly, the extent of any income disparity between the spouses. Accordingly 
(and also taking into account the partiality that Step 2 displays towards the breadwinner), 
while Step 3 is often the most contentious step, it is also the most important stage for the 
homemaker as the courts use it to redress the economic disadvantages that arise from the 
division of roles in relationships.  
Early case law adopted a needs-based approach to this step and the alterations made for the 
financially weaker party were very strict as a result. However, the courts began to recognise 
that this approach alone did not acknowledge the full extent of the economic impact that the 
homemaking role could have. In Best v Best851 (a 30-year marriage with four children), the 
court, while considering Step 3 factors, remarkably referred to research from the Australian 
Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) which discussed the economic consequences of divorce and 
the ‘feminisation of poverty’.852 Here, the couple had met at university and by the time of 
separation the husband was the partner of a Law firm. Conversely, the wife had given up a 
career in nursing almost 25 years earlier to assume a homemaking role and raise the couple’s 
children. In view of the vastly disparate earning capacities between the parties and the AIFS 
research, the court held that a needs-based award would not produce a sufficient adjustment 
for the wife. Instead the courts adopted a more holistic approach which looked at the wife’s 
ability to recover financially, post-separation. Consequently the court awarded Mrs Best 100% 
of the net assets stating that: 
…while in ordinary circumstances it might be thought to be unusual to make an order 
which leaves one of the parties without any significant share of assets to which both 
have made contributions over the years and leaves that party with many of the 
liabilities that appears to be entirely justified in this case. In our view there is little point 
in attempting to divide in percentage terms such a small quantum of net assets against 
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a background where one party has no income and the other party has a very 
substantial income and, as far as one can judge, an assured professional future.853 
 
Similarly in Mitchell v Mitchell854 the wife also received 100% on account of her husband’s 
significant income and in Figgins855 the court supported Lord Nicholl’s statement in the English 
case White856 and concluded that a needs-based approach was inappropriate:857 
I can see nothing, either in the statutory provisions or in the underlying objective of 
securing fair financial arrangements, to lead me to suppose that the available assets of 
the respondent become immaterial once the claimant wife’s financial needs are 
satisfied.858 
The court granted Mrs Figgins 10% ($2.5 million) on the grounds of maintaining a standard of 
living, the fact that there was a huge disparity in resources and because she had to care for the 
children.  
Consequently, while this step aims to meet any financial need, it also attempts to compensate 
the detrimental impact that homemaking and care-giving can have on a spouse’s ability to be 
financially self-sufficient. This ‘compensatory’ approach appears to be more extensively 
applied than the compensation provisions in both New Zealand859 and Scotland860 which is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that in Australia both needs and compensation are considered 
simultaneously. Consequently, in comparison with these jurisdictions, the Australian system is 
much closer to achieving Fineman’s ‘equality of resources’ between spouses at the end of a 
relationship and therefore goes much further to protect the care-dyad: 
 …it should not be forgotten that the payment of child support in no way compensates 
the custodial parent for the loss of career opportunities, lack of employment, mobility 
and the restriction upon the independent lifestyle that the obligation to care for 
children usually entails.861 
However, the extent to which ‘equality of resources’ can be achieved is limited by the fact that 
the courts’ aim (as stressed in Mallet v Mallet)862 is not ‘to equalise the financial strengths of 
the parties. It is to empower the Court...to effect a re-distribution of the property of the 
parties if it be just and equitable to do so...’863 Dickson v Dickson emphasised that this means 
that ‘the mere existence of disparity of wealth ought not of itself justify a settlement of 
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property to one party at the expense of the other.’864 This is similar to the approach in 
Scotland towards rebalancing economic advantages and disadvantages;865 an economic 
disparity does not automatically warrant redistribution. In Australia, achieving equality is not 
the goal and therefore Step 3 does not automatically redress an imbalance in resources that 
exists between the spouses. Yet, given that Step 2 places greater value on financial 
contributions in comparison to domestic contributions, it is highly likely (especially in large 
asset cases) that there will be an imbalance in resources where there is a 
homemaker/breadwinner division of roles. It therefore seems that Step 3 in practice may not 
offer enough protection for the care-dyad to rebalance the disadvantage suffered by the 
homemaker at Step 2. This can be seen in Lee Steere866 where at Step 3 the courts only 
adjusted the wife’s award by an additional 5% which failed to cover the cost of a house for her 
or her children. 
Furthermore, this imbalance between homemaker and breadwinner is particularly apparent in 
big money cases. The full court in Clauson867 emphasised that the adjustment made under this 
step is not about the percentage, but rather ‘it is the real impact in money terms which is 
ultimately the critical issue’.868 Consequently, the size of the asset pool can have a substantial 
impact on the size of the adjustment and generally the percentage awarded at this step is 
much higher in small asset cases. A 10% adjustment in an asset pool of $200,000 would equate 
to $20,000, whereas in a large asset pool of $5,000,000 it would equate to $500,000. 
Therefore a variation can be seen between smaller asset cases like Best869 and Mitchell870  
(where 100% of the assets were awarded to both wives) and big money cases like Pastern v 
Pastern871 (a 29-year marriage with three children and assets over $3 million). Here the wife 
was awarded a 1.5% adjustment even though she had minimal employment prospects in 
comparison to her husband (he was a veterinary surgeon while she only worked casually from 
time to time). Furthermore, this percentage adjustment does not necessarily reflect the extent 
required by the homemaker as the courts must take into account the impact that this will have 
on the respondent. Phipson v Phipson872 emphasised that as the disparity is measured in 
money terms, where the homemaker is seen as requiring a 10% alteration on account of Step 
3, she will receive 5% (as it includes the 5% taken from the other party). This monetary-based 
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rather than percentage-based approach in the large asset cases clearly reaffirms the principle 
that the courts are not trying to equalise any economic disparity between the couple. At the 
same time, it also reinforces the implicit assumption in Australian property settlement that 
homemaking is less valuable than breadwinning. Considering that at Step 2 it is much harder 
for the homemaker to demonstrate that their contributions are equal to that of the 
breadwinner’s and at the same time Step 3’s monetary-based approach typically results in 
nominal adjustments in large asset cases, it seems that in reality there is a glass-ceiling on the 
monetary value of the award that a homemaker can achieve.  
While this step appears limited in relation to how much protection it can provide for Fineman’s 
care-dyad, it also seems incompatible with Deech’s position. For Deech, Step 3 allows the 
courts to excessively interfere within the private sphere. The approach adopted by the courts, 
which extends beyond needs to include compensation, interferes with the breadwinner’s 
financial autonomy and promulgates a gendered division of roles and the notion of female 
dependency by reinforcing a ‘meal ticket for life’ attitude. Consequently, this step ignores the 
fact that it is the woman’s independent choice to remain within the private sphere and to 
sacrifice her career. Rather this compensatory approach removes any responsibility for this 
choice and does so to a far greater degree than in the previous two jurisdictions. 
Yet, there are difficulties with Deech’s argument based around choice and corresponding 
responsibility given that the homemaker’s decision to remain in the home can also be seen as 
a joint choice where the breadwinner is also agreeing to support the homemaker. The court in 
Waters v Jurek recognised this, stating that the roles chosen within a relationship: 
…[were] the joint decision of the parties that that be the way in which they would 
conduct their affairs, and where that decision was made in the expectation of the 
relationship continuing.873  
 
In recognition of this fact and as the husband earned $170,000 per annum, the court awarded 
the wife $50,000 of relationship property. This was despite the fact that she earned $75,000 
and thus was able to provide for herself. This recognition of a mutual responsibility for the 
parties’ financial position at the end of a relationship therefore aligns more closely with 
Fineman’s position than with Deech’s. 
Overall, this stage of property settlement does go some way to redress need and to 
compensate any financial imbalance between spouses (more so than either Scotland or New 
Zealand) and therefore it seems to correspond to a greater extent with Fineman’s position 
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than with Deech’s. However, as the end goal is not substantive equality, Step 3 appears limited 
in relation to how much protection it can provide for Fineman’s care-dyad. It seems that the 
full financial impact of the homemaking/care-giving role does not appear to be recognised. As 
a result, it reinforces the implicit assumption present in Australian property settlement that 
homemaking and care-giving does not appear to be as valued as breadwinning activities. This 
is particularly worrying when women and men have different ‘life-course investments’.874 
5.2.4 Spousal Maintenance 
In Australia, the courts have the discretion to grant spousal maintenance where they feel it 
proper to do so875 and can make urgent,876 interim and final877 orders. If an application is being 
made at the same time as a property settlement, the property settlement will be considered 
first as it sets the background to the parties’ financial resources as they may already be able to 
support themselves after the property settlement. This (unfavoured) award can either be by 
way of a lump sum, periodical instalments878 or property transfer (although the courts in 
Vautin v Vautin879 warned about the difficulties in making financial predictions when ordering 
lump sums) and will terminate (bar exceptional circumstances) on death or remarriage. 
Maintenance applications have to be made within 12 months of separation (reinforcing the 
concept of clean break) and, to be applicable, the claiming party must prove firstly that they 
are unable to support themselves (as a result of caring for a child under 18, age or health 
resulting in an incapacity for employment or any other reason),880 secondly, that the other 
party can reasonably pay maintenance and thirdly, when considering an award, the courts 
must have regard to the s75(2) factors. The courts are keen to emphasise the difference in 
interpretation of s75(2) here in comparison to property settlements; in Clauson v Clauson881 
the court emphasised that s75(2) in regards to maintenance is to be considered after s75(2) 
consideration at Step 3; it is to become effectively the fourth step. 
Maintenance here, as in New Zealand and Scotland, is rarely awarded, with the courts 
preferring a ‘clean break’.882  Where it was awarded, the early rationale behind maintenance in 
Australia883 echoed the rehabilitative rationale preferred by Deech884 (and also by New 
                                                          
874 P Parkinson, ‘Quantifying the Homemaker Contributions in Family Property Law’ (2003) 31(1) Federal Law Review 1, 2 
875 S74 Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
876 S77 Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
877 Ss 72, 74, 75(2) and 80(1)(h) Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
878 S80 Family Law Act (Cth) 1975  
879 Vautin v Vautin [1998] FLC 92-827 
880 S72(1)(a)-(c) Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
881 Clauson v Clauson [1995] FLC 92-595 
882 J Behrens and B Smyth, Spousal Support in Australia: A Study of Incidence and Attitudes (Working Paper 16, Australian Institute 
of Family Studies, Melbourne, February 1999) 8 available via the Institute's website: <www.aifs.org.au/>. This study recorded that 
7% of cases resulted in periodical payments in comparison to 10% of cases receiving a property transfer award.  
883 B Fehlberg,  ‘Spousal Maintenance in Australia’ (2004) 18(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1, 5 
196 
 
Zealand885 and Scotland886).  Here the courts were essentially concerned with the claimant’s 
ability to support themselves adequately.  For example, in Hope v Hope887 (a 22-year marriage) 
the homemaker wife received maintenance for the duration of a two-year training course. Yet, 
as Fehlberg notes, the courts have adopted a more compensatory approach over the last 15 
years. Bevan v Bevan888 indicated that spousal maintenance was not limited to need and in the 
aforementioned Mitchell889 (and also Best)890 the courts emphasised that ‘adequately’ was to 
be determined by reference to s75(2) factors. Through this wider approach, the courts are 
attempting to redress the feminisation of poverty and to recognise the full financial impact 
that homemaking and child-rearing has on the primary care-giver’s ability to enter the labour 
market.891 This shift in approach recognises the unequal distribution of the burden of child-
care and the case of Kiesinger v Paget892 indicates that the courts recognise the impact that 
the length of a relationship may have on the financial vulnerability of a homemaker. However, 
for Fehlberg this does not go as far as supporting a compensatory model of maintenance.893  
In addition, the courts are more restrictive in looking at the respondent’s ability to pay 
maintenance than in the property context. In DJM v JML894 (where the husband reduced his 
income to avoid paying maintenance) the courts would not look at his earning potential, 
finding it unreasonable to expect a spouse to work more to pay maintenance even though the 
wife, the homemaker, had four (of five) children under 18 to look after: demonstrating a 
restrictive rehabilitative approach. 
The limited approach towards maintenance reflects Deech’s position that it should be 
rehabilitative in its nature and that clean break should be the courts’ goal. While there has 
been some move towards a more needs-based approach which arguably may conflict with 
Deech’s position, the frequency with which maintenance is awarded suggests that it rarely 
prolongs female dependency post-separation. Where maintenance is awarded, the courts 
adopt an approach which recognises the impact that caring can have on the ability to be self-
sufficient. Yet the infrequency of the award suggests that Fineman’s care-dyad is left in a 
financially vulnerable position post-separation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
884 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229, 232-233 
885 See Chapter 3, section 3.5.2 
886 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.4 
887 Hope v Hope  (1977) FLC 90-294 
888 Bevan v Bevan (1995) FLC 92-600   
889 Mitchell v Mitchell [1995] FLC 92-601 
890 Best v Best [1993] FLC 92-418 
891 B Fehlberg, ‘Spousal Maintenance in Australia’ (2004) 18(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1, 5 
892 Kiesinger and Paget [2008] Fam CAFC 23 
893 B Fehlberg, ‘Spousal Maintenance in Australia’ (2004) 18(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1, 10  
894 DJM v JLM [1998] FLC 92-816 
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5.3 Financial Provision on Relationship Breakdown: 
Cohabiting Couples 
Since 1 March 2009 the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other 
Measures) Act 2008 introduced provisions giving same-sex and different-sex cohabiting 
couples (or de facto couples in Australia) the same rights as married couples which apply to all 
States in Australia except South Australia and Western Australia.895 This is with the exception 
of relationships ending before this date, which will have to revert to State provisions.  
Now the FLA Part VIIIAB deals with cohabitants and s4AA defines them as having ‘a 
relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis’896 which can exist even if 
the person or persons are married or in a de facto relationship with someone else. To 
determine whether parties are cohabiting for the purpose of this Act, the courts can regard all 
circumstances including (but not limited to) the same list of provisions found within the New 
Zealand jurisdiction.897 Now, cohabiting relationships have the same rights as married couples 
reflected (and interpreted) in the mirror provisions in Part VIIIAB including maintenance. 
Accordingly, the same substantive difficulties that have been discussed in the marriage context 
will extend to the cohabitation context.  
However, there is a time-bar in place of two (rather than New Zealand’s three) years meaning 
that cohabiting relationships of this length will not fall under the Act’s jurisdiction unless 
(similarly to New Zealand) there is a child of the relationship, or the claiming party has made a 
substantial contribution (monetary or to the welfare of the family) and the failure to make an 
order would result in serious injustice.898 Since the Act came into force, only one case, Miller v 
Trent,899 has dealt with the definitions of ‘substantial contribution’ and ‘serious injustice’. 
Here, the male cohabitant was seeking 15% of a $3.5 million asset pool where Ms Trent had 
brought in 91% of the assets. Here, Federal Magistrate Coates determined that ‘substantial 
contribution’ was to follow the definition laid out in the Western Australian case V v K900  and 
that serious injustice was to be given its ordinary meaning: 
…the applicant has to produce evidence to satisfy the test of having made substantial 
contributions, described as ‘more than usual or ordinary’…or ‘exceptional 
circumstances where serious injustice may be caused. [85] (Coates FM) 
                                                          
895 See Appendix V for a table demonstrating the similarities and differences. 
896 S4AA(1)(c) Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
897 See Appendix R 
898 S90SB(a)(d) Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 
899 See Miller v Trent [2011] FMCAFam 324 
900 V v K [2005] FCWA 80. This was a case from Western Australia, which has been settling de facto property disputes since 2000. 
Coates here felt that he could draw on the definition as the provisions set out in the Family Law Act 1997 (WA), ss.205X, 205ZG 
were of a similar wording to s90SB and 90SM of the FLA. See Paragraphs 53 - 57 
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The court held that Mr Miller’s contributions which consisted of ‘personal suggestions [to 
improve the property], interventions, building works, training of horses, and assistance to the 
welfare of the family’ were not substantial. Consequently, it seems unlikely at this early phase 
that ordinary domestic contributions would be considered enough to qualify: 
I am of the view that contribution to domestic duties in circumstances…where there are 
no dependent children and over a short period of time ought not to be substantial.901 
Yet, where a short relationship meets these exceptions to the time-bar, the relationship will be 
treated the same as all married relationships whereas in New Zealand, if they fall under the 
exemptions, they are treated as a marriage of short duration.  From Fineman’s position, this 
smaller time-bar means that Australia is closer to having a scheme based on function rather 
than form in comparison with New Zealand, especially considering that Australia’s framework 
allows concurrent relationships to be protected at the same time (frequently referred to as the 
‘mistress provisions’). As discussed in earlier chapters, the presence of cohabitation legislation 
which is opt-out rather than opt-in presents a degree of difficulty for Deech. Furthermore, 
Australia’s ‘mistress provisions’ from Deech’s position may encourage ‘gold-digging’ claims 
made by a mistress that will undermine the institution of marriage. Nevertheless, this 
provision ensures that dependency and vulnerability are protected regardless of the 
monogamous marital status in that it does not necessarily exclude a claim, and arguably goes 
some way to putting care-dyads more at the focal point of this area. Moreover, the 2009 
amendments allow cohabiting couples to enter into financial agreements pre-,902 during903 and 
post-separation,904 as long as it does not defeat the interests of those already married/in a de 
facto arrangement. This goes some way to reflect and strengthen concepts of autonomy 
promoted by Deech. 
5.3.1 Same-Sex Couples 
These amendments were also designed to remove any discrimination between same-sex and 
different-sex couples, changing up to 85 different laws to do so, thus the cohabiting legislation 
also extends to same-sex couples.905 However, unlike the other jurisdictions, federal law does 
not extend to same-sex registered partnerships and consequently, there is no equivalent 
relationship status to marriage unless provided at state level. Yet registered partnerships only 
                                                          
901 V v K [2005] FCWA 8 definition as followed in Miller v Trent [2011] FMCAFam 324 
902 S90UB Part VIIIAB Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
903 S90UC Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
904 S90UD Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
905 This was done through the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws—Superannuation) Act 2008 which 
received assent on 4 December 2008 and the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws—General Law 
Reform) Act 2008 
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exist in Tasmania, Victoria, The Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales906 and a 
number of bills proposing same-sex marriage have been rejected by the federal Senate.907 This 
means that, given the two year time-bar, there is scope for discrimination against same-sex 
relationships that are unable to qualify for any protection under the FLA.  
5.4 Doctrinal And Feminist Conclusion 
 
Overall, Australia offers a greater opportunity to take into account domestic contributions 
than the previous jurisdictions of Scotland and New Zealand by evaluating past contributions. 
Yet, it seems that the task of weighing contributions is fraught with difficulties (as glimpsed in 
New Zealand) and leads to a strong presumption of financial contributions as carrying more 
weight, especially through the doctrine of special skills. Valuing domestic contributions offered 
the opportunity to avoid the negative impact that a blanket application of equality has, but in 
actual fact the courts have failed to give domestic contributions any significant weight and any 
attempt to do so is met with a slow retreat back to an approach that focuses on ‘nexus’ and 
financial contributions. While the partnership approach is a greater step towards recognising 
non-financial contributions, the concept of partnership is limited, given that the courts have 
emphasised that equality is not the starting point. Furthermore, Step 3 of property settlement 
offers an important opportunity to redress some of the economic imbalance suffered by the 
primary care-giver. However, this also seems to be limited by the fact that equality is not the 
objective of the courts. Consequently, the approach does not adequately address the impact 
that care-giving can have on a primary care-giver’s economic position (although this may be 
covered in Australia’s more extensive child maintenance legislation). Maintenance is also 
rarely awarded and when it is the focus is on self-sufficiency. Thus, where it is awarded, it is 
limited and clean break encourages a greater use of lump sum awards Therefore, it seems that 
valuing past contributions, disadvantages the homemaker and does not go far enough to 
protect the care-dyad. 
The actual complicated task of actually valuing such different contributions has also resulted in 
a complex and confusing application of not one, but two conflicting philosophical principles 
that potentially encourage litigation and make it difficult to predict the outcome of a 
judgment. As a result, this uncertainty is unsatisfactory from both Fineman’s and Deech’s 
perspectives. While this system allows for greater financial autonomy, the complexity of the 
                                                          
906 E.g. Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania. Tasmania even recognises overseas same-sex couples. New South Wales and 
Victoria have a civil union scheme without an official ceremony and South Australia has same-sex marriage proposed. 
907 E.g. Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2009 rejected by the Senate on 25 February 2010 
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system and lack of justification when using the partnership theme may provoke litigation and 
undermine the value of caregiving by placing more importance on financial contributions.  
In the cohabitation context, the synonymous treatment of cohabitation and marriage presents 
an opportunity to protect a greater number of care-dyads, although this is still limited by 
sexual relations as the focal point of the jurisdiction; and registering relationships is perhaps a 
way of extending rights that would align better with Deech’s views. Still, there is concern that 
the lack of a relationship status similar to marriage for same-sex relationships may mean that 
there is a level of discrimination between different and same-sex relationships of short 
duration. Yet what are the implications of this scheme in practice? 
5.5 Empirical Analysis 
 
Building on the above doctrinal and feminist analysis of the Australian jurisdiction, this section 
now outlines and discusses the results from the interviews in order to develop a three-
dimensional impression of how effectively the scheme values domestic contributions. To do 
so, after outlining the socio-demographics of those interviewed, this section addresses the 
results in four parts: the responses in the married, cohabiting and same-sex context and finally 
the results relating to the vignettes. 
5.5.1 Socio – Demographics of the Interviewees 
15 lawyers took part in the study, eight male and seven female. There was a much greater 
spread of ages here and the sample was generally much younger than in Scotland and New 
Zealand with a third under 40. 
Following from this, the Australian lawyers had not been practising for as long as those in 
Scotland and New Zealand and while six had practised for between 11 – 20 years making this 
the mode (as in Scotland), five had practised for 10 years and under, making these participants 
less experienced in their jurisdictions. These respondents had been selected from Queensland, 
Australia in an effort to gain greater insight into how the new cohabitation provisions brought 
in under the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 
2008 would operate in practice. Prior to 2009 (when this Act was enacted), Queensland had 
had its own state provisions under the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) that had been modelled on 
the marriage provisions contained within the FLA (1975).908 
                                                          
908 See Appendix V 
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While the new Federal regime extends the marriage provisions to cohabiting relationships over 
two years in length, Queensland’s state provisions had been modelled on Australia’s marital 
regime. 
Figure 5.1: Ages of the respondents in Australia 
 
5.5.2. Responses in the Marriage Context 
Table 5.1 Themes in the marriage context 
Overarching Themes Themes Sub-Themes 
Procedural justice v. individual 
justice 
Procedural difficulties 
Inconsistency 
Evidence 
Advising clients 
Unpredictable 
Greater litigation and cost 
Benefits of discretion 
Flexibility 
Fairness 
Satisfaction 
Equality 
Partnership N/A 
Practicality N/A 
Limited suitability 
Children 
Assets 
Length 
The burden of caring 
Children make a difference 
Greater work 
Financial autonomy 
Impact of caring 
Needs 
Maintenance provision 
Additional burden 
Disbelief 
Partnership 
 
As Table 5.1 shows, Australia’s themes in the marriage context are dominated by the 
overarching themes of ‘procedural justice vs. individual justice’, ‘equality’ and also ‘the burden 
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of caring’. While the first overarching theme reflects the operation of the system, the latter 
two themes reveal the substantive ‘fairness’ of the system in practice. 
5.5.2.1 Procedural Justice vs. Individual Justice 
 It was evident from Table 5.2 that seven lawyers thought that their system was completely 
discretionary and from Table 5.3 that this was too discretionary. 
Table 5.2: How rigid/discretionary the lawyers believe Australia to be. 
 
Table 5.3: Attitudes towards how rigid/discretionary Australia is. 
 
The Australian interviewees indicated a number of procedural difficulties which seemed to be 
linked to this level of discretion. At the heart of this was the lack of certainty or predictability 
that such an approach has, which almost all the lawyers had indicated in some form during 
their interviews. Some were concerned that there was a lack of consistency with the way that 
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the judges were valuing contributions, although others felt that this was due to evidence 
problems. 
...so they rely quite heavily on whatever the individual judge sees as being something 
he can hang his hat on as to why he made the quantity decision he made. (AusLaw6) 
Another theme linked to this ‘inconsistency’ was ‘advising clients’. Almost half of those who 
took part stated that the lack of certainty made it difficult to advise clients. Generally, the 
practitioners felt that it was possible to predict a range that the courts would operate within, 
usually between 10-15%, but overall it was too broad to give an adequate prediction to the 
client.  
 ...the width of the range and the discretion is about 10 or 15% depending on who’s 
hearing it and I think that we often get dissatisfied with that because, you know, that 
can make a big difference on what your outcome is and it’s hard to advise. (AusLaw4) 
Nevertheless, the respondents were aware of how particular judges approached cases, which 
indicates that the judges themselves are predictable and therefore consistent in their 
approach.  
So all of us have worked out which judges are likely to do what...[but it’s] on the 
morning of our trial generally cos that’s when we know who our judge is. (AusLaw15). 
 
However, as the lawyers may not find out who the judge is until the day of the trial, it remains 
difficult to advise clients. Consequently, the lawyers wanted to provide their clients with better 
advice. Accordingly, this lack of certainty and subsequent difficulty in preparing a case means 
that it is a complex and uncertain route for individuals to attain a judicial remedy. Therefore, 
while New Zealand and Scotland indicated that individuals were aware of their legal 
entitlements and frequently settled outside of court, in Australia, access to a lawyer is vital to 
make sense of the system. 
It is also possible that such a breadth in outcomes and the unpredictability of the courts may 
encourage a more litigious approach to financial provision on relationship breakdown. In fact, 
the respondents were concerned that too many cases were going to court:  
We don’t apply strict rules but it creates lack of certainty and so it’s very hard to advise 
people with that lack of certainty as to how their arguments will go and therefore more 
cases probably run than they should. (AusLaw2) 
Therefore, there is some concern that Australia’s approach may foster a more litigious 
environment at the end of a relationship and perhaps unnecessarily so, as one of the New 
Zealand lawyers indicated: 
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...in Australia they have...a lot of litigation. But Australian law is in a bloody terrible 
way. Australian lawyers are shark-like in their approach of these things, but only 
because they have the opportunity to do so... (NZLaw9) 
This potential to drag cases through the courts unnecessarily means unnecessary costs. This 
may act as a deterrent for the economically weaker party who cannot afford a lengthy court 
proceeding or high-quality counsel and therefore is placed in a weaker bargaining position. 
Arguably, it could mean that the financially vulnerable party is pressurised to settle outside of 
court and therefore is possibly controlled by the financially stronger party. This may hinder the 
primary care-giver’s ability to litigate effectively:  
The person with the more money has more, um, bargaining power to get you know, 
bigger guns on their side...The problem is you need to make an application to the court 
and get all your material together…to get to that stage, but if you don’t have 
representation or money, that is very hard for a person to do it on their own. Um to 
navigate through the system. (AusLaw14) 
Despite the procedural difficulties voiced by the interviewees, it was clear that the lawyers 
highly valued the ‘benefits of discretion’. A key theme linking heavily with this concept of 
individual justice was the perception that each individual case was different. Over half the 
interviewees specifically referred to this theme and there was a strong belief that a high level 
of ‘flexibility’ was needed to achieve an appropriate outcome according to the unique features 
of each case; a fairer outcome is achieved through individual justice: 
I don’t think you can prescribe these things into a formula because each relationship is 
its own enterprise and it should be assessed on its own facts and circumstances. 
(AusLaw7)  
 Furthermore, most of those interviewed were satisfied with the approach taken in Australia 
and therefore the participants perceived that individual justice is being achieved in most cases. 
Thus, despite the earlier procedural concerns, it seems that by and large the discretionary 
nature of the scheme was the appropriate mechanism to achieving fair and appropriate 
results: 
Well, there’s no such thing as a perfect system, but, um, I think that it is as close to 
perfect as one can get. Because underlying that is enormous discretion...and I think in 
Family Law you need a flexible system. (AusLaw6) 
5.5.2.2 Equality 
When the lawyers were asked about the substantive aspects of their system, surprisingly, the 
equality theme emerged. The central component of this theme was that domestic 
contributions were (and should be) valued equally against financial contributions. This was 
particularly unanticipated given that Australia is the only jurisdiction under analysis where it is 
outwardly stated that there is no presumption of equality between differing contributions. 
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Nevertheless, ‘equality’ and the sub-theme ‘partnership’ were dominant themes throughout 
the qualitative analysis in Australia. Consequently, for nearly half the participants, equality was 
an entitlement which recognised both that marriage is a partnership and that the way that 
couples order their affairs is a lifestyle choice within that relationship: 
...marriage is a partnership, and you know, that is the parties’ arrangement. They 
agreed to organise their affairs in that manner. And so to judge their contributions 
equally is fair. (AusLaw8)  
The lawyers were also satisfied on a practical level with valuing homemaking and 
breadwinning contributions equally because it avoided the complexity of actually attributing a 
value to the non-financial contributions. Consequently, ‘equality’ meant that a satisfactory 
value was placed on domestic contributions and therefore avoided the danger that these 
would be undervalued or overlooked by the courts.  
While the majority were satisfied with generally treating the homemaker and breadwinner 
equally, some believed that equality had ‘limited suitability’ and therefore was only 
appropriate in certain situations. These situations seemed to hinge on children (without which 
there should not be a presumption of equality) and also on original assets; lawyers deemed 
that the relationship property that should be divided equally should exclude initial 
contributions, much like Scotland’s approach: 
 I think that if that’s the way they live their lives then they should be equally treated 
and it is equally treated. It’s different with introducing assets at the beginning. 
(AusLaw4) 
 
5.5.2.3 The Burden Of Caring 
As the previous theme of ‘limited suitability’ demonstrated, the lawyers clearly believed that 
equality was not appropriate where there were children. The message was clear and also far 
stronger than it had been in the previous jurisdictions: children make a substantial difference. 
Thus, Fineman’s care-dyad appears to be more central to Australia’s legal framework than in 
the previous jurisdictions. The lawyers attributed this difference to the burden of caring that 
accompanied having children, as it involved additional work on top of everyday homemaking 
contributions. Furthermore, the lawyers recognised that having children severely interfered 
with the primary care-giver’s financial autonomy and ability to make independent choices: 
Those without children, it should be valued less because they have the potential to do 
something else; I’m not saying they have to, they have the potential. (AusLaw11) 
As a result of the economic impact of care-giving, the lawyers identified that care-givers were 
more financially vulnerable and therefore had greater needs post-separation: 
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I think they should favour people with children, because you’re financially 
vulnerable...They’re trying to, you know, they’ve got the emotional side of it, they’ve 
got the financial aspect trying to keep their job and also trying to settle the children, 
and that would cause a lot of financial strain if they have that extra support it would 
help. (AusLaw14) 
 
In fact, it seems that there is a greater concept of partnership where there are children as 
some of the respondents thought that the courts should avoid evaluating the contributions 
only where there were children.  
When evaluating the lawyers’ perceptions of ‘substantive fairness’ within Australia, the 
responses contained two themes: how the system dealt with the ‘impact of caring’ and 
secondly how the system dealt with any ‘additional burden’. In terms of the ‘impact of caring’, 
the lawyers were satisfied with the way in which Australia rebalances disadvantages and also 
meets the future needs of parties. Only one lawyer indicated that they were dissatisfied 
overall with the approach and another lawyer indicated that they were dissatisfied with the 
approach where there were no children in the relationship.  However, there was indication 
that future disadvantages that were relationship generated were hard to quantify: 
…it’s hard to value that past present and future disadvantage. I think they try to do it 
but not always successfully... (AusLaw6) 
 
Moreover, the lawyers were content with the operation of ‘maintenance’ within their system. 
In fact, in comparison to the other jurisdictions, no-one voiced any concerns in relation to the 
maintenance provisions. Generally, the consensus was that clean break was the preferable 
option at the end of the relationship. Those who preferred clean break raised similar themes 
to those in earlier chapters: economic ties should not be ongoing as maintenance prolongs 
conflict whereas clean break allows people to move on with their lives. However, most of the 
respondents emphasised that there should only be a clean break if the award would not be 
unfair. A clean break was identified as being potentially unfair where there were children or 
health reasons for not being financially independent. Three deemed that clean break was only 
suitable for larger asset pools: 
[In] a smaller pool, a very small pool, I would be content with the breadwinning party 
having an ongoing obligation to support the person. Not forever, but for a period of 
time, you know spousal maintenance. In a big pool where they can both get enough 
money to look after themselves, then I am content with financial independence if you 
like. (AusLaw7)  
 
For those who promoted the use of maintenance it was generally in relation to where there 
was a nexus between the dependency and relationship roles. Using the idea of a social 
contract, nearly all the lawyers felt that both parties are responsible for any such dependency: 
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Financial dependence is at the consent of both parties. Revoking an agreement is 
inappropriate and unconscionable. (AusLaw1) 
Yet, where maintenance was desirable, most of the lawyers argued that it should be 
rehabilitative and therefore it should be used to make parties self-sufficient by retraining: 
...you may need some further ongoing spousal maintenance either to retrain or for an 
ongoing period. (AusLaw8) 
 
Overall, it seems that the Australian lawyers were happy with the way that Fineman’s care-
dyad was treated on relationship breakdown in the married context. This child-centric 
approach was further demonstrated when the lawyers were asked to rank the list of principles 
in order of importance within their jurisdiction as displayed in Table 5.4 below.  
Table 5.4 Order of principles ranked by importance 
Ranking by Average Score Principle Number of Times the 
Principle was Omitted from 
the List 
1 Child's Welfare 4 
2 Needs 2 
3 Economic Burden of Caring 0 
4 Fairness 1 
5 Reward for Past Contributions 0 
6 Compensation 3 
7 Equal Sharing 6 
8 Retention of Property 
Interests 
6 
9 Clean Break 2 
 
Rather than ranking ‘reward for past contributions’ or ‘clean break’ as the most important 
principles (as was expected after the doctrinal analysis), the lawyers instead listed the needs-
focused principles as most important. Most notably, clean break was listed as the least 
important principle of all which was surprising given that there appeared to be a strong 
preference towards clean break within the doctrinal analysis. It seems that in practice, both 
needs and maintenance play a greater role than the doctrinal analysis had indicated. This gap 
between the empirical and doctrinal results may reflect the disparity between cases that reach 
the higher courts, and the average day to day cases that these lawyers encounter. The former 
often involve disputes over large asset pools and thus may require a greater evaluation of the 
contributions made by the parties. 
While the themes relating to the ‘impact of caring’ were generally positive, the lawyers 
demonstrated that there were some difficulties in recognising any ‘additional contributions’ 
made by the primary care-giver. This theme related to dual earner relationship models where 
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one party was also carrying out the majority of the homemaking/care-giving contributions. 
Some lawyers believed that domestic contributions should not be valued on the grounds of 
‘practicality’ and ‘choice’; the couple should work out their own domestic arrangements.  
Yet, those respondents who were in favour of recognising this additional contribution felt that 
it was only acceptable where both parties were on more or less the same financial income. 
However, if one party was on a lower income and carried out the domestic contributions, the 
lawyers considered the additional contribution to ‘make up' for the income disparity: 
 …it would therefore take into account the…commitment necessary to earn an income. 
You might have one person who’s on a very high income, one on a moderate income 
but therefore more available to do homemaker tasks so… (AusLaw8) 
In fact, some lawyers felt that a spouse could not be earning an income and also conducting 
the majority of domestic contributions. Consequently, the respondents assumed that the 
spouse with the dual burden would either have sacrificed their career or only be making 
minimal homemaking contributions: 
 ...it’s unlikely that someone who works fulltime could be making that, um, degree of 
contribution in the homemaker role to have really any significance in the overall 
decision. (AusLaw2) 
...it will enhance the award to the one who’s been sacrificial in terms of homemaker 
contributions. (AusLaw10) 
There appeared to be disbelief that only one party would have a dual burden of homemaking 
and breadwinning: 
 ...because there’s a certain amount of disbelief, um, or credit concerns where you’ve 
got someone working who is saying, you know, they’re a super homemaker. (AusLaw2) 
Therefore, the lawyers would only want to recognise an additional burden where both parties 
are on equal incomes. If there is a disparity of incomes, then the additional contribution makes 
up for this. However, there were concerns that a pay gap exists between men and women 
places a glass-ceiling on the primary care-giver’s potential awards: 
…and yeah, generally it is not an equal financial contribution because of Australia’s pay 
situation we don’t have equal pay for equal work. So there will generally be a 
disparity… (AusLaw15)  
This was reflected by half of the respondents who felt that the current valuation was 
unsatisfactory. Thus overall, the lawyers tended to be satisfied, but it was clear that for some 
(and much more prominently than Scotland and New Zealand) not enough recognition was 
being given on relationship breakdown where a dual role had been carried out. 
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5.5.3 Responses in the Cohabitation Context  
Table 5.5: Attitudes towards cohabitation and marriage in Australia 
 
Overall, the lawyers tended to believe, as Table 5.5 shows, that little difference existed 
between registered and unregistered relationships. This table has a similar distribution as in 
New Zealand. Seven lawyers felt that where there were no children, married couples organise 
their affairs differently from cohabiting couples and therefore there is some perception of a 
difference between the two relationships. This does not mean that they think marriage is more 
financially intertwined than cohabitation or that married couples divide their roles more 
traditionally. In fact, 100% of respondents answered yes to the question of whether the same 
principles on relationship breakdown should apply uniformly between married couples, 
cohabiting couples and same-sex couples. More specifically, 100% of respondents stated that 
there was no difference in how homemaker contributions were valued in these two 
relationship styles and also no difference between how they should be valued next to one 
another. 
Table 5.6 below sets out the major themes that emerged from the data in this section.  The 
overwhelming majority of interviewees believed that cohabiting couples and married couples 
were functionally similar and therefore both relationships should be treated in the same 
manner: 
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I just don’t think it matters whether the couples are married or not. Homemaking 
contributions are homemaking contributions and whether you’ve got a ring on your 
finger or a piece of paper um ought not colour the nature of contributions. (AusLaw7) 
 
Table 5.6 Australian themes in the cohabiting context 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Some uncertainty N/A 
Difference 
Nature of the relationship 
Short relationships 
Similar 
Function 
In practice 
Both should be regulated by Family Law 
 
A small minority thought that cohabiting couples and married couples should be treated 
differently as they differed in their very nature and therefore organised their relationships 
differently. One lawyer stated that there should be a difference, but could not clarify why:  
...I’m a little old fashioned in my beliefs in that there should be some benefit to being 
married...That’s the only expansion I could make (laughs). There has to be some benefit 
going through the marriage business (laughs). (AusLaw6) 
 
For another respondent, there was only a difference between short cohabiting and marital 
relationships. This suggested that potentially a timeframe should be in place particularly where 
the potential award is so great: 
...marriage is only financially intertwined than de facto in certain circumstances...I 
certainly think that in a marriage people mix and intertwine financially more than just 
in shorter de facto relationships but in longer de facto relationships I think they become 
more like a marriage... (AusLaw4) 
 
In practice, the lawyers were unsure how the regime would work as the cohabitation 
legislation was so new.  However, the general consensus is that it will be the same as marriage: 
.. .as the new legislation only came in last year it’s, um, not very well tested and there 
aren’t many precedents...[and] at the moment it’s kind of piggy backing on what would 
apply for married couples. (AusLaw3) 
 
Yet, there was some concern that, in reality, the courts would treat these relationships 
differently. The main assertion from the respondents was that married couples would be 
afforded greater protection than cohabiting couples. This preferential treatment was 
attributed to the embryonic stage of the legislation. 
 
Despite the uncertainty that surrounded the responses in the cohabitation context, the 
qualitative analysis clearly demonstrated that the lawyers viewed the new provisions as a vast 
improvement on the old ones.  The lawyers criticised the fact that, previously, cohabiting 
couples were dealt with under Property Law. Although the previous regime in Queensland had 
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been based on the federal scheme for married couples, dealing with these disputes in the 
State courts was felt to be completely inappropriate as these courts ‘do not do Family Law’. 
AusLaw7 in fact indicated that lawyers actually avoided cohabiting cases under the old law: 
...we would avoid like the plague taking a de facto matter be it same- or different-sex 
to the state court cos they don’t do Family Law. They don’t get it... (AusLaw7) 
 
This therefore questions Deech’s argument that cohabitants should be kept from the mire of 
Family Law; keeping disputes out of the family courts was extensively criticised by the 
respondents.  
5.5.4 Same-Sex Relationships 
Table 5.7: Attitudes towards same-sex relationships in Australia 
 
As there is no federal registered relationship status that same-sex couples may enter into in 
Australia, the comparisons made in the interviews were solely relating to the cohabitation 
context. Nevertheless, as Table 5.7 demonstrates, most respondents believed that same-sex 
relationships divided their relationships in a similar manner to different-sex relationships and 
11 felt that domestic and financial contributions were of equal value on relationship 
breakdown. The rest of the distributions in the interview were exactly the same for same-sex 
and different-sex cohabitating relationships. Eleven respondents thought that same-sex 
relationships are and 13 thought that they should be treated the same as different-sex 
relationships. 
In the cohabitation context, the respondents were uncertain over how the legislation was 
going to be applied. Furthermore, the lawyers also indicated that they had not had a lot of 
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experience with same-sex relationships. However, the qualitative themes outlined in Table 5.8 
supported the quantitative figures. 
Table 5.8 Australian themes in the same-sex context 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Uncertainty 
Lack of experience 
Presumed similarity 
Children 
Potential bias 
 
Most lawyers909 specifically stated that there should be no difference between same-sex and 
different-sex couples: 
...the aim of the legislation is to ensure that there’s no discrimination between de facto 
couples and married couples…I think that’s...it’s a very good aim to have. (AusLaw8)  
 
Despite the presumption that same-sex and different-sex couples should be treated similarly, 
there were some concerns that in practice there would be a difference. Mainly, this related to 
the fact that same-sex couples are less likely to have children. Furthermore, one lawyer 
thought that same-sex couples tended to be more financially dependent at the end of a 
relationship: 
Um, same-sex couples it does tend to be a bit different, and I don’t really know why. It 
seems to be this ongoing lingering you know almost financial dependence that goes on. 
I don’t really know why. (AusLaw13) 
 
For others, there was the fear that there could be potential bias where same-sex couples 
would be treated differently based on gendered assumptions about roles: 
…It’s never specifically said, but...I think there is a bit of a divide between the female 
who works and the female who stays at home, the female who works is ‘oh, you’re not 
caring for your child’. Whereas in the gay couples, the one who stays at home ‘oh, 
you’re a bit of a namby-pamby, not out being the breadwinner that’s what blokes 
should be doing. So you’ll understand at the beginning when I say my portion before 
we started why we would avoid like the plague taking same-sex stuff to the courts.’ 
(AusLaw7) 
 
Thus, out of all the jurisdictions, Australia was most concerned with bias. 
 
                                                          
909 AusLaw2,4,7,8,9,11,12,13,14,15 
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5.5.5 The Vignettes 
5.5.5.1 Scenario A910 
The lawyers clearly thought that the outcome in England and Wales (Table 5.9 below) was too 
protective of the breadwinner. Similarly to New Zealand, seven lawyers911 were shocked by the 
way in which Miss Jones would be treated on relationship breakdown: 
 Holy hell. Jeez, that’s a bit tough in England. Christ. (Laughs). (AusLaw13) 
Table 5.9: Attitudes towards England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario A 
 
Consequently, when the lawyers were asked how Australia’s approach would alter in 
comparison to England and Wales, 100% indicated that the outcome in Australia would be 
‘much more generous’.  In fact 11 of the lawyers912 stated that not only would Miss Jones get 
50% of the relationship property, but also that she would receive an additional sum to 
compensate her lack of earning capability and also would have her needs met through 
maintenance. The respondents emphasised that after 20 years, the relationship's length 
outweighs any initial financial contributions.913 Eight lawyers felt that this was about right 
although three felt that the approach was a little too generous due to Mr Smith’s initial 
financial contribution, and two thought that it was not generous enough as they wanted a 
greater recognition of Miss Jones’ needs. 
                                                          
910 See Appendix A This scenario is based on Burns v Burns (1984) Ch. 317  
911 AusLaw1,4,5,10,12,13,15 
912 AusLaw1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,12,13,15 
913 AusLaw1,2,5,10,13 
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5.5.5.1.1 Scenario A – The Variables 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law would alter its response for the four different 
variables.914 Nine indicated that the award would be a little less generous without children, 
stating that the quality of contributions would drop without children.915 In fact two lawyers916 
stated that the crucial question would be why she was not working: 
...the courts would be looking for a reason why she wasn’t working; it would be 
unusual for a person with no children to be not working at all… (AusLaw5)  
Table 5.10: How Scenario A’s outcome in Australia would vary for each variable 
 
 
Where Miss Jones did continue working, seven felt her award would be less generous on 
account of reduced needs.917 Again, for three,918 there was a level of disbelief that she could be 
carrying out the same contributions and earning: 
...presuming that she’s done the actual work…if she’s done that as well as working, 
she’s unlikely to get that as any recognition of a contribution. (AusLaw6) 
Thus, it seems that even in small asset cases where there are no children there is some level of 
evaluation of the contributions that the parties have made to the relationship, although, for 
three lawyers, the fact that the relationship was 20 years long meant that whether she had 
                                                          
914 Listed in section 3.5.5.2 
915 AusLaw1,2,4,5,7 
916 AusLaw5,6 
917 AusLaw1,13 
918 AusLaw6,8,9 
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worked or not was irrelevant. However, as both Tables 5.11 and 5.12 demonstrate, overall the 
lawyers were happy with the approach, although there was some room for manoeuvre for a 
more generous award where Miss Jones had stayed in continuous employment. 
Table 5.11: Attitudes towards  Australia’s approach towards each of Scenario A’s variables 
 
Table 5.12: How the lawyers would alter Australia's approach to Scenario A 
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5.5.5.2 Scenario B 
Table 5.13: Attitudes to England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario B 
 
Generally, the respondents thought that the approach in England and Wales was too generous 
to Mrs Higgins (as demonstrated in Table 5.13), although four thought it was about right. Nine 
lawyers indicated they would make it less generous with five making it much less generous: 
most answers indicated that she would get between five and ten per cent of the net pool.919 
Nine lawyers thought Australia’s approach here was about right. 
Table 5.14: How Scenario B’s outcome in Australia would vary 
 
                                                          
919 AusLaw2,4,5,6,8,12 
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5.5.5.2.1 Scenario B – The Variables 
Table 5.15: How Scenario B’s outcome in Australia would vary for each variable 
 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law would alter its response for four different 
variables. As Table 5.15 shows,  where there are children the award would be a little more 
generous. However, if Mrs Higgins had remained in continuous employment or even if the 
relationship had been longer, the lawyers tended to think that the approach would be less 
generous.   
Table 5.16: How the lawyers would alter Australia’s approach to Scenario B 
 
Most notably, as shown in Table 5.16, 12 lawyers thought that the award should be much 
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more generous in long-term marriages. This perhaps reflects the fact that particularly in big 
asset cases the courts evaluate contributions without a presumption of equality between 
homemaker and breadwinner. For same-sex couples it was clear that three felt it was not quite 
right, and that they would make it a bit more generous. 
5.6 Australia’s System of Financial Provision: A 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored Australia’s framework of financial provision which embodies a mixture 
of both Fineman’s and Deech’s approaches. Australia has a discretionary approach which 
prioritises ‘individualised justice’ and primarily evaluates contributions made in relationships. 
However, the discretionary approach, in the absence of a core guiding principle, has produced 
a complex system. There are two conflicting methods of valuing contributions and it is unclear 
how these interact with each other or when either should apply. Furthermore, there are clear 
procedural problems relating to the high level of discretion within Australia: namely 
inconsistency and uncertainty. This has led to the criticism that in fact it was difficult to advise 
clients and there was an indication that it may also lead to a greater level of litigation. As a 
result, the system may place homemakers at a further disadvantage with the cost of 
unnecessary litigation causing parties to settle. Yet, these out-of-court settlements, in the 
absence of a rule-based system, may accentuate inequalities in bargaining power as a result of 
financial inequalities between spouses. This presents real concern for Fineman’s care-dyad 
where the primary care-giver is often at a financial disadvantage in comparison to the other 
spouse.  
Both the doctrinal and feminist analysis demonstrated that in the absence of a presumption of 
equality between the homemaker and breadwinner contributions, the Australian system itself 
seems to give weight to financial contributions. This serves to disadvantage the primary carer. 
Even where the partnership theme has developed, the courts still emphasise the importance 
of establishing a nexus between domestic contributions and the relationship. This is an 
arduous task for the homemaker. Nevertheless, the requirement of ‘nexus’ demonstrates that 
homemaking is of secondary importance in comparison with breadwinning. Moreover, 
Australia appears to have a retrospective focus which examines past contributions and, 
consequently, needs and relationship-generated disadvantage appear to be secondary 
considerations. This, combined with the limited scope of maintenance, affords little protection 
for Fineman’s care-dyad especially in small asset cases. The actual (and unclear) method of 
valuing domestic contributions therefore appears to be an undesirable approach to property 
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settlement in either relationship context. Yet, if these unsatisfactory cases are usually the ones 
with big assets, would an approach that has a narrower conception of relationship property 
avoid the complex problems that evaluation raises? 
There appears to be a noticeable gap between the doctrinal and empirical analysis. The 
empirical results demonstrated that in practice, there was a presumption of equality between 
homemaking and breadwinning contributions. Consequently, it seems that ‘evaluating 
contributions’ in principle is not as dominating as the doctrinal analysis first suggested. 
Instead, the approach towards property settlement in practice was welfare based, with a 
strong emphasis on needs and redressing the impact of caring. Similarly, the emphasis on 
clean break that was apparent in the doctrinal phase was seemingly absent from the empirical 
data. The lawyers were extremely satisfied with the way in which the Australian system 
operated, although there were calls for a greater level of certainty to limit the procedural 
difficulties. Yet, why is there such a gap? Arguably, it could be down to the type of cases that 
end up within the court system: those with big assets and those who are in dispute over the 
source of those assets. In these cases, the narrow approach towards evaluation in big asset 
cases seems to be in place because of the wide definition of relationship property. The day-to-
day cases that the interviewees deal with are most likely small asset pool cases and therefore 
may not require such an extensive consideration of the contributions that have been made in 
the relationship. The courts may therefore avoid the arduous task of valuing contributions 
when it is unlikely to make a great deal of difference to the awards. This supports Dewar’s 
contention over the normal chaos of Family Law where the lawyers themselves make sense of 
a seemingly chaotic system.920  
With regard to other relationship forms, the qualitative analysis revealed that the respondents 
believed that these relationships should be treated the same as married couples (although 
with a limitation period for cohabiting couples).  However, there was a level of uncertainty 
over the application of the scheme which prevented detailed substantive analysis of the 
system in operation. Nevertheless, the respondents emphasised that Property Law was not the 
appropriate forum for awarding financial provision at the end of a cohabiting relationship. 
Therefore, it seems that the respondents from Australia rejected Deech’s contention that 
cohabitants should be ‘protected’ from Family Law. Instead there was overwhelming support 
for Fineman’s position that relationships should be treated according to function and based on 
discretionary Family Law remedies.   
                                                          
920 J Dewar, ‘The Normal Chaos of Family Law’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 467, 473 - 474 
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CHAPTER 6: FINEMAN’S POSITION IN PRACTICE - 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at England and Wales, a system which most closely resembles Fineman’s 
end of the spectrum out of all the jurisdictions examined in this thesis. England and Wales 
exemplifies Fineman’s principles of discretion, protection and substantive equality and places 
the care-dyad central to financial awards as needs is at the heart of this system. Consequently, 
this means that the discretion used in England and Wales is forward looking and it considers 
the future economic positions of former spouses. Therefore, this system has a wide scope to 
consider the long-term implications of care-giving. This is in direct contrast with Australia’s 
system which has a retrospective discretionary approach that looks back at past contributions 
made in a relationship. Subsequently, England and Wales potentially offers greater relief for 
the care-dyad in comparison with the level of protection that Australia offered in practice. Yet, 
while England and Wales may offer improved protection towards Fineman’s care-dyad, this 
jurisdiction has been at the receiving end of Deech’s critique, accused of entrenching gendered 
stereotypes, rewarding women with maintenance for remaining in the private sphere and 
consequently employing a system that traditionally has done little to promote financial 
autonomy.921  
However, the decision in Radmacher v Granatino922 has heralded a move towards greater 
recognition of autonomy by radically altering the position of pre-nuptial agreements as the 
courts now no longer consider them to be contrary to public policy.923 Yet, there is uncertainty 
over the enforceability of these agreements as there is wide scope for these courts to dismiss 
them if both needs and compensation render the agreement unfair.924 Furthermore, it seems 
that this greater acceptance will apply to those contracts post-Radmacher.925 Thus, those 
agreements entered into before this case are unlikely to meet the measure of fairness and 
therefore the parties will be subject to a system which has little regard for autonomy. As a 
result, this system appears to be even more opposed to Deech’s stance than Australia. Yet, 
since Australia’s retrospective focus failed to satisfy either of the feminist viewpoints, the 
question posed in this chapter is whether this alternative direction of discretion offers a better 
                                                          
921 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1141 - 1143 
922 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 
923 See F v F [1995] 2 FLR 45 where Thorpe J at [66] declared pre-nuptial agreements to be of ‘very limited significance’.  
924 See section 6.3.5 
925 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements (Law Com CP No 198, 2011) 
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way of balancing Deech’s and Fineman’s divergent positions. Additionally, this system of 
financial provision on divorce, unlike the Australian approach, has been extended to same-sex 
couples who can enter a civil partnership affording them almost identical rights to married 
couples.926  
Paradoxically (considering that out of all the jurisdictions financial autonomy is given the least 
weight in England and Wales), in the cohabitation context the reverse is true. Instead, 
cohabitants have no specific Family Law remedy and therefore cohabiting parties must (in the 
absence of legal title) rely on Trust Law to ascertain an interest in the property. However, it is 
possible under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 for cohabitants to apply for child 
maintenance, although awards under this provision are expressly child-focused and thus will 
not provide financial support for the care-giver where the children have left home or for the 
economic consequences of assuming the care-giving role.927 Consequently, financial provision 
for cohabiting couples post-separation from Fineman’s position is completely inconsistent with 
her belief that the law should protect the care-dyad regardless of relationship status. Yet for 
Deech this is more than adequate. This approach respects the couple’s choice not to marry and 
provides them with ‘a corner of freedom where couples may escape Family Law with all its 
difficulties.’928 
Therefore, the legal framework in England and Wales demonstrates how the two extremes on 
the feminist spectrum would work in practice, where the marriage context is closest to 
Fineman’s position and the cohabitation context is closest to Deech’s position. Furthermore, 
this system reveals how appropriate it is to treat married and cohabiting couples in completely 
different manners. To examine the success of both approaches, this chapter uses Deech’s and 
Fineman’s stances929 to critique England and Wales’ law of financial provision on relationship 
breakdown in the married/civil partner and cohabiting context. This chapter now considers the 
gender implications by further exploring the legal practitioners’ opinions of how the system 
treats homemaking contributions in practice and also it draws comparisons with the empirical 
results from the former jurisdictional chapters.  
 
                                                          
926 Civil Partnership Act 2004 
927 Under Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989, the court can consider circumstances such as the financial 
resources, the financial needs, obligations and resources of both the primary care-giver, the financial needs and resources of the 
child, any physical and mental disability of the child, the manner in which the child was being, or is expected to be, educated or 
trained. However, the awards made are to be for the benefit of the child, rather than for the primary care-giver (MT v OT [2007] 
EWHC 838 (Fam).) 
928 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 43 
929 Appendix I and Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.4 
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6.2 Financial Provision on Divorce and Dissolution: 
Married Couples and Civil Partners 
 
Financial provision on divorce, or ancillary relief, in England and Wales is governed by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (hereafter MCA). Since the MCA’s amendments in 1984,930 the 
courts’ first consideration is for the welfare of the children under 18 although this is not a 
paramount consideration.931 Furthermore, the courts have a duty to consider the 
appropriateness of a clean break in light of what the court believes to be ‘just and 
reasonable’.932 The courts therefore are unlikely to grant a clean break order if it departs from 
the overall requirement of fairness.933 This differs from the other jurisdictions which put a far 
greater emphasis on clean break and thus have a high bar in place for maintenance to be 
considered.934 Consequently, this system offers greater provision for Fineman’s care-dyad in 
small asset cases. 
Part II MCA outlines the orders that are available to the court and s25935 gives the courts wide 
discretion when making awards, with a list of factors under s25(2) which are similar to the 
factors considered in Australia.936 Yet, just as Australia lacks an overriding principle within its 
legislation, the s25(2) factors are to be used without any particular order; although here, the 
children are the courts’ first consideration. This may account for England and Wales’ needs-
based approach which is forward-looking on the impact of contributions in comparison to 
Australia’s retrospective approach to the parties’ past contributions.937 
Before 2000, needs938 were the only measure for awards. This placed a glass-ceiling on 
potential decisions (particularly for women in big money cases) which tended to be no more 
than a third of the assets.939 However, the landmark case of White940 dramatically changed 
this, introducing the concept of fairness as the new rationale of interpreting and applying the 
s25 provisions and the yardstick of equality. The decision in White was an attempt to remove 
                                                          
930 Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 
931 Section 25(1) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
932 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25A(1); and Civil Partnership Act 2004 schedule 5, part 5, para 23(2). 
933 See for example S v S [2008] EWHC 519 (Fam) [27] (Sir Mark Potter). The concept of the overall requirement of fairness is 
developed later at section 6.2.1 
934 This shall be discussed below. 
935 Appendix S 
936 s79(4) and s75(2) FLA (Cth) 1975 Australia considerations demonstrated in Chapter 5 
937 under ss79(4)(a) – (c) of Australia’s FLA (Cth) 1976 
938 Needs was previously called ‘reasonable requirement.’ This could be a very generous consideration of needs. See, for example 
Duxbury v Duxbury [1987] 1 FLR 7 
939 Never more than £12 and 15 million of See chapter 1 for further discussion 
940 White  v White [2000] UKHL 54 at [24], [2001] 1 AC 596 
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the gendered discrimination that had been so prevalent in the prior approach. Lord Nicholls 
identified that there was now: 
…no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their respective 
roles...whatever the division of labour chosen by the husband and wife, or forced upon 
them by circumstances, fairness requires that this should not prejudice or advantage 
either party.941 [605] (Lord Nicholls) 
 
He went on to say that when assets went beyond needs, there was no reason to presume that 
the surplus belonged to the husband and that the judge has discretion to ‘check his tentative 
views against the yardstick of equality of division and depart from equality only if...there was 
good reason for doing so.’942 Subsequent cases affirmed this yardstick and Charman v 
Charman943 confirmed that the principle of fairness is to be used as a starting point. 
Miller;McFarlane944 expanded that fairness comprises of three factors: needs, compensation 
and (equal) sharing which this chapter examines below. 
Schedule 5 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 sets out a framework for financial provision on the 
dissolution of civil partnerships which is to correspond to those provisions in the MCA 1973; 
s21(2) of the schedule mirrors s25 of the MCA setting out the factors which must be taken into 
account when making a financial order on dissolution. Lawrence v Gallagher945 has since 
confirmed that the approach in White and Miller;McFarlane will be followed in this context 
and thus, it seems that the same assumptions in the matrimonial context will be extended to 
Civil Partnerships.  
6.2.1 Fairness and Equal Sharing 
This equal sharing principle has arguably introduced a quasi-community-of-property scheme946 
similar to the approaches in New Zealand and Scotland. Both the breadwinner and homemaker 
are treated without discrimination and an approach which embraces equal division of 
matrimonial property suggests that the courts are moving towards a concept of partnership,947 
where the parties are entitled to an equal division of assets. However, Charman948 held that 
equal sharing is the informal starting point unless there is good reason to depart from this, 
                                                          
941 White  v White [2000] UKHL 54 at [24], [2001] 1 AC 596 [605] (Lord Nicholls)  
942 White  v White [2000] UKHL 54 at [24], [2001] 1 AC 596 [605] (Lord Nicholls)  
943 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 
944 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 
945 Lawrence v Gallagher  [2012] EWCA Civ 394 
946 ; A Barlow, 
‘Community of Property- the Logical Response to Miller and McFarlane?’ (2007) 39 Bracton Law Journal 19, 22 - 23 
947 L Glennon, ‘Obligations between Adult Partners: Moving from Form to Function?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family 22, 31 - 32 
948 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 
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such as needs.949 Therefore, the aim of the courts is to ‘give each party an equal start on the 
road to independent living’950 by equally sharing the matrimonial assets. This is regardless of 
the marriage’s duration951 although the duration would likely affect the size of the asset pool 
to be divided. Thus, this principle of equality is not as strictly adhered to as it is in Scotland and 
New Zealand, and Lord Nicholls in Miller;McFarlane emphasised that the equal sharing 
principle was an aid rather than a rule. Consequently, the concept of partnership seems to 
reflect Fineman’s position that provision in the Family Law context should be based on 
achieving ‘equality of resources’ rather than Deech’s notion that partnership should reflect 
formal equality and therefore be gender-neutral. 
Yet whereas the previous chapters have seen that equal division as a starting point can ignore 
the care-dyad and the economic consequences of care-giving, the discretionary consideration 
of needs serves to avoid this, and Lambert v Lambert952 determined that only once these are 
met will the rest of the matrimonial property be divided equally. Therefore it seems that the 
courts acknowledge that an unequal and gendered division of roles exists, which leads to 
financial vulnerability on relationship breakdown. However, for Eekelaar this implicitly 
reinforces a social bargain; that ‘the wife should perform domestic functions, and in return she 
should receive protection and support from her husband’953 and, as Deech herself argues, it 
therefore assumes and even promotes954 the role division of male breadwinner and female 
homemaker. This in turn discourages women from pursuing financial autonomy as it 
encourages wives to become dependent on their husbands.955 Yet, the extent of Deech’s fears 
cannot be fully examined without considering what constitutes matrimonial property subject 
to equal division. 
6.2.1.1 Matrimonial Property 
The very definition of non-marital and marital property is itself unclear, and in Miller956 Lord 
Nicholls and Baroness Hale offered conflicting definitions. Lord Nicholls’ definition was similar 
to the definition within Scotland; matrimonial assets consisted of the matrimonial home and 
everything acquired during the marriage (excluding gifts, inheritances and pre-marriage 
assets). Baroness Hale offered a stricter category for matrimonial assets that was similar to 
New Zealand’s approach. Hale’s definition looked at ‘family assets’ which requires a particular 
                                                          
949 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 [80] (Sir Mark Potter) 
950 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 [144] (Lady Hale) 
951 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 [16] – [17] (Lord Nicholls) 
952 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 [65] (Sir Mark Potter) 
953J Eekelaar, ‘Uncovering Social Obligations: Family Law and the Responsible System’ in M MacLean (eds), Making Law for 
Families (Hart 2000) 16 
954 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1141 - 1142 
955 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1142 
956 Miller v Miller [2006] 2 FCR 213 
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nexus between the family and the assets. Therefore, property acquired through the sole 
efforts of one party even throughout the relationship would be excluded. Charman957 
preferred this latter, narrower approach, considering it to be more pragmatic and asserted 
that ‘unilateral’ assets (essentially non-matrimonial property) would not be subject to the 
sharing principle. Consequently, if the homemaker cannot prove a nexus between her 
contributions and the asset, then it will not be equally shared. Yet, as the analysis from 
previous jurisdictions has shown,958 requiring a nexus between the homemaker’s contributions 
and the assets seems to result in awards that are weighted heavily against the homemaking 
role. It is incredibly difficult to show that there is a link between the homemaking 
contributions and the property which causes difficulties in scenarios where a party has 
assumed the care-giving role or has had some degree of financial independence in order that 
the other party can progress in their career.959  As Herring points out, this potentially 
discriminates between homemakers who can and cannot afford time to help their husbands’ 
business960 and it appears to limit the degree by which domestic and financial contributions 
are considered to be equal. Subsequently, Lord Nicholls’ approach appears to be more fitting 
with Fineman’s belief that the aim of Family Law should be to achieve an ‘equality of 
resources’ at the end of a relationship. 
Furthermore, there is uncertainty over how rigid the boundary between matrimonial and non-
matrimonial property is. The court in K v L (2011) indicated that the acquisition and ‘usage’ of 
property may affect the classification of that asset.961 In K v L, (a 25-year-long relationship, 
including marriage and cohabitation, with two children) the wife had inherited shares worth 
£57.4 million. The family lived modestly off the income of those shares, but the capital itself 
remained untouched. Consequently, the courts held that the shares were non-matrimonial 
property. In his judgment, Lord Justice Wilson outlined three situations where the importance 
of the source of the assets may diminish over time: 
(a) Over time matrimonial property of such value has been acquired as to diminish the 
significance of the initial contribution by one spouse of non-matrimonial property.  
(b) Over time the non-matrimonial property initially contributed has been mixed with 
matrimonial property in circumstances in which the contributor may be said to have 
accepted that it should be treated as matrimonial property or in which, at any rate, the 
task of identifying its current value is too difficult.  
(c) The contributor of non-matrimonial property has chosen to invest it in the purchase of 
a matrimonial home which, although vested in his or her sole name, has – as in most 
                                                          
957 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 case facts discussed below 
958 See New Zealand at sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, see Scotland at section 4.3.2 and also see Australia at section 5.3.2.1.(ii) and 5.4.1 
959 J Miles, ‘Charman v Charman (No. 4): Making Sense Of Needs, Compensation And Equal Sharing After Miller/McFarlane’ (2008) 
20(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly  378, 391 
960 J Herring, Family Law (4th edn, Pearson Education 2010) 241 
961 K v L (Non-Matrimonial Property: Special Contribution) [2011] EWCA Civ 550, [2011] 2 FLR 980 
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cases one would expect – come over time to be treated by the parties as a central item 
of matrimonial property.962 
 
These appear to be exceptions which are similar to the provision in Scotland which excludes 
property from equal sharing according to its ‘usage’.963 Furthermore, it seems that the 
classification of non-marital property alters as the relationship lengthens964 (in a similar 
manner to the erosion principle in Australia).965 This is not a rigid rule and does not necessarily 
mean that non-marital property will be reclassified as marital property after a lengthy 
marriage.966 Consequently, it seems that the categories of property are not necessarily fixed 
although it is not possible to predict when these boundaries may move.  This seems to enable 
a broader definition of non-matrimonial property which allows more opportunity for the 
courts to achieve ‘equality of resources’ between the spouses. From Deech’s standpoint, the 
lack of clarity over this definition and the absence of protective functions (especially pre-
Radmacher) that are present in New Zealand and Scotland (for example the automatic 
exclusion of business assets or the source of funds argument, presents a lack of protection 
over the financial gains of a party) may lead to overly generous awards which promote 
financial dependency by encouraging women to rest on their husband’s wealth.967 While pre-
nuptial agreements can now offer some protection, the ambiguity surrounding the definitions 
of unfairness where agreements may be overturned, still means that there is little opportunity 
to safeguard one’s assets.  
While difficulties exist over the definition of non-matrimonial property, there are also 
uncertainties over how this property is to be treated by the courts. Two schools of thought 
appear to have emerged from the courts. The first, favoured by the Court of Appeal in cases 
such as Charman v Charman,968 Robson v Robson (2010)969 and AR v AR (2012)970 is a non-
formulaic, discretionary approach where the sharing principle is applied to all the assets and 
therefore all assets are also available to meet needs. Here, the courts consider all the 
circumstances of the case and the s25 MCA factors, and judge what is fair in light of these. 
However, non-matrimonial assets are to be the last of the assets used to meet needs and are a 
reason to depart from the equal sharing principle. The second approach favoured in cases such 
                                                          
962 K v L (Non-Matrimonial Property: Special Contribution) [2011] EWCA Civ 550, [2011] 2 FLR 980 [18] (Lord Wilson) 
963 See section 4.3.1 and the discussion concerning section 10(6)(d) Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
964 Baroness Hale and Lord Nicholls in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186; Charman v 
Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246. 
965 See Chapter 5 at section 5.2.2.1 
966 See for example N v N [2010] EWHC 2654 (Fam) [394] (Charles J) – after a 32 year marriage, the wife only got 32% 
967 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1141 - 1142 
968 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 
969 Robson v Robson [20120] EWCA Civ 1171 
970 AR v AR (Treatment of Inherited Wealth)  [2011] EWHC 2717, [2012] 1 FLR 
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as Jones v Jones (2011)971 and K v L972 is a two stage process, and much more formulaic. This 
approach separates matrimonial property from non-matrimonial property. Then, the equal 
sharing principle is applied to the marital property and, where this is insufficient to meet 
needs, the courts can redistribute the non-matrimonial assets.  
The differences between these approaches seem to reflect the differences between Fineman’s 
and Deech’s positions. The approach favoured in Robson973 offers greater protection for 
Fineman’s care-dyad. The broad discretion that the courts have to achieve a fair and just 
outcome with access to a larger range of assets provides a greater chance for the courts to 
achieve substantive equality and equality of resources between the spouses, post-separation. 
On the other hand, as Justice Moylan notes in AR v AR, the approach favoured in Jones974 is in 
danger of being too rigid and may ‘unduly…fetter the exercise by the court of its discretionary 
powers’.975 This approach would ‘risk re-imposing the ceiling identified as resulting in 
unfairness in White and Miller and McFarlane,’976 which inevitably would be to the detriment 
of Fineman’s care-dyad. Yet, and unsurprisingly, from Deech’s position, this latter approach 
would be most preferable as it moves closer towards consistency and predictability. 
Thus, it seems that two philosophically opposed approaches to defining and also treating non-
matrimonial property exist in England and Wales which reflect (to varying degrees) Fineman 
and Deech’s stances. While Chandler states that they are irreconcilable in their approach,977  it 
is not clear how far either approach will differ in outcome.978 However, the impact that the 
two conceptually different approaches can have on the award has been observed in the 
Australian jurisdiction.979 Consequently it seems undesirable in a discretionary system to have 
the side-by-side operation of Fineman’s and Deech’s approaches particularly where there is no 
clarity as to when or why one approach will apply rather than the other. These dual 
approaches may produce inconsistent and uncertain outcomes that may hinge on the 
individual judge who presides on the case. It is evident that greater clarity from the courts is 
                                                          
971 Jones  v Jones  [2011] EWCA Civ 41 
972 K v L (Non-Matrimonial Property: Special Contribution) [2011] EWCA Civ 550, [2011] 2 FLR 980 
973 Robson v Robson [20120] EWCA Civ 1171 
974 Jones  v Jones  [2011] EWCA Civ 41 
975 AR v AR (Treatment of Inherited Wealth)  [2011] EWHC 2717, [2012] 1 FLR [77] (Moylan J) 
976 AR v AR (Treatment of Inherited Wealth)  [2011] EWHC 2717, [2012] 1 FLR [77] (Moylan J) 
977 A Chandler, ‘The Law is Now Reasonably Clear: The Courts’ Approach to Non-Matrimonial Assets’ (2012) 42(1) Family Law 163, 
167 
978 G Douglas, ‘AR v AR (Treatment of Inherited Wealth) [2011] EWHC 2717 (Fam)’ (2012) 42(1) Family Law 15, 17 
979 See the discussion in Chapter 5 at section 5.3.2. Here a dual approach towards valuing domestic contributions exists. The 
evaluative approach reflects Deech’s position and the partnership approach reflects Fineman’s position (to varying degrees) 
229 
 
both needed and desired980 and currently the Law Commission is considering the classification 
of property in its current project ‘Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements’.981 
6.2.1.2 Special Contributions 
Special contributions, much like Australia’s special contributions doctrine,982 are contributions 
that merit a departure from equality as a result of a party’s special skill such as business 
acumen or talent. Therefore, this approach essentially evaluates contributions. Generally, the 
courts have been reluctant to use this doctrine for two reasons. Firstly, in Lambert,983 the court 
emphasised that evaluating domestic duties should be avoided due to its ‘intrusion, indignity 
and possible embarrassment,’984 thus, recognising special contributions should be limited to 
exceptional circumstances. Secondly, Baroness Hale in Miller; McFarlane985 emphasised the 
difficulty in identifying a comparative outstanding contribution by the homemaker.986  
Yet, despite the reluctance to examine contributions, the courts have applied this principle in 
certain cases where there is an ’exceptional and individual quality which deserves special 
treatment.’987 For example, in Charman988 the wife had stayed at home and raised their two 
children while the husband had built up a hugely successful career and an asset pool of £131 
million over the course of their 28-year marriage. It was held that Mr Charman’s contributions 
were special, justifying a departure from equality. The court granted Mrs Charman £48 million 
(around 36%) of the total assets. Here the courts reasoned that special contributions must 
result from a ‘genius element’ and should only vary the other spouse’s award from 50% to an 
award in the region of 33-45%, although K v L989 emphasised that this percentage boundary 
only applied to special contributions made towards matrimonial property. However, the 
definition of this ‘genius element’ seems to be worded in a way that excludes considerations of 
domestic contributions and ‘super women’. In practice cases where special contributions have 
justified a departure from equality, these have been limited to the husband’s business 
acumen990 reflecting Baroness Hale’s concerns that such an evaluation may be only applicable 
to the breadwinning spouse. Similarly in Australia, the special contributions doctrine has also 
been used in large asset cases and only to recognise the contributions of the breadwinner. 
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982  See Chapter 5, section 5.3.2.1 
983 Lambert v Lambert [2002] 3 FCR 673 
984 Lambert v Lambert [2002] 3 FCR 673 [38] 
985 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
986 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 [27] 
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Thus it seems that this doctrine is used to limit the broad conception of matrimonial property 
in both discretionary jurisdictions. Would a narrower conception of property avoid the task of 
evaluating contributions? From Deech’s position this focus on financial contributions goes 
some way to protecting an individual’s substantial assets. Yet, the limited use of this doctrine 
means that the breadwinning spouse does not have enough protection for his or her 
(substantial) financial assets. Consequently, it may therefore, from Deech’s perspective, 
encourage ‘gold-digging’ attitudes, and yet from Fineman’s perspective it ignores the societal 
value of care-giving activities. In fact, where each of the jurisdictions explored within this thesis 
have used approaches or provisions which involve valuing contributions, this has continually 
been to the homemaker’s detriment. 
6.2.2 Equal Sharing and Needs 
Nevertheless, where special contributions may appear to limit the protection of Fineman’s 
care-dyad, needs are the cornerstone of the system in England and Wales and therefore 
Fineman’s care-dyad is placed firmly at the centre of financial provision on relationship 
breakdown. This forward-looking approach sets England and Wales apart from all other 
jurisdictions explored in this thesis. Substantive rather than formal equality therefore defines 
this jurisdiction, as equal sharing can be departed from on the grounds of needs,991 rather than 
equality at the expense of needs.992  
Yet, the courts have disagreed over how needs should be defined. In Miller;McFarlane993 
Baroness Hale defined them as relationship-generated needs whereas Lord Nicholls indicated 
that needs should also include independent ones such as age or disability.994 In the majority of 
cases, this difference will be irrelevant as most separating couples only have a small pool of 
assets and therefore it will only ever be possible to meet basic housing needs and the needs of 
the children and care-giver.995 Even then, this is a marked difference from Scotland and New 
Zealand’s approach where the homemaker in a small asset case would only receive 50% of the 
matrimonial property. However, in England and Wales where assets exceed these basic needs 
the courts can use a broader definition, and therefore they will also look at other factors such 
                                                          
991 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 confirmed that it was to meet the needs then to share the rest. 
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as the age (namely the potential earning capacity),996 health, standard of living and resources 
of the parties. Within this, the courts will also consider the cost of a home, as well as:  
...what budget the [parent] reasonably requires to fund…expenditure in maintaining 
the home and its contents and in meeting other expenditure external to the home, such 
as school fees, holidays, routine travel expenses, entertainment, presents etc.997 
 
Thus the courts, where it is possible, try to have a holistic approach to needs. This strand of 
fairness, therefore, allows the court to fully recognise the impact that the homemaker role has 
on financial independence, and it permits the court to adequately protect the financially 
vulnerable which has been absent in the other jurisdictions.  
 
This approach to needs for Deech is too generous as (while she recognises some needs must 
be met) she believes that financial provision on relationship breakdown should be limited to 
where there is no state support for the spouse, and only where any financial disadvantage or 
need is attributable to the cohabitation.998 Perhaps the greatest cause for contention for 
Deech is the broad definition of a party’s ‘standard of living’ which is designed to reduce the 
disparity of living between the spouses, especially where there are children.999 This is 
calculated through the expenditure during the marriage1000 and alters according to the 
relationships’ length and (most significantly) to the size of the asset pool. For example in 
Miller1001 a short marriage of two years without children, Mrs Miller gave up her high income 
job to become a homemaker for Mr Miller who had assets of over £30 million. The courts 
found that needs and economic disadvantage arising from the marriage were actually very 
small but that Mrs Miller was used to a high standard of living and a large amount of the 
wealth had been acquired during the marriage. She was accordingly awarded £5 million of her 
husband’s total £32 million assets. Furthermore in F v F1002 the award of three houses was 
considered to be meeting needs and in Preston v Preston1003 the courts determined that, on 
account of the wife’s standard of living, the cost of housing would include ‘a home in a house 
or flat at the top end of the market, and probably a second home in the country or abroad, 
together with a very high spending power.’ This is an extremely generous interpretation of 
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needs although equally the courts can reduce the scale of the award according to the standard 
of living.1004  
While Mrs Miller received only one-sixth of her husband’s total assets, from Deech’s position 
the sum of £5 million seems overly-generous indeed for such a short relationship (particularly 
in comparison to the approaches in the other jurisdictions). This offers a huge amount of 
protection for the care-dyad in a way that is absent in the other jurisdictions (and in fact where 
there is no care-dyad such as in Miller). This presents a precarious position for the wealthy 
breadwinner particularly when there are few safeguards in place to protect big assets through 
the definition of matrimonial property and given the uncertainty of whether a pre-nuptial 
agreement will be upheld in the court post-Radmacher. However, in Radmacher1005 the courts 
emphasised that there is a difference between need and ‘real need’. By delineating between 
these two types of need, it seems that the courts may be narrowing this overly-generous 
approach (although it also suggests a wider conception to compensation as discussed below). 
Nevertheless, without the presence of safeguards for breadwinning contributions, needs 
remains a highly unsatisfactory consideration for Deech and even from Fineman’s position it 
could be argued that it goes beyond safeguarding her care-dyad. Nevertheless, this approach 
appears to be the closest out of all the jurisdictions to satisfying Fineman’s conception that this 
dyad should be protected. 
6.2.3 Equal Sharing and Compensation 
This strand of fairness, as Lord Nicholls described,  ‘…is aimed at redressing any significant 
prospective economic disparity between the parties arising from the way they conducted their 
marriage.’1006 Compensation, therefore, attempts to rectify situations where the relationship 
role has greatly advantaged one party financially at the expense of the other (for example 
becoming the homemaker to raise children while the other is then able to pursue a career). 
Thus, this strand of fairness recognises that not only may formal equality not equate to equity, 
but also that needs may not account for the full economic impact of a career sacrifice. 
Therefore, this provision is concerned with future fairness by rebalancing that economic 
disadvantage.1007 For example in McFarlane v McFarlane1008 (a 19-year marriage) both parties 
had been in equally lucrative careers and Mrs McFarlane gave hers up to look after their three 
children. On divorce, the couple had assets worth £3 million and Mr McFarlane was earning £1 
                                                          
1004 K  v L (Non-Matrimonial Property: Special Contribution)[2011] Here, on the grounds the husband was granted £5 million of the 
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1005 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 4 
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million a year. The court granted Mrs McFarlane £250,000 per annum as it recognised that if 
the assets were divided equally, the husband would quickly exceed his wife’s wealth, whereas 
she had sacrificed ‘what would very probably have been a lucrative and successful career.’1009  
However, this strand has (similarly to compensation provisions in other jurisdictions) been 
relatively unused since Miller;McFarlane and therefore it remains largely undeveloped. Where 
it has been awarded, the courts have used it to redress an economic disadvantage relating to 
the applicant’s earning ability that has arisen as a result of his or her contributions to the 
family. Rather than just limiting this conception of a relationship generated disadvantage to 
those who may have had lucrative careers (as some of the other jurisdictions have),1010 the 
courts have also recognised the economic disadvantage that may arise more generally from a 
career break that has caused the applicant to remain out of the labour market for a prolonged 
period of time. In Lauder v Lauder,1011  for example, (a marriage of 24 years with three children 
aged 14, 18 and 20 at the time of separation) the couple had originally settled in 1988, and the 
wife was now seeking to appeal a capitalised maintenance order. During that period the wife 
had been the primary care-giver for their youngest child while the husband had excelled in 
business ventures partly funded from matrimonial assets. Baron J stated that: 
…in the context of a marriage which lasted 24 years and produced three children this 
lady did her best after divorce and continued to spend many years caring for the 
younger child of the family. Despite her disability, given that she was 50 years old when 
the parties separated, the wife had a modest earning capacity. This was a direct result 
of the marriage and the parties' decision that she should be a wife and mother. This 
disadvantage requires proper compensation.1012 
Thus, the courts are able to recognise the impact that the care-giving role can have on the 
economic position of the care-giver in ‘moderate’ careers and seemingly to a greater degree 
than in comparison with the other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the courts are also 
acknowledging that often this career break arises from the decision of both parties rather than 
the sole decision of the care-giver as Deech tends to suppose.1013 This offers far greater scope 
for the use of the compensatory provision and therefore for protecting Fineman’s care-dyad.  
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Charman also indicated that compensation could relate to a loss arising from the end of the 
relationship, such as pension rights.1014  
Yet, for the most part, it seems that compensation is rarely used and is instead included in 
either a generous interpretation of needs or equal sharing This was exemplified by Sir Mark 
Potter in VB v JP1015 where he stated that compensation was not a distinct strand, but a feature 
of fairness which can be fulfilled by equal sharing (in big-money cases) or an over-generous 
interpretation of needs (where capital assets are insufficient to meet maintenance needs). 
Consequently, it seems that compensation may only make a substantial difference to the 
award in a narrow band of cases where a generous interpretation of needs will not address 
compensation1016 such as McFarlane.1017 In fact, ‘ordinary’ career prospects (particularly in big 
money cases) are likely to have been compensated by equal division.1018 Therefore, the Law 
Commission argues that ‘compensation’ has in reality made no real difference to awards.1019 
The courts’ reluctance to engage with the compensation strand of fairness may be the result of 
the ambiguity that surrounds the term. Yet this also means that compensation’s vagueness is 
not addressed by the courts, and its overlap with needs and equal sharing arguably 
complicates the role of compensation and when it is to apply. Yet, the Law Commission also 
observed1020 that compensation ‘draws attention to financial consequences that may not be 
obvious’, namely the economic impact of the homemaking role.1021  
The Law Commission also noted that the result of using ‘compensation’ to address the long-
term financial impact of homemaking contributions has resulted in a narrower interpretation 
of needs. This can be seen in Radmacher where the court provided a firmer definition for 
compensation by narrowing need to ‘real need’ and expressing compensation as the ‘long-
term disadvantage generated by the devotion of one partner to the family and the home.’1022 
This, as the Law Commission noted,1023 may help the award focus on the actual loss born by 
the homemaking spouse. It is evident that the principle of compensation alongside needs 
offers the most generous approach towards the care-dyad out of all the jurisdictions. While 
the compensation provisions in the previous jurisdictions have often been restrictively applied, 
here there is a focus on the long-term impact that care-giving can have on the economic 
position of the primary care-giver.  
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1023 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements (Law Com CP No 198, 2011)  para 2.58 
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Furthermore, the courts seem to have issues quantifying the loss itself as well as distinguishing 
it from need. While the other jurisdictions have struggled with the actual size that the 
alteration should be under the compensatory provisions,1024 in England and Wales it seems 
that the courts frequently use compensation as a basis for an award without explaining how 
they have quantified it. Instead, compensation is vaguely referred to as being used to achieve 
fairness or a generous assessment of needs. For example, in Lauder1025 Baron J felt that 
compensation should be added to the award however she ‘[did] not consider that it [was] right 
to seek to separate those two factors in delineating [her] figure.’1026 Consequently, the actual 
amount that the compensatory value can alter the award is uncertain. This reluctance to 
develop the principle of compensation again creates further uncertainty over how this 
provision applies. As a result, this makes the system more complex and uncertain, potentially 
causing lengthy litigation and negotiation which may in turn serve to disadvantage those who 
are in a financially weaker position. While there is a tendency to gloss over compensation, Sir 
Mark Potter indicated in VB v JP1027 that ‘these complexities in relation to “compensation” may 
well merit closer examination and attempts at more precise quantification for the purposes of 
a clean break at some date in the future.’1028  He continued that this principle will also require 
consideration in cases like McFarlane1029 where the economic disadvantage ‘went well beyond 
the compensation afforded by a generous interpretation of [Mrs McFarlane’s] needs.’1030  
Miles (2008) criticised ‘compensation’ in England and Wales, observing that (as Charman 
indicated1031) compensation in this context fails to consider the respondent’s position. The 
danger of this, Miles observes, is that rebalancing the financial positions between the two 
spouses may result in an award that places the applicant in a financially stronger position to 
the detriment of the respondent.1032 Instead, she feels that the focus of the courts should be 
on sharing the impact of the economic sacrifice rather than claims for future earnings and 
earning capacity losses.1033 She suggests that an ‘economic equality ceiling’ is necessary to 
prevent over-generous ancillary relief awards and footnotes that this could be modelled on the 
approach in New Zealand where the claim can only be for half the award.1034 Arguably there is 
                                                          
1024 See New Zealand at section 3.4.2.3 and Scotland and section 4.3.2 
1025 Lauder v Lauder [2007] EWHC 1227 (Fam); [2007] 2 FLR 802 
1026 Lauder v Lauder [2007] EWHC 1227 (Fam); [2007] 2 FLR 802 [79] (Baron J) 
1027 VB  v JP [2008] 2 FCR 682 
1028 VB  v JP [2008] 2 FCR 682 [59] (Sir Mark Potter) 
1029 McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 
1030 VB  v JP [2008] 2 FCR 682 [59] (Sir Mark Potter) 
1031 Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 [72]  
1032 J Miles, ‘Charman v Charman (No. 4): Making Sense of Needs, Compensation and Equal Sharing after Miller/McFarlane’ (2008) 
20(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 378, 390 
1033 J Miles, ‘Charman v Charman (No. 4): Making Sense of Needs, Compensation and Equal Sharing after Miller/McFarlane’ (2008) 
20(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 378, 391 
1034  J Miles, ‘Charman v Charman (No. 4): Making Sense of Needs, Compensation and Equal Sharing after Miller/McFarlane’ (2008) 
20(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 378, 390. Also see section 3.4.2.3 on s15 and economic disparity in New Zealand. 
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a danger that an unrestrained application of compensation could result in what Deech 
perceives to be overzealous awards that interfere with the financial autonomy of the 
breadwinner and serve to discourage women from engaging with the public sphere.  
However, for Deech, as earlier chapters have discussed,1035 compensation itself is an unrealistic 
conceptual basis as it is a free choice of the woman to remove herself from the public sphere 
(often to her own benefit).1036 Additionally, the meshing of compensation and needs may lead 
to double counting and further limits the breadwinner’s ability to safeguard their own assets 
and the high level of uncertainty here promotes Deech’s contention that ‘certainty about the 
way to split assets may be more important than total fairness.’1037 Arguably, it goes too far 
beyond protecting the care-dyad and arguably it makes it far more beneficial to be in a 
homemaker/breadwinner model as there lacks a focus on rehabilitation and on couples who 
are dual earners.  
For Fineman, the coexistence of needs and compensation seems to have avoided the limited 
approach that the other jurisdictions have had.  Consequently, the full economic impact of the 
care-giving role is protected. Given that needs and equal sharing frequently catch the majority 
of compensatory issues, the difficulties associated with compensation are left in only a small 
selection of cases. 
6.2.4 Potential Orders and Maintenance. 
In comparison to the previous jurisdictions, maintenance has a much bigger role upon 
separation in England and Wales and it is considered during the course of property settlement 
rather than requiring a separate application. The courts have a wide selection of orders that 
they can make including capital orders, property orders and income orders1038 which generally 
are made through periodical payment orders (PPO).1039 PPOs can be for an unspecified amount 
of time, stopping at a specific date, death or remarriage. This makes maintenance far more 
accessible to the claiming spouse in this jurisdiction and consequently means that such orders 
are much more commonplace. However, the courts must consider whether a clean break is 
appropriate, although they will not make such an order if it would depart from the principle of 
fairness.1040 Nevertheless, if the courts make a PPO they must consider limiting its length1041 
and thus the courts may have consideration for the extent that a homemaker role can impact 
                                                          
1035 See Chapters 3 (New Zealand) and 4 (Scotland) 
1036 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1142 
1037 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1143 
1038 Ss23 and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
1039 S23 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
1040 S25A(1) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
1041 S25(1)(a), (2) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
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on the capability to work. Generally in short childless marriages,1042 ‘big-money’ cases or dual 
earners,1043 it is likely that clean break will apply.1044 This is at the courts’ discretion and 
fairness will be the overriding measure here.  
PPOs are not only needs-based but since Miller;McFarlane, they can be used for compensation 
too. The greater consideration of PPOs presents a number of benefits for Fineman’s care-dyad 
as it means awards can be altered at a later date if there is uncertainty over the recipient’s 
financial future1045 or where there are young children.1046 Consequently, the courts can take 
full account of the financial impact that the care-dyad may have on the economic situation 
post-separation especially when that is not necessarily immediately obvious, recognising that 
rehabilitation is not always possible. Furthermore, it offers support where assets are small and 
a lump sum would not cover needs or economic disparity.1047 This, combined with an increased 
access to such provisions, means that the care-dyad is not as disadvantaged as in the other 
jurisdictions, particularly in small asset cases where often equality will not meet needs. 
Yet for Deech, this specific approach encourages women to remain dependent on their ex-
spouses, particularly considering that maintenance can be indefinite and that there is an overly 
generous interpretation of needs and compensation. She argues that without maintenance, or 
with a much narrower, rehabilitative approach, women will have to engage with the public 
sphere and find work.1048 Maintenance, therefore, should only be for where there are young 
children and where the spouse is unable to work, and even then it should be rehabilitative.1049 
Certainly, greater onus should be placed on a rehabilitative function of maintenance or at least 
a clearer difference in the threshold between short-term and ongoing maintenance similar to 
the approach in Scotland (although not as restrictive, as it was clear that this severely 
disadvantaged Fineman’s care-dyad).1050 
 
 
6.2.5 Opting-out and Marital Agreements 
                                                          
1042 Hobhouse v Hobhouse [1999] 1 FLR 961 
1043 Burgess v Burgess [1996] 2 FLR 34, [1997] 1 FLR 89 
1044 J Herring, Family Law (4th edn, Pearson Education 2010) 223 - 224 
1045 E.g. Whiting v Whiting [1988] 2 FLR 189, [1988] FCR 589 
1046 Suter v Suter-Jones [1987] 2 FLR 232, [1987] FCR 52 
1047 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 [39] 
1048 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1145 
1049 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1145 
1050 See the discussion at section 4.3.4 
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Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to consider pre-nuptial agreements,1051 believing 
that they were contrary to public policy (a complete contrast to Scotland’s position) as they 
were seen as undermining marriage, and consequently s34(1) MCA restricts parties from 
contracting out from the court’s jurisdiction.1052 However, the past 15 years have 
demonstrated a shift within the courts to give pre-nuptial agreements greater weight1053 in 
cases such as S v S1054 and M v M.1055 In K v K1056 the courts held that these agreements 
counted as conduct that would be inequitable to disregard, and in Crossley v Crossley1057 
Thorpe LJ stated that these agreements could be ‘not simply a peripheral factor but one of 
magnetic importance.’1058  
This trend towards a greater recognition of financial autonomy came to the fore in Radmacher 
v Granatino.1059 This case involved an 11-year marriage between a German heiress and a 
French investment banker on a high salary. They entered a pre-nuptial agreement where Mr 
Granatino received no legal advice or a translation (he just had the effects explained by a 
German notary) which opted out of Germany’s community-of-property regime declaring each 
party to be independent. During the marriage, Radmacher had substantial wealth transferred 
to her and was worth over £100 million while he had left his job to pursue a PhD. Lord Phillips 
argued that the reason why: 
…the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is [because] there should 
be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect to the 
decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs 
should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their 
agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true 
where the parties' agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely 
the contingencies of an uncertain future.1060 
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the public policy rule making agreements void is: 
...obsolete and should be swept away...The court should give effect to a nuptial 
agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its 
implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the 
parties to their agreement.1061  
                                                          
1051 See F v F [1995] 2 FLR 45 and also Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements (Law Com CP No 198, 2011)  para 2.56 Part 3 
1052 S34(1) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
1053 N v N (Foreign Divorce: Financial Relief) [1997] 1 FLR 900 
1054 S v S [1997] 2 FLR 100 at p. 102, M (Prenuptial Agreement) [2002] Fam Law 177 
1055 M v M (Prenuptial Agreement) [2002] Fam Law 177 
1056 K v K (Ancillary Relief: Pre-Nuptial Agreement) [2003] 1 FLR 120 
1057 Crossley v Crossley [2007] EWCA Civ 1491, [2008] 1 FLR 1467 
1058 Crossley v Crossley [2007] EWCA Civ 1491, [2008] 1 FLR 1467 [15] (Thorpe J) 
1059 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 
1060  
1061 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 [75] (  
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Still, it means that while the influence of these agreements has increased, they are not 
necessarily binding and thus needs and compensation may render the agreement unfair.1062 
Yet this, as the Law Commission (2011)1063 states, takes post- and pre-nuptial agreements as 
far forward as possible, as matrimonial agreements are at the mercy of the discretion of the 
courts in determining the fairness of the agreements. Yet, given the uncertainty of pre-nuptial 
agreements, the shape of the legal framework in England and Wales, from Deech’s position, 
does not give enough weight to the autonomy of the parties. Yet, similarly for Fineman, the 
current situation also seems inadequate and, as Baroness Hale expressed in her dissenting 
judgment in Radmacher, such agreements can be used ‘to deny the economically weaker 
spouse the provision to which she…would otherwise be entitled.’ Baroness Hale was 
concerned that the test gave a presumption in favour of upholding agreements, placing an 
‘impermissible gloss’ on s25’s wide discretion. It could be argued that the limitation will serve 
to disadvantage the care-dyad by presuming that both parties are equally autonomous when 
making such contracts. This is evident in the earlier analysis of Scotland’s approach to pre-
nuptial agreements, where there lacks any formal requirements other than ‘unfairness’.1064 As 
a result of Scotland’s approach, no safeguards exist to avoid any inequality of bargaining 
power and subsequently there is great scope for unfairness to follow from pre-nuptial 
agreements.  This seems to support Hale’s contention that the nature of the discretion and 
more formal requirement are necessary to ensure that the inequality of bargaining power as 
the result of being the economically weaker party is recognised by the courts. While the Law 
Commission is currently examining what shape the law should take,1065 it seems that formal 
requirements are necessary to ensure a balance between Fineman’s and Deech’s perspectives. 
6.2.6 Domestic Contribution on Divorce/Dissolution 
It seems that in the marriage context, England and Wales has an approach which places needs 
(broadly defined) at its heart, thus amply protecting the care-dyad and the financially 
vulnerable at the end of a relationship. The mix of sharing, needs and compensation has 
produced an approach which strives for substantive rather than formal equality, and goes 
some way to recognise the full extent that care-giving has on the financial autonomy of the 
primary care-giver. Furthermore, the substantial use of maintenance allows for greater 
protection for care-dyads in smaller-asset families. However, there is a danger (particularly in 
big money cases) that the extensive provisions which protect the care-dyad in fact do not offer 
enough safeguards for breadwinners. Consequently, this approach may, as Deech fears, 
                                                          
1062 [2010] UKSC 42 [76] to [80] (Phillips J) 
1063 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements (Law Com CP No 198, 2011)  Para 1.11 
1064 See Chapter 4 Scotland at section 4.3.1 
1065 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements (Law Com CP No 198, 2011)  
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encourage women to assume the homemaking role and thus reinforce gendered stereotypes. 
This potentially may be heightened because the generous interpretation of needs includes a 
generous definition of the standard of living which is relative to wealth. Additionally, 
maintenance does not have an overtly rehabilitative function and therefore may serve to 
perpetuate this gendered dependency. While this is appropriate in longer marriages where 
there are children, perhaps clearer differentiation is needed between those and shorter 
marriages without children. There are also some elements within this jurisdiction that require 
greater clarity. The definition and subsequent treatment of matrimonial property seems overly 
complex, and the courts seem to be developing incompatible conceptual approaches. 
Similarly, the role of compensation is unclear and further clarity is needed on its relationship 
with needs.  
6.3 Financial Provision on Relationship Breakdown: 
Cohabiting Couples 
In England and Wales, unlike the other jurisdictions, cohabiting couples have no Family Law 
remedy available to them on relationship breakdown and consequently must rely on Property 
Law and Trust Law. Therefore, unless the claimant is able to demonstrate a legal1066 or 
beneficial interest in the home, they have no right to remain in the home and no security in it 
either.  
For Deech, this approach allows cohabitants to order their lives in the private sphere without 
any interference from Family Law. Consequently, these couples can try alternative forms of 
relationships and ‘not…have one form imposed on them especially one that treats women as 
perpetual dependents.’1067 In fact, Deech strongly believes that any extension of marriage 
rights, particularly in the England and Wales context, would be a windfall to ‘gold-diggers’ and 
impose marriage rights ex post facto when cohabitants have chosen not to marry; they ‘are 
well aware of the situation they have placed themselves in.’1068 Yet, while this allows for 
financial autonomy, how far does Trust Law protect the Mother/Child care-dyad? The next 
sections shall consider the three ways through which a cohabiting couple can establish a 
beneficial interest: resulting trusts, constructive trusts or by way of proprietary estoppel. 
6.3.1 Resulting Trusts 
                                                          
1066 Through a joint tenancy or tenancy in common  of either equal or unequal shares Law of Property Act 1925, section 34(1) 
1067 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 42 
1068 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 43  
241 
 
Since Stack v Dowden1069 the use of resulting trusts is diminishing, particularly following the 
increasing usage of constructive trusts.1070 Resulting trusts arise where one party is the legal 
title holder of the property and the other makes contributions to the purchase price where the 
property is then held in the same proportion as the financial contributions made under the 
trust, irrespective of the legal title. The contributions made must be financial in nature and 
thus cannot be indirect contributions1071 and neither can they include gifts or loans.1072 
6.3.2 Constructive Trusts 
Constructive trusts are implied trusts which are most frequently used in relation to cohabiting 
couples and disputes over the family home. This trust developed in the 1970s as the use of the 
resulting trust was felt to be ‘old-fashioned and inappropriate’1073 and Lord Bridge in Lloyds 
Bank v Rosset (1991)1074 held that it consists of first a common intention and second 
detrimental reliance based on this common intent.  
6.3.2.1 Common Intent 
Common intent can be either express or implied.1075 Express intent looks for communicated 
intention specifically to share ownership;1076 an express agreement where actual conversations 
on the topic have taken place;1077 where there has been obvious recognition of the parties’ 
interest. These can be almost throw-away remarks such as ‘don’t worry about the future 
because when we are married [the house] will be half yours anyway’1078 and ‘you need a 
secure home’.1079 Express common intent has been interpreted quite generously; for example 
in Grant v Edwards and Eves v Eves,1080 the courts have been prepared to treat excuses for not 
putting one party on the title documents as evidence of an express common intention to 
share. This is even though the private intention of the legal owner is that no such share should 
arise. Thus, relatively innocent statements can have a great deal of significance attached to 
them. For Deech, this is one of the pitfalls of this area leading her to warn people to ‘conduct 
their love affairs in silence.’1081 
                                                          
1069 Stack v Dowden (2007) UKHL 17  [66] (Lady Hale) 
1070 Pettitt v Pettitt[1969] 2 WLR 966; [1970] AC 777 dismissed the resulting trust as old-fashioned and inappropriate 
1071 Gissing v Gissing [1970] 3 WLR 255; [1971] 1 AC 886 HL; Burns v Burns (1984) Ch 317 
1072 For example, see Fowkes v Pascoe (1875) 10 Ch. App 343; Sekhon  v Alissa [1989] 2 FLR 94 
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1075 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 
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Ch. 638 and Eves v Eves [1975] WLR 1338 
1078 Hammond v Mitchell [1992] 2 All ER 109, [1992] 1 FLR 229 
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1081 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 42 
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Alternatively, intent can be inferred where, in the absence of an express conversation, the 
courts instead look to the parties’ actions and contributions to form the basis to infer common 
intent. However, the definition of contributions has been narrowly interpreted, only 
considering direct financial contributions to the acquisition of the house.1082 In Lloyd’s Bank v 
Rosset the House of Lords indicated that only direct financial contributions would do when 
inferring a common intent and Lord Bridge stated that ‘it is at least extremely doubtful 
whether anything less will do.’1083 
Consequently, domestic contributions and indirect financial contributions, and therefore 
Fineman’s care-dyad, are excluded from the scope of conduct in this area and will not give rise 
to a beneficial interest. Nevertheless, there is some indication that a broader approach may be 
possible. In Le Foe v Le Foe and Woolwich plc.1084 it was suggested that Lord Bridge had not 
considered previous cases such as Gissing v Gissing1085 or Burns1086 where in fact some indirect 
financial contributions could give rise to a common intent. For example, in Burns1087 Lord 
Justice Fox stated that:  
…a payment could be said to be referable to the acquisition of the house if, for 
example, the payer either (a) pays part of the purchase price or (b) continues regularly 
to the mortgage instalments or (c) pays off part of the mortgage or (d) makes a 
substantial financial contribution to the family expenses so as to enable mortgage 
instalments to be paid… 
Thus, if an indirect financial payment was ‘referable’ back to the purchase price of the 
property or, for example, if one party paid the bills to free the other party up to pay the 
mortgage, then it could give rise to a common intent. The decision in Le Foe1088 indicated that 
the courts could have a more holistic approach to the course of dealings as put forward in 
Midland Bank v Cooke and Another (1995) where the courts ‘undertake a survey of the whole 
course of dealing between the parties’.1089 This shift, Pawlowski notes, should be ‘applauded in 
broadening the circumstances in which a wife (or cohabitee) may claim an equitable share in 
property.’1090 
                                                          
1082 This can be to the mortgage as well as the purchase price Lightfoot v Lightfoot – Brown [2005] EWCA Civ 201 [23] 
1083 Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1991) AC 107 p 119 (Lord Bridge) 
1084 Le Foe v Le Foe and Woolwich plc. (2002) 1 FCR 107 
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1088Le Foe v Le Foe and Woolwich plc. (2002) 1 FCR 107 (Waite LJ) 
1089 Midland Bank v Cooke and Another [1995] 4 All ER 562; [1995] 2 FLR 915; [1996] 1 FCR 442 CA 
1090 M Pawlowski, ‘Family Home: Doing Justice to the Parties’ (2006) Family Law 36, 40 
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This holistic approach was further supported by the Court of Appeal in Oxley v Hiscock1091 
where Lord Justice Chadwick stated that the court was to have regard to the whole course of 
dealings which: 
…includes the arrangements which they make from time to time to meet the outgoings 
(for example, mortgage contributions, council tax and utilities, repairs, insurance and 
housekeeping) which have to be met if they are to live in the property as their home.1092 
In fact Le Foe has since then received support from the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden 
(2007), the first cohabitation trust case to reach the House of Lords. This concerned a 27-year 
cohabitation with four children. Their first home was in Ms Dowden’s name until 1993 when 
they bought a new residence, where she contributed 65% of the purchase price and was the 
main breadwinner. Mr Stack had made a number of unquantifiable indirect contributions and 
improvements to the home and while they had both shared childcare, Stack had not 
undertaken to pay for food or childcare and throughout this period they had maintained 
separate finances. This, the courts found, meant that Stack was entitled to only 35% of a share 
in the family home. Ms Dowden received 65%. Here the majority took a broader view of what 
contributions are to be taken into account1093 rather than the previous narrow direct 
contributions (although this is obiter dicta and thus unclear over exactly what the definition 
will be). Consequently, the courts can now impute an intention, considering ‘what the parties 
must, in the light of their conduct, be taken to have intended’1094 and potentially may be able 
to look at indirect contributions. Three of the Law Lords supported this contention and Lord 
Walker stated: 
...in my opinion the law has moved on, and your lordships should move it a little more 
in the same direction...1095 
Yet the court in Stack v Dowden emphasised that mere payments towards household bills and 
outgoings, living together for a long time or having children would not establish a beneficial 
entitlement. Furthermore, these overlooked contributions are gendered given that evidence 
shows women are still largely responsible for the majority of household tasks,1096 are more 
likely to not work because of looking after the family home1097 and where women are in 
control of financial expenditures they are more likely to spend their income on the family and 
                                                          
1091 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] 2 FCR 295 
1092 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] 2 FCR 295 [69] (Chadwick LJ)  
1093 Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 [36] (Lord Walker) 
1094 Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 [61] (Lady Hale) 
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1097 National Statistics (2009) ‘Labour market’ Social Trends 39 (ONS 2009) 7 
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children.1098 Thus, Fineman’s care-dyad and the contributions that arise out of a care-giving 
relationship are neglected. Nevertheless, it is possible that making improvements to the 
property may give rise to a common intent, and Stack v Dowden indicated that substantial 
contributions may not even have to be linked to the purchase price. These improvements must 
be substantial; Pettit v Pettit emphasised that mere decoration, minor repairs, gardening, DIY 
jobs, etc. will not suffice. Rather, the courts are looking for the contributions to add financial 
value to the property. Yet, research has indicated the gendered divide between household 
chores with male work tending to add value to assets (building, DIY) and ‘women’s work’ less 
so, being more responsible for day-to-day tasks.1099 Thus, contributions more attributable to 
women are unlikely on their own to be enough to demonstrate implied common intent. 
This new approach of ‘imputing an intention’ was supported in the Privy Council case Abbot v 
Abbot1100 and it seems has been approved again by the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott 
(2011).1101 Yet, the court in Jones v Kernott limited imputation to the quantification of shares. 
Consequently, it seems that the courts are able to engage in a process that attempts to 
determine ‘fair’ shares and that these beneficial shares can alter over time. Lady Hale and Lord 
Walker stated: 
 …if [the court] cannot deduce exactly what shares were intended, it may have no 
alternative but to ask what their intentions as reasonable and just people would have 
been had they thought about it at the time.1102 
Yet, it is questionable whether this will apply in the single name context. Furthermore, 
‘fairness’ in the cohabitation context is restricted in the convoluted Trust Law as still common 
intention is to be deduced objectively from the cohabitants’ conduct having regard to the list 
of contributions set out by Baroness Hale in Stack.1103 The onus of this conduct, however, is 
still on financial and indirect financial contributions1104 and therefore the constructive trust 
continues to ignore traditionally gendered contributions to the detriment of those whose lives, 
for Fineman, are characterised by dependency. 
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For Deech, disregarding domestic contributions promotes financial independence and 
autonomy, recognising cohabitants’ choice not to enter marriage.1105 Moreover, in this 
context, traditionally gendered roles are not attached to any value, cohabitation is a way that 
gendered practices can be avoided and a greater position for negotiation is available providing 
a space ‘to define gender and personal identity in more liberating and non-traditional ways’1106 
placing women in a better bargaining position.1107 Consequently, it avoids patriarchal 
dependence as it presumes and encourages financial equality between the partnership and for 
women to engage within the labour market because there is no recognition of domestic 
contributions in the private sphere. 
Research has supported this position, demonstrating that cohabitants have a less gendered 
division of roles within their relationship and have a more equal division of housework.1108 Yet, 
while cohabitants tend to have a more egalitarian division of roles than married couples, this is 
actually attributable to life stages rather than relationship status. Crompton and Lyonette 
determined that age and employment status1109 were the predominant factors and other 
research has found a link between working hours1110 and the presence of children1111 and the 
division of paid and unpaid labour rather than the relationship status.1112  
However, there are strong arguments that the approach in Trust Law fails to protect the 
vulnerable, and the case of Burns1113 is frequently cited to demonstrate this. This case 
concerned a 19-year cohabitation relationship where Mrs Burns assumed the homemaker role 
raising her children who, at the time of the trial, had all left home. She had even changed her 
surname to match her partner’s, redecorated the house, bought various chattels and paid for a 
substantial amount of the bills with a part-time job that she had in the later years of the 
relationship, although she did not really have any earning potential as the result of her 
homemaking role. Yet, in the absence of any direct financial payments which Lord Justice Fox 
                                                          
1105 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 42 
1106 C Hughes, Women's Contemporary Lives: Within and Beyond the Mirror (Routledge New York 2002) 127 
1107 A Cherlin, ‘Towards a New Home Socio-Economics of Union Formation’ in L Waite and C Bachrach (eds), The Ties That Bind: 
Perspectives On Marriage And Cohabitation (Aldine de Gruyter 2000) 126, 131 
R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, 
M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52, 74 - 75; B Homann-
Marriott, (2006) ‘Shared Beliefs and the Union Stability of Married and Cohabiting Couples’ (2006) 68(4) Journal of Marriage and 
the Family 1015, 1016 
1109 R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K 
Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52, 74 - 75;  
1110 T Greenstein, ‘Husbands’ Participation in Domestic Labor: Interactive Effect of Wives’ and husbands’ Gender Ideologies’ (1996) 
58 Journal of Marriage and the Family 585, 592; K Pyke and S Coltrane, (1996) ‘Entitlement, Obligation and Gratitude in Family 
Work’ (1996) 17(1) Journal of Family Issues 60 
1111 K Dwenda, B Gjerdingen and A Center, ‘First-time Parents’ Postpartum Changes in Employment, Childcare, and Housework 
Responsibilities’ (2005) 34(1) Social Science Research 103; T Greenstein, ‘Husbands’ Participation in Domestic Labor: Interactive 
Effect of Wives’ and Husbands’ Gender Ideologies’ (1996) 58 Journal of Marriage and the Family 585; K Pyke and S Coltrane, 
‘Entitlement, Obligation and Gratitude in Family Work’ (1996) 17(1) Journal of Family Issues 60 
1112 R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who Does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K 
Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th report (Sage 2008) 52, 72 - 75 
1113 Burns v Burns (1984) Ch 317 
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emphasised should be referable to the purchase price or the mortgage on the property, Mrs 
Burns was left without a share in the home and without a remedy elsewhere so she was in 
effect left with nothing. Essentially, child-bearing and its effect on Mrs Burns’ socio-economic 
status is of no value to the courts when establishing a beneficial interest and consequently a 
major concern is discrimination against the homemaker or primary care-giver as constructive 
trusts omit any consideration of ‘home-making and parental contributions’,1114 a role 
predominantly held by the female.1115 Thus, as Baird argues, ‘it is women, usually, who are left 
high and dry after cohabitation’.1116 Trust Law fails to recognise Fineman’s care-dyad and 
therefore fails to protect the vulnerable by ignoring the contributions made within the family 
sphere. 
Yet, for those who argue against the recognition of domestic contributions, to afford them a 
greater value in property disputes at the end of the relationship restricts personal freedom1117 
and for Deech especially, it ‘retards the emancipation of women, degrades the relationship, 
[and] takes away [that] choice.’1118 Consequently, to offer ‘protection’ for women by 
recognising these contributions undermines the notion of women as rational beings who can 
decide how to order their own lives. Instead she argues that ‘there should be a corner of 
freedom where couples may escape Family Law with all its difficulties.’1119 Furthermore, 
commentators have argued that in fact the Burns scenario does not portray the typical 21st 
century cohabiting woman1120 who is an economic equal of her partner. Yet Douglas’1121 work 
indicated that in fact the Burns scenario still exists and again it is still the female partner who 
tends to be disadvantaged by the lack of recognition of her domestic contributions in Trust 
Law.  
Consequently, while Trust Law may offer a chance to renegotiate roles for couples, the extent 
of that suitability may lie with couples who are young, are in short duration relationships, who 
are earning similar amounts of money and who do not have children. For those in longer-term 
relationships with children and with an inequality in bargaining power, the lack of regard for 
domestic contributions or indirect financial contributions leaves homemakers in a vulnerable 
position at the end of the relationship. 
                                                          
1114 R Bailey-Harris, ‘Law and the Unmarried Couple – Oppression or Liberation?’ (1996) Child and Family Law Quarterly 137, 139 
1115 National Statistics (2009) ‘Labour market’ Social Trends 39 (ONS 2009) 53 – 90% fathers work, 67% women work.  
1116 Vera Baird, 13 June 2006, HC Deb vol. 447, col. 637  
1117 A Bottomley, K Gieve, G Moon and A Weir, The Cohabitation Handbook: A Woman’s Guide to the Law (1st edn, Pluto 1981) 181 
1118 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 43 
1119 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 43 
1120 R Probert, ‘Trusts and the Modern Woman – Establishing an Interest in the Family Home’ (2001) 13(3) Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 275, 283 - 286 
1121 G Douglas, J Pearce and H Woodward, A Failure of Trust: Resolving Property Disputes on Cohabitation Breakdown (Funded by 
ESRC, Cardiff Law School 2007) 138 
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6.3.2.2 Detrimental Reliance 
Unless there was detrimental reliance based on the common intent, then the courts will not 
establish a constructive trust.1122 Here, the courts look for behaviour that would not have 
happened except for the belief that they shared an interest. The courts have been willing to 
consider spending money on the property1123 or exceptional behaviour like paying the 
mortgage as evidence of detrimental reliance1124 although often this behaviour is gender 
stereotyping,1125 and the courts have not gone as far as recognising domestic contributions. 
What is interesting, as Gardner (2008) notes1126 and which can be seen in the cases of Stack v 
Dowden,1127 Abbot v Abbot1128 and Jones v Kernott1129 is that the courts do not mention a 
detrimental reliance element. Consequently, this may suggest that there is a lessening amount 
of importance placed on this part of the constructive trust or it may also possibly indicate that 
the distinction between common intention and detrimental reliance has become far more 
blurred.1130  Once again, the focus is financial or on behaviour not typically associated with the 
mother/child care-dyad. 
6.3.2.3 Quantification 
Jones v Kernott1131 confirmed that the over-riding presumption is that equity follows the law 
and thus if the property is in joint names, then there is a rebuttable presumption of joint 
beneficial interest. Similarly if the property is in a sole name, then the presumption is that 
there is sole beneficial ownership.1132 Where this presumption has been displaced through 
evidence of a different common intention, then the shares are to be divided in accordance 
with that common intention. However, if the shares intended cannot be ascertained, the 
courts are able to ‘impute an intention, having regard to the whole course of dealing.’1133 To 
impute an intention, the courts are able to determine what their intentions would have been 
as reasonable and just people.1134 The courts therefore will consider things like financial 
contributions although the court recognised that other factors may be considered.1135 
                                                          
1122 Churchill v Roach [2004] 3 FCR 744 
1123 Layton v Martin (1986) 2 FLR 227, 237 
1124 Le Foe v Le Foe and Another (2002) 1 FCR 107 indicated that direct mortgage payments could suffice. 
1125 J Herring, Family Law (4th edn, Pearson Education 2010) 162. Contrast for example Thomas v Fuller-Brown [1988] 1 FLR 237 
where the man had moved into her property and carried out DIY, it was held that this was the type of thing a man would do 
around the house! E.g. a woman using a sledgehammer Eves v Eves (1975) 1 WLR 1338 
1126 S Gardner, ‘Family Property Today’ (2008) 122 Law Quarterly Review 422, 424 
1127 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17   
1128 Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53 
1129 Jones  v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 
1130 S Gardner, ‘Family Property Today’ (2008) 122 Law Quarterly Review 422, 424 - 425 
1131 Jones  v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 
1132 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 
1133 Jones  v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [51] (Lord Walker and Lady Hale) 
1134 Jones  v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [51] (Lord Walker and Lady Hale)  
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6.3.3 Proprietary Estoppel 
This is rarely used,1136 and the courts generally accept that the requirements for proprietary 
estoppel and constructive trusts are very similar;1137 where someone has relied detrimentally 
on an agreement to share property this will ‘give rise to a constructive trust or proprietary 
estoppel.’1138 There are four elements to the estoppel: 
1) A believes she has or is going to be given an interest over B’s property 
2) A must act to her detriment on this 
3) B is aware of his own interests in the property 
4) B knew and encouraged A’s belief1139 
 
Proprietary estoppel is governed by conscionability or fairness and hinges on each case’s 
facts.1140 Thus, if the cohabitant can prove an actual, unambiguous direct encouragement1141 
such as promising the partner that they will be ‘financially secure in the future’,1142 which they 
have then detrimentally relied on1143 then the courts may protect their interest by way of 
proprietary estoppel. This allows the courts quite literally to stop someone’s property rights if 
they consider it to be inequitable to the other party. Yet, once again, only financial 
contributions are recognised and therefore it does not afford any real protection for the 
financially weaker party who is primarily the homemaker or care-giver. 
6.3.4 Children Act 1989, Schedule 1 
While it is evident that Trust Law is extremely limited in the protection given to Fineman’s 
care-dyad, some relief may come through the use of Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989. This 
schedule permits the primary carer parent, regardless of marital status, (although rarely used 
by cohabitants as they do not tend to seek legal advice)1144 to apply for child support and, 
where granted, it can take the form of lump sums, periodical payments, or even property 
transfer for the benefit of the child. In its deliberations, the courts must have regard to a 
number of factors under s4.1145 This completely focuses on the needs of those children during 
minority or in education until 18. This consequently provides some maintenance for the 
welfare of the child, and indirectly the parent, and Deech argues that the Burns example of the 
                                                          
1136 Wayling v Jones [1995] 2 FLR 1029 
1137 Yaxley  v Gotts [2000] Ch 162, [1999] 2 FLR 941 
1138 J Herring, Family Law (4th edn, Pearson Education 2010) 166  
1139 J Herring, Family Law (4th edn, Pearson Education 2010) 164 
1140 Gillet v Holt [2000] FCR 705 
1141 This cannot be inferred or imputed and should be made before witnesses. 
1142 For example stating that the partner will be ‘financially secure in the future’ (Lissimore v Downing [2003] 2 FLR 308) 
1143 This once again cannot be through domestic contributions Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 and must be of a financial nature 
such as leaving a job, (Jones v Jones [1977] 1 WLR 438) or caring fulltime for the owner (Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990. 
1144  M Maclean, J Eekelaar, J Lewis and S Arthur, ‘When Cohabiting Parents Separate – Law and Expectations’ (2002) 32 Family 
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1145 See Appendix T 
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vulnerable homemaker is now covered by Schedule 1 of the Children Act although in fact it 
would not be as Mrs Burns’ children were all over 18. 
However, the courts, while not specifically considering the standard of living, will not 
disadvantage a child because of it.1146 Therefore the courts will often reflect the payee’s 
circumstances in the award,1147 and often they will go beyond the bare minimum to include 
housing and schooling costs.1148 Moreover, considering that the courts cannot alter property 
rights, this timeframe places limitations on these orders as once the children reach majority, 
the care-giver is unprotected and the property reverts back in accordance with Property Law 
entitlements. Consequently, while there may be some indirect benefits and potentially this 
could act as a rehabilitative period, the child focus does not reflect the impact that 
dependency has on the primary care-giver and it is questionable how far Fineman would 
consider this to be a viable alternative to provide protection to the economically weaker 
spouse. 
6.3.5 Cohabitation Agreements 
In the absence of protection for the care-dyad from Trust Law, it is also possible for the couple 
to have a cohabitation contract, although there is some history of reluctance from the courts 
to support these contracts on grounds of public policy. Yet, the Law Commission (2007) 
indicated that as long as they meet the legal requirements of a contract, they seem 
enforceable.1149 Cohabitation agreements are Deech’s preferred form of regulation between 
cohabiting couples.  It gives the couple complete autonomy over their financial affairs without 
the paternalistic intervention of the law and also provides the couple with an opportunity to 
protect each other’s interests throughout the relationship. However, just as with matrimonial 
agreements, there are concerns about the inequality of bargaining power that couples may 
have when making these contracts. 
6.3.6 Domestic Contributions and Cohabitants 
The approach in the cohabitation context in England and Wales is the scheme most strongly 
rooted in Deech’s end of the spectrum as it fully recognises the autonomy of participants who 
choose not to marry and therefore avoids the gendered assumptions frequently seen in the 
marriage context. Yet, it seems that in direct contrast with the marriage context, the 
                                                          
1146 See H v P (Illegitimate Child: Capital Provision) [1993] Fam Law 515; A v A (A Minor: Financial Provision) [1994] 1 FLR 657   
1147 J v C (Child: Financial Provision) [1999] 1 FLR 152   
1148 Re P (Child: Financial Provision) [2003] EWCA Civ 837 [2003] 2 FLR 865 on which see S Gilmore, ‘Re P (Child) (Financial 
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and Family Law Quarterly 103   
1149 Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (Law Com CP No 179, 2006) para 3.19 
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cohabitation framework in England and Wales completely ignores the care-dyad and 
consequently leaves them in precarious and vulnerable positions post-separation. Where there 
is some provision for children under the Children Act, this support is not granted with the care-
giver’s long-term needs in mind. While this may be appropriate where the relationship is 
between two financially equal parties, perhaps at similar life stages in similar professions, 
there is little consideration for relationships where the balance of power is not equal. 
Consequently, this option seems to fall short of Fineman’s position. 
6.4 Empirical Analysis 
After considering the system of financial provision in the married and cohabiting context, the 
question now demanded is how do these schemes work in practice? This chapter considers the 
results from the interviews with lawyers practising in this jurisdiction to answer this question. 
Furthermore, it was possible in this section to draw direct comparisons between all of the 
jurisdictions that are explored within this thesis. Consequently, while primarily the focus is on 
the responses from England and Wales, the empirical analysis also draws out the key 
differences between the various jurisdictions.  
6.4.1 Socio - Demographics of the Interviewees 
Table 6.1: Ages of the respondents in England and Wales 
 
Thirteen respondents took part which was a slighter smaller number than the other 
jurisdictions. Out of these, six were male and seven were female. The sample tended to have 
practised for a shorter period than the other jurisdictions, with five practising for under 11 
years, four between 11 and 20 years, three between 21 and 30 years and only one above 30 
years. This meant that the participants here had less experience in practice compared to the 
2 
3 
5 
2 
1 
Under 30
30 - 39
40 - 49
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Base = 13 
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other jurisdictions. Correspondingly, England and Wales had the youngest distribution of 
participants with 11 under 50 and six under 40. 
6.4.2. Responses in the Marriage Context 
After analysing England and Wales, the last jurisdiction explored in this thesis, it is now 
possible to draw comparisons between all the jurisdictions that this thesis examined. The first 
area of comparison relates to the lawyers’ level of satisfaction in relation to the structure of 
each legal framework. Essentially, this explores whether the lawyers were happier having 
Deech’s or Fineman’s approach at the heart of their system. Table 6.2 (below) demonstrates, 
on a scale of 0 to 10 how rigid/discretionary the lawyers thought that their jurisdiction was 
(where 0 represented a completely rigid system and 10 signified that the system was 
completely discretionary).1150 Table 6.2 has collapsed this scale into 0–3, 4–6 and 7–10. It is 
evident that New Zealand was depicted as being the most rigid jurisdiction. This is unsurprising 
given that New Zealand, out of all the jurisdictions, is the closest to Deech’s position due to its 
strong formulaic principles. What was surprising was that Australia was portrayed as having 
the highest level of discretion out of all the jurisdictions. It had been anticipated that England 
and Wales would be the most discretionary system because this jurisdiction had appeared 
closest to Fineman’s end of the feminist spectrum. It is possible that England and Wales 
displayed a higher level of rigidity than Australia because there are more guidelines for the 
application of discretion under s25 MCA through the yardstick of equality in comparison with 
s79 FLA (Australia).1151  
However, there appears to be a visible link with how satisfied lawyers were with the level of 
discretion in their jurisdiction. The lawyers had to select a number on a scale of 0 – 10, where 0 
indicated that the system was far too rigid, 10 indicated that their system was far too 
discretionary, and ‘5’ represented that the lawyers thought the approach was about right. As 
Table 6.3 below demonstrates, New Zealand lawyers most commonly selected ‘5’ suggesting 
that they felt that their system’s framework was ‘about right,’ and this was followed by 
Scotland, England and Wales and finally by Australia. Therefore when Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are 
directly compared, it seems that the higher the level of discretion is within the jurisdiction, the 
less frequently ‘about right’ was selected by the respondents. 
 
 
                                                          
1150 Appendix A 
1151 Through the case of White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981 and Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 
1186 
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Table 6.2: How rigid/discretionary the lawyers believe each jurisdiction to be  
 
Table 6.3: Attitudes of the lawyers from each jurisdiction on how rigid/discretionary their 
jurisdiction is. 
 
This visual relationship between rules and satisfaction was unsurprising given that both New 
Zealand and Scotland have prioritised procedural justice over individual justice. Consequently, 
the lawyers in those jurisdictions had emphasised the extensive procedural benefits that came 
with a system based on certainty and predictability, whereas Australia had indicated that there 
were a number of procedural problems associated with the level of discretion in that 
jurisdiction. England and Wales also mirrored these difficulties in the qualitative analysis as the 
themes demonstrate in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6. 4 Themes in the married context in England and Wales 
Overarching Themes Themes Sub-Themes 
Structural considerations 
Limited procedural difficulty 
Inconsistency 
Uncertainty 
Advising clients 
Complexity 
More litigation - limited 
Benefits of discretion 
Flexibility 
Fairness 
Satisfaction 
Pro-Fineman 
Equality avoids evaluation 
Pragmatism 
Private choice 
Reconceptualised partnership 
Contingent formal equality 
Substantive, not formal 
equality 
Ongoing support  
Child-centric 
Impact of caring Dissatisfaction Compensation 
 
Some of the lawyers were concerned (as the lawyers had been in Australia) that there were 
some inconsistencies between the courts, and therefore that the judges’ approaches were 
causing uncertainty. There was further indication from the lawyers in England and Wales 
(again reflecting the problems that had been identified in Australia) that this inconsistency 
made it difficult to advise clients:  
...it leads to um different courts coming out with slightly different orders which make it 
very difficult to advise people precisely as to what they expect to get... (EWLaw3) 
In Australia, the lawyers indicated that the complexity of the system and the struggle to give 
advice led to an increased amount of litigation. However, despite the level of complexity 
within England and Wales, only one lawyer from this last jurisdiction, compared to four in 
Australia, was concerned that the discretion was leading to more cases going to court1152 and 
only two lawyers specifically wanted to be able to give their clients more advice. In actual fact, 
the participants stated that a high number of cases were prevented from going to court 
because the approach in England and Wales avoided an examination of the parties’ 
contributions. This could indicate that in Australia, it is the examination of contributions (and 
the evidence problems that follow) rather than the discretionary nature of the framework 
which causes a greater level of litigation, or at least a greater concern about the amount of 
litigation. Furthermore, in England and Wales, there was no mention of an imbalance against 
those in a weaker bargaining position as there had been in Australia. While it does not mean 
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that this concern is not present within the system, it demonstrates that it is not a concern that 
was at the forefront of the participants’ minds throughout this study. The absence of this 
criticism in England and Wales could be related to the focus that the courts have on need at 
the end of the relationship and the theme of ‘substantive equality’ which is expanded below. 
The courts are fundamentally focused on meeting the needs of the parties, rather than first 
focusing on the past contributions that have been made in a relationship. 
In fact, generally, the discourse that surrounded procedural difficulties raised in both 
discretionary jurisdictions was much lower in England and Wales than in Australia. This may be 
because of the greater level of ‘rigidity’ within England and Wales1153 (see Table 6.2) and 
therefore the link between ‘satisfaction’ and certainty, when Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are compared, 
seems to relate to the fact that there are less procedural problems with more certainty: 
Deech’s approach therefore appears to be the preferred starting point.  
However, just like the Australian interviewees, the respondents in England and Wales 
emphasised the need for discretion to cover the large amount of variance found in 
relationships. The consensus was that the one-size-fits-all approach was unrealistic because it 
would be impossible for the legislator to conceive every form of relationship dynamic: 
…very rarely are two cases quite alike...without discretion, you can’t achieve fairness. 
(EWLaw9) 
Consequently two lawyers1154 emphasised that a more rigid approach would cause more 
injustice: 
…I think there’s far more injustice in jurisdictions where you have to stick rigidly to a 
community-of-property for example. (EWLaw8) 
To some extent, this was reflected in the empirical analysis of New Zealand and Scotland, 
where it was evident that one-size-did-not-fit-all. In these exceptions to equality, the criticism 
that both jurisdictions raised was that the courts stuck too rigidly to the equality provision and 
this led to unfair results, particularly for the primary care-giver.1155 While this criticism was not 
generally directed at either jurisdiction’s framework,1156 it still demonstrates that too much 
rigidity produces results that lawyers in this study perceived to be unfair. 
In comparison, despite the procedural problems that arose out of discretion, the lawyers from 
England and Wales emphasised that judges on the whole get the right outcome and nearly all 
                                                          
1153 White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981 introduced the principle of fairness as the new rationale for s25 interpretation  
1154 EWLaw8,9 
1155 See New Zealand Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.2 and Scotland Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2.2 
1156 Rather it was the judges’ application of the discretion 
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the participants were satisfied with the approach within their jurisdiction, that it works the 
best for most people: 
…[it] is pretty fair and reasonable. District judges decide the majority of these cases 
and um they know how to do it, they’re doing it on a day to day basis and it does work 
for most people. (EWLaw12) 
 
Therefore, the participants generally believed that the level of discretion within England and 
Wales was suitable and necessary to deal with the varied dimensions that exist in different 
relationships and nine were satisfied with the principles at work within the system. 
Consequently, the empirical analysis relating to the structure of England and Wales’ 
framework may suggest that this starting point is perhaps closer to achieving a balance 
between Deech’s and Fineman’s positions than Australia. England and Wales had far less 
reference to procedural problems and yet the lawyers did not perceive the level of discretion 
to have been sacrificed for this greater level of certainty. Furthermore, the analysis in England 
and Wales also demonstrates the importance of having some guidelines for the application of 
discretion. This desire for greater guidance had been voiced in all the previous jurisdictions: in 
Australia, this was because the discretion was applied too unpredictably and in Scotland and 
New Zealand it was because the discretion had not been used in a wide enough manner. While 
there were also calls for greater guidance in England and Wales, these calls were not as 
vocalised by the lawyers as they had been in the other jurisdictions. Consequently, where 
there is a use of discretion, the use of guiding principles (as in England and Wales) may be the 
most successful way of applying that discretion effectively. 
6.4.2.1 Pro-Fineman Themes 
The majority of the themes that emerged from the data analysis in England and Wales were 
pro-Fineman (as the themes in Table 6.4 above demonstrate) and more so than the previous 
jurisdictions. Generally, the lawyers were in favour of equal treatment between the 
homemaker and breadwinner. Nine lawyers thought that the breadwinner and homemaker 
contributions were treated equally and ten thought that this approach was about right, which 
was as high as Australia and much higher than Scotland and New Zealand. In fact as Table 6.5 
(below) shows, England and Wales had the highest percentage of those who thought it was 
about right (‘5’).1157 From the qualitative analysis, most of the lawyers thought that treating 
contributions equally was fair: 
…Well, it simply seems to me right to treat them both the same whatever contribution 
both has made. (EWLaw7) 
                                                          
1157 0 – 4 too protective towards the breadwinner, ‘5’ about right, 6 – 10 too protective of the homemaker. 
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However, the lawyers seemed to be happy with ‘equality’ between homemaker and 
breadwinner because ‘equality avoids evaluation’. There were two sub-themes that developed 
out of the data which justified the lawyers’ position for preferring an approach which did not 
value the parties’ contributions: ‘pragmatism’ and ‘private choice’.  
Table 6.5: Homemaker/breadwinner: attitudes towards how each jurisdiction balances 
domestic and financial contributions. 
 
On a pragmatic level, the respondents in England and Wales spoke of similar benefits which 
arose from avoiding the valuation of contributions as had been expressed by the interviewees 
in the previous jurisdictions. Some of the lawyers stated that it helped avoid evidence issues: 
Not many people keep years and years and years’ worth of bank statements, receipts, 
uh invoices, uh whatever else there is so there are very real questions, this doesn’t 
crock up in the married context… (EWLaw13) 
Furthermore, evaluation was seen to essentially antagonise the relationship between former 
spouses, encouraging them to score points against one another. Not evaluating contributions 
prevents the parties from undervaluing each other’s roles and overvaluing their own roles. In 
fact, the lawyers generally believed that it was impossible to attribute a value to domestic 
contributions and therefore equality avoids judging contributions, and subsequently prevents 
unnecessary litigation. Consequently, when the respondents discussed whether additional 
contributions should be valued in a dual earner relationship model (where one party was 
predominantly responsible for the majority of homemaking contributions) the view was that it 
was unfeasible to value domestic contributions: 
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…it’s easier for the court to try and avoid quantifying the value of the parties’ interests 
and just say that they’re always equal. So I don’t think that it adequately reflects what 
that person is putting into the relationship, but I understand why it’s never going to 
change because it’s just too hard for it to be quantified in anyway. (EWLaw2) 
The other sub-theme related to avoiding the evaluation of contributions was ‘private choice’. 
Here, England and Wales was quite different from the other jurisdictions. The data from the 
previous three systems had revealed ‘pragmatism’ and ‘partnership’ themes as the reasons for 
such an overwhelming preference for equality. However, in England and Wales, there was an 
absence of ‘partnership’ dialogue in the discussions of equality. Rather, the focus was on 
choice; that it was either the individual’s choice within that relationship to make additional 
contributions or to become the primary care-giver: 
…it would be unfair to the other party because maybe that person chooses to do that 
extra, you know, and the other person wouldn’t have realised that they’d get a better 
settlement for that. (EWLaw10) 
…people make arrangements during their marriage and they should live with those 
arrangements when they separate. (EWLaw3) 
The lawyers were demonstrating, to some extent, Deech’s position that an individual chooses 
to take on that extra burden around the household. Furthermore, the lawyers did not view 
formal equality as an entitlement. Consequently, some of the lawyers felt that the way in 
which domestic contributions were valued hinged on the length of the relationship. Therefore, 
those in shorter marriages were not entitled to equal treatment between homemaker and 
breadwinner. Instead it seemed that the participants wanted to see the spouses return to the 
positions that they were in prior to the marriage: 
…The longer the relationship, I think, the more important the homemaker should be 
given more protection than they are. But if it’s a short relationship then I don’t really 
see that that’s merited. (EWLaw12) 
Consequently, in England and Wales there was little discussion of partnership and entitlement. 
This appeared most likely due to a reconceptualised notion of partnership. In the previous 
jurisdictions, the respondents indicated that formal equality between the breadwinner and 
homemaker’s roles should flow from the partnership as this was an entitlement. In England 
and Wales, it seems that the lawyers interpreted equality not to be formal equality, but rather 
that it referred to substantive equality between the homemaker and breadwinner and thus 
the courts should attempt to rebalance the ‘impact of caring’:   
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...the homemaker can’t continue with the dual earnings position because they have to 
restrict their hours because they’re caring for children, then that would be reflected in 
the settlement or at least should be. (EWLaw12) 
Consequently, the themes that emerged were very protective towards Fineman’s care-dyad 
and most of the respondents indicated that there should be a difference where children are 
present. Furthermore, the respondents recognised that clean break was not always possible 
particularly in relationships where there was a higher degree of dependency, namely 
homemaker/breadwinner relationship models, longer relationships or relationships with 
children (particularly younger children). It was in the discussion of spousal support that, 
interestingly, the lawyers raised the concept of partnership; protecting the financially 
vulnerable was a necessary duty: 
...it seems to me that in principle if you recognise marriage as an obligation for life, 
then you have to um recognise the possibility that the financial dependency will 
continue if it’s unable to be broken. (EWLaw7) 
This was extremely different from the empirical analysis within the other jurisdictions. The 
other jurisdictions had all indicated that in similar situations, particularly where there were 
children, maintenance would be necessary. Yet, this had been qualified with the perception 
that this maintenance should only have a rehabilitative function: the aim was to make the 
primary care-giver self-sufficient. However, in England and Wales, there was no mention of 
rehabilitative maintenance by the respondents. Rather, there was the underlying perception 
that the financially stronger spouse had a responsibility to support the care-dyad in the long-
term. Consequently, this suggests that the lawyers from England and Wales have a 
reconceptualised concept of partnership in comparison to the other jurisdictions, where 
partnership equates substantive, not formal, equality. The lack of formal equality or 
entitlement from within the data perhaps justifies why the lawyers thought that short 
marriages should return to the position that they were in before they were married.   
On a scale of 0 – 10, where 0 was agree and 10 was disagree, the interviewees were asked how 
far they agreed with the statement that their jurisdiction does not protect those who are 
financially dependent on their partners. It is evident in Table 6.6 that England and Wales had 
the highest percentage of those who disagreed with this statement, and Scotland had the 
highest number of those who agreed with this statement. Additionally, the lawyers were asked 
how far they agreed that their jurisdiction should not protect those who are financially 
dependent on their partners (Table 6.7). All the lawyers’ responses for this second question 
demonstrated that they wanted a higher level of protection for the financially dependent post-
separation. Scotland’s shift was most dramatic, demonstrating that the lawyers felt more 
protection was needed. 
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Consequently, it seems that the lawyers from England and Wales aligned far more with 
Fineman’s position. This is because a far less dramatic shift towards protecting the financially 
dependent was needed in comparison to the other jurisdictions. 
Table 6. 6 How far do the lawyers agree that their own jurisdiction does ‘not protect’ those who 
are financially dependent on their partners? 
 
Table 6.7 How far do the lawyers agree that their own jurisdiction should ‘not protect’ those 
who are financially dependent on their partners? 
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In fact, the data from England and Wales’ system indicates that it was the most child-centric 
jurisdiction of all and thus had Fineman’s care-dyad closer to its heart. Much like Australia, 
there were varying approaches when ordering the principles listed in Schedule B1158 and the 
lawyers also listed ‘child’s welfare’ and needs as most important, followed by fairness. 
Therefore, both Australia and England were child-centric with Fineman’s discretionary 
principles ranked at the top of the list. Interestingly, all the female lawyers in England and 
Wales bar one placed child’s welfare as the most important consideration of the courts, 
whereas most male participants placed fairness at the top (see Table 6.8 below). In 
comparison, ‘child’s welfare’ in Scotland was ranked at 7th and in New Zealand, it was last. Yet, 
while equal sharing, needs and compensation have been viewed in England and Wales as being 
the three strands of fairness, compensation was second to last in its average score, indicating 
that in actual fact it is not as prevalent, perhaps due to the majority of cases involving low 
assets. In fact, this was the lowest ranking of compensation out of all the jurisdictions 
demonstrating that even though it is an exception to equal sharing, in practice it is seldom 
used.   
Table 6.8: Order of principles ranked by importance 
Ranking by Average Score Principle Number of Times the 
Principle was Omitted from 
the List 
1 Child's Welfare 0 
2 Needs 0 
3 Fairness 0 
4 Equal Sharing 0 
5 Economic Burden of Caring 4 
6 Clean Break 1 
7 Retention of Property 
Interests 
4 
8 Compensation 1 
9 Reward for Past Contributions 3 
 
England and Wales’ child-centric approach was reflected in Table 6.9 and 6.10 below. Lawyers 
were asked to select a number on a scale of 0–10 to indicate whether having children made a 
difference to the way that domestic contributions are valued, where 0 signified that these 
contributions should be valued more favourably with children and 10 denoted that they should 
be valued more favourably without children. Five indicated that these contributions should be 
valued the same for couples with and without children and none of the lawyers selected a 
number above 5. As Table 6.9 demonstrates, lawyers from Australia and England and Wales 
                                                          
1158 See Appendix A for the principles 
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felt most strongly (and closely followed by Scotland), that where there were children, 
homemaking contributions should be treated more preferentially. Lawyers from New Zealand 
indicated that having children would not necessarily make a difference.  
The results of whether the lawyers thought that children should make a difference outlined in 
Table 6.10 had a similar distribution to Table 6.9. However, more interviewees from Australia 
indicated that couples with and without children should be treated in the same manner, thus it 
seems that the lawyers in England and Wales were the most child-centric out of all the 
jurisdictions. Interestingly, despite Scotland and New Zealand seemingly more Deech-centric, 
the results were hugely different. Most Scottish lawyers thought that children should make a 
difference whereas most interviewees from New Zealand thought that those with and without 
children should be treated the same. 
Table 6.9 Children v no children: How domestic contributions are valued across all four 
jurisdictions 
 
The most prevalent reason for a child-centric approach in England and Wales was attributed to 
need, or to the actual cost of child-rearing; some participants felt that the primary care-giving 
role had a detrimental impact on the child-carer’s career and therefore the individual’s ability 
to be autonomous. 
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Table 6.10 Children v no children: How domestic contributions should be valued across all four 
jurisdictions 
 
6.4.2.2 Impact of caring 
However, despite the theme of ‘substantive equality’ and the apparently more child-centric 
approach of the lawyers in England and Wales, the participants demonstrated some 
dissatisfaction with the way that the courts dealt with the impact of caring. Consequently, as 
Table 6.8 displayed above, compensation was the principle ranked the lowest, despite it being 
one of the three strands of fairness within the English system.  Yet the lawyers indicated that 
quantifying loss for compensation was in actual fact unfeasible (as had been identified in New 
Zealand): 
I don’t think it would fully rebalance future disadvantages, because no one has a 
crystal ball… (EWLaw6) 
This seemed to be linked to the accusation that the judges only paid lip service to the 
compensatory provision: 
…the courts have put the lid back on that box [compensation] so unless in exceptional 
cases and I haven’t had one yet, it doesn’t recognise it at all. It pays lip service to it but 
the district judges in my experience have shied completely away from it”. (EWLaw9) 
Table 6.12 also shows that the English lawyers were the least satisfied out of all the 
jurisdictions.  Australia (closely followed by Scotland) seems most content with the way that 
dual-earner couples are treated. Thus, there seems to be a trend that the more recognition is 
given to additional contributions, the more satisfied the lawyers are. Yet, the lawyers in 
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England and Wales are not as content with this outcome and it seems that a greater 
recognition of these additional contributions is desired.  
Out of all the jurisdictions, the lawyers in this jurisdiction gave the lowest score when asked 
how far their jurisdiction treats the additional domestic contribution in dual earner couples as 
demonstrated in Table 6.11. None of the lawyers indicated that the system fully rebalances 
past, present and future disadvantages (as in New Zealand). Twelve indicated that the 
additional contribution was disregarded. The frequency with which the English lawyers 
selected 0–3 was surprising given that this was even more frequent than Scotland and New 
Zealand. A similar trend was identified where there was a relationship model where one party 
worked full-time and the other worked part-time while carrying out the majority of the 
homemaker/care-giving contributions. 
Table 6.11: How far each jurisdiction treats the additional domestic contribution in dual earner 
couples 
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Table 6.12: Lawyers’ attitudes towards how their jurisdiction treats the additional domestic 
contribution in dual earner couples 
 
 
Again, out of all the jurisdictions, as demonstrated in Table 6.13 below, England and Wales had 
the highest number of respondents between 0–3,1159 when asked how the law compensated 
for any relationship generated disadvantage that arose in a full-time/part-time relationship 
model (where the part-time earner had made a career sacrifice in the interests of the 
relationship). Thus it seems that relationship-generated disadvantage is not considered as 
much as the other jurisdictions. However, the differences between the other jurisdictions were 
not as extensive as they had been in Table 6.11. Yet, when the respondents were asked how 
satisfied they were with this approach, England and Wales had by far the highest number of 
those who selected answers under five and the lowest number of those who thought that it 
was about right. It seems that, out of all the jurisdictions, lawyers from England and Wales felt 
their regime was the least generous, with Scotland being the most overly-generous. This was 
despite the fact that Table 6.13 had indicated that the lawyers throughout all the jurisdictions 
had similarly ranked how far each jurisdiction recognised any relationship generated 
disadvantage. 
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Table 6.13: Fulltime/part-time: how each jurisdiction recognises relationship-generated 
disadvantage  
 
Table 6.14: Fulltime/part-time: lawyers’ attitudes towards how each jurisdiction recognises 
relationship-generated disadvantage 
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because the judiciary does not sufficiently assess compensation; the courts only address it 
superficially: 
…the courts have put the lid back on that box so unless in exceptional cases and I 
haven’t had one yet, it doesn’t recognise it at all. It pays lip service to it but the district 
judges in my experience have shied completely away from it. (EWLaw9) 
 
Furthermore, this disadvantage was felt to be gendered. For some relationship generated 
disadvantage was not rebalanced and EWLaw11 also thought this was true for small asset 
pools: 
 If there’s more money than is required to meet the parties’ needs then I think the 
homemaker/breadwinner result, it tends towards fairness. In limited money cases then 
very often the person left with the children will in the long-term fair far worse. 
(EWLaw11)  
 
For two lawyers,1160 the courts were doing the best that they could do; it would never be 
possible to be able to account for all future needs and EWLaw2 felt that the courts’ difficulty in 
rebalancing these disadvantages was largely due to the provisions’ infancy and thus they may 
not currently be as satisfactory as they could be, which suggests that the full extent of the 
provision remains to be seen: 
I think that [there’s been] a recent movement towards the relationship generated 
disadvantage type claim, but I think it’s…in its infancy so I don’t think it’s gone as far as 
it could yet. (EWLaw2) 
However, given the higher satisfaction rates in the other jurisdictions (even in New Zealand 
with its very hard-line approach), perhaps a greater level of attention can be given to these 
contributions. Yet, it is possible that the lower level of satisfaction from the lawyers in England 
and Wales might come from the focus of the jurisdiction: it is forward looking (at needs and 
also substantive equality) whereas Australia is more retrospective and Scotland and New 
Zealand focus on the present (entitlement and equality from the assets). Therefore perhaps 
the lawyers in England and Wales have a greater expectation that the scheme should 
rebalance the needs of the parties whereas in the other jurisdictions similar approaches are 
considered to be a greater step to meeting the needs than in an already needs-based 
framework.  
6.4.3 Responses in the Cohabitation Context  
Just as in Scotland, the majority of the themes raised in this section of analysis concerned 
whether cohabitation should be treated differently from married couples. Similarly to 
                                                          
1160 EWLaw5,6 
267 
 
Scotland, most respondents from England and Wales felt that cohabiting and married couples 
were different and 11 (as shown in Table 6.15) felt that they should be treated differently too.  
Table 6.15 How domestic contributions are valued in cohabiting couples compared to married 
couples in England and Wales 
 
Furthermore, as Table 6.15 demonstrates, six agreed that married couples without children 
organise their financial and domestic affairs differently from cohabiting couples without 
children, although nine respondents disagreed with the statement that marital unions organise 
their affairs more traditionally than cohabiting couples. Yet, given that nine also agreed that 
married couples were more financially intertwined than cohabiting couples, it seems that 
perhaps the difference between these two relationship styles is not being attributed to the 
division of household responsibilities, but rather the financial enmeshing between the couples. 
However, where there are children, the consensus was that the relationships are similar (nine 
agreed). This reflected the distribution in Scotland1161 although fewer Scottish respondents 
agreed that all relationships with children were similar regardless of relationship style in 
comparison to England and Wales. 
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Table 6.16 Themes in the cohabitation context in England and Wales 
Themes Sub-Themes 
The scheme Inadequate 
Different from marriage 
Choice 
Commitment 
Similar to marriage 
Function 
Children 
Length 
Future Reform 
Uncertainty 
Theory and practice 
 
The themes from the qualitative analysis (outlined in Table 6.16) reflected these quantitative 
observations and the interviewees suggested (to a greater degree than the Scottish 
participants) that relationship function may be a key factor in the way that cohabiting 
relationships should be treated. Thus, the views were more pro-Fineman than had been 
expected. Nearly all of the participants acknowledged that the current state of affairs was 
‘inadequate’ as it left cohabitants in a vulnerable position at the end of a relationship: 
It’s a disaster! Very dissatisfied. (EWLaw5) 
Well the law relating to cohabitees is an absolute mess, everybody knows that. It’s 
extremely difficult to apply and...that can lead to a high degree of unfairness… 
(EWLaw12) 
Out of all the jurisdictions, the lawyers demonstrated that they were the least satisfied with 
the way that the law treated the homemaker/breadwinner model, how the law recognised any 
additional contributions made in a dual earner relationship model (where one party is 
predominantly responsible for the homemaking activities) and how the law compensated for 
any relationship generated disadvantage that arose in a  full-time/part-time relationship model 
(where the part-time earner had made a career sacrifice in the interests of the relationship). 
Table 6.17 demonstrates how dissatisfied the lawyers were on a scale of 0–10 (where 0 
equated with domestic contributions being recognised too little in each relationship model).  
This jurisdiction has the highest frequency of scores of ‘2’ or below out of all the jurisdictions. 
Yet, out of the three relationship models, the interviewees from England and Wales appeared 
to be least dissatisfied with the dual-earner relationship model as two1162  believed that 
recognising additional contributions would be impractical and a further two1163 deemed that 
this was the least of the cohabitants’ concerns; bigger issues need addressing. 
                                                          
1162 EWLaw1,2 
1163 EWLaw5,6 
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Table 6.17: Comparison of attitudes towards different relationship models in England and 
Wales 
 
Yet, while most believed that the current state of affairs needed to be reformed, the majority 
of respondents felt that cohabiting and married couples should be treated differently on 
relationship breakdown. This was generally attributed to the themes of ‘choice’ and 
‘commitment’: some of the lawyers believed that cohabitants had actively chosen not to marry 
and this choice should therefore be respected. The interviewees who believed that cohabiting 
couples were not as committed as married couples consequently argued that these 
cohabitants should not have as many ongoing responsibilities post-separation:  
...It seems to be much...stronger the case in unmarried couples because they haven’t 
taken on a lifetime commitment, so it seems to me that if they separate, there 
shouldn’t be a continuing uh a continuing responsibility. (EWLaw7) 
 
On the whole the lawyers felt that clean break was more appropriate than ongoing financial 
responsibility and two lawyers1164 felt that it is not the law’s functions in these scenarios to 
protect cohabitants in such a way: 
Yeah I don’t think that’s the function of the law of relationship breakdown. (EWLaw8) 
Yet, the discussion over difference was far less thorough than it had been in Scotland, and 
instead the lawyers were concerned with the lack of protection that the homemaker was 
receiving. Consequently, this theme of ‘difference’ did not appear to mean that the 
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interviewees agreed with Deech’s position that cohabitants should have no protection at all.  
Instead the lawyers were dissatisfied with the fact that cohabiting disputes fell under Property 
Law rather than Family Law: 
Um, yes because the law isn’t based on the people, it’s based on the property and I 
think that’s completely inappropriate to Family Law. (EWLaw8) 
…because the court when dealing with property and trusts looks at what each party 
brought financially to the party, then that could adversely affect the homemaker 
because she was at home and not contributor… (EWLaw6). 
This adds weight to the findings in Australia that Family Law is far more suitable than Property 
Law for a cohabitation regime and therefore questions Deech’s argument that cohabitants 
should be able to ‘escape’ the confines of Family Law. The current property-based approach in 
England and Wales was felt to be too rigid, and some of the lawyers wanted to see a greater 
amount of discretion in the courts so that a wider range of contributions could be taken into 
consideration: 
...you pull together and you do things for the family and any family wealth as a result 
of you pulling together [should] be recognised on distribution. (EWLaw6) 
Furthermore, the lawyers criticised the current provisions for not being child-centric enough: 
...the law is still inadequate under Schedule 1 of the Children Act when you are 
providing for children where there are cohabitees...The capital applications under the 
Children’s Act are very rarely used and they, it ought to be easier to use and I also think 
applying strict property rights in that situation is probably wrong where you’re raising 
children… (EWLaw12) 
Therefore most of the lawyers wanted more protection to be given to Fineman’s care-dyad by 
having child welfare as the most important principle of a cohabitation regime.  
While most lawyers wanted different relationship styles to have different regimes, the theme 
of ‘function’ also emerged. Just over a third of the lawyers felt that where cohabiting couples 
were functionally similar to married couples, they should also be treated similarly: 
 I think they should be the same and I suppose that’s the opportunity to say if you take 
the view that cohabitation is functionally the equivalent of marriage, then why should 
marriage be treated any differently in terms of what provisions are available on 
breakdown. (EWLaw13) 
It seemed that for some participants, being faced with the practical reality of the relationship 
often overtook the abstract campaign for difference between relationship styles: 
I think that I would say they’re the same…[but] when you actually think through the 
different scenarios, I don’t think there should be much of a distinction. (EWLaw13) 
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Relationships were identified as being functionally similar according to ‘length’ and ‘children’. 
Four lawyers suggested that where there were children, married and cohabiting couples 
should be treated similarly: 
...[it] should be more similar to marriage where there’s a child. (EWLaw4) 
The justifications for this were because of the inevitable dependency that arose from care-
giving: the care-giver will have greater needs and will often be financially weaker than the 
other party. Some of the respondents felt that relationship length and children meant that 
maintenance or a greater degree of support should be available at the end of the relationship.  
Yet, this more protective approach was only in reference to these exceptions of children and 
relationship duration. Thus, for those in shorter relationships without children, the lawyers 
indicated that a difference should be maintained between relationship styles, with cohabiting 
couples less entitled to maintenance provisions. However, the lawyers were torn on the 
approach that should be taken here: how far should a cohabitation regime respect the 
autonomous decision not to marry? 
...this is one where again I feel a bit torn about it because it seems to me that you’ve 
got couples who have not chosen to commit to one another in marriage, so not chosen 
a lifetime commitment. On the other hand, that can produce some real hardship in 
some cases. And I do, uh, question whether something should be done to address that 
hardship. (EWLaw7) 
As a result of this internal conflict there was ‘uncertainty’: none of the respondents could 
determine how the law should intervene for those without children. Some specifically referred 
to their confusion over the shape that any reform should take: 
I think it probably should differ, I think there should be some differentiation between 
those who commit themselves to marriage and those who don’t. I hope you’re not 
going to ask me what that is because that’s much more difficult. (EWLaw9) 
 
This is perhaps indicative of a gap between ‘theory and practice’; the lawyers believe 
cohabitants should be treated separately, but when faced with the practical reality of 
relationship dynamics there is little differentiation with married couples. This difference 
between theory and practicality was reflected (although with more force) in Scotland. Thus it 
seems that while the lawyers generally believed that cohabiting and married couples should be 
treated separately, it appeared that this was with less fervour than in the Scottish context. 
Instead, the respondents’ focus in England and Wales was on the function of the relationships 
and the need to give greater protection to the care-dyad. 
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6.4.4 Same-Sex Relationships 
Table 6.18 Themes in the same-sex context in England and Wales 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Uncertainty 
Lack of experience 
Presumed Similarity 
 
In the same-sex context, similar themes to all the other jurisdictions were raised. Firstly, most 
lawyers emphasised that they had not had a great deal of experience over same-sex 
relationships, particularly civil partnerships. However, despite this, the respondents generally 
felt that the relationships would be treated in the same way:  
I think generally the courts are very careful not to discriminate against civil partners 
and so… I think a civil partnership would more than likely follow the marriage model. 
(EWLaw1) 
For each question, the respondents, although uncertain, gave the same responses in the same-
sex context as they had done in the different-sex context. When the respondents were 
specifically asked how domestic contributions were valued in same-sex relationships (both civil 
partnerships and cohabiting relationships) compared with different-sex relationships (both 
marriage and cohabiting relationships) all the respondents agreed that the couples were and 
should be treated the same.  
Table 6.19: Attitudes towards same-sex relationships in England and Wales 
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Similarly, as Table 6.19 shows, the majority of respondents agreed that same-sex relationships 
divide their relationship responsibilities in a similar manner to different sex relationships. 
6.4.5 The Vignettes 
6.4.5.1 Scenario A 
Table 6.20: Attitudes to England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario A - responses from England 
and Wales compared with Scotland 
 
When presented with Scenario A’s outcome which was based on Burns,1165 the mode response 
was ‘0’, that the outcome was too protective of the breadwinner as demonstrated in Table 
6.20. Scotland’s lawyers selected much higher answers indicating a higher level of satisfaction 
with the approach and were a lot closer to ‘5’, ‘about right’ suggesting that the Scottish 
respondents preferred a more restrictive approach than the respondents in England and 
Wales.  
The New Zealand responses (Table 6.21) most frequently indicated that this was far too 
protective of the breadwinner out of all the jurisdictions. Five lawyers in England and Wales 
wanted the approach to be a little more generous and five wanted it to be much more 
generous. Only three wanted it to be similar to marriage and three respondents felt there 
should be an equal share of the assets, that is to say the award should be an entitlement.1166 
                                                          
1165 Based on Burns v Burns (1986) Ch 317 
1166 EWLaw6,12,13 
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The majority of respondents wanted there to be greater financial support either through a 
lump sum or limited maintenance1167 to help Miss Jones get back on her feet. 
…well frankly it would be entitled to some form of finance, but not housing for however 
many years it would be. Oh, actually I’d make it a little more generous. (EWLaw1) 
Table 6.21: Attitudes to England and Wales’ outcome in Scenario A - responses from Australia 
compared with New Zealand 
 
6.4.5.1.1 Scenario A – The Variables 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law would alter its response for four different 
variables.1168 It is clear in Table 6.22 that the lawyers felt that the same outcome would occur 
where there were no children and also where it was a same-sex relationship. Marriage 
unsurprisingly would make the outcome much more generous. Continued employment 
affected answers depending on where the money was placed: if it was added to the property 
then it would increase the settlement, if not then it would either stay the same or even be less 
generous.   
 
 
                                                          
1167 EWLaw1,3,4,5,7,10 
1168 Appendix A or New Zealand, Table 3.18 
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Table 6.22: How Scenario A’s outcome in England and Wales would vary for each variable 
 
Table 6.23: how satisfied the lawyers are with Scenario A’s outcomes in England and Wales for 
each variable. 
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As Table 6.23 shows, the outcome was deemed about right for most of the variables except 
where there were no children; the lawyers believed that it was too protective of the 
breadwinner. This perhaps reflects the impact that the Children Act has on settlements for 
cohabiting couples with children. In the absence of children, there is no recognition for the 
homemaking role. Furthermore, in Table 6.24 the majority of lawyers indicated that they 
wanted to make the scenario without children more generous, followed by the scenario where 
there was continuous employment. 
Table 6.24: How the lawyers would alter England and Wales' approach to Scenario A 
 
6.4.5.2 Scenario B1169 
When asked how satisfied the lawyers were with the outcome in Scenario B based on 
Miller,1170 nine selected ‘5’ that the outcome was about right and, following this, eight would 
not change the outcome but three would make it a little less generous. Given the criticism that 
has followed Miller1171 for being overly-generous, this was a surprise as it seems that in fact the 
lawyers are satisfied with the approach taken. 
6.4.5.2.1 Scenario B – The Variables 
The lawyers were then asked about how the law would alter its response for four different 
variables.1172 Table 6.25 shows that the lawyers felt civil partnerships would be treated the 
same. If the marriage had been longer, 11 felt it would be much more generous and the 
                                                          
1169 Based on Miller v Miller; [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
1170 Miller v Miller; [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
1171 Miller v Miller; [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
1172 Appendix A or Chapter 3, table 3.13 
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lawyers indicated that the award would be much closer to equality most likely at around 40%. 
Most lawyers felt that if there had been children the award would become more generous, 
although where Mrs Higgins had carried on in employment, seven felt that the award would be 
less generous, and that she would receive a lower settlement attributable to the lower level of 
maintenance that she would be entitled to on account of compensation for giving up her 
career. 
Table 6.25: How Scenario B’s outcome in England and Wales would vary for each variable 
 
 
Yet, overall the lawyers felt that the outcome was about right in all the scenarios which is 
reflected in Table 6.26 where the majority of respondents indicated that they would keep the 
outcome the same for the variables. However, six respondents wanted it to be less generous in 
a longer marriage. 
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 Table 6.26: How the Lawyers would alter England’s and Wales' approach to Scenario B 
 
6.5 England and Wales’ System of Financial Provision: A 
Conclusion 
This jurisdiction has offered an opportunity to explore regimes that sit at the polarised ends of 
the Deech-Fineman spectrum. It is therefore unsurprising that from the doctrinal and feminist 
analysis, both the married and the cohabitation regime only appeared to be satisfactory from 
one feminist position. In the married context, the needs-based approach clearly was the 
jurisdiction that provided the most protection for Fineman’s care-dyad as England and Wales 
was the only jurisdiction that essentially defined equality as being substantive rather than 
formal. This was also reflected in the themes that emerged from the empirical analysis, and 
the lawyers demonstrated a ‘reconceptualised partnership’ where they emphasised the 
importance of rebalancing economic disadvantages and supporting the economically weaker 
party at the end of the relationship.  
Consequently, this system (and the discretion that is used) is forward looking, and seeks to 
redress the full economic impact of caring. Yet, the lawyers evidently felt that the approach in 
England and Wales was not protective enough as the participants here had the lowest levels of 
satisfaction out of all the other jurisdictions for the other two models of a dual-earner and full-
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time/part-time earners. This finding was surprising given that England and Wales was so pro-
Fineman in its approach. The lawyers indicated that this may be because of the inherent 
difficulty that the courts face when quantifying relationship generated disadvantage; no-one 
has a crystal ball. However, this overall dissatisfaction with a Family Law approach that is so 
pro-Fineman may also reflect the limitations of private law being used to meet Fineman’s 
aims. Fineman clearly set out that to fully achieve equality of resources it is necessary to have 
a substantial overhaul of the public/private boundaries as well as a shift in social and legal 
definition of the family so that it is based around care-giving rather than sexual 
relationships.1173 Thus, perhaps the lawyers’ frustration with this approach represents the fact 
that private law has been stretched as far as it possibly can go to accommodate Fineman’s 
care-dyad. Greater satisfaction may only now come from more substantial changes to the 
social contract.  
Still, it was surprising that the lawyers were the least satisfied out of all the jurisdictions given 
that the approach was mostly pro-Fineman. This anomaly may potentially be explained 
through the lawyers’ (in England and Wales) expectations. The respondents defined 
partnership as meaning substantive rather than formal equality which therefore centred on 
rebalancing needs and economic disadvantages. Consequently, their expectations may have 
been higher in terms of achieving ‘equality of resources’ than the participants from the other 
jurisdictions. As a result of this needs-based approach, the respondents may therefore have 
been more critical of the way in which needs were being met. In comparison, the other 
jurisdictions did not have needs as a central focus and therefore may not have been so 
conscious of the way in which their jurisdiction’s approach dealt with this issue; the lawyers 
from England and Wales may have expected more from their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in 
both the doctrinal and empirical analysis, needs appeared overall to be a successful rationale 
for interpreting the s25 provisions particularly in smaller asset cases. Yet, in big money cases, 
the rationale appears to become much more complex, and the courts seem to be unsure over 
how far the sharing provision should apply to substantial assets owned by one party. 
Consequently, the approach to be taken towards matrimonial property, the doctrine of special 
contributions and pre-nuptial agreements is not overly certain, and there appears to be a 
mixture of conflicting approaches which reflect both Fineman’s and Deech’s positions. The 
courts therefore do not appear to have definitively committed themselves to one approach or 
another and it is unclear whether or not property will be classified as non-matrimonial, 
business acumen as a special contribution, and whether pre-nuptial agreement will carry 
                                                          
1173 M Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory Of Dependency (New Press 2004) 
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weight. Further clarity over how the courts should approach big money cases is evidently 
needed. Therefore, from Deech’s perspective, the married context is wholly unsatisfactory in 
its current format. The lack of certainty surrounding the equal sharing provision means that in 
effect there is little to no real protection for financial autonomy and financial assets, and 
consequently this may perpetuate wives’ economic dependency on their husbands. Therefore, 
there is the danger that this current approach, combined with the broad interpretation of 
needs may not respect (nor encourage) the financial autonomy of the parties particularly in 
short marriages without children. This is especially heightened by the generous maintenance 
provisions available that do not focus on rehabilitation in the way that such provisions do in 
the other jurisdictions.  
In complete contrast, in the cohabitation context the opposite is true. While the cohabitation 
framework most strongly espouses Deech’s belief in autonomy, independence and privacy, for 
Fineman it completely ignores the care-dyad and the dependency that frequently exists in such 
a relationship. Consequently, this approach seems to be suitable for couples with complete 
financial independence, yet at the same time it seems dangerously unsupportive for the 
economically weaker partner where the balance of power is not equal and particularly where a 
care relationship exists. The lawyers were evidently dissatisfied with this approach, and a large 
proportion of the participants from other jurisdictions had been shocked at the level of 
protection in England and Wales. Furthermore, the participants in this jurisdiction indicated 
that Property Law (much as Australia confirmed) was not the appropriate forum to regulate 
cohabiting couples at the end of their relationship, and it was clear that more family-based 
remedies were desired instead. This criticism towards this regime also demonstrates that an 
approach which is the most ‘pure’ from Deech’s position is in actual fact the model which has 
the lowest rates of satisfaction, and evidently, therefore, the respondents do not align 
themselves with Deech’s position. Therefore, on the whole, the participants were in 
agreement that something needs to be done and a greater level of protection is needed; 
Property Law is not the appropriate forum through which to decide matters post-separation. 
More lawyers than expected were pro-Fineman in their suggestion that financial provision at 
the end of a relationship should be based on function, and thus cohabiting and married 
couples with children should be treated in the same way. Yet, the majority believed that there 
should be some difference between these relationship styles (although with less fervour than 
the Scottish lawyers). While it was difficult to identify a coherent way in which these 
relationships should be treated differently, it seems that the lawyers wanted maintenance to 
be limited.   
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While neither of these approaches has achieved a balance between Deech and Fineman, each 
framework presents a thorough picture of how these feminist positions would operate in 
reality.  Furthermore, the empirical stage in this chapter has allowed the positive and negative 
aspects of this system to be tentatively compared with the other jurisdictions that have 
(differing) approaches which blend these two feminist positions together. Consequently, it is 
possible to compare the effects of essentially ‘watering down’ these approaches in different 
manners. One thing that appears certain from all the jurisdictions is that an evaluation of 
contributions always disadvantages the homemaker. Secondly, the operation of discretion 
requires clear guidelines, regardless of whether Fineman or Deech is the starting point of the 
scheme. The three strands of fairness that guide discretion in England and Wales appear to be 
the most successful mix of discretion with guidelines. The lawyers from England and Wales did 
not voice as many procedural criticisms as the Australian lawyers had in reference to the use of 
discretion, and at the same time it avoided the overly-rigid application of discretion which had 
been present in both Scotland and New Zealand.  
However, before it is possible for this thesis to address reform options in light of examining 
these jurisdictions, the next chapter considers a fundamentally important element that feeds 
into this matter: how do members of the public think that the law should approach domestic 
contributions. Consequently, Chapter 7 presents the findings from the focus groups to 
consider how these various methods of valuing domestic contributions, raised in the previous 
chapters would be received by the affected community in England and Wales. Which options 
are preferred by those who would be directly affected by such change? 
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLEMENTING DEECH OR FINEMAN? 
FOCUS GROUP ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The last four chapters have tested out how the approaches of Fineman and Deech work in 
practice by critiquing the systems of financial provision in New Zealand, Scotland, Australia and 
England and Wales which differentially reflect the positions between these two feminist 
commentators. The detailed empirical and feminist analysis conducted in the past few 
chapters has therefore examined the implications that these stances would have on (usually 
female) homemakers and further considered whether a balance between these two polarised 
feminist positions can be achieved. This chapter now considers the possibility of implementing 
these two different positions in England and Wales by exploring a range of views that some 
non-lawyers in this jurisdiction have on issues relating to the valuation of domestic 
contributions. In particular this part examines whether these views lean towards Deech’s or 
Fineman’s position to provide insight when considering the shape of future reform.1174 
To gather this information, this thesis used a small number of focus groups. However, due to 
the time constraints and also the scope of this project it was not possible to do this on a larger 
scale and thus the sample selected is modest in its size, but appropriate for a qualitative 
thematic analysis. Consequently, although the sample was purposively selected to include an 
appropriate range of participants as discussed below, the views that arise here are not being 
held out as nationally representative as it is not possible to say whether they reflect broader 
trends within the general public in England and Wales. Yet, given the dangers of legal 
transplanting that were identified in Chapter 21175 (especially those voiced by Cotterrell on the 
‘affected community’)1176 it was felt that it was necessary to give some contextualisation to the 
findings so far made in the previous chapters, before considering the impact that the results 
from this project may have on reform considerations. Therefore, this chapter serves as the first 
step towards examining how Deech and Fineman’s respective approaches might serve families 
in England and Wales; how viable or indeed desired such schemes are, and how these different 
formulations of domestic contributions would be received by the affected community. While 
                                                          
1174 These two views are summarised in Appendix I and Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.4 
1175 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2 
1176 R Cotterrell, ‘Is There A Logic Of Legal Transplants’ in D Nelken and J Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart 2001) 71, 83; E 
Örücü, ‘Law as Transposition’ (2002) 51(2) International and Comparative Law 205; R Probert, ‘From Lack of Status to Contract: 
Assessing the French Pacte Civil de Solidarite’ (2001) 23(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 257, 266 - 267 
284 
 
this chapter provides some insight into these matters, this insight is necessarily limited by the 
scale of the project and thus further research is necessary to explore this in greater detail. 
7.2 Sample and Methodology 
 
With this limitation in mind, this thesis sought to ground the findings from the previous 
chapters by using focus groups that consisted of non-lawyers in England and Wales. The 
sample, as previously emphasised, was not intended to be statistically representative. 
However, it was felt that there were certain viewpoints that were important to reflect and 
therefore participants with these socio-demographic characteristics (including relationship 
experience) were purposively selected. Given the contentious debate on whether married/civil 
partners and cohabiting couples should be treated similarly or differently, and considering the 
gendered nature of domestic contributions,1177 this project therefore tried to recruit an even 
number of men and women, an even number of married and cohabiting participants as well as 
a number of respondents who were in same-sex relationships (either cohabiting or civil 
partnered).  
Altogether, 23 participants took part (12 respondents were men and 11 were women) with 
groups of between four and six people, each focus group lasting between 45–60 minutes. The 
groups were divided according to relationship and gender with one additional group that had 
participants who were in same-sex relationships as it was felt that these relationships would 
not carry the same gendered hierarchy that different-sex relationships may. Thus altogether 
five focus groups were held and divided into relationship category groups as follows: married 
women; married men; cohabiting women; cohabiting men; and same-sex relationships. 
Given the importance that age, gender, children and employment play in the division of 
relationship responsibilities,1178 this project also sought to include a range of those socio-
demographic characteristics. There was a large range of ages, but most fell between 25–441179 
and the majority of cohabitants were under 30.1180 Of those who took part, eight had 
children1181 (none of the same-sex respondents had children) and there was a spread of 
                                                          
1177 See Chapter 1 section 1.3 
1178 R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K 
Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52, 74 - 75  
1179 The biggest category in Crompton et al.’s survey out of their four age categories, 18 – 24, 25 – 34, 35 – 44, and 45+: R 
Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M 
Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52 
1180 This corresponds with research that has shown that cohabiting relationships tend to be between younger couples: J Haskey, 
‘Cohabitation in Great Britain: Past, Present and Future trends and attitudes’ (2001) 103 Population Trends 4 
1181 Of these, only one had children from a previous relationship and only one had children who had all left home 
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employment statuses (fulltime, part-time and those who were not employed)1182 and 
correspondingly of incomes. Interestingly 11 participants were in a dual-earner1183relationship 
model, three in a full-time/part-time model and nine in a homemaker/breadwinner1184 
relationship model. Women were more likely than men to have the part-time or the 
homemaker role and so were financially weaker than their partners, whereas the men were 
more likely to be in the fulltime or breadwinner role and so were financially stronger than their 
partners. This reflects research which demonstrates that women tend to be responsible for the 
majority of household tasks1185 and work part-time more frequently than men.1186  
 
The focus group schedule1187 was designed to determine how the respondents felt regarding 
specific issues relating to how domestic contributions should be valued. Therefore, the 
schedule asked participants how domestic contributions should be valued alongside financial 
ones and how to define relationship property. Furthermore, the groups were asked to discuss 
their preference of a range of models based on the differing approaches in the previous 
jurisdictions, and were then presented with two scenarios1188 which had a number of potential 
outcomes based on these differing approaches, where they were asked to select which 
outcome they preferred.  
 
Each focus group was recorded on an MP3, and thematic analysis was used to analyse the 
qualitative data. As outlined in section 2.2.4.2.3, this approach to analysis meant that the 
transcripts were repeatedly read until a familiarity with the texts was achieved and codes were 
developed, given conceptual labels and then themes. Theoretical thematic analysis1189 was 
used, generating themes by analysing the data through the lens of Deech and Fineman’s 
opposing stances. 
7.3 Data Analysis 
 
The thematic analysis of the data revealed four main substantive themes with a number of 
sub-themes relating to the way that domestic contributions should be valued on relationship 
breakdown demonstrated in Table 7.1 below. 
                                                          
1182 This included participants who identified themselves as homemakers, students and retired 
1183 This included couples where the roles were equal, for example student and student 
1184 This was determined as couples where one party was working and one was not even if they were in education 
1185 R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K 
Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52; 
1186 There are nearly five times as many part-time women as men. National Statistics (2009) ‘Labour market’ Social Trends 39 (ONS 
2009) 7 
1187 Appendix B 
1188 Based on Burns  v Burns (1984) Ch 317 and Miller v Miller [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
1189 V Braun and V Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology 77, 84 
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Table 7.1 Themes generated from the Focus Group Data Set 
 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Contingent autonomy 
Choice 
Autonomy myth (children) 
Needs 
Sacrifice (relationship-generated 
disadvantage) 
Limited partnership 
Mutual dependency 
Entitlement 
Unjust enrichment 
Relationship property as ‘family assets’ 
Evaluation (specifically valuing 
contributions) 
Effort 
Financial 
Asset size 
Relationship length 
Equality between relationship styles Qualifying period (children/length) 
 
 
7.3.1 Autonomy 
The concept of autonomy was a theme raised by a number of the respondents throughout the 
focus groups and it emerged from the sub-themes that essentially there was a divide present 
between autonomy which reflected Deech’s notions of responsibility for a person’s actions and 
choices1190 and Fineman’s autonomy myth which argues that in fact dependency is inherent in 
caretaking relationships.1191 Deech’s concept of autonomy received a great deal of support 
from the focus group participants and there is considerable emphasis placed on the 
significance of ‘choice’ behind decisions made within the domestic sphere: 
I was wondering whether it was…having to take responsibility for protecting yourself a 
little bit as well. I don’t know whether that sounds a bit harsh, but if a woman chooses 
to be with a man who pays for absolutely everything...she’s left herself with nothing 
and is no way protected (Kes, cohabiting women group) 
…I find it a bit uncomfortable about paying for a decision that they’ve made really. In a 
way it’s like you make your choices. (Julian, cohabiting men group)  
                                                          
1190 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140, 1142 
1191 M Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory Of Dependency (New Press 2004) 193 
287 
 
As a result it seems that the fear is that the parties will be unjustly enriched if responsibility is 
not given to their own independent decisions. However, the vast majority of respondents 
considered that this ability to make a choice was in fact severely limited by the presence of 
care-giving relationships: 
It’s only when they have kids it’s normally there’s a sacrifice, otherwise as you’ve said, 
there’s no excuse! (Leonard, married men group) 
This sub-theme of the autonomy myth was linked directly with that of ‘needs’: 
...and obviously whoever is going to do the majority of the parenting is going to require 
financial support for that and is going to be unable to work because of that. (Geordie, 
same-sex relationship group) 
This trend towards aligning more with Fineman’s conception of an ‘autonomy myth’ in care-
giving relationships was most prevalent when the respondents were discussing sacrifice or 
relationship generated disadvantages and whether or not they should be recognised as 
contributions made in a relationship. Generally, career changes and care-giving were 
recognised mostly as sacrifices, and many of the respondents who clearly felt that there was a 
choice believed that sacrifices should not be recognised. Here there was a sense of Deech’s 
position of taking responsibility for one’s decisions:1192 
...because at the time when you’re in a relationship you do make sacrifices and that’s 
part of a relationship and you’re not being forced to do something for the benefit of the 
relationship, you’re doing it because of your relationship as a whole. (Will, same-sex 
relationship group) 
Those who felt it should be recognised referred to situations (often involving childcare) where 
choice was absent; so compensation should only be for those sacrifices that had to be made: 
 I think if you’re sacrificing something like to care for a disabled child or something, 
then that should be quite highly recognised. But general domestic…everything is equal 
so. (Will, same-sex relationship group) 
 
The respondents further demonstrated this perception that children reduced the ability for 
parties to attain financial autonomy when they were asked their opinions on five models of 
property settlement based on the jurisdictions explored in this thesis and outlined in Table 7.2 
below.1193 Model five (presented to the respondents as considering needs and compensation) 
was preferred by almost half the respondents as they felt it produced a fairer outcome. 
However, it was clear that this was only in the context of couples with children:  
                                                          
1192 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1142 
1193 See Appendix B 
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I agree, but I like model 5 for if someone has a child. (Beth, same-sex relationship 
group) 
Table 7.2: Model number with corresponding jurisdiction 
Model Number Jurisdiction 
1 England and Wales’ Approach to Cohabitants 
2 Scotland’s Approach to Cohabitants 
3 Australia’s General Approach and New Zealand’s Approach to Short 
Marriages 
4 Scotland and New Zealand (equality) 
5 England and Wales’s Approach to Marriage/Civil Partnership 
 
Thus it seems that while the respondents did fundamentally believe that where decisions 
made out of choice should not be considered sacrifices and a level of accountability should be 
placed on one’s own actions, in fact children and the presence of a care-dyad essentially 
reduced a party’s autonomy in a relationship, with dependency instead intrinsic. 
Consequently, the respondents seemed to reflect that on relationship breakdown, greater 
recognition should be given to sacrifices and also to the resulting needs that arise from this 
circumstance. Model five, the approach in England and Wales, was considered the most 
appropriate mechanism for doing so.  
 
7.3.2 Partnership 
Partnership was the biggest theme that was collated during the thematic analysis and 
consisted of the most sub-themes. The majority of participants referred to mutual dependency 
as a factor that was fundamentally important in a relationship and should subsequently be 
given recognition. Nearly all of the respondents highlighted the importance of ‘emotional 
support’ in times of difficulty or supporting a difficult job, suggesting a mutual emotional co-
dependency between couples: 
…there’s a role to cry on each other’s shoulders; emotional support. I don’t know how 
you quantify that but I should have thought that was particularly important…that 
emotional support, particularly when the going gets tough. (Jim, married men group)  
Furthermore, many participants indicated how a homemaking role worked to support a 
breadwinning role, suggesting the social bargain that ‘the wife should perform domestic 
functions, and in return she should receive protection and support from her husband’1194 
identified by Eekelaar.  
                                                          
1194 J Eekelaar, ‘Uncovering Social Obligations: Family Law and the Responsible System’ in M MacLean (eds), Making Law for 
Families (Hart 2000) 16 
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…if you’re running a business, if you’re earning a salary whatever, you’re enabled to 
that by your other, by your relationship like someone who is looking after the kids or 
worked for two years through the training. (Montgomery, married men group) 
 
In fact the roles and decisions made in the relationship were seen as a partnership decision 
overall: 
 Well, it comes down to the things that they’ve decided as a couple... (Montgomery, 
married men group) 
From this, it could be said that in fact there is an expectation therefore of mutual support at 
the end of the relationship and an equally strong theme that was established throughout the 
analysis was a sense of entitlement. This seems to imply that Fineman’s care-dyad should 
therefore receive financial support as a result of the domestic contributions made. 
I suppose when you go into a relationship you go into it on an equal basis emotionally 
don’t you and when you come out of it…on a financially equal basis. You wouldn’t go 
into it saying okay well I have more than you have. (Miles, cohabiting men group) 
 
...but if you get married I suppose that’s what it is. You’re supposed to be a team and 
you enter into that knowing [that] legally. (Anna, cohabiting women group) 
...so if we did break up, I would, as the main earner, I wouldn’t see why he wouldn’t get 
any because he’s been part of the relationship and he was there at the time when we 
were sharing.’(Christine, married women group) 
However, while the sense of entitlement perhaps first implies that it will be accompanied by 
some level of equality, another sub-theme indicated that the respondents were concerned 
that formal equality could lead to unjust enrichment and ‘gold-digging’, reflecting a concern 
from Deech’s position.1195  
I mean it would encourage all kinds of abuse...once you get that ring on your finger 
you’re entitled to half. (Mark, married men group) 
This was a particular concern where there was an uneven distribution of financial income or 
where one party’s contributions were financially ‘special’ in their nature. 
Sue: …if you get divorced then if you’ve had a husband who’s been earning right 
round the clock while you’ve been, which some women can be doing which is 
also socialising and enjoying the money... 
Lou: Yeah, painting their toenails 
Sue ...then actually in a way it does seem unfair that they’re entitled to whole or 
half... 
(Sue and Lou, married women group) 
Many of the participants indicated that formal equality was only suitable where roles reflected 
a greater level of equality or joint enterprise partnership, matching earlier discussions of 
equality: 
                                                          
1195 R Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140 
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Presumably if you’re both equal then it’s kind of less of an issue…It’s when there’s 
unequalness then it becomes more…that’s when it becomes difficult. And you have to 
find out what’s fair really. (Jake, cohabiting men group) 
Thus it seems that this would mean that there is little to gain by way of unjust enrichment. 
Consequently, a sub-theme indicated that the participants felt that reflecting the concept of 
partnership on relationship breakdown through formal equality (as in New Zealand) should not 
be automatic. Instead a number of qualifying factors for equal sharing to be present were 
suggested where the couple were not on an equal financial footing therefore limiting unjust 
enrichment. Firstly, there was the presence of children reflecting again the impact that 
Fineman’s care-dyad should have on relationship breakdown: 
...bringing up children [while] the husband’s making loads of money on the stocks and 
shares…[is different to just] two independent people living in the same house. Perhaps 
there’s less of an entitlement to his talents and the money he can make from that. I 
think it depends on the situation. (Sarah, cohabiting women group) 
 
Secondly where there is a ‘nexus’ between the wealth and the special contribution such as a 
family business built from scratch compared to the talent of one party, then equality (similar 
to the concept in Australia) was suggested to be contingent: 
 
Ben: ‘…well in that instance that’s a couple that have been together a while and 
they accumulated their vast sums individually and together…then why 
shouldn’t they both get half each. It would seem unfair to…weigh it on one 
person.’ 
Wilfred: ‘I agree, yeah’. 
Ben: ‘That’s one case. But…[with] a Rooney and Coleen, erm, he’s… propelled her 
into the limelight so everything she’s got is because of him effectively you 
would say really. So to then split his assets over hers…would that be fair?’ 
      (Ben and Wilfred, cohabiting men group) 
The majority also felt that formal equality should thirdly hinge on the length of the 
relationship: 
I think it would depend on the length of time, say if it were 20 year marriage there will 
be a…greater…emotional investment in it rather than one year. (Naomi, cohabiting 
women group) 
Therefore, while it was evident that the respondents seemed to align more with Fineman’s 
position in recognising a partnership and the mutual dependence that arises from it, it is 
evident that there is considerable worry that a partnership approach on relationship 
breakdown will lead, as Deech fears, to ‘gold-digging’. This was further reflected when the 
respondents considered preferred models of property settlement (see Table 7.2) and only one 
participant selected model four while the other participants felt that formal equality is only 
suitable for those in financially similar positions. Where parties faced financial imbalances, the 
triggering circumstances should be children, considerable length or nexus.  
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The extent by which the participants viewed partnership at the end of a relationship was 
demonstrated also through their definition of relationship property. Some believed that all 
property should be considered to be relationship property and thus awards should be made on 
the grounds of fairness. However, the majority felt that it should be more restrictively defined 
and generally that inheritances, gifts, business assets and initial contributions should not 
automatically be included within the relationship’s asset pool. This advocates Baroness Hale’s 
approach in Miller1196 and the definition in New Zealand1197 which looks at ‘family assets’ as 
relationship property subject to division on relationship breakdown. 
While generally the participants wanted to see a narrower definition of this property, it was 
evident that the respondents felt non-family assets should become relationship property if 
there was either a nexus (as in Australia)1198 between a contribution and the asset or as a 
result of usage. This is akin to the approach currently taken in Scotland. 
 …if you’re running a business, if you’re earning a salary whatever, you’re enabled to 
that by your other, by your relationship like someone who is looking after the kids or 
worked for two years through the training (Mark, married men group) 
 Categorising it with heirlooms or business you could say has it contributed to your 
relationship, have you both benefitted from it… (Christine, married women group) 
It seems that this definition is a balance between Deech’s and Fineman’s position between 
protecting the breadwinner’s assets and encouraging ‘self-dependency’ and ‘caring for the 
care-giver’ where it would impinge on their lifestyle to a greater degree, based on the use of 
that asset. 
 
In fact, overall while the respondents wanted to promote and protect the idea of partnership, 
it was clear that there was the concern that this would lead to unjust enrichment. 
Consequently the themes of limiting factors that the participants felt would prevent this from 
occurring were children, length and nexus. These factors seem to be aimed at a higher level of 
commitment and both financial and emotional mutual dependence by their very nature.  
 
7.3.3 Evaluation 
Evaluation was a common theme that the focus group participants raised, that is to say that 
they advocated to some degree an approach similar to that in Australia1199 which analyses the 
contributions made by the parties during the relationship: 
                                                          
1196 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 FCR 213 
1197 See Chapter 3, section 3.4.1 
1198 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.2.1 
1199 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.2.1 
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I think that shared effort is what should be valued…because if somebody is fantastic, 
successful granted or even just plain lucky, they could bring in a whole load of money, 
but if they’re doing their job making 80,000 a week and someone’s putting in a lot 
more effort as a cleaner and bringing 80 a week, they’re still putting the same amount 
of effort in... (Montgomery, married men group)  
For the female participants as well as the same-sex relationships group, evaluation involved a 
far closer examination of the relationship roles and physical exertion: 
…there’s a difference between the situation you’re describing if someone had a life of 
leisure and that sort of thing, and a person who works really hard as a stay at home 
mum… (Anna, cohabiting women group) 
In comparison for the male participants, evaluation was an actual quantification of 
contributions and their direct market value. Yet it was felt that this approach would be too 
difficult and unfair for the homemaker and thus was an unsuitable way of comparing 
contributions: 
You could put a notional value, so how much does the average child-minder earn and 
how much does the average cleaner earn… (Wilfred, cohabiting men group) 
Overall, the majority of participants identified evaluation as an inappropriate way of valuing 
domestic contributions as it was seen not only as unsuitable, but that it could potentially be 
open to abuse: 
It seems like because you can’t really quantify it, it could easily be manipulated which 
could be dangerous to others. (Anna, cohabiting women group) 
Despite this general consensus that evaluation was not a desired method of valuing domestic 
contributions, it seems that again this may depend on whether or not there are children of the 
relationship. The above dissatisfaction of the approach was also made in relation to couples 
with children and it was clear that where there were no children, the participants themselves 
were more critical on the evaluation of contributions. 
 I would question why they’re not working if they don’t have children, even if they can’t 
have children then actually why aren’t you working? (Sue, married women group) 
This was attributed by many to the level of work associated with care-giving: 
 I suppose it gets very different if there are children involved…it’s very difficult to decide 
who’s going to be at home and sort of decide not to have a job and be home for them 
sort of you’ve got your children being looked after by someone else, there’s possibly a 
higher value on that than if someone’s just chosen to stay at home or look after the 
house. (Miles, cohabiting men group) 
Thus it seems that evaluation is considered inappropriate where there is a care-dyad, but 
necessary where there is no care-giving and the party is still within the domestic sphere. Given 
the analysis in the partnership context, it seems to imply that domestic contributions are only 
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as equally valuable as financial contributions where there are children, and where there are no 
children there is an expectation that both parties will be self-dependent and contributing 
financially to the relationship. 
 
This perhaps is attached to the aforementioned concept of ‘choice’ in a bid to avoid ‘gold-
digging’ and preventing unnecessary (and perhaps here, considered reprehensible) financial 
dependence on the other partner where it is at all possible. 
 
Furthermore, asset size and relationship length seemed to give rise to situations where the 
respondents believed an evaluative approach would be fitting. Most prominently, it seemed to 
fall on those categories where the respondents believed the partnership model to be 
inappropriate. Evaluation is evidently seen by the respondents as a device to prevent unjust 
enrichment on relationship breakdown. Therefore, as alluded to in the above theme of 
‘partnership’ where assets were significantly large then a nexus or an evaluation approach was 
preferred by the majority of respondents: 
 ...say that someone married someone who was a superstar at football or something 
like that, the person married to that person could never do a job of that income of that 
wealth, so is it fair that fifty-fifty split...it’s your talent for earning...money. (Leonard, 
married men group) 
This combination of evaluation and partnership was also demonstrated in the choice of 
suitable models for financial provision on relationship breakdown. On its own, model three (an 
evaluative approach, see Table 7.2) was felt to be open to abuse and in practice difficult to 
implement, working against Fineman’s care-dyad. In contrast, whereas the partnership 
approach could be seen to give rise to unjust enrichment, the participants demonstrated that 
in actual fact it would serve the interests of a primary care-giver well. It provides an 
opportunity to care for the care-giver. Consequently, the majority of respondents preferred a 
combination of model three and four and therefore a combination of an evaluative and a 
partnership approach. Thus, for shorter relationships, an evaluative approach was more 
suitable where model four comes in after a time period or where there were children: 
Mark: Starts with model three and then moves on to model four, something like that 
Leonard: Yeah, that’s what I would have thought; it starts there and moves to number 
four. 
(Mark and Leonard, married men group) 
 
This therefore gives rise to the questions of whether there should be a differentiation in the 
way that the law approaches couples with children and those without children. 
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7.3.4 Equality between Different Relationship Styles 
Not one of those who took part felt that same-sex relationships should be treated any 
differently from different-sex ones. There were a number of participants who felt that 
cohabitants and married couples/civil partners should be treated differently which was largely 
attributed to their choice not to marry and that they were less committed: 
Yeah, but the bottom line is the decision not to marry…So there must be a difference. 
There has to be a difference if they’re not married. (Lou, married women group) 
However, the majority of respondents indicated that they thought that cohabiting and married 
couples should be treated identically: 
I think for the law to make an assumption that marriage somehow brings with it a 
different level of commitment is mad. (Naomi, cohabiting women group). 
Nearly all of those who thought there should be a parity of treatment between cohabiting and 
married/civil partner relationships felt that there needed to be a qualifying period on the 
relationship’s length before that occurred: 
 I think that it should be the same irrespective of the sort of legal status of the 
relationship if it’s a long term relationship such as where people are committed to, 
whether its legal marriage partnership or just an arrangement, (Jake, cohabiting men 
group) 
Furthermore, many of those respondents indicated that couples with children, no matter what 
the length of the relationship, should be treated the same regardless of relationship status: 
If you’ve got children, then you’re as good as married really and if you’ve been together 
a long-time and you’ve got a financial commitment then you’re as good as married. 
(Sue, married women group) 
Thus, it seems that on the whole the respondents felt that cohabiting couples should be 
treated the same as married couples with children and if there were no children, they should 
be treated the same as married couples after a period of time although how long was not 
expanded on in the group. This seemed to support Fineman’s position more than Deech’s, 
basing regulation on the presence of a care-dyad and dependency. 
7.3.5 Practical Considerations of Property Settlement: 
 
7.3.5.1 Scenario A 
Here the participants were asked to consider a scenario based on Burns1200 and to select a 
preferred outcome from seven choices.1201 No-one selected Outcome A or B, the approaches 
                                                          
1200 Burns v Burns(1986) Ch 317 
1201 See Appendix B 
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towards cohabitation in England and Scotland respectively with the married men feeling that it 
was ‘brutal’.1202 Thus out of seven outcomes, only C (which was based on the evaluative 
approach in Australia where she would be given 50% of the home as a lump sum, 40% for her 
contributions and 10% for future needs), E (50% of the house and pension with a maximum of 
three years’ maintenance) and F (similar to New Zealand’s approach of 50% of house and 
pension plus maintenance for over three years) were selected.1203  
The reasoning behind the choice of outcomes here essentially settled on the different 
conceptual stances that maintenance should take for Miss Jones post-settlement. The entire 
same-sex relationship group selected outcome C. Here, the group focused on Mr Smith’s initial 
contribution, feeling uneasy that Miss Jones had not made one herself and the fact that the 
children had grown up, feeling that (similar to Deech’s perspective) maintenance should only 
be for the children: 
…I’m not really sure why anyone would get maintenance when the children are all 
grown up. That seems a bit bizarre… (Will, Same-sex relationship group) 
…Part of the problem is…that she didn’t bring anything into that situation, um, which 
you assume her role as homemaker was just a natural, organic move for her. (Joe, 
same-sex relationship group) 
In comparison, the married groups felt that outcome C was unduly harsh: 
…if one thinks it through very brutally and logically without valuing other contributions, 
you would automatically come to C. But when you take other contributions, my 
personal view would be E…’ (Kira, married women group) 
Outcomes E and F both had maintenance provisions for less than three years and over three 
years respectively. 
The most popular outcome was E which resembled the outcome for married couples in 
Scotland. The reasoning behind this choice for all the participants was its rehabilitative nature 
that it gave her a chance to pick up a career. This reasoning demonstrates that for the 
participants it was her age and need rather than the length of the relationship and entitlement 
which influenced the decision: 
Well that seems fair and then the maintenance for the three years to give her a chance 
to catch up. (Mark, married men group) 
Those who selected ‘E’, echoed Deech-like concerns about ‘gold-digging’; maintenance for any 
longer than three years would deter Miss Jones from becoming financially independent: 
                                                          
1202 Leonard, Jim, Mark and Simon, Married Men Group 
1203 See Appendix H 
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…at 43 she could then live off her ex for the next 20 years unless she enters another 
relationship and there’s no proviso for her actually getting a job. (Jake, cohabiting men 
group) 
In comparison, those who selected option ‘F’ focused on the impact that the relationship had 
on Miss Jones’ financial position and to some degree seemed to discuss a compensatory 
approach: 
Sarah: …if the children are kind of older I think it’s different. She could work. 
Anna: But then she couldn’t have a career now, it’s too late for her, she can’t she’s 
given up all the income she could have made, so I think it… 
Naomi: Plus, it’s probably changed now, but she could have affected her pension, 
whether she gets a full state pension… 
(Naomi, Sarah and Anna, cohabiting women group) 
Overall it seems that the same-sex group were most evaluative and the rest selected 50% with 
rehabilitative maintenance. However, most cohabiting participants felt that it does not reflect 
the full long-term impact of financial disadvantages. 
7.3.5.2 Scenario B 
Table 7.3: Scenario B - outcomes selected1204 
 Outcome 
B 
Outcome 
C 
Outcome 
D 
Outcome 
E 
Outcome 
F 
Cohabiting Men 
Group 
- 4 1 - - 
Cohabiting Women 
Group 
5 1 - - - 
Married Men 
Group 
1 1 - 1 - 
Married Women 
Group 
3 - - - 1 
Same-Sex 
Relationship Group 
- - 1 2 1 
 
Here the participants were asked to consider a scenario based on Miller1205 and then select a 
preferred outcome from seven choices as displayed in Table 7.3.  
The most popular outcome for this scenario was outcome B, which was the lowest possible 
settlement out of all the outcomes.1206 The reasoning here was based on Mrs Higgins’ choice 
and autonomy compared to Miss Jones’ sacrifice: reflected in earlier discussions that there 
                                                          
1204 See Appendix B for an outline of the outcomes 
1205 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 
1206 Based on weighing up economic advantages and disadvantages on Scotland’s approach to cohabitation, Mrs Higgins would 
receive nothing. 
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would be an expectation to work and more of an evaluation of domestic activities without 
children: 
 
Kira:  [Miss Jones had] given up all, given up her potential to get a proper career. 
Kerry: Whereas Mrs Higgins has given up her career to swan about and have lunch. 
(Kira and Kerry, cohabiting women group) 
In fact only one cohabitee referred to her sacrifice in the workplace.  
...but she gave up her job which was high income and even if it is the short marriage of 
time it could make a difference in the field she was in (Naomi, cohabiting women 
group) 
However, if there was evidence that it was a joint decision she would be entitled to more and 
it was felt that given her age and that the relationship was only five years’ long that she was 
not entitled to anything greater. 
Outcome C was the second most selected outcome. The reasons behind this seemed to be a 
desire for greater recognition of contributions made in the relationship. Yet, this recognition of 
contribution should involve an evaluation not only of the quality, but also the nexus these have 
to the increased wealth of Mr Higgins: 
So maybe she should be entitled for something for [homemaking] as well, whatever the 
homemaker to a multimillionaire involves. (David, cohabiting men group) 
I agree sort of what he has brought into the marriage shouldn’t come into it as much 
here with both high income individuals, but then to what extent has she then 
contributed to his increase in wealth? (Miles, cohabiting men group) 
The two married men who chose B and C appeared to evaluate Mrs Higgins’ domestic 
contribution fearing that anything greater would lead to unjust enrichment, reflecting earlier 
themes that big money cases should avoid the partnership approach altogether and settle for 
something akin to evaluation: 
…she was only on 80,000 a year, you know now she’s going to get millions…I think that 
is totally unfair, three years of marriage and she’s profited. (Leonard, married men 
group) 
However, Simon felt that she was entitled due to marriage to half of everything and Mr Higgins 
should take some responsibility for that commitment: 
 Once they become married then what’s his is hers and hers is his and that’s how it 
should be and if they’re not prepared to do that then they shouldn’t get married. 
(Simon, married men group) 
The same-sex relationship group were more generous in this scenario than the other groups in 
complete contrast to the approach in Scenario A. Even with this generous approach the group 
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still felt that Mrs Higgins’ contributions should be evaluated1207 and Joe felt that there would 
be a nexus between her contributions which would entitle her to more: 
I would tend to think that F was probably the fairest. It seems to be the most balanced 
and I think…the term homemaker is probably undervaluing her contribution, she’s 
probably doing quite a lot backing up the business, um, in effect she’s being a dies 
partner in the business. Without extensive evidence it’s hard to. (Joe, same-sex 
relationship group) 
Overall, ‘B’ (Scotland’s economic advantage/disadvantage) was most popular amongst the 
respondents for the cohabitation scenario. 
7.4 Discussion 
This chapter aimed to provide some contextualisation of the findings from the previous 
chapters before considering options for reform in Chapter 8.  Thus it sought to get a sense of 
how well either Fineman or Deech’s approaches might be received by families in 21st Century 
England and Wales. However, as this chapter has emphasised, it is not possible to say whether 
these trends are representative of the general public in England and Wales and therefore 
further research is needed to determine how such schemes would be received by the affected 
communities. Nevertheless, it is the first step towards achieving this aim and provides some 
valuable insight to ground the findings of this project so far. 
Four broad themes were identified in the data set: autonomy, partnership, evaluation and 
equal treatment of relationship styles. Within these themes it was evident that there was a 
range of participants who agreed with Deech and Fineman’s positions. This last theme seemed 
to show respondents’ views leaning towards Fineman’s end of the spectrum as (while all 
believed that same and different sex relationships should be treated identically) most 
participants felt that there should not be any difference between cohabiting and married 
couples/civil partnerships. Yet, there was a general consensus that this should come in after a 
time period and automatically with the presence of children.1208 This seemingly disagrees with 
Deech’s contention that Family Law should not interfere with cohabiting couples’ domestic 
affairs and suggests an approach towards cohabitants that is similar to Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s (although not necessarily in content) with a time limitation period in place. 
The other themes seemed to fluctuate between Deech’s and Fineman’s positions without a 
definite preference at either end of the spectrum. On the whole, the theme of autonomy 
                                                          
1207 Will and Beth, Same-Sex Relationship Group 
1208 This reflects the Law Commission’s proposal for a minimum duration period should be placed for cohabiting couples. See The 
Law Commission, Cohabitation: the Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (Law Com No 179, 2007) 
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demonstrated how many respondents felt that (as Deech contends) where sacrifices were the 
result of a lifestyle choice they should not be recognised. However, at the same time it was 
recognised that the ability to make a choice was limited by care-giving and Fineman’s care-
dyad. It seems that from these focus groups the general sense was that relationship-generated 
disadvantage should only be recognised where it arises out of necessity and not from the 
parties’ own free will. A scheme which recognises needs and compensation is preferred only in 
the context of having children. 
In the theme of partnership, it was evident that participants recognised the existence of 
mutual dependency in a relationship suggesting that financial and non-financial contributions 
should not be weighted differently. Thus there was a sense of entitlement to financial support 
on relationship breakdown which offers greater protection for Fineman’s care-givers. Yet 
again, it was equally recognised that formal equality and equal sharing could lead to much 
unjust enrichment and again the majority of respondents felt that equal sharing should only be 
implemented in relationships that have children, or are of significant length.  In fact it seems 
that the respondents preferred an evaluative approach for shorter relationships without 
children, yet it was evident that an evaluative approach serves to disadvantage the 
homemaker. Consequently the respondents seemed to want to combine an evaluative 
approach with formal equality, arguably similar to Scotland’s approach. This combination had a 
strong influence over discussions on how property was to be divided, with participants 
preferring a narrow approach which could be modified according to usage and evaluation of 
contributions (similar to Scotland’s approach). Consequently evaluation was felt to be far too 
harsh for the homemaker who equally contributed, and formal equality was felt to be far too 
dangerous as it opened the avenue for ‘gold-diggers’ and when presented with the models, 
the majority selected a combination of three and four (Australia and New Zealand), a 
combination of evaluation and equality, to compensate for this. 
So, what, if anything, can be taken from this analysis? Most notably across these themes were 
two trends characterising the pull between the positions of Fineman and Deech: length of 
relationship and the presence of a care-dyad. Children led to a change in approach towards 
relationship-generated disadvantage with a greater focus on needs and compensation; couples 
with children were more suited for the partnership approach and not evaluation. Even those 
who felt that cohabitation and marriage should be treated differently indicated that, with 
children, there should be no difference, and that children added more weight to the value of 
domestic contributions and the homemaker role. Similarly, relationships of considerable 
length were also felt to be more suited to a partnership approach and to a wider division of 
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matrimonial assets. It seems that there is some similarity in these discussions to New Zealand’s 
approach of separating between short and long marriages. 
The relationships that caused concern and a Deech style approach were short relationships 
without children (particularly where there was an unequal distribution of financial 
contributions). It was felt necessary to treat these differently to prevent ‘gold-digging’ and 
unjust enrichment. Thus it seems that the presence of children and the length of a relationship 
are in fact being used as indicators of commitment and emotional intertwining. This potentially 
indicates also that both Deech and Fineman’s positions work for different styles of 
relationships; short, childless relationships for Deech, and longer relationships with children 
for Fineman. 
The next chapter concludes by considering the analysis both from this chapter and the earlier 
jurisdictional analyses to determine how domestic contributions should be approached and 
valued in England and Wales and whether a balance can be achieved between Deech’s and 
Fineman’s positions.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Given the schizophrenic nature of the law of financial provision on relationship breakdown in 
the married and cohabiting context, and the subsequent heavy criticism that it has received for 
respectively overvaluing1209 and undervaluing domestic contributions,1210 the aim of this thesis 
has been to explore how the law might in future better value these sorts of contributions at 
the end of a relationship. However, the way in which the law should quantify these inherently 
gendered contributions1211 is debated amongst feminist commentators and a divide exists over 
whether the law should promote the financial autonomy of women and remain out of the 
private sphere by ignoring domestic contributions;1212 or whether it should value these 
contributions to give greater public recognition to this relationship role and therefore greater 
protection for women who undertake homemaking and child-rearing.1213 Consequently, the 
objective of this project has been to consider how domestic contributions should be 
recognised in light of these feminist positions, and whether a balance or a middle ground 
between the two can be achieved. To do so, the polarised positions of Ruth Deech – who 
promotes autonomy - and Martha Fineman – who argues for greater protection and 
appreciation of the value of the care-dyad (as set out in Chapter 2) - have been used as a 
heuristic device to explore these dichotomous theories.  
In particular, this project has sought to establish the merits and disadvantages of how these 
different feminist approaches might work in practice. This has been undertaken with reference 
to the legislative frameworks of financial provision in New Zealand,1214 Scotland,1215 
Australia1216 and England and Wales.1217 Each of these jurisdictions appeared to exemplify key 
aspects of these feminist positions in differing ways. This thesis therefore used the Deech and 
                                                          
1209 R Deech, 'The Principles against Maintenance' (1977) 7 FL 229  
1210 A Barlow, ‘Configuration(s) of Unpaid Caregiving within Current Legal Discourse in and around the Family' (2007) 58(3) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 251, 260 
1211 R Crompton and C Lyonette, ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour within the Home’ in A Park, J Curtice, K 
Thomson, M Philips, M Johnson and E Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (Sage Publications 2008) 52; R Breen and 
L Cooke, ‘The Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour’ (2005) 21(1) European Sociological Review 43 
1212 R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229 
1213 A Diduck, ‘Fairness and Justice for All? The House of Lords in White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981’ (2001) 9(2) Feminist Legal Studies 
174, 180 - 182; R Bailey-Harris, ‘The Paradoxes of Principle and Pragmatism: Ancillary Relief in England and Wales’ (2005) 19 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 229, 234 - 235 
1214 Chapter 3 
1215 Chapter 4 
1216 Chapter 5 
1217 Chapter 6 
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Fineman lenses to explore how far these schemes actually reflect either of these positions and 
their alignment is demonstrated in Table 8.1. Additionally, structured interviews (with 
additional room for free-form comment) with lawyers from each jurisdiction have been used 
to determine how effectively these differing frameworks function in practice and, more 
specifically, how they affect women. Finally, focus groups were used to consider a range of 
views on different approaches from members of the affected community in England and 
Wales.1218  
Another aspect of this research has been to consider (using insight gained from the differing 
approaches used in these jurisdictions) how cohabiting couples should be treated in 
comparison with married couples and furthermore whether different-sex and same-sex 
couples should be treated identically post-separation. This chapter now draws these different 
aspects together to consider in light of the research findings how the law should value 
domestic contributions in the married, cohabiting and same-sex context in England and Wales. 
Table 8.1 The jurisdictions' position on a spectrum between Deech and Fineman 
Ruth Deech                                                                                                                                            Martha Fineman  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   E&W  Scotland        New         Scotland                         Australia                                                  E&W          fv    
(Cohabitants)          Zealand     (Marriage/                                                                                   (Marriage/ ccc                                                              
n                                                  Civil Partnerships)                                                                          Civil Partnerships)                
 
 
8.2 How to Value Domestic Contributions 
8.2.1 Differing Approaches: Care-Dyad vs. No Care-Dyad 
Each of the schemes aligned to varying degrees with Deech’s and Fineman’s positions as Table 
8.1 above shows. Yet to what extent can these aid reform considerations in England and 
Wales? How well do these approaches value domestic contributions and do they achieve a 
balance between the two polarised positions? The first measure that this thesis had intended 
                                                          
1218 Chapter 7 
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to use to help this reflection was a comparison between the levels of satisfaction of the 
lawyers from each jurisdiction. However, surprisingly, the majority who took part in this 
investigation were overwhelmingly satisfied with their jurisdiction’s legal framework for 
financial provision on divorce, despite there being such disparities in the theoretical 
underpinnings of the differing approaches. While the lawyers recognised and were keen to 
voice difficulties within their systems, it was evident that the general perception was that each 
of the approaches ‘worked the best it could’ and that ‘things could be a lot worse’. This fits in 
with Dewar’s notion of the normal chaos of family law;1219 that legal professionals make sense 
of the system they are in, inevitably making it work in practice. 
Nevertheless, the overarching finding from this project demonstrated that none of the legal 
frameworks analysed achieved a perfect balance between Fineman’s and Deech’s positions, as 
demonstrated in Table 8.1. Furthermore, this project clearly shows that where a legal 
framework aligned with one feminist position, it would then conflict with the other. 
Consequently, balancing Fineman’s and Deech’s stances is an arduous task because both 
positions are appropriate in different circumstances.  Nevertheless, this study has illustrated 
that one appropriate dividing line in choosing which stance to apply appears to be between 
those relationships with and without children (or a care-dyad). For example, in New Zealand 
and Scotland, the lawyers were generally content with their jurisdiction’s Deech-like approach 
when there were no children. Yet, it was evident that these jurisdictions were inadequate for 
dealing with Fineman’s care-dyad; by sacrificing substantive fairness for procedural fairness in 
both these systems, the lawyers argued that manifest (substantive) unfairness followed, 
especially for relationships with children. Ten respondents from New Zealand felt that their 
jurisdiction’s approach was too narrow and did not really consider the future impact of 
relationship generated disadvantage and that s15 P(R)A had ‘failed’ at its objectives, and 10 in 
Scotland felt that s9(1)(b) FL(S)A was inadequate. In both these jurisdictions, it was the 
judiciary’s rigid application of statutory discretion which produced the homemaker’s (and 
therefore a gendered) disadvantage. While, procedurally, a formula-based approach has 
reduced the potential for inequality of bargaining power in out-of-court settlements, the level 
of rigidity in the system may actually act to deter parties from accessing the courts on costs 
grounds, rather than because the tensions between parties have been reduced or a resolution 
fair to both parties achieved. The New Zealand employment statistics also challenge Deech’s 
position that a more liberal approach will encourage women to engage more with the labour 
market, as these figures show that even with a scheme based on formal equality, only 58% of 
                                                          
1219 J Dewar, ‘Reducing Discretion in Family Law’ (1997) Australian Journal of Family Law 309, 348 
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women in New Zealand are employed in comparison to 70.2% of men.1220 Consequently, 
Deech’s prioritising of financial autonomy and clean break in place of protection and fairness 
at the end of a relationship, appears to be most suitable for relationships without children (or 
a care-dyad), and where it is therefore more possible for both parties to be equally 
autonomous. 
At the same time, the pro-Fineman jurisdictions of England and Wales (in the married context) 
and (to a lesser degree) Australia, have a much greater level of discretion in their systems 
allowing for greater consideration of substantive justice, and thus these frameworks offer 
awards that are tailor-made to Fineman’s care-dyad. Therefore, lawyers from both 
jurisdictions were the most satisfied with how the homemaker/breadwinner relationship 
model was treated, with 10 lawyers in each system indicating that, overall, equality was 
achieved between these two roles. However, both systems lack a clear rationale or mechanism 
through which the owning spouse could protect their property which has led to a conflicting 
and complex use of discretion to limit awards in large asset cases.1221 Furthermore, the level of 
discretion within these jurisdictions was linked to a number of procedural difficulties like 
greater litigation, greater conflict and inconsistency. In both jurisdictions lawyers were 
concerned that the judges’ approaches were inconsistent, which caused difficulties when 
advising clients (although this was far more prevalent in Australia, perhaps due to the relative, 
if far from perfect, clarity of  interpretation of s25 after White1222 in England and Wales). 
Therefore, there were calls for a greater level of predictability or guidelines to be able to give 
better advice to clients to prevent cases unnecessarily going to court, while preserving the 
pursuit of individual fairness to protect the most vulnerable members of the post-separation 
family – a pro-Fineman position in direct conflict with Deech’s thinking. Consequently, this 
leads to the conclusion that Fineman’s and Deech’s positions are each most suitable where 
children are and are not present respectively, and that neither position is more suitable than 
the other in the reverse circumstances. Therefore, to truly balance these two feminist 
positions, this study concludes that it is necessary to separate out the legal approaches to 
those relationships with and without children as a minimum, and potentially to separate those 
with and without any form of care-dyad. While the care-dyad may include other relationships 
such as caring for the elderly, for the purposes of this conclusion and for reasons based on 
                                                          
1220  C Ashley-Jones, Acting Government Statistician Household Labour Force Survey: September 2011 Quarter (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2011) 4 
1221 See for example Australia Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 and England and Wales Chapter 6, section 6.2.1.1 
1222 White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981  
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practicality, this thesis focuses specifically on a divide between relationships with and without 
children.1223 
Nearly all the lawyers who took part in this study made it clear that children made a difference 
due to the on-going needs and dependency that arose from the presence of children: 
...you simply can’t compare a situation where somebody’s got childcare obligations 
and has dedicated a life to doing that as opposed to … enjoying a slightly more 
luxurious lifestyles… (Scotlaw16) 
Even where lawyers from Scotland and England and Wales wanted cohabiting couples to be 
treated differently from married couples, in practice, both sets of lawyers wanted greater 
protection for cohabiting couples than existed in these jurisdictions, especially where there 
were children. It is suggested that perhaps there is a gap between theory and practice; that 
while the lawyers feel that some difference ought to exist, in actual fact when faced with the 
practical realities of the financial implications of relationship breakdown (as was tested in the 
scenario questions), there is far less weight placed on this difference. Thus it is concluded an 
approach more similar to that found in the marriage context will in practice achieve the more 
protective awards that the data show they desire for cohabitants (with Scotland’s ‘half way 
house’ approach  deemed not protective enough in practice particularly where there were 
children).  
The focus groups in England and Wales also demonstrated a division in the participants’ 
preference between a Deech-like or pro-Fineman approach according to whether there were 
children; a higher proportion selected a needs-based remedy only for where children were 
present: 
I think children should be central to the whole decision making process. I think 
relationships before there’s children  are different to relationships after in terms of how 
money should be split up because someone’s going to end up looking after the children 
and that’s going to have huge financial consequences for them (Katherine, cohabiting 
women group) 
Moreover, the results from the focus groups clearly emphasised that there should be no 
difference in the legal treatment of cohabiting and married relationships where couples have 
                                                          
1223 Children also includes children of the family as defined under s105 Children’s Act 1989 to include step-children as well as 
children of both the parties. While further consideration where children are not of a cohabiting relationship may be needed, it is 
feasible that this could be extended to step (cohabiting) parents under the test established in D v D (Child of the Family) (1981) 2 
FLR 93 (CA) p. 97 (Omrod LJ); ‘does the evidence show that the child was treated as a member of the family’. It may be necessary, 
however, to impose a (flexible) time limitation period on this qualifier for cohabiting couples. 
306 
 
children, and perhaps more surprisingly even where they do not (subject here to a qualifying 
period): 1224 
I think that it should be the same irrespective of the … legal status of the relationship if 
it’s a long term relationship … (Jake, cohabiting men focus group) 
Thus the overwhelming consensus from the Australian and New Zealand lawyers, as well as 
from members of the general public within England and Wales is that cohabitants without 
children should be treated (after a length of time) in the same manner as married couples. 
While more research is needed to capture the views of the same-sex community on future 
reform options, this project indicates that nearly all who took part (including the focus groups 
in England and Wales) agreed that same-sex couples should be able to enter a relationship at 
least functionally equivalent to marriage, and that same- and different-sex relationships should 
be treated in the same manner on relationship breakdown. However, nearly all the lawyers 
indicated that the presence of children was a reason to treat same- and different-sex couples 
dissimilarly, therefore confirming the impact that children were perceived to have on 
relationship dynamics. Consequently, a dividing line based on the presence of children should 
also apply in the same-sex context. 
Therefore, the fundamental conclusion of this thesis is that there needs to be a distinction 
between the legal treatment of those relationships with and without children rather than a 
distinction based wholly on relationship status. By re-drawing the dividing line in this manner, 
the law will be able to both respect and promote financial autonomy, and at the same time 
recognise the limitations that having children places on the primary care-giver’s ability to 
engage with the labour force and become financially independent. This now begs the question 
of what shape a system of financial provision should take, and how it should distinguish 
between those with and those without children. What elements of the jurisdictions studied 
(and therefore from the pro-Fineman and Deech-like approaches) can be taken away from this 
comparative investigation to feed into future reform? This conclusion now tentatively 
considers what shape reform could take. 
8.2.1.1 The Same Starting Point 
Formal equality on its own fails to protect Fineman’s care-dyad and therefore relationships 
with children. At the same time, wide discretion was inappropriate for Deech’s imperative of 
promoting and achieving financial autonomy post-separation. Yet, this study concludes that 
having a starting point that embraces formal equality has great merits for relationships both 
                                                          
1224 This qualifying period is discussed below. 
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with and without children. The procedural benefits that are associated with a rule-based 
system were evident in both Scotland and New Zealand: reduced costs through out-of-court 
settlements, simplicity and consistency, all of which would help relieve the English courts from 
a backlog of cases which are both costly and often heavily delayed. If realisable, these benefits 
of far greater certainty would be of value to any form of relationship upon separation provided 
perceived fairness is not sacrificed to over-rigid notions of formal equality. 
Given that certainty does not necessarily mean formal equality,1225 are there good reasons why 
formal equality should be the starting point for asset division post-separation in all or some 
relationships? While the findings of this study indicated that couples with and without children 
should be treated differently, the fact remained throughout all the empirical analysis that the 
lawyers considered relationships with children to be an equal partnership regardless of 
relationship status1226 and thus to represent this, relationship assets should be divided equally. 
This was supported too by the focus groups in England and Wales. However, in the cohabiting 
context without children, the Scottish and English lawyers did not refer to cohabiting 
relationships without children as a ‘partnership’.1227 Yet, given the gap demonstrated above 
between their views in theory and in practice on the treatment of cohabitants as well as the 
overwhelming empirical findings which indicate that the other lawyers and focus group 
participants believe that relationships even without children are still a joint venture, it is 
concluded that these relationships should also be considered as a partnership:1228  
…because it’s a partnership; whatever you contribute in your relationship should count 
equally. (NZLaw1)1229  
Consequently, formal equal sharing of relationship property1230 (rather than a scheme based 
solely on separate property) as a starting point will reflect this conception of partnership as it 
allows for equal entitlement. Similarly, this entitlement to equal sharing is also the most 
appropriate starting point for relationships with children to recognise equally homemaking and 
breadwinning contributions. The approach pre-White in England and Wales demonstrated that 
only meeting needs does not place the care-relationships central to the system, and instead a 
solely needs-based approach placed a ‘glass-ceiling’ on the awards that the primary care-giver 
                                                          
1225 For example a one third rule would similarly achieve certainty. 
1226 The lawyers from Scotland and England and Wales referred to relationships with children as being functionally equivalent to 
marriage. Discussions on qualification periods and the potential differences that may arise between different relationship statuses. 
1227 Lawyers from both jurisdictions referred to the fact that cohabiting relationships with children are functionally equivalent to 
marital relationships with children. 
1228 However, see below discussions on qualification periods and the potential differences that may arise between different 
relationship statuses. 
1229 Also, see Jake’s quote above (Cohabiting Men Group). Furthermore, see the discussion below on qualification periods for 
cohabitating couples. 
1230 Relationship property shall be defined below 
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could achieve.1231 Instead, to avoid effectively what was gender discrimination pre-White,1232 
the court in White recognised that the approach should be based on entitlement: 
…whatever the division of labour chosen by the husband and wife, or forced upon them 
by circumstances, fairness requires that this should not prejudice or advantage either 
party…1233 
Therefore, the entitlement of the primary care-giver to an equal division of relationship assets 
at the end of the relationship (as a starting point) can be seen as an important step towards 
Fineman’s position by signalling that care-giving is equally important to financial contributions. 
Thus, it is argued, starting from a position of formal entitlement both recognises the 
relationship as a partnership and promotes the idea that domestic contributions are of equal 
value to financial contributions and this stance should be clearly adopted within the legislative 
framework in England and Wales. Furthermore, given that certainty (in the form of a starting 
point of entitlement to formal equal sharing of relationship property) will ostensibly provide 
greater equality of bargaining power, formal equality seems particularly appealing in light of 
the substantial cuts that are being made in legal aid in England and Wales for family disputes 
over ancillary relief where domestic violence is not present.1234 If more people are 
consequently unable to access the courts due to financial costs then a more certain approach 
through formal equality would allow parties to settle their disputes outside of the courts more 
readily, aid speedy settlements and reduce tension by placing the parties on a more equal 
bargaining level. 1235 
8.2.1.2 The Default Regime - Defining Relationship Property  
Yet what should be subject to equal sharing? Deech’s fundamental criticism of England and 
Wales’ approach can be said to amount to the lack of provision within the jurisdiction to 
protect the proprietary interests of the financially stronger party. A wide definition of 
relationship property, from Deech’s perspective, encourages dependency and also enables 
‘gold-digging’.1236 Consequently, an entitlement to equally share all property would be 
counter-productive to promoting and achieving financial autonomy post-separation.1237 
Therefore, it is important to define relationship and non-relationship property and therefore 
which property is subject to equal division. 
                                                          
1231 C Butler, Newsline: Miller and McFarlane (2006) 36 Family Law 512, 516 
1232 White  v White [2000] UKHL 54, [2001] 1 AC 596 
1233 White  v White [2000] UKHL 54, [2001] 1 AC 596 [24] (Nicholls LJ) 
1234 Ministry of Justice, Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales (Consultation Paper, CP12/10, 2010) 178. This is 
now the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill 2011 
1235 J Dewar, ‘Reducing Discretion in Family Law’ (1997) 11 Australian Journal of Family Law 309, 349 
1236 See, for example, R Deech, ‘The Principles Against Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229 
1237 Also note the qualification period discussions below 
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One notable result from this research was that any actual valuation of contributions should be 
avoided as much as possible especially where it is used to identify what is and is not 
relationship property. Australia was the only jurisdiction where valuing domestic contributions 
was fundamental in its approach where parties (particularly the homemaker) must 
demonstrate that they have earned a share in the property, although most of the lawyers from 
Australia felt that the homemaker and breadwinner were treated equally post-separation. 
Evaluating contributions protects the owning spouse’s property and is therefore a mechanism 
through which the jurisdictions attempted to give greater recognition to any substantial 
financial contribution made by one spouse and therefore it may protect the breadwinner from 
an ‘undeserving wife’. Yet, every jurisdiction that embodied elements of evaluation 
consistently gave weight to financial contributions at the expense of domestic ones. 
Homemaking and care-giving were never seen to be enough to be determined as 
‘extraordinary’ or ‘special’ and it seemed that an additional negative burden was required 
from the homemaker in order to be ‘a superwoman’ in the eyes of the court. In these 
jurisdictions, domestic contributions are effectively taken for granted and a requirement of 
suffering is necessary in comparison to the success or indeed financial luck for the 
breadwinner. Therefore, any evaluation of contributions seems to works against Fineman’s 
care-dyad (a theme reflected in the focus group analysis) and undermines the societal value of 
care-giving; although for Deech, this arguably gives greater protection towards the 
breadwinning spouse especially given that usually the non-owning spouse must prove a nexus 
to the asset.  
However, the empirical interviews with practitioners all emphasised the difficulties associated 
with valuing domestic contributions, claiming that it was like comparing apples with oranges; 
or that there were huge difficulties with evidence and proof which fed into earlier concerns 
that discretion would increase litigation. It is perhaps this approach which raised so many 
criticisms about discretion in Australia: Australian lawyers made far greater reference to 
procedural difficulties such as increased litigation, whereas England and Wales’ lawyers made 
few references to these difficulties. This leads to the conclusion that the difficulties that arise 
with discretion are really to do with its focus which affects the level and type of evidence that 
is required to establish a claim and that may affect the impact that this has procedurally. 
Having a focus which requires the parties to prove their respective contributions is inevitably 
biased in practice against the homemaking contributions as these are harder to prove and thus 
may rely more on hearsay, provoking conflict, as compared with needs or compensation, 
which can be measured in economic terms. The lawyers from England and Wales, New Zealand 
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and Scotland clearly championed the fact that, on the whole, they avoided valuing 
contributions as it was too difficult to quantify or gather evidence: 
 “...it’s one of those notorious areas where it is the tendency for the client to overstate 
their contribution and understate that of the other” (NZLaw6) 
Similarly the focus groups raised concerns that the evaluation approach may be open to abuse, 
and eight respondents1238 had a problem with having to prove contributions, feeling that the 
burden of proof and evidence would be far too difficult. Consequently, a clear 
recommendation of this research is that evaluating contributions should be avoided at all costs 
as it provokes conflict and only ever serves to disadvantage the homemaker, which is 
predominantly a gendered disadvantage.  
Instead, the answer to protecting substantial assets may lie in the definition of 
matrimonial/relationship property. Both New Zealand and Scotland have clear approaches to 
matrimonial assets. New Zealand has the narrowest conception of relationship property 
limited only to the family home and chattels,1239 followed by Scotland. Scotland defines 
matrimonial property as all property acquired throughout the relationship1240 which could be 
limited by the source of funds argument, pre-marital agreements and usage. In comparison, 
Australia and England and Wales are able to consider all property and also have conceptual 
problems where the courts have tried to limit claims to one party’s substantial financial assets. 
Having a more restrictive definition of relationship property may avoid some of the difficulties 
seen in Australia and England and Wales and may alleviate some of Deech’s criticisms. Yet, this 
definition has to be carefully considered as, equally, an overly-narrow concept (such as in New 
Zealand) may actually impact detrimentally on the care-dyad.  
From those jurisdictions considered throughout this thesis, Scotland’s definition of 
matrimonial property seems to find the right balance between Fineman’s and Deech’s position 
most effectively. Scotland defines matrimonial property as the ‘fruits of the marriage’, thus the 
relationship home, chattels and any property acquired during the marriage (excluding gifts and 
inheritance subject to usage)1241 and at the same time has the possibility of excluding certain 
assets from equal division. This would limit Deech’s ‘gold-diggers’ as the source of funds 
argument is able to keep the assets those successful entrepreneurs made before the marriage 
out of the pool of assets. Furthermore, Scotland considers ‘source of funds’ and ‘usage’ which 
was considered vital in the focus groups’ definition of relationship property. ‘Usage’ would 
                                                          
1238 All of the participants of the married women group; Ben and Miles, cohabiting men group 
1239 S9 Property (Relationships) Act 1976. See Chapter 3 section 3.4.1 
1240 This does not include gifts or inheritances. See s10(4) Family Law (Scotland) Act and the discussions at Chapter 4, section 4.3.1 
1241 See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1 
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protect the owning spouse from claims against a relationship home which also is integral to a 
business, such as farmland. This conclusion suggests that this definition should be extended to 
all qualifying relationships. 
However, formal equal division of relationship property on its own creates serious (although 
very different) problems from both Fineman’s and Deech’s perspectives. Consequently, 
although this study can provisionally conclude that an appropriate starting point is equal 
sharing for relationships with and without children, how universally equal sharing should apply 
requires further thought according to the contexts under consideration here. Should an 
entitlement to equal sharing be the automatic starting point in all relationships or should there 
be an eligibility bar in some situations? Furthermore, should equal sharing be applied rigidly or 
are there circumstances which might justify equality ‘plus’ (or minus)? Let us first consider 
where it may be appropriate to introduce an eligibility bar to the entitlement to equal sharing 
of relationship property before considering where there may be a case for an entitlement to 
more than 50%. 
8.2.1.3 Eligibility for Automatic Entitlement to Equal Sharing 
8.2.1.3.1 A Different Starting Point for Cohabiting Couples without Children? 
The danger of having formal equal sharing for all relationships regardless of duration or 
presence of children is that cohabiting couples may enter these relationships casually and 
therefore may be surprised to find that they must share 50% of their assets (if relationship 
assets include a home owned by one party). Therefore, account should be taken of Deech’s 
fears that treating cohabiting couples in the same way as if they were married, may leave 
unwitting individuals open to ‘gold-diggers’, and hapless couples may stumble into a regime 
without realising it. To avoid Deech’s fears, careful attention towards a qualification period is 
needed where there are no children of the relationship. Cohabiting couples with children 
should be entitled to the starting point of equal sharing to ensure that the care-relationship is 
placed at the heart of the system and caregiving contributions are recognised. 
Yet, the results from this project suggest that the appropriateness of a qualification period for 
those couples without children may depend on the type of settlement that the cohabiting 
couples would be entitled to once they have satisfied the threshold. For example, in New 
Zealand it was felt that the three-year limitation period was applied too rigidly and thus some 
were concerned that, given that the claimants would be entitled to 50% of all relationship 
property after a period of three years, this could lead to some unfair awards for those who had 
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drifted into a relationship. Furthermore, it could (as Deech suggests)1242 open the doors to 
‘gold-digging’. In contrast, in Australia the two-year qualification period for a discretionary 
approach was not criticised, nor was Scotland’s approach where a far more limited remedy 
was available: the scheme began from the first day of cohabiting as it was felt that the length 
of a relationship would, of itself, be self-limiting. This lack of criticism in Scotland and Australia 
may be because qualifying for the cohabitation regime does not bring about such substantial 
entitlements as it did in New Zealand. Thus, another key finding of this project is that these 
issues are inter-linked. 
The tentative conclusion of this study is that cohabiting couples without children should be 
treated similarly to relationships with children after a longer qualifying period and therefore 
be entitled to equal sharing. This conclusion suggests that the time bar should be raised to five 
years to prevent couples from qualifying as a result of just drifting into relationships; five years 
demonstrates a greater long-term commitment to one another where three years in New 
Zealand had been considered too low. Also, the lawyers from Australia and New Zealand 
highlighted the dangers of not having cohabitation provisions for those outside of the time 
limitation period. Yet, it is fundamentally clear from this project that a Property Law approach 
which reflects a pure Deech-like position is completely inadequate for cohabiting couples 
either with or without children. Therefore, it is important to have Family Law provisions for 
relationships that fall outside of this qualification period rather than merely falling back on a 
property-based settlement. However, what shape should this alternative approach take? 
Perhaps a scheme, similar to Scotland’s regime which starts from day one, providing 
protection for claimants and yet, at the same time, is self-limiting according to the length of 
the relationship would be a way of ‘bridging that gap’.  
Using Scotland's approach here may create difficulties similar to those seen in New Zealand.  If, 
after five years cohabitants are to find themselves entitled to formal equality, then the narrow, 
discretionary approach towards cohabiting relationships within Scots Law would mean that 
there would be a huge leap in rights for couples at the five year mark. New Zealand lawyers 
were clear that a rigid time bar could also severely disadvantage those who fell below the 
relationship duration threshold. Furthermore, economic advantages and disadvantages have 
generally been restrictively interpreted by the Scottish courts which could lead to unfair 
outcomes in those longer ‘short duration’ relationships. Consequently, this may impose an 
arbitrary time limitation period which may severely disadvantage the claimant whose 
relationship has ended at 4.5 years. While one answer to this may be that a flexible approach 
                                                          
1242 R Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 40 - 41 
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to the time-bar is needed, this would create other problems and potentially introduce 
uncertainty into the system.  
Yet, it is also suggested that the regime for those short duration relationships needs ideally to 
have some connection to the regime for longer relationships. If a regime that mirrors formal 
equality is to be adopted at five years, then perhaps for short duration relationships, couples 
could accrue rights incrementally based on the number of years that they are together. For 
example, as Barlow and Lind suggested with regard to the matrimonial home, the non-legal 
owner could be entitled to 10% after one year, 20% after two years etc. until they reach the 
five year threshold where they are entitled to equal sharing of family property.1243 However, 
would this open the door to ‘gold-digging’, particularly for those hapless couples who have 
stumbled into cohabitation? What if, after a year, the non-owning cohabitant has rights in the 
proprietor’s home without the proprietor having been aware of it? Perhaps the answer lies in 
blending these two approaches together. Maybe for those very short duration cohabiting 
relationships, Scotland’s self-limiting approach may be more appealing, and then after three 
years there should be a different construction of percentages (for example 10% of relationship 
property after three years, 33% after four years and then 50% after five). This mixture of 
approaches would prevent ‘gold-digging’ claims from early cohabitation relationships limiting 
the extent of unjustified claims in very short duration relationships and yet at the same time 
provide protection for longer ‘short duration’ relationships where the approach based on 
economic-advantages and disadvantages is less appropriate.  As indicated earlier, what would 
be acceptable where there are no children of the family is likely to depend on the definition of 
relationship property and whether it would include the home owned by one partner and 
purchased prior to the relationship. Furthermore, such changes to the regulation of a 
cohabitation relationship would require an awareness campaign for those potentially affected 
by such a scheme, and there should be scope for cohabitants to contract out of this system 
which is considered further on in this chapter. While this may be very complicated for the 
individual trying to navigate their way through the system, tables might be produced to guide 
people through their entitlement for ease of reference. 
8.2.1.1.2 A Different Starting Point for all Relationships of Short Duration without Children? 
While length was a concern for preventing automatic entitlement to 50% of relationship assets 
for cohabiting couples, the findings from this project also indicated that most of the lawyers 
across the four jurisdictions and also the focus groups distinguished between marriages of 
short and long duration. In fact, the focus groups wanted an approach similar to New Zealand 
                                                          
1243 A Barlow and C Lind, ‘A Matter of Trust: The Allocation of Rights in the Family Home’ (2006) 19(4) Legal Studies  468, 478 
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where contributions were evaluated in relationships of short duration and then, after a length 
of time, this moved towards a model of entitlement to equal sharing. Thus, this conclusion 
suggests that a line should also be drawn between short and long marriages without children 
as well as short and long duration cohabitating relationships without children.  
Yet, as the earlier discussion of time limitation periods revealed,1244 having a set time-bar may 
introduce an arbitrary division that produces unfairness for being too low or too high in certain 
situations. To avoid the criticisms that suggested that the three year time-bar in New Zealand 
was too low, it seems necessary to place the bar at a five year mark as in the cohabitation 
context. The question then posed is how should short duration marriages be treated, and 
should they be any different from cohabiting relationships of short duration? As the discussion 
above indicates, this thesis rejects evaluation as a method through which to govern the 
distribution of assets at the end of a relationship, as it tends to disadvantage the female 
homemaker; it is possible that the criticisms in New Zealand that stated the three year time 
bar was too high in many cases may in fact reflect the inadequacy of having evaluation as the 
approach for short duration marriages. At the same time, it was evident that where 
respondents believed that marriage and cohabitation differed, it was because of the 
expression of commitment that was associated with a marital union. While many of the 
respondents throughout this project believed that cohabitants in long-term relationships also 
reflected that level of commitment, it is important not to ignore the finding that most of the 
lawyers and in particular, the focus groups presumed there to be a difference between short 
term relationships according to relationship status. In light of this, the Scottish approach 
towards cohabitants based on rebalancing economic advantages and disadvantages seems 
inappropriate in the short-duration marriage context. This is even considering that the Scottish 
approach towards economic advantages and disadvantages is more generous in the married 
context than it is in the cohabiting context; even then, the overall approach was still criticised 
by the lawyers for being overly narrow. Rather, an approach based on incrementally accruing 
rights each year of the relationship may offer an option which meets both Deech’s and 
Fineman’s positions1245 where each year of marriage carries with it a greater entitlement to a 
share in the assets, and this increment should be more dramatic than in the cohabitation 
context. For example, where cohabitants might receive 10% after three years etc., married 
couples could be entitled to 10% after one year, 20% after two years etc. until they reach 50% 
at five years.1246 Any periods of pre-marital cohabitation would also need to be factored in to 
                                                          
1244 See section 8.2.2 
1245 A Barlow and C Lind, ‘A Matter of Trust: The Allocation of Rights in the Family Home’ (2006) 19(4) Legal Studies  468, 478 
1246 A Barlow and C Lind, ‘A Matter of Trust: The Allocation of Rights in the Family Home’ (2006) 19(4) Legal Studies  468, 478 
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this on the basis that getting married is an express declaration of commitment. It is the 
absence, or at least perceived absence of this declaration in the cohabitation context that has 
caused this commentator to suggest that different approaches for ‘short duration’ married and 
cohabiting couples should be taken. Furthermore, in light of this difference, the definition of 
relationship property should be wider than cohabiting relationships to include ‘fruits of the 
marriage’ as under section 8.2.1.2. Consequently, if a cohabiting couple has been together for 
three years and then marries, only to break up a year later, the short duration married couple 
scheme should apply. Therefore, the non-owning spouse would be entitled to four years under 
the short duration marriage scheme and thus to a sum of 40% of relationship property. This is 
in comparison to the 33% share that a cohabiting relationship of four years would give rise to. 
Similarly to the cohabitation context, tables would be necessary to explain these entitlements 
to those who are using this system. 
8.2.1.1.3 Contracting Out of this Regime 
While Deech may view these suggested proposals as an unwarranted paternalistic intervention 
into the private affairs of a couple, it is possible to give recognition to autonomy by recognising 
cohabitation and marital agreements. Additionally, cohabitation agreements and also the 
possibility of opting-out of the scheme allow cohabitants to avoid being regulated by Family 
Law where they do not wish it. Yet, balancing both Fineman’s and Deech’s positions when 
considering pre-nuptial agreements appears to be more difficult. While Deech argues that 
everyone is capable of autonomy and entering such contracts, Fineman contends that this 
autonomy is a myth. Consequently, enforcing contracts that are premised on the autonomy of 
two parties causes difficulties from Fineman’s position. Therefore, to enforce relationship 
agreements without any formal requirements (such as in Scotland) can induce manifest 
injustice for Fineman’s care-dyad, particularly considering that in Scotland the only 
prerequisite is that the agreement cannot be unfair; even an inequality in bargaining power 
will not necessarily render the contract void. While pre-nuptial agreements offer a way for 
spouses to protect large assets, it needs to be balanced with the economic inequality (and its 
effect on bargaining positions) that may exist between the parties. Consequently, having strict 
statutory protocols such as in New Zealand and Australia which require separate legal advice 
would be a way of balancing those two competing interests of autonomy and protection. 
For couples without children, much greater weight should be given to contracts to recognise 
the autonomy of the parties, and thus such agreements should be upheld if they meet the 
above procedural requirements. In the absence of these agreements, then both married and 
cohabiting couples should be regulated by the default system for both short and long duration 
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relationships. However, contracting-out of this system is more complicated for relationships 
with children, as the danger of placing too much weight on these contracts is that this will 
mean that care-relationships are no longer at the heart of the system. Messages of autonomy 
ought not to be at the expense of those in care-relationships. To avoid this, it is suggested that 
for relationships with children, contractual agreements should not hold as much force as they 
would for relationships without children. Instead, for those contracts that meet the above pre-
requisites, the current approach in England and Wales to pre-nuptial agreements which only 
takes them into consideration rather than rigidly enforcing them, and also considers how fair 
they are1247 may be a suitable compromise between autonomy and protection in this instance. 
8.2.1.4 The Safety Net - An Entitlement to Equality ‘Plus’ 
For relationships with children, or where relationships without children have crossed the time-
bar (and not before), there may be instances where equal sharing of relationship property is 
not enough on its own. In light of these scenarios, there needs to be a safety net for the 
regime, and therefore a way in which the courts can grant an award that is equality ‘plus’ to 
the non-owning or financially weaker partner. For relationships without children, the 
overriding aim of financial provision should be financial autonomy and therefore a clean break 
through formal equality (as far as possible).  For relationships with children, the goal should 
rather be substantive equality on account of the primary care-giver’s reduced ability to be 
financially independent. This means that how and when the courts should grant equality ‘plus’ 
will depend on whether or not children are present. 
8.2.1.4.1 Relationships (of at least five years) without Children 
Although financial provision on relationship breakdown (without children) should promote 
financial autonomy and clean break, it is possible that these relationships may still have a 
division of relationship functions which results in an imbalance or an economic disparity 
between partners and therefore it may not be possible for one party to be financially 
autonomous at the moment of separation. Therefore, to recognise these relationships as a 
joint venture, it may be necessary to have some short-term maintenance to rehabilitate the 
partner and/or a provision to rebalance any economic disparity and compensate the non-
owning spouse as in Scotland and New Zealand. In fact, these two jurisdictions rarely used 
periodical payments, and the lawyers voiced the clear benefits from a clean break; it severed 
ties between parties, allowed the parties to move on and limited hostility in the majority of 
cases. Where maintenance was applied, the emphasis of all of these jurisdictions was on 
                                                          
1247 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 
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rehabilitation, and, consequently, the orders were often of short duration. In fact, in Scotland 
there were two options for maintenance – a short three year provision and an indefinite 
provision which had a high bar to cross. These provisions were extremely rare to use and 
where they were, the awards were small and modest, allowing for the parties to go their 
separate ways post-divorce, and really reflecting greater elements of Deech’s position rather 
than Fineman’s. Thus, to offer some protection where formal equality may not enable financial 
independence on relationship breakdown, it is tentatively suggested that maintenance in a 
limited capacity which is designed to be rehabilitative is available on relationship breakdown in 
England and Wales. However, given that the onus of awards in this relationship context is on 
financial independence, it is possible to have unequal division of relationship property, but 
there is no access to non-relationship property. Furthermore, if this unequal division of 
relationship property is in place of maintenance, this would facilitate a clean break at the end 
of these relationships.  
8.2.2.2 Relationships with Children 
From the findings of this project, the approach outlined for relationships without children 
would not usually be suitable for those with children. Although ‘entitlement to equal sharing’ 
appears to be the most appropriate starting point for relationships with children, formal 
equality with a narrow conception of relationship property and a restrictive approach to 
maintenance and compensation, as seen in New Zealand and Scotland, can produce results 
that are unfair towards the care-giving partner. While neither Scotland’s nor New Zealand’s 
statutory framework excludes discretion, the narrow approach from the judges demonstrated 
the consequences of having such a restrictive and certain approach. The danger is that a 
scheme based solely on certainty (at least here through equal division) may go too far, be too 
rigid and may in fact cause the courts to completely ignore domestic contributions and the 
impact that care-giving can have on a party’s financial situation. Again, this study has found 
that preferences for autonomy ought not to disadvantage caregivers on relationship 
breakdown, and the lawyers from Scotland and New Zealand recognised that where there 
were children, additional protection on top of formal equality was necessary. Consequently, it 
is proposed that in the context of relationships with children, formal equality of relationship 
property (as defined above) ought to be the starting point for financial provisions on 
relationship breakdown, with discretion to adjust this award in the favour of the homemaker 
to ensure that the primary care-giver’s needs are met at the very minimum at the end of a 
relationship. To effectively place these care-relationships at the heart of financial provision on 
relationship breakdown, the focus of financial awards should be, as Fineman notes, to equalise 
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the resources between both parties.1248 Formal equality alone will not always achieve this, as it 
fails to consider long-term economic disadvantage that arises from care-giving. To ignore these 
long-term effects not only impoverishes care-givers post-separation, but it also can create a 
disparity in the standard of living between former spouses which can severely impact children 
post-separation.  
Thus, certainty on its own is not enough of a reason to place a formal equality ceiling on 
financial provision following relationships with children as this may often prove inadequate to 
meet the caregiver and children’s needs, particularly if formal equality is limited to relationship 
property. However, in a similar fashion to the Scottish approach (where separate property 
could be divided under the other principles of s9(1)),1249 if property which is not considered 
matrimonial can be used as a resource to achieve substantive equality for the care-
relationships, this will balance the competing claims of autonomy for relationships without 
children, with room to protect primary care-givers and therefore relationships with children in 
a holistic manner. This overall approach to relationship property means that while the clear 
definition demarks and protects property ownership, there is space to interfere with separate 
property where relationship property on its own is insufficient. 
Furthermore, most of the lawyers who took part in this project argued that maintenance 
should be available from future income, particularly for small asset cases and those with 
children. Respondents in both Scotland and New Zealand, which have rehabilitative 
approaches to maintenance, felt that the awards made were too infrequent and too small. In 
fact, the Scottish lawyers criticised the fact that it was not possible to grant periodical 
payments for s9(1)(b) (the compensatory provision) arguing that the result was that it severely 
disadvantaged the primary care-giver particularly in small asset cases, and those who had been 
in long marriages. In direct contrast, in Australia and England and Wales there was little 
mention of concerns relating to maintenance provisions. Maintenance appeared to be the best 
way to ensure that needs are met in the majority of cases. Through this definition of 
matrimonial property and maintenance, a wider scope of resources can be used to meet the 
needs of the care-dyad where formal equality is insufficient. Moreover, to provide extensive 
support where equal sharing is not enough to equalise resources on its own, and that this 
support can be accessed from non-relationship property and also the future income of the 
other party, demonstrates that the societal importance of care-giving is not displaced by the 
individual worth of financial contributions. Awards which provide the care-giving spouse a far 
                                                          
1248 M Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory Of Dependency (New Press 2004) 
1249 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
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greater sum than that of the other spouse are necessary to fully support the care-giving 
relationship post-separation.  
However, even with a wide pool of assets, formal equality on its own may be insufficient and 
consequently it may be necessary to provide additional support on top of equal sharing. Yet, 
what shape should this additional support take: should it be based on relationship-generated 
disadvantages, needs or both? Neither New Zealand nor Scotland considered the needs of the 
party; instead the focus was on compensating any relationship-generated disadvantage that 
either party had suffered. New Zealand uses s15 of the Property (Relationships) Act to 
rebalance any economic disparity relating to the division of relationship responsibilities, and 
Scotland rebalanced any economic advantages and disadvantages made in the interests of the 
family under s9(1)(b) Family Law (Scotland) Act. Furthermore, Scotland compensated for the 
economic burden of caring under s9(1)(c). Yet, while compensation is conceptually attractive, 
lawyers from both these jurisdictions indicated that they were in practice immensely 
dissatisfied with the way in which this approach fails to meet needs. It is hard to discern 
whether compensation approach fails because of the shape of the statutory provisions, or just 
because the discretion has not been used widely enough. Perhaps with greater guidance on 
these discretionary provisions (including maintenance), more effective protection of the care-
dyad may have been achieved. 
Yet, Australia, which had a strong history of discretion within its legal framework, also had 
difficulty with compensation. Australia, had the opportunity to consider future needs under 
s75(2) of the Family Law Act Cth; however the courts held that this was an inappropriate test 
and so instead focused on compensation by trying to rebalance any economic disparity.1250 
Thus, the provision was more compensatory and holistic in practice. Similarly, England and 
Wales also uses a compensatory provision as one of its strands of fairness with the aim to have 
a holistic approach.1251 Needs alone had been insufficient within England and Wales prior to 
White.1252 Yet, respondents from both of these jurisdictions indicated that the legal system did 
not adequately compensate the primary care-giver where there was a relationship-generated 
disadvantage. Therefore, compensation as a concept may not be easy to apply. Perhaps the 
practical difficulties that are associated with quantifying the losses that a career sacrifice has in 
the labour market prevent the courts from adequately compensating the primary care-giver: 
                                                          
1250 See Figgins v Figgins (2002) Fam CA 688. Also see discussion Chapter 5, section 5.3.3 
1251 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186 identified that fairness consisted of needs, 
compensation and sharing. 
1252 As discussed in section 8.2.1.1 above 
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…I don’t think it would fully rebalance future disadvantages, because no one has a 
crystal ball… (EWLaw6) 
…it’s really hard to prove a career break because it’s really hard to get any evidence 
about what the career would have been.  (NZLaw13)  
Furthermore, this practical difficulty may also relate to the typical salaries that are sacrificed by 
one party. It is unlikely that many will have as large a salary to give up as Mrs McFarlane1253 
and consequently, compensation may not prove to be a useful provision for most run of the 
mill cases. While it may prove more quantifiable and effective in big asset cases where a 
substantial salary has been forgone, in most cases this will be impractical to measure.  
Consequently, an approach that is based solely on compensatory provisions may actually not 
protect Fineman’s care-dyad. However, that is not to say that compensation should be 
excluded altogether as it may have a place in a small category of cases such as McFarlane. 
Rather, it appears to be ineffective to have relationship-generated disadvantage as the basis of 
an award in its own right, particularly for these relationships identified as vulnerable. 
Addressing needs first (and perhaps generously interpreted) which can be reduced to an easy 
to apply formula, which England and Wales has traditionally done so well, therefore appears to 
be a safer and more quantifiable approach as a minimum for Fineman’s care-dyad. Therefore, 
having a discretionary approach which is first and foremost needs-based, but which 
compensation can be built on top of (where possible) will provide a holistic approach towards 
the care-giving relationship.  
Yet, England and Wales was the least satisfied with the provisions made for need at the end of 
a relationship although, it is suggested that this dissatisfaction may be because the lawyers 
held high expectations for the outcome of such an approach that has needs at its heart. Given 
the practical difficulties of quantifying compensation and the fact that the most pro-Fineman 
jurisdiction had the most dissatisfied lawyers, it appears that to provide adequate provision for 
the primary care-giver may require wider societal change as Fineman herself has proposed.1254 
An equality ‘plus’ approach that places the care-relationship at its heart is perhaps the furthest 
that private law can take Fineman’s position which should involve a meeting of needs and 
compensation where it is relevant; certainty should not trump substantive ‘fairness’ for the 
caregiver in these relationships. 
Consequently, while the starting points for those with and without children may be the same, 
the end goal is different. For relationships without children subject to a qualifying period, the 
                                                          
1253 McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186. Mrs McFarlane gave up a career equally lucrative to her husband 
and thus was granted £250,000 per annum 
1254 M Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory Of Dependency (New Press 2004) 
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end goal is formal equality and financial independence, and therefore, there should only be a 
limited entitlement to equality ‘plus’. In comparison, for relationships with children the end 
goal is ‘substantive equality’. Consequently, not only should entitlement to equal sharing of 
relationship property be automatic but there should be extensive provision to allow for 
equality ‘plus’ where necessary to place the care-relationship firmly at the centre of financial 
provision on relationship breakdown. It is concluded from this study that only by separating 
relationships with and without children will it be possible to balance the competing stances on 
autonomy and the autonomy myth, and appropriately reflect the lessons learned from other 
jurisdictions on the benefits and disadvantages of the conflicting feminist positions of Martha 
Fineman and Ruth Deech on the value to be placed on non-financial contributions to 
relationships.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Interview Schedule 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This interview forms the basis of a wider project that 
looks at how the homemaker (and therefore domestic or non-financial contributions such as 
the unpaid contributions of caring for children, household chores and the organisation and 
running of the family home) should be valued by the courts in England and Wales on 
relationship breakdown when the courts divide the assets. To gain insight into this matter, this 
interview is interested in how your jurisdiction quantifies these contributions in married 
couples, cohabiting couples and same-sex relationships. It seeks to establish not only how your 
jurisdiction values homemaker contributions beside the breadwinner contributions (principally 
financial) at the end of these relationships, but also wishes to assess the level of your 
satisfaction at this approach in practice and whether you think that an alternative method of 
quantification would be more appropriate.  
To do this, the questions have been divided into three sections. Section A looks at your general 
attitudes towards certain aspects of marriage, cohabiting and same-sex relationships. Section 
B then looks at the more practical elements of your jurisdiction in this area; what principles 
guide your courts when dividing assets on relationship breakdown and how they value 
contributions. It also assesses your opinion on these issues. Section C finally provides two 
scenarios of couples breaking up with a number of variables which aims to establish how your 
jurisdiction would settle financial provision and how satisfied you are with this approach. 
A) ATTITUDES (general) 
1) To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the statements below? Please 
select from strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly 
disagree. 
 
a) Marriage is a social and economic partnership between equals 
b) A Cohabiting relationship is an arrangement between individuals in which efforts 
should be recognised on a discrete or separate basis1255 
c) Marriage is a more financially intertwined union than cohabiting relationships 
d) Marriage and cohabiting relationships should be treated exactly the same in law 
e) Couples with children are likely to organise their financial and domestic affairs 
similarly irrespective of marriage 
f) In general marital unions without children organise their financial and domestic 
affairs differently from cohabiting unions without children 
g) In general married couples organise their affairs more traditionally into a 
homemaker/breadwinner divide than cohabiting couples 
h) Same-sex cohabiting relationships divide their relationship responsibilities in a 
similar manner to different sex cohabiting relationships. 
i) Regardless of who made the contributions, financial and domestic contributions 
are of equal value within marriage 
                                                          
1255 Taken from B Fehlberg and J Behrens Australian Family Law: The Contemporary Context (Oxford University Press 2008) 543 
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j) Regardless of who made the contributions, financial and domestic contributions 
are of equal value within different-sex cohabiting relationships 
k) Regardless of who made the contributions, financial and domestic contributions 
are of equal value within same-sex cohabiting relationships 
 
B) THE JURISDICTION (on relationship breakdown) 
 
1) PRINCIPLES 
Here is a non-exhaustive list of some principles that are used to guide courts when 
dividing assets on relationship breakdown 
 
 Fairness 
 Needs 
 Equal Sharing 
 Compensation (to redress any significant prospective economic disparity 
between the parties arising from the way they conducted their relationship) 
 Retention of property interests 
 Child’s Welfare 
 Economic burden of caring 
 Reward for Past Contributions 
 Clean break 
 
a) Which, if any of these principles feature in your jurisdiction on divorce? Please list 
them in order of importance to the court when determining the division of assets 
(including maintenance and pension if relevant) for married couples. 
 
i) Where do these principles originate from? 
Case Law; Statute; Both; ‘Other’. Please expand on other 
ii) In your experience, how consistently are these applied in that order of 
importance? 
Always; Usually; Sometimes; Infrequently; Never 
iii) How satisfied are you with this order of principles?  
Very Satisfied; Satisfied; Neutral; Dissatisfied; Very Dissatisfied 
iv) Please rewrite the list to indicate the order you think would be most 
appropriate including any alternative principles that you would think 
appropriate. Please expand on why. 
 
b) In your experience, do the courts use these principles in the same order of 
importance for cohabiting couples? If not, how would the order of importance of 
the above principles change? Please list them. 
i) Where do these principles originate from? 
Case Law; Statute; Both; ‘Other’. Please expand on other. 
ii) In your experience, how consistently are these applied in that order of 
importance? 
Always; Usually; Sometimes; Infrequently; Never 
iii) How satisfied are you with this order of principles?  
Very Satisfied; Satisfied; Neutral; Dissatisfied; Very Dissatisfied 
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iv) Please rewrite the list to indicate the order you think would be most 
appropriate including any alternative principles that you would think 
appropriate. Please expand on why. 
v) Do these principles apply equally to same-sex couples? 
Always; Usually; Sometimes; Infrequently; Never 
vi) Do you think the same principles should apply equally between same-sex 
cohabiting couples and different-sex cohabiting couples? 
vii) Do you think that the same principle should apply equally between 
married/civil partners and same-sex/different-sex cohabiting couples? 
 
2) VALUING DOMESTIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
(a)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a marriage have divided their roles 
unequally into breadwinner and homemaker contributions, how does your 
jurisdiction balance their respective financial and non-financial contributions 
to a relationship on breakdown? 
 
Protects               Equally         Protects 
Breadwinner         Homemaker  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this treats the homemaker? 
 
Too           Satisfactorily          Too      
Little          Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
(b)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a same-sex cohabiting relationship 
have divided their roles unequally into breadwinner and homemaker 
contributions, how does your jurisdiction balance their respective financial and 
non-financial contributions to a relationship on divorce? 
 
Protects               Equally         Protects 
Breadwinner         Homemaker  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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ii) How adequately do you think that this treats the homemaker? 
 
Too           Satisfactorily          Too      
Little          Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Please expand on why. 
(c)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a different-sex cohabiting relationship 
have divided their roles unequally into breadwinner and homemaker 
contributions, how does your jurisdiction balance their respective financial and 
non-financial contributions to a relationship on breakdown? 
 
Protects               Equally         Protects 
Breadwinner         Homemaker  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this treats the homemaker? 
 
Too           Satisfactorily          Too      
Little          Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
(d)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a marriage are both fulltime dual 
earners and only one is predominantly responsible for the homemaker 
contributions, how is this additional contribution reflected in financial 
provision on relationship breakdown in your jurisdiction in comparison to a 
fulltime homemaker’s contribution? 
             
It is valued less                                                   It enhances        
the         the 
award on 
account of                
the additional             
contributions 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this serves the interests of the party who 
carries out the dual role? 
 
Too           Satisfactorily          Too      
Little          Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
(e)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a same-sex cohabiting relationship are 
both fulltime dual earners and only one is predominantly responsible for the 
homemaker contributions, how is this additional contribution reflected in 
financial provision on relationship breakdown in your jurisdiction in 
comparison to a fulltime homemaker’s contribution? 
             
It is valued less                                                   It enhances        
the         the 
award on 
account of                
the additional             
contributions 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this serves the interests of the party who 
carries out the dual role? 
 
Too           Satisfactorily          Too      
Little          Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
(f)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a different-sex cohabiting relationship 
are both fulltime dual earners and only one is predominantly responsible for 
the homemaker contributions, how is this additional contribution reflected in 
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financial provision on relationship breakdown in your jurisdiction in 
comparison to a fulltime homemaker’s contribution? 
             
It is valued less                                                   It enhances        
the         the 
award on 
account of                
the additional             
contributions 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this serves the interests of the party who 
carries out the dual role? 
 
Too           Satisfactorily              Too      
Little              Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Please expand on why 
 
(g)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a marriage, one party works fulltime 
and the other works part-time as well as carrying out all the homemaker 
responsibilities, how does financial provision in your jurisdiction reflect this 
relationship generated disadvantage on relationship breakdown? 
 
 
             
Disregarded:                                           Fully a               
d                                                                                                                                           rebalances past,  
f                                                                                                                                                present and    
f                                                                                                                                   future disadvantages 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this serves the interests of the party who 
carries out the dual role? 
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Too           Satisfactorily              Too      
Little              Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
(h)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a same-sex cohabiting relationship, 
one party works fulltime and the other works part-time as well as carrying out 
all the homemaker responsibilities, how does financial provision in your 
jurisdiction reflect this relationship generated disadvantage on relationship 
breakdown? 
             
Disregarded:                                           Fully a               
d                                                                                                                                           rebalances past,  
f                                                                                                                                                present and    
f                                                                                                                                   future disadvantages 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this serves the interests of the party who 
carries out the dual role? 
 
 
 
Too      Satisfactorily                   Too          
Little                   Generous 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
(i)  
i) In your experience, where the parties in a different-sex cohabiting 
relationship, one party works fulltime and the other works part-time as well as 
carrying out all the homemaker responsibilities, how does financial provision 
in your jurisdiction reflect this relationship generated disadvantage on 
relationship breakdown? 
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Disregarded:                                           Fully a               
d                                                                                                                                           rebalances past,  
f                                                                                                                                                present and    
f                                                                                                                                   future disadvantages 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How adequately do you think that this serves the interests of the party who 
carries out the dual role? 
 
Too      Satisfactorily                   Too          
Little                   Generous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
Please indicate how far you agree with the following statements in (j) and (k) 
(j)  
i) Financial provision on relationship breakdown in my jurisdiction encourages 
couples to avoid financial dependence on one another post separation. 
 
Agree               Disagree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) In principle I think that financial provision on relationship breakdown in my 
jurisdiction should encourage couples to avoid financial dependence on one 
another post separation. 
 
Agree               Disagree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
iv) Does this differ between same-sex and different-sex cohabiting couples and 
married couples? 
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(k)  
i) Financial provision on relationship breakdown in my jurisdiction does not 
protect those who are financially dependent on their partners. 
 
Agree               Disagree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) In principle I think that financial provision on relationship breakdown in my 
jurisdiction should not protect those who are financially dependent on their 
partners. 
 
Agree               Disagree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
iv) Does this differ between same-sex and different-sex cohabiting couples and 
married couples? 
 
(L)  
i) How does financial provision in your jurisdiction at the point of relationship 
breakdown value homemaking contributions in couples where there are 
children compared to where there are not? 
 
 
 
With Children:             Without Children: 
More Favourably          The Same        More Favourably 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How do you think that financial provision in your jurisdiction at the point of 
relationship breakdown SHOULD value homemaking contributions in couples 
where there are children from those where there are not? 
 
With Children:             Without Children: 
More Favourably          The Same        More Favourably 
Favourably 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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iii) Please expand on why. 
 
iv) Does this differ between same-sex and different-sex cohabiting couples and 
married couples? 
 
(m)  
i) How does financial provision in your jurisdiction at the point of relationship 
breakdown value homemaking contributions in married couples beside those 
of unmarried couples. 
 
With more weight           With more weight 
Cohabiting couples          The same        in married couples 
0        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How do you think that financial provision in your jurisdiction at the point of 
relationship breakdown SHOULD value homemaking contributions in married 
couples beside those of unmarried couples? 
 
With more weight           With more weight 
Cohabiting couples          The same        in married couples 
0        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
 
(n)  
i) How does financial provision in your jurisdiction at the point of relationship 
breakdown value homemaking contributions in different-sex couples beside 
those of same-sex couples. 
 
 
With more weight           With more weight 
in different-sex couples         The same    in same-sex couples 
0        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) How do you think that financial provision in your jurisdiction at the point of 
relationship breakdown SHOULD value homemaking contributions in different-
sex couples beside those of same-sex couples? 
 
With more weight           With more weight 
in different-sex couples         The same    in same-sex couples 
0        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why. 
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(o)  
i) What degree of flexibility do the courts have when valuing these 
contributions? 
 
Applies Strict Rules            Complete Discretion 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
ii) Which number on this scale best matches your view on this amount of 
discretion? 
 
Far too rigid    Right Balance            Far too uncertain 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) Please expand on why you have chosen this answer. 
 
iv) Does this differ between same-sex and different-sex cohabiting couples and 
married couples? 
 
v) What difficulties are posed when quantifying domestic contributions in your 
jurisdiction? Please expand. 
 
C) SCENARIOS 
This section wishes to establish how your jurisdiction would settle financial disputes in two 
scenarios. Each will entail a set of circumstances surrounding a couple splitting up which has a 
number of alternative variables. For each scenario you will be given the outcome in England 
and Wales then asked your opinion, the you will be asked a number of questions underneath 
about financial awards made for either Miss Jones (Scenario A) or Mrs Higgins (Scenario B). 
Both scenarios will have 4 variations of case facts. For each of these adaptations you will be 
asked a number of questions concerning the approach that your jurisdiction would take in light 
of these. 
Scenario A: 
Mr Smith and Miss Jones were unmarried and had lived together for almost 20 years. Their 
home was purchased in Mr Smith’s name and Miss Jones had made no contribution to the 
purchase price or to any subsequent mortgage payments. They presented themselves as a 
married couple and she had assumed the homemaker role, raising their three children who are 
now grown up. 15 years into their relationship she began to work part-time and subsequently 
contributed to household bills and bought various chattels. She also had redecorated the 
house twice. On separation, she had no assets of her own or any potential earning capacity. 
The house was an average three-bedroom house and Mr Smith was on an average income. 
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THE OUTCOME IN ENGLAND AND WALES: It is likely that as the couple are unmarried and Miss 
Jones has not made any direct financial contributions to the property’s purchase price, the 
courts in England and Wales would not find a beneficial entitlement in the home and thus she 
has no share in the property, no right to remain in the home and no remedy elsewhere on 
relationship breakdown. 
1)  
 
a. Which number on the below scale best represents your opinion on this 
outcome in England and Wales? Please give an explanation regarding your 
choice. 
 
Too protective         About Right              Too generous to 
of the financial                     the non-financial 
contributor              contributor 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2)   
a. In your experience, how would financial provision on relationship breakdown 
in your jurisdiction differ for Miss Jones in comparison? (Please also indicate 
the award that the courts would be likely to grant e.g. any potential 
maintenance and/or how the assets would be divided 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
 
b. Which number on the scale best represents your opinion on your jurisdiction’s 
approach? Please give an explanation regarding your choice. 
 
Too protective         About Right              Too generous to 
of the financial                     the non-financial 
contributor              contributor 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
c. If you could, how would you in comparison to your jurisdiction vary the 
financial orders for Miss Jones in light of this variation? (Please also indicate 
the award that you would feel to be most appropriate AND WHY) 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
3) VARIABLES 
 
I) Miss Jones had not had any children. 
II) Mr Smith and Miss Jones were in fact married 
III) Miss Jones had worked throughout the relationship 
IV) If this was a same-sex relationship with adoptive children 
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You will be asked the below questions for each scenario: 
 
i) How would the financial provision for the original scenario in Your jurisdiction 
for Miss Jones alter in light of this variation? (Please also indicate the award 
that the courts would be likely to grant) 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
ii) Which number on the scale best represents your opinion on the approach to 
this variant in your jurisdiction? Please give an explanation regarding your 
choice. 
 
Too protective         About Right              Too generous to 
of the financial                     the non-financial 
contributor              contributor 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) If you could, how would you in comparison to your jurisdiction vary the 
financial orders for Miss Jones in light of this variation? (Please also indicate 
the award that you would feel to be most appropriate AND WHY) 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
Scenario B: 
Mr and Mrs Higgins had been married for under three years with no children. At the time of 
the marriage, Mr Higgins had a very successful career and a high income bringing vast multi-
million assets to the relationship over 16.7 million. Shortly after their marriage Mr Higgins 
joined a new company buying vast shares in it. Mrs Higgins gave up her high income job upon 
marriage to become the homemaker. She was used to an extremely high standard of living. At 
the time of separation, Mr Higgins had huge assets increasing to 17.5 million plus his shares 
worth between 12 and 18 million and an income of 1 million a year. Mrs Higgins had 
significantly smaller assets worth 100,000 of which half were tied up in pension funds. 
THE OUTCOME IN ENGLAND AND WALES: In England and Wales, although the marriage was 
short, giving the standard of living that Mrs Higgins legitimately expected and that Mr Higgins 
had acquired some of the wealth through his actions during the marriage, the courts would 
award her financial provision exceeding her needs; the matrimonial home (worth 2.3 million) 
and a 2.7 million lump sum for a clean break.  
iv)  
 
a. Which number on the below scale best represents your opinion on this 
outcome in England and Wales? Please give an explanation regarding your 
choice. 
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Too protective         About Right              Too generous to 
of the financial                     the non-financial 
contributor              contributor 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
v)   
a. In your experience, how would financial provision on relationship 
breakdown in your jurisdiction differ for Mrs Higgins in comparison? 
(Please also indicate the award that the courts would be likely to grant e.g. 
any potential maintenance and/or how the assets would be divided 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
 
b. Which number on the scale best represents your opinion on your 
jurisdiction’s approach? Please give an explanation regarding your choice. 
 
Too protective         About Right              Too generous to 
of the financial                     the non-financial 
contributor              contributor 
     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
c. If you could, how would you in comparison to your jurisdiction vary the 
financial orders for Mrs Higgins in light of this variation? (Please also 
indicate the award that you would feel to be most appropriate AND WHY) 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
 
vi) VARIABLE 
I) How would the scenario change if the couple had had children 
II) How would the scenario change if the marriage had lasted 20 years 
III) How would the scenario change if Mrs Higgins had not given up her job 
IV) How would the scenario change if this was a same-sex relationship 
 
You will be asked the below questions for each scenario: 
 
i) How would the financial provision for the original scenario in Your jurisdiction 
for Mrs Higgins alter in light of this variation? (Please also indicate the award 
that the courts would be likely to grant) 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
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ii) Which number on the scale best represents your opinion on the approach to 
this variant in Your jurisdiction? Please give an explanation regarding your 
choice. 
 
Too protective         About Right              Too generous to 
of the financial                     the non-financial 
contributor              contributor 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
iii) If you could, how would you in comparison to your jurisdiction vary the 
financial orders for Mrs Higgins in light of this variation? (Please also indicate 
the award that you would feel to be most appropriate AND WHY) 
Much less generous; A little less generous; the same; a little more generous; much more 
generous 
 
Overall, how satisfied are you with the approach that the Law in your jurisdiction would take in 
both these scenarios and generally for: 
a. Married Couples 
b. Different-Sex cohabiting Couples 
c. Same-Sex cohabiting Couples 
 
Very satisfied; Satisfied; Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied; Unsatisfied; Very unsatisfied 
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Appendix B: Focus Group Schedule 
 
Firstly, thank you for taking part in my project and giving up the time for this session. As I’m 
sure you’re aware, my project looks at how the law values roles in relationships which is 
reflected in the way that it divides assets when couples break down. In particular, I’m 
investigating options for legal reform on financial provision for when married couples, civil 
partnerships, and unmarried couples split up. This session therefore seeks your own opinions 
on how the law should go about taking considerations of the domestic and financial 
arrangements within couples of different styles when it decides how to divide assets. 
With regards to the rules of the focus groups, this session is being recorded but everything said 
and done is confidential and will not be used outside the room except for research purposes. If 
you feel it is necessary you do not have to give your real name in the group introductions. Also, 
there are no wrong opinions although please do not hesitate to disagree with someone else’s 
perspective. 
Opening 1. Tell us your name and a little bit about yourself 
Introductory 2. The first task of this session is for you to list the things that you think of 
when we talk about contributions in relationships? So what types of come to 
mind? 
 What about sacrifices? 
 Childcare/housework 
 Not about fault/negative contributions in the law 
 Financial Assets? (Gifts/inheritances) 
 Is this the same for cohabiting couples or same-sex couples? 
 
NB - SAY HOW IT FALLS INTO FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL/DOMESTIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
Transitional 3. When a couple breaks up, how do you think that domestic contributions in 
comparison to financial contributions should be valued by the law and 
therefore reflected in the division of assets? Do you think that the law 
should view them as equally valuable, thus giving 50:50, or do you think 
certain contributions are of more value or importance? E.g. business success 
or caring for a disabled child. 
 What about where a special contribution has been made? 
 Is childcare more important than without, be treated more 
generously? 
 Should the law think about needs if there are relationship 
disadvantages caused by the homemaking? 
 Is this the same for cohabiting couples or same-sex couples? 
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Key 4. What sort of financial assets do you think that the law should be able to 
divide between both parties at the end of a relationship no matter who they 
belong to? Should any type of property be seen by the law as solely 
belonging to one party or should everything the parties own be divisible? 
 Gifts and inheritances? 
 Very large income? 
 Business Assets? 
 Property bought before/during/after a relationship and its subsequent 
increase in its value. 
 Pensions 
 Is this the same for cohabiting couples or same-sex couples? 
 
Key 5.  The law has a choice of a number ways of paying attention to domestic 
contributions which take a number of alternative approaches to the issues 
that we have discussed. What do you think of these alternatives? Which do 
you prefer, which do you least prefer and why? Could a compromise be 
reached? 
THINK ABOUT DIFFERENT MODELS FOR DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIP STATUSES – 
COHABITANTS, MARRIED COUPLES, SAME-SEX and CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS 
MODEL ONE:     FINANCIAL FOCUS: Financial contributions only should be recognised. Money 
in is money out. There is no recognition of domestic contributions unless they 
add value to the property. 
MODEL TWO:    ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE v. ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE: This rebalances the 
positive and negative economic effects of a relationship. It ensures that no-
one is dramatically better or worse off financially than the other as a result of 
the contributions made in the relationship. It can’t be for loss of earnings (just 
that the loss has caused a lasting disadvantage) and does not consider the 
needs of the parties. 
MODEL THREE:  EVALUATIVE APPROACH: An evaluation of the domestic and financial 
contributions made. The homemaker must prove that their contributions are 
significant enough to gain a percentage of the financial assets either by linking 
it to the property. This also may consider future needs, but not necessarily. 
MODEL FOUR:   EQUAL SHARING. It is a partnership, so everything should be divided equally in 
all circumstances regardless of the roles. 
- What if certain property was excluded? 
o Property owned before the relationship 
o Gifts/inheritance 
o Business assets 
MODEL FIVE:     NEEDS AND COMPENSATION: The needs of the parties are central to this 
model and it ensures they are met regardless of the ownership of property. 
Secondly, if there are any family assets (e.g. the relationship home or property 
attained after the relationship began) left after meeting needs, it will be 
339 
 
divided equally. However, if there has been a career disadvantage (such as 
giving up a job to look after children) then the courts may award unequal 
sharing with compensation to the homemaker. 
6. SCENARIOS – Which if any of the outcomes would be most appropriate/least appropriate? 
Key 6. What if I said that this couple was married? 
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Appendix C: Focus Group Handout 
 
MODELS OF FINANCIAL PROVISION 
MODEL ONE: FINANCIAL FOCUS: Only financial contributions should be recognised. Money 
in is money out. There is no recognition of domestic contributions unless they 
add value to the property. 
 
MODEL TWO: ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE v. ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE: This rebalances the 
positive and negative economic effects of a relationship. It ensures that no-
one is dramatically better or worse off financially than the other as a result of 
the contributions made in the relationship. It can’t be for loss of earnings (just 
that that loss has produced lasting disadvantage) and does not consider needs 
of the parties. 
 
MODEL 
THREE: 
EVALUATIVE APPROACH: An evaluation of the domestic and financial 
contributions made. The homemaker must prove that their contributions are 
significant enough to gain a percentage of the financial assets either by linking 
it to the property. This also considers future needs of the parties. 
 
MODEL 
FOUR: 
EQUAL SHARING. It is a partnership, so everything should be divided equally in 
all circumstances regardless of the roles. 
 
MODEL FIVE: NEEDS AND COMPENSATION: The needs of the parties are central to this 
model and it ensures they are met regardless of the ownership of property. 
Secondly, if there are any family assets (e.g. the relationship home or property 
attained after the relationship began) left after meeting needs, it will be 
divided equally. However, if there has been a career disadvantage (such as 
giving up a job to look after children) then the courts may award unequal 
sharing with compensation to the homemaker. 
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SCENARIOS: 
  
SCENARIO B Potential Outcomes. 
 
Mr and Mrs Higgins (respectively 41 and 36) had 
been cohabiting for two years and then married 
for under three years without children. At the time 
of the marriage, Mr Higgins had a very successful 
career and a high income bringing vast multi-
million assets to the relationship over 16.7 million. 
Shortly after their marriage Mr Higgins joined a 
new company buying vast shares in it. Mrs Higgins 
gave up her high income job upon marriage to 
become the homemaker. She was used to an 
extremely high standard of living. At the time of 
separation, Mr Higgins had huge assets increasing 
to 17.5 million plus his shares worth between 12 
and 18 million and an income of 1 million a year. 
Mrs Higgins had significantly smaller assets worth 
100,000 of which half were tied up in pension 
funds. 
 
a. Mrs Higgins would receive nothing as she has made 
no financial contributions.  
b. Mrs Higgins would receive a settlement that would 
share the economic disadvantage she sustained 
during the course of their relationship. Given that 
she was only out of employment for three years, it 
is likely to be negligible unless she can show it 
produced lasting disadvantage. She could not claim 
any maintenance. 
c. As her contributions could not be linked to Mr 
Higgins’ financial assets she could not receive more 
than 10% (a lump sum of 2-3 million) 
d. She would get 50% of house and £6-9 million for 
half of Mr Higgins’ shares  
e. She would get 50% of the house which is worth 2.3 
million (so 1.15 million) and half of the increase in 
Mr Higgins assets (around 500,000)  
f. She would get the house (2.3 million) and a lump 
sum of 2.7 million  
SCENARIO A Potential Outcomes. 
 
Mr Smith (45) and Miss Jones (43) were unmarried 
and had lived together for almost 20 years. Their 
home was purchased in Mr Smith’s name and Miss 
Jones had made no contribution to the purchase price 
or to any subsequent mortgage payments. They 
presented themselves as a married couple and she 
had assumed the homemaker role, raising their three 
children who are now grown up. 15 years into their 
relationship she began to work part-time and 
subsequently contributed to household bills and 
bought various chattels. She also had redecorated the 
house twice. On separation, she had no assets of her 
own or any potential earning capacity. The house was 
an average three-bedroom house and Mr Smith was 
on an average income. 
 
a. Miss Jones would receive nothing. She would 
have no right to remain in the home and no 
remedy elsewhere  
b. Mr Smith would have to sell the house and she 
would be entitled to about 30% and some of 
maybe pension sharing. She could not claim any 
maintenance.  
c. 50% of home only, without maintenance (40% 
for contributions and 10% extra for future 
needs) 
d. 50% of home and 50% of Mr Smith’s pension 
e. 50% of the house and 50% pension and maybe 
maintenance for a maximum of 3 years 
f. 50% of the house and 50% of pension and 
maintenance over 3 years 
g. Over 50% of house and any share of pension 
and maintenance until she remarries or enters 
another relationship 
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Appendix D: Focus Group Questionnaire 
 
Section 1: General information about yourself. This will be used for statistical purposes only. 
Please tick the relevant boxes 
 
1) Age:     18 – 24                 25 – 30 
 
     31 – 40       41 - 44 
 
     45 – 54                 55 – 64 
 
     65+        
 
2) Gender:          Male       Female 
3) Relationship Status:  a) Married  
b) Civil Partnered      
 
Did you cohabit before Marriage/Civil Partnership? 
Yes/No 
- If so, for how long? ......... 
-  
OR 
c) Cohabiting    
Do you have a cohabitation agreement or an 
agreement about ownership of the home?    Yes/No 
- If yes, please give details below. 
- If no, have you ever considered one?      Yes/No 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
 
d) Length of time that you and your partner have been living together: ………….. 
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e) Length of time (if relevant) you and your partner have been married:…………. 
 
f) Have you ever lived with any other partner before? Yes/No 
g) Have you ever been married before? Yes/No 
 
4) Employment. 
 
a) Your Status:              Fulltime             Part-Time 
 
                   Casual            Homemaker 
     
        Retired       Student 
  
           Unemployed       Self Employed 
  
                 Other 
 
 
b) Your income bracket        Under £5,000           £5,000 - £10,000 
 
             N/A              £10,000 - £20,000          £20,000 - £30,000            
     
             £30,000 - £40,000         Over £40,000  
  
 
 
c) Your partner’s status:  Fulltime             Part-Time 
 
                   Casual            Homemaker 
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        Retired       Student 
  
           Unemployed       Self Employed 
  
                 Other 
 
d) Your partner’s income bracket 
 
           Under £5,000           £5,000 - £10,000 
 
             N/A             £10,000 - £20,000          £20,000 - £30,000            
     
              £30,000 - £40,000            Over £40,000  
  
 
 
e) Who would you regard to be the main financial earner in your household? 
  
     Me 
 
     About equal 
 
     My Partner 
 
5) THE FAMILY HOME 
What is the status of your family home’s ownership: 
 
Rented    
 
Owned solely by you     
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Always 
my 
partner 
About 
equal 
Usually 
my 
partner 
Usually 
me 
Always 
me 
Always 
my 
partner 
About 
equal 
Usually 
my 
partner 
Usually 
me 
Always 
me 
 
Jointly owned  
 
Owned solely by your partner 
 
Other   Please Expand 
.........................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................. 
 
Do you have a mortgage? Yes/No 
 
Overall, who would you say is mostly responsible for paying the rent/mortgage? Please circle. 
 
 
 
 
6) CHILDREN (If relevant) 
 
a) Number of Children under 18 in the household: …… 
 
 
b) Do you have any children from previous relationships living with you and your partner? 
If yes, how many?................................. 
 
c) Overall, who would you say is mostly responsible for childcare responsibilities? Please 
circle. 
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Always 
my 
partner 
About 
equal 
Usually 
my 
partner 
Usually 
me 
Always 
me 
Always 
my 
partner 
About 
equal 
Usually 
my 
partner 
Usually 
me 
Always 
me 
Always 
my 
partner 
About 
equal 
Usually 
my 
partner 
Usually 
me 
Always 
me 
7) Overall, who would you say is mostly responsible for domestic (not including childcare) 
responsibilities? Please circle. 
 
 
 
 
8) Overall, who would you say is mostly responsible for organising financial payments e.g. bills, 
house expenses? Please circle. 
 
 
 
 
9) Overall, who would you say is mostly responsible for paying financial payments e.g. bills, 
house expenses? Please circle. 
 
 
 
 
 
10) In which ways, if at all, have either you or your partner made lifestyle changes to support 
your partner’s career (e.g. moving location, helping them out at work, taking on more 
childcare responsibilities, paid for training/educational courses...) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Do you have any other comments? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire – your help is much appreciated.   
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Appendix E: Interview Consent Form 
 
GUIDE INFORMATION/CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS 
 
Title of Research Project  
Valuing Domestic Contributions: A Search for a Solution for Family Law  
Details of Project 
My name is Fae Garland and I am currently a PhD student at the University of Exeter, England 
and my research project concerns aspects Family Law. Currently, the family, its forms, and 
traditional family practices are undergoing change in British society and these changes are in 
turn affecting the development of family law, particularly when relationships break down. As 
part of this research, this project investigates options for legal reform on financial provision for 
when married couples, civil partnerships, and unmarried couples split up. In particular, this 
session seeks your opinion of how well you think your legal system values domestic 
contributions, if at all, when considering how to divide the assets  in each of the various forms 
of relationship breakdown.  
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
Fae Garland School of Law Exeter University, Devon UK.  
Tel 00 44 (0) 1392 263240, fsg201@ex.ac.uk  
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone 
else at the University, please contact my PhD supervisor: 
Professor Anne Barlow, a.e.barlow@ex.ac.uk 
Confidentiality 
This interview session will be tape recorded but as set out below, it will only be used 
anonymously in any publication or presentation relating to the project and not for any other 
purpose. Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other 
than for the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them 
(except as may be required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a 
copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please 
give your email below). Your data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act and 
held indefinitely on an anonymous basis. 
 
Anonymity 
Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, 
but we will assign you a first-name pseudonym if we wish to quote your interview.  
 
Consent  
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I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I 
can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewers.  
 
TICK HERE:      DATE…………………………..... 
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
 
Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
Signature: ......................................................................................... 
Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
 
2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each 
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Appendix F: Focus Group Consent Forms 
 
GUIDE INFORMATION/CONSENT FORM FOR FOCUS GROUPS 
 
Title of Research Project  
Valuing Domestic Contributions: A Search for a Solution for Family Law  
Details of Project 
My name is Fae Garland and I am currently a PhD student at the University of Exeter, England 
and my research project concerns aspects of Family Law. Currently, the family, its forms, and 
traditional family practices are undergoing change in British society and these changes are in 
turn affecting the development of family law, particularly when relationships break down. As 
part of this research, this project investigates options for legal reform on financial provision for 
when married couples, civil partnerships, and unmarried couples split up. In particular, this 
focus group session seeks your views on how the law should value and consider ‘homemaker’ 
and ‘breadwinner’ contributions before making a decision on the division of assets.    
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
Fae Garland School of Law Exeter University, Devon UK.  
Tel 00 44 (0) 1392 263240, fsg201@ex.ac.uk  
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone 
else at the University, please contact my PhD supervisor: 
Professor Anne Barlow, a.e.barlow@ex.ac.uk 
 
Confidentiality 
The focus group session will be tape recorded but as set out below, contributions to discussion 
will only be used anonymously in any publication or presentation relating to the project. Focus 
Group tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the 
purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may 
be required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of the 
focus group transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your 
email below). Your data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act and held 
indefinitely on an anonymous basis. 
 
Anonymity 
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Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, 
but we will refer to the group of which you are a member and each member will be given a 
first-name only pseudonym.  
 
Consent  
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I 
can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewers.  
 
TICK HERE:      DATE…………………………..... 
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
 
Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
Signature: ......................................................................................... 
Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
 
2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each 
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Appendix G: Interview Information Sheets 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate. 
 Background to the project: 
I am a PhD student at the University of Exeter, England studying Family Law and this 
project forms part of my thesis. Currently, the family, its forms, and traditional family 
practices are undergoing change in British society and these changes are in turn 
affecting the development of family law, particularly when relationships break down. 
As part of this research, this project investigates options for legal reform on financial 
provision for when married couples, civil partnerships, and unmarried couples split up. 
Therefore, this project looks at how the law should go about taking considerations of 
the domestic and financial arrangements within couples of different styles when it 
decides how to divide assets. 
 What is involved? 
This session will involve an interview which will last around half an hour. It is one of up 
to 12 that shall be carried out in your jurisdiction. You will be asked several questions 
involving some personal information, some information on how the law in your 
jurisdiction values domestic contributions, whether the current law is fair or justified in 
its approach, and the possible ways that the law could and should value and consider 
‘homemaker’ and ‘breadwinner’ contributions before making a decision on the 
division of assets.  
 Any Risks? 
I am unaware of any risks in this project, although it does deal with personal data and 
concern topics that are personal in their nature such as your opinions on your legal 
systems which I hope that you are happy to discuss. However, consent is completely 
voluntary and you may withdraw at any point and do not have to answer any 
questions that cause discomfort. Furthermore, you can have any statements 
withdrawn within 7 days after this session, and can request to review the transcript. 
 Confidentiality: 
This project shall comply with the University of Exeter’s policy regarding anonymity 
and storage of personal data and the procedures used have been approved by the 
Ethics Officer. Therefore, the data collected shall be completely confidential to the 
researcher unless your permission is gained. Additionally, upon signing the consent 
form, all those participating in the focus groups shall be expected to maintain the 
confidentiality of the other participants. Please refer to your consent sheet for further 
information on data storage. 
 It will be possible to request a summary of the findings. 
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Please complete the attached consent sheet and return it to me at the beginning of the 
session. If you have any further queries, then please do not hesitate to contact me on the 
following details. 
Many thanks, 
Fae Garland. 
Tel: 07729 836 470 
Email: fsg201@ex.ac.uk 
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Appendix H: Focus Group Information Sheet 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate. 
 Background to the project: 
I am a PhD student at the University of Exeter, England studying Family Law and this 
project forms part of my thesis. Currently, the family, its forms, and traditional family 
practices are undergoing change in British society and these changes are in turn 
affecting the development of family law, particularly when relationships break down. 
As part of this research, this project investigates options for legal reform on financial 
provision for when married couples, civil partnerships, and unmarried couples split up. 
Therefore, this project looks at how the law should go about taking considerations of 
the domestic and financial arrangements within couples of different styles when it 
decides how to divide assets. 
 What is involved? 
This session will ask you to complete a brief questionnaire to tell me a bit about 
yourselves. After this, you and five to seven others shall come together in a focus 
group to have a general discussion on issues surrounding how domestic contributions, 
whether the current law is fair or justified in its approach, and the possible ways that 
the law could and should value and consider ‘homemaker’ and ‘breadwinner’ 
contributions before making a decision on the division of assets. This will be one of up 
to six groups studied in this project. This session should last about an hour in total. 
 Any Risks? 
I am unaware of any risks in this project, although it does deal with personal data and 
opinions which I hope that you are happy to discuss (in a group scenario). However, 
consent is completely voluntary and you may withdraw at any point and do not have 
to answer any questions that cause discomfort. Furthermore, you can have any 
statements withdrawn within 7 days after this session, and can request to review the 
transcript. 
 Confidentiality: 
This project shall comply with the University of Exeter’s policy regarding anonymity 
and storage of personal data and the procedures used have been approved by the 
Ethics Officer. Therefore, the data collected shall be completely confidential to the 
researcher unless your permission is gained. Additionally, upon signing the consent 
form, all those participating in the focus groups shall be expected to maintain the 
confidentiality of the other participants. Please refer to your consent sheet for further 
information on data storage. 
 It will be possible to request a summary of the findings. 
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Please complete the attached consent sheet and return it to me at the beginning of the 
session. If you have any further queries, then please do not hesitate to contact me on the 
following details. 
Many thanks, 
Fae Garland. 
Tel: 07729 836 470 
Email: fsg201@ex.ac.uk 
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Appendix I: Table Summarising Ruth Deech’s and 
Martha Fineman’s Positions 
 
 
Ruth Deech’s Position Martha Fineman’s Position 
Women are rational, they are as rational as 
men 
Women ARE different – gendered 
The Law should promote autonomy The Law should protect 
No Discretion – Certainty is Key Needs discretion: dependent on it to work out 
how to protect care model 
Domestic contributions should have no value; 
financial contributions and property 
ownership is central. To value them is to 
retard the emancipation of women 
Care, and therefore domestic contributions 
should be central 
The Law should stay out of the private sphere Should protect and recognise the private 
sphere, make sure the carer’s voice is ‘heard’ 
ion the public sphere 
Cohabitants should have no remedy; their 
free choice should be recognised 
Irrelevant of marital status, shouldn’t be 
based on a sexual relationship 
 
Ideally financial agreements, maintenance 
should only apply in extreme circumstances 
and be rehabilitative. 
maintenance to support the care-dyad 
Autonomy: Imposing a solution will 
subordinate, undermine women’s autonomy
  
Autonomy myth! Dependency is inherent, 
thus the Mother/child care-dyad needs 
protecting by state 
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Appendix J: s18 Property (Relationship) Act 1976 (New 
Zealand) 
 
18 Contributions of spouses or partners 
 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a contribution to the marriage, civil union, or de facto 
relationship means all or any of the following: 
o (a) the care of— 
 (i) any child of the marriage, civil union, or de facto relationship: 
 (ii) any aged or infirm relative or dependant of either spouse or 
partner: 
o (b) the management of the household and the performance of household 
duties: 
o (c) the provision of money, including the earning of income, for the purposes 
of the marriage, civil union, or de facto relationship: 
o (d) the acquisition or creation of relationship property, including the payment 
of money for those purposes: 
o (e) the payment of money to maintain or increase the value of— 
 (i) the relationship property or any part of that property; or 
 (ii) the separate property of the other spouse or partner or any part of 
that property: 
o (f) the performance of work or services in respect of— 
 (i) the relationship property or any part of that property; or 
 (ii) the separate property of the other spouse or partner or any part of 
that property: 
o (g) the forgoing of a higher standard of living than would otherwise have been 
available: 
o (h) the giving of assistance or support to the other spouse or partner (whether 
or not of a material kind), including the giving of assistance or support that— 
 (i) enables the other spouse or partner to acquire qualifications; or 
 (ii) aids the other spouse or partner in the carrying on of his or her 
occupation or business. 
(2) There is no presumption that a contribution of a monetary nature (whether under 
subsection (1)(c) or otherwise) is of greater value than a contribution of a non-
monetary nature. 
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Subsection (3) was substituted, as from 6 November 1986, by section 2 Matrimonial 
Property Amendment Act 1986 (1986 No 99). 
Sections 11 to 18, and the headings before sections 11 and 15, were repealed, and a 
new Part 4 (comprising sections 11 to 18C) was inserted, as from 1 February 2002, by 
section 17 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 (2001 No 5). See Part 9 of 
this Act as to the transitional and saving provisions. 
The heading to section 18 was amended, as from 26 April 2005, by section 3(1) 
Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2005 (2005 No 19) by substituting the word 
“partners” for the words “de facto partners”. 
Subsection (1) was amended, as from 26 April 2005, by section 3(2) Property 
(Relationships) Amendment Act 2005 (2005 No 19) by substituting the word “partner” 
for the words “de facto partner” wherever they appear. 
Subsection (1) was amended, as from 26 April 2005, by section 3(4) Property 
(Relationships) Amendment Act 2005 (2005 No 19) by inserting the words “, civil 
union,” after the word “marriage” in the first place where it appears. 
Subsection (1)(a)(i) was substituted, as from 26 April 2005, by section 3(4) Property 
(Relationships) Amendment Act 2005 (2005 No 19). 
Subsection (1)(c) was amended, as from 26 April 2005, by section 3(3) Property 
(Relationships) Amendment Act 2005 (2005 No 19) by inserting the words “, civil 
union,” after the word “marriage”.  
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Appendix K: s2D Property (Relationship) Act 1976 (New 
Zealand) 
 
2D Meaning of de facto relationship 
 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a de facto relationship is a relationship between 2 
persons (whether a man and a woman, or a man and a man, or a woman and a 
woman)— 
o (a) who are both aged 18 years or older; and 
o (b) who live together as a couple; and 
o (c) who are not married to, or in a civil union with, one another. 
(2) In determining whether 2 persons live together as a couple, all the circumstances 
of the relationship are to be taken into account, including any of the following matters 
that are relevant in a particular case: 
o (a) the duration of the relationship: 
o (b) the nature and extent of common residence: 
o (c) whether or not a sexual relationship exists: 
o (d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any 
arrangements for financial support, between the parties: 
o (e) the ownership, use, and acquisition of property: 
o (f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life: 
o (g) the care and support of children: 
o (h) the performance of household duties: 
o (i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. 
(3) In determining whether 2 persons live together as a couple,— 
o (a) no finding in respect of any of the matters stated in subsection (2), or in 
respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as necessary; and 
o (b) a Court is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such 
weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the Court in the 
circumstances of the case. 
(4) For the purposes of this Act, a de facto relationship ends if— 
o (a) the de facto partners cease to live together as a couple; or 
o (b) 1 of the de facto partners dies. 
Compare: Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (New South Wales) s 4(1)-(3) 
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Sections 2A to 2H and the heading preceding section 3 were inserted, as from 1 
February 2002, by section 8 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 (2001 No 
5). See Part 9 of this Act as to the transitional and saving provisions. 
Subsection (1)(c) was amended, as from 26 April 2005, by section 3(4) Property 
(Relationships) Amendment Act 2005 (2005 No 19) by inserting the words “, or in a 
civil union with,” after the words “married to”. 
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Appendix L: s9(1) Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
 
9 Principles to be applied. 
(1)The principles which the court shall apply in deciding what order for financial provision, if 
any, to make are that— 
(a)the net value of the matrimonial property should be shared fairly between the 
parties to the marriage; 
(b) fair account should be taken of any economic advantage derived by either party 
from contributions by the other, and of any economic disadvantage suffered by either 
party in the interests of the other party or of the family; 
(c) any economic burden of caring, after divorce, for a child of the marriage under the 
age of 16 years should be shared fairly between the parties; 
(d)a party who has been dependent to a substantial degree on the financial support of 
the other party should be awarded such financial provision as is reasonable to enable 
him to adjust, over a period of not more than three years from the date of the decree 
of divorce, to the loss of that support on divorce; 
(e)a party who at the time of the divorce seems likely to suffer serious financial 
hardship as a result of the divorce should be awarded such financial provision as is 
reasonable to relieve him of hardship over a reasonable period. 
(2)In subsection (1)(b) above and section 11(2) of this Act— 
 “economic advantage” means advantage gained whether before or during the 
marriage and includes gains in capital, in income and in earning capacity, and 
“economic disadvantage” shall be construed accordingly; 
 “contributions” means contributions made whether before or during the marriage; 
and includes indirect and non-financial contributions and, in particular, any such 
contribution made by looking after the family home or caring for the family. 
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Appendix M: s10(6) Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
 
10 Sharing of value of matrimonial property.  
(6) In subsection (1) above “special circumstances”, without prejudice to the generality of the 
words, may include— 
(a)the terms of any agreement between the parties on the ownership or division of 
any of the matrimonial property; 
(b) the source of the funds or assets used to acquire any of the matrimonial property 
where those funds or assets were not derived from the income or efforts of the parties 
during the marriage; 
(c) any destruction, dissipation or alienation of property by either party; 
(d)the nature of the matrimonial property, the use made of it (including use for 
business purposes or as a matrimonial home) and the extent to which it is reasonable 
to expect it to be realised or divided or used as security; 
(E)the actual or prospective liability for any expenses of valuation or transfer of 
property in connection with the divorce. 
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Appendix N: s11 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
 
11 Factors to be taken into account. 
(1)In applying the principles set out in section 9 of this Act, the following provisions of this 
section shall have effect. 
(2)For the purposes of section 9(1)(b) of this Act, the court shall have regard to the extent to 
which— 
(a) the economic advantages or disadvantages sustained by either party have been 
balanced by the economic advantages or disadvantages sustained by the other party, 
and 
(b) any resulting imbalance has been or will be corrected by a sharing of the value of 
the matrimonial property or otherwise. 
(3)For the purposes of section 9(1) (c) of this Act, the court shall have regard to— 
(a) any decree or arrangement for aliment for the child; 
(b) any expenditure or loss of earning capacity caused by the need to care for the 
child; 
(c) the need to provide suitable accommodation for the child; 
(d) the age and health of the child; 
(e) the educational, financial and other circumstances of the child; 
(f) the availability and cost of suitable child-care facilities or services; 
(g)the needs and resources of the parties; and 
(h)all the other circumstances of the case. 
(4)For the purposes of section 9(1)(d) of this Act, the court shall have regard to— 
(a)the age, health and earning capacity of the party who is claiming the financial 
provision; 
(b)the duration and extent of the dependence of that party prior to divorce; 
(c)any intention of that party to undertake a course of education or training; 
(d)the needs and resources of the parties; and 
(e)all the other circumstances of the case. 
(5)For the purposes of section 9(1)(e) of this Act, the court shall have regard to— 
(a)the age, health and earning capacity of the party who is claiming the financial 
provision; 
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(b)the duration of the marriage; 
(c)the standard of living of the parties during the marriage; 
(d)the needs and resources of the parties; and 
(e)all the other circumstances of the case. 
(6)In having regard under subsections (3) to (5) above to all the other circumstances of the 
case, the court may, if it thinks fit, take account of any support, financial or otherwise, given by 
the party who is to make the financial provision to any person whom he maintains as a 
dependant in his household whether or not he owes an obligation of aliment to that person. 
(7)In applying the principles set out in section 9 of this Act, the court shall not take account of 
the conduct of either party unless— 
(a)the conduct has adversely affected the financial resources which are relevant to the 
decision of the court on a claim for financial provision; or 
(b)in relation to section 9(1)(d) or (e), it would be manifestly inequitable to leave the 
conduct out of account. 
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Appendix O: s79(4) Family Law Act (Cth), (Australia) 
79 Alteration of property interests 
(4)  In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property 
settlement proceedings, the court shall take into account:  
(a)  the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to 
the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or 
improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, 
or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that 
last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the 
property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and  
 (b)  the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by 
or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, 
conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or 
either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, 
whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the 
contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of 
them; and  
(c)  the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family 
constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including 
any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent; and  
(d)  the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the 
marriage; and  
(e)  the matters referred to in subsection 75(2) so far as they are relevant; and 
(f)  any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the marriage or a child of 
the marriage; and  
(g)  any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to 
the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for 
a child of the marriage.   
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Appendix Q: s75(2) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 
(Australia) 
FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 - SECT 75  
Matters to be taken into consideration in relation to spousal maintenance  
(1)  In exercising jurisdiction under section 74, the court shall take into account only the 
matters referred to in subsection (2).  
(2)  The matters to be so taken into account are:  
(a)  the age and state of health of each of the parties; and  
(b)  the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties and the 
physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment; and  
(c)  whether either party has the care or control of a child of the marriage who has not 
attained the age of 18 years; and  
 (d)  commitments of each of the parties that are necessary to enable the party to 
support:  
(i)  himself or herself; and  
(ii)  a child or another person that the party has a duty to maintain; and  
(e)  the responsibilities of either party to support any other person; and  
(f)  subject to subsection (3), the eligibility of either party for a pension, allowance or 
benefit under:  
(i)  any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another 
country; or  
(ii)  any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was 
established, or operates, within or outside Australia;  
 and the rate of any such pension, allowance or benefit being paid to either party; and  
(g)  where the parties have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the 
circumstances is reasonable; and  
(h)  the extent to which the payment of maintenance to the party whose maintenance 
is under consideration would increase the earning capacity of that party by enabling 
that party to undertake a course of education or training or to establish himself or 
herself in a business or otherwise to obtain an adequate income; and  
(ha)  the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to recover 
the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant; and  
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(j)  the extent to which the party whose maintenance is under consideration has 
contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the 
other party; and  
(k)  the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning 
capacity of the party whose maintenance is under consideration; and  
(l)  the need to protect a party who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent; 
and  
(m)  if either party is cohabiting with another person--the financial circumstances 
relating to the cohabitation; and  
(n)  the terms of any order made or proposed to be made under section 79 in relation 
to:  
(i)  the property of the parties; or  
(ii)  vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party; and  
(naa)  the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under 
Part VIIIAB in relation to:  
(i)  a party to the marriage; or  
(ii)  a person who is a party to a de facto relationship with a party to the 
marriage; or  
(iii)  the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person 
covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or  
 (iv)  vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by 
subparagraph (i) or (ii); and  
(na)  any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to 
the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for 
a child of the marriage; and  
(o)  any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case 
requires to be taken into account; and  
(p)   the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on the parties to the 
marriage; and  
(q)  the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on a party to the 
marriage.  
(3)  In exercising its jurisdiction under section 74, a court shall disregard any entitlement of the 
party whose maintenance is under consideration to an income tested pension, allowance or 
benefit.  
(4)  In this section:  
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"party" means a party to the marriage concerned.  
  
373 
 
  
374 
 
Appendix R: S4AA Family Law Act 1975(Cth), (Australia) 
 
S4AA Meaning of de facto relationship  
(1)  A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:  
(a)  the persons are not legally married to each other; and  
(b)  the persons are not related by family (see subsection (6)); and  
(c)  having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a 
relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.  
Paragraph (c) has effect subject to subsection (5).  
Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple  
(2)  Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:  
(a)  the duration of the relationship;  
(b)  the nature and extent of their common residence;  
(c)  whether a sexual relationship exists;  
(d)  the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for 
financial support, between them;  
(e)  the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;  
(f)  the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;  
(g)  whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or 
Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;  
(h)  the care and support of children;  
(i)  the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.  
(3)  No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in 
deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.  
(4)  A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to 
such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court 
in the circumstances of the case.  
(5)  For the purposes of this Act:  
(a)  a de facto relationship can exist between 2 persons of different sexes and between 
2 persons of the same sex; and  
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(b)  a de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to 
someone else or in another de facto relationship.  
When 2 persons are related by family  
(6)  For the purposes of subsection (1), 2 persons are related by family if:  
(a)  one is the child (including an adopted child) of the other; or  
(b)  one is another descendant of the other (even if the relationship between them is 
traced through an adoptive parent); or  
(c)  they have a parent in common (who may be an adoptive parent of either or both 
of them).  
For this purpose, disregard whether an adoption is declared void or has ceased to have effect.  
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Appendix S: s25 Part II Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
(England and Wales) 
 
25 Matters to which court is to have regard in deciding how to exercise its powers 
(2)As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24 
above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the 
following matters— 
(a)the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of 
the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including 
in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the 
opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to 
acquire; 
(b)the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the 
marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(c)the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; 
(d)the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; 
(e)any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; 
(f)the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable 
future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after 
the home or caring for the family; 
(g)the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the 
opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; 
(h)in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the 
parties to the marriage of any benefit. . . which, by reason of the dissolution or 
annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. 
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Appendix T: Schedule 1, Children Act 1989 (England and 
Wales) 
 
4 Matters to which court is to have regard in making orders for financial relief 
4(1)In deciding whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 1 or 2, and if so in what 
manner, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances including— 
(a)the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each 
person mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) has or is likely to have in the foreseeable 
future; 
(b)the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each person mentioned in 
sub-paragraph (4) has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(c)the financial needs of the child; 
(d)the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the 
child; 
(e)any physical or mental disability of the child; 
(f)the manner in which the child was being, or was expected to be, educated or 
trained. 
(2)In deciding whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 1 against a person who is not 
the mother or father of the child, and if so in what manner, the court shall in addition have 
regard to— 
(a)whether that person had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the child 
and, if so, the extent to which and basis on which he assumed that responsibility and 
the length of the period during which he met that responsibility; 
(b)whether he did so knowing that the child was not his child; 
(c)the liability of any other person to maintain the child. 
(3)Where the court makes an order under paragraph 1 against a person who is not the father 
of the child, it shall record in the order that the order is made on the basis that the person 
against whom the order is made is not the child’s father. 
(4)The persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) are— 
(a)in relation to a decision whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 1, any 
parent of the child; 
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(b)in relation to a decision whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 2, the 
mother and father of the child; 
(c)the applicant for the order; 
(d)any other person in whose favour the court proposes to make the order. 
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Appendix U: s64(2) Family Proceedings Act 1980 
 
64 Maintenance after marriage or civil union dissolved or de facto relationship ends 
(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are as follows: 
(a) the ability of the spouses, civil union partners, or de facto partners to become self-
supporting, having regard to— 
(i) the effects of the division of functions within the marriage or civil union or 
de facto relationship while the spouses, civil union partners, or de facto 
partners lived together: 
(ii) the likely earning capacity of each spouse, civil union partner, or de facto 
partner: 
(iii) any other relevant circumstances: 
(b) the responsibilities of each spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner for the 
ongoing daily care of any minor or dependent children of the marriage or civil union or 
(as the case requires) any minor or dependent children of the de facto relationship 
after the dissolution of the marriage or civil union or (as the case requires) the de facto 
partners ceased to live together: 
(c) the standard of living of the spouses, civil union partners, or de facto partners while 
they lived together: 
(d) the undertaking by a spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner of a 
reasonable period of education or training designed to increase the earning capacity of 
that spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner or to reduce or eliminate the need 
of that spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner for maintenance from the other 
spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner if it would be unfair, in all the 
circumstances, for the reasonable needs of the spouse, civil union partner, or de facto 
partner undertaking that education or training to be met immediately by that spouse, 
civil union partner, or de facto partner— 
(i) because of the effects of any of the matters set out in paragraphs (a)(i) and 
(b) on the potential earning capacity of that spouse, civil union partner, or de 
facto partner; or 
(ii) because that spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner has previously 
maintained or contributed to the maintenance of the other spouse, civil union 
partner, or de facto partner during a period of education or training. 
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Appendix V: Ethical Approval Form 
   
Appendix V: Ethical Consent Form 
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Appendix V: Comparative Table On The Cohabitation 
Regimes Within Australia 
This table demonstrates the core similarities and differences between the marital regime, the 
new Federal cohabitation regime, and Queensland’s State regime.1256 
 
                                                          
1256 F Willis and D Morzone, ‘The New De Facto Legislation’ (2009) 37 The Journal of the Bar Association of Queensland 
<http://www.hearsay.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=580&Itemid=45> accessed 16/12/2011 
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